Ontological relativism

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In philosophy, the term “ relativism ” primarily describes a type of position on the question of what makes beliefs (or statements) about a topic true. “Relativistic” positions in this sense mean: The truth of the convictions in the relevant subject area is relative to other things, for example to subjects, places in space and time, conceptual schemes or the like. In negative terms, this means: There are no absolute , objective truths (which in principle apply to all subjects) or facts or circumstances (which exist objectively) in this subject area .

This is not an answer to the epistemological question of whether and how the truths in question can figure out , but to the ontological question of whether it here at all truths are (ie: yes), and in what sense they are actually (consist namely relative to others ). However, relativistic positions often have epistemological implications.

The term “ontological anti-realism ” often means a more far-reaching position, according to which there is (in the respective area) no truth, no reality and no facts. However, some variants of relativism come down to anti-realism and "anti-realism" is sometimes used in the sense of ontological relativism.

The term “relativism” is also used to denote a number of other theoretical positions that do not directly concern the status or content and reference of beliefs (or statements). Semantic relativism should be mentioned here in particular (see also: relativism ).

Features of ontological relativism

Truth despite contradiction

Relativists claim that the truth of certain beliefs (or statements) is relative, for example, to subjects. B. is true for certain subjects, can be false here (i.e. in the subject area under discussion) for others (possibly also at the same point in time, etc.). Therefore, apparently contradicting statements can also be true , for example for different subjects. "To be true for someone" does not mean the truism that different people have different opinions , but rather: Only with mentioning of (the same) information content and what relativity insists on here (a certain subject, for example) is from here at all Speaking truth.

Relativism vs. absolutism

The opposite position to relativism is often called "absolutism" regarding truth, reality and facts. In its simplest form, absolutism says that a belief with a certain content is simply either true or false.

Many absolutists also admit vagueness problems: suppose, for example, it is about the conviction that it rained at so much time in Potsdam . Is the conviction also true if it only rained in the northern half of Potsdam? One possible treatment is to simply deny such beliefs truth-valency: they could be neither true nor false. Because, according to one of the possible arguments for such positions, truth requires precise truth conditions , for which the content is simply too vague. This variant of absolutism is also a counterposition to relativism, according to which a belief can be both true and false.

Multiple realities

One can also formulate some relativistic positions according to which the truth of certain convictions varies according to subject and point in time, as I said before: There is not one reality in the relevant subject area , but several.

Some relativists take the view that every subject lives in its own reality. Others claim that certain groups (the members of "a" culture, for example) could each share a reality. And still others are of the opinion that the reality of different individual subjects or groups certainly overlap, but do not completely coincide.

In this formulation, too, one can easily confuse relativism with one or the other truism. The point is not that different subjects live in different material or social environments - in different niches within the one reality. The point is also not that one reality gives each subject very different experiences that no other subject otherwise has. And ultimately it is not about the fact that one reality is infinitely multifaceted and can therefore be viewed from the most varied of perspectives. The claim is that there is no such thing as one reality.

Relativism vs. realism

Relativistic positions do not in and of themselves contradict ontological realism . Ontological realism says: Reality is independent of beliefs (wishes, thoughts, ideas, etc.). What the facts are does not depend on what anyone thinks they are .

Virtually all ontological realists are also absolutists. The realism is therefore formulated by default for “the one reality”. However, that is not the essence of realism. The core is the thesis of independence.

The relativistic position initially only says that there is more than one reality. In and of itself, that does not mean that these multiple realities depend on any beliefs.

Ontological anti-realism

The most popular form of relativism is the assertion that different subjects (or groups of subjects) live in different realities precisely because they have different convictions (or through them). The different realities are to a certain extent fabricated by convictions. (This position is also called constructivism .) Or these realities are simply beliefs. (The latter is a variant of idealism , according to which the world is made up of ideas.)

Both positions are variants of ontological anti-realism. According to them, there is no such thing as a reality independent of beliefs (in the subject area).

Error and ignorance

The simplest variant of ontological anti-realism says: Beliefs in the subject area in question become true for a subject at a point in time simply because this subject has this belief at that point in time (it represents, considers its content to be true).

Thus, there is in the relevant subject area no error and no ignorance . There are just all sorts of different opinions, each as good as the other.

Some advocates of such positions put it this way: “ All beliefs on the subject are true.” However, most prefer to say: “ Nothing is true here. There is no truth on this subject. ”Where there is no such thing as error and ignorance, marking certain beliefs as true no longer makes any sense.

Where no independent of beliefs actually exist, it, however, gives no sense more to say something like: "What I once thought on the subject earlier, was nonsense (it was at that time already nonsense, which I then just do not understand ) ", Or:" Nobody knows what is about to happen on this topic (something is going to happen, but we have no idea what it could be.) "

Other variants of ontological anti-realism admit that error and ignorance are possible. Such a position reads, for example: What is true for certain subjects at certain points in time depends on the beliefs of certain other subjects - for example the beliefs of the authorities responsible for them, such as scientists, priests, chiefs, etc. According to this position only these authorities are not mistaken. Everyone else can still be wrong - their beliefs may not match those of the authorities.

According to such positions, at least for the non-authorities there is a kind of independent reality - their reality is not fabricated by their own convictions or does not consist of them. But they are still anti-realistic. The postulated realities are still dependent on other convictions.

Yet another variant of ontological anti-realism invokes the ideas of logical consistency and logical implication . Some of the beliefs of a subject (or group) may accordingly be so far wrong when she said Gros contradict other beliefs this subject (or this group). The possibility of ignorance then consists in the fact that the truth of further convictions can follow from the majority of the consistent convictions, but the subject (or the group) in question has actually failed to draw the corresponding conclusions.

It should be noted that, according to this position, which beliefs are actually compatible and what actually follows from them must be independent of what the respective subjects themselves consider to be consistent or implied.

Ontological anti-realism vs. Fallibilism, skepticism, nihilism, epistemological anti-realism and pragmatism

Many epistemological positions presuppose ontological realism. This includes in particular epistemological realism (“It is possible to find out the truth”), but also, for example, fallibilism (“We can never be sure whether we have found out the truth”), skepticism (“There is always reason to doubt whether our beliefs correspond to reality ”) and nihilism (“ none of our beliefs correspond to reality ”).

Because ontological anti-realism contradicts ontological realism, it is incompatible with these epistemological positions.

In the popular discussion, however, it is sometimes derived from one of the latter three positions. That is, it is argued: If we can never be certain about a certain topic (fallibilism), then there is no truth on this topic (anti-realism). Or: If there is always doubt about the truth of our beliefs on the subject (skepticism), then there is no truth here (anti-realism). Or: If none of what we believe on the subject is true (nihilism), then there is no truth here (anti-realism).

Often ontological anti-realism is confused with epistemological anti-realism (“There are truths independent of beliefs, but we cannot find them out”) or with pragmatism (“We shouldn't judge beliefs according to whether they are true but whether they are useful ”).

Ontological relativism with regard to different subject areas

aesthetics

A relativistic position in aesthetics could, for example, be as follows: The statement: “Sushi are delicious” can now be true for Hans, but false for Fritz.

This position would contradict aesthetic absolutism, which says: sushi is either delicious or not, and if Hans and Fritz disagree about it, then one of them is wrong - he may not have the skills to recognize the deliciousness or the badness of sushi .

Aesthetic relativism also contradicts expressivism, which says: The way we usually formulate aesthetic judgments, it looks as if they were apodictic judgments (“Sushi are delicious” looks like “Sushi are Japanese”). In reality, however, they are only an expression of individual preferences. When Hans claims: “Sushi are delicious”, he actually means that sushi is delicious for him (Hans) - that he likes it. On the other hand, when Fritz says: "Sushi are not delicious", he means that he (Fritz) does not like them. These two beliefs do not contradict each other.

Expressivism goes hand in hand with an anti-realism in terms of apodictic aesthetic judgments: there are no facts such that sushi is tasty or bad. There are only facts such that certain subjects either like or dislike the taste experiences that sushi prepares for them.

ethics

A relativistic position in ethics would be, for example, this: “The American invasion of Iraq was unjust”, may be true for Hans, but false for Fritz.

This position contradicts ethical absolutism (“Ethical judgments are either true or false”) and ethical expressivism (“Ethical judgments look like apodictic judgments, but actually only express subjective sensitivities”). The latter position is also called emotivism .

logic

For logic , too , a relativistic position seems conceivable or at least formulated: for Hans it is true that p ↔ p (every statement implies itself), for Fritz it is not true that p ↔ p.

Content of texts and mental states

Relativistic positions regarding the content of texts (literary works) or mental states (perceptual impressions, sensations, beliefs, thoughts, emotions, wishes, intentions, etc.) are also widespread.

The thesis here is that contradicting interpretations of a text or the sensitivities of a subject can apply (be true) at the same time. It may therefore be true, for example, that the character in the novel is portrayed as a role model, and that this character is portrayed in the same novel (in the same passages with the same words) as a deterrent example. And it can be true that Hans never wants to see Fritz again and that Hans longs for Fritz.

There are at least two variants of the absolutist opposite position (which can, however, also be combined). The first variant says that there can only be contradictions in the contents of the texts to be interpreted or in the contents of the mental states of the subjects to be interpreted, but not in the respectively applicable interpretations. So it is the novel that makes contradicting statements about the character. The interpretative statement: "The novel depicts the character in a contradictory way, both as a role model and as a deterrent example", is not itself contradicting itself. Accordingly, it is Hans who has contradicting attitudes towards Fritz. But the interpretative statement: "Hans never wants to see Fritz again and at the same time want to see him again" is not itself contradicting itself.

The second variant is aspect realism : interpretations always only highlight individual aspects of the content of a text or the sensitivities of a subject. On the surface, it can easily appear that equally accurate interpretations contradict one another. However, if they actually apply at the same time, they do not contradict each other. This becomes clear when it is formulated more clearly: In the novel, the character is portrayed as a role model in certain respects (the novel attributes virtues to her that everyone would like to have), but in other respects she is portrayed as a daunting example (the novel makes it clear that nobody really wants to be like this figure). Hans has these and the reasons for never wanting to see Fritz again (Fritz insulted him), but at the same time he also has other reasons for missing him (Fritz always told good jokes).

Relativism regarding the content of texts and thoughts must be distinguished from the thesis of the indetermination of meaning . The latter says: texts and mental states have no clear content at all . Every interpretation necessarily puts more into the texts or mental states than is actually contained in them. This position can be combined with aspect realism . The thesis then reads: On the one hand, interpretations always only capture certain aspects of the content and , on the other hand, they always add something to it.

Characters and events in fictional worlds

Anti-realistic positions are adopted in philosophy by default for characters and events in fictional worlds (the worlds in which Sherlock Holmes and Harry Potter act): different authors can tell logically incompatible versions of the same story without being able to say which one is true and the other is false.

The simplest variant of such a position is: The facts in a fictional world depend solely on (are fabricated by or consist of ) what the respective author of the respective (version of) story says or believes about it. The author is therefore the authority on this fictional world and can neither be ignorant nor in error about it. What others believe about this world is true if and only if it is in accordance with the statements or beliefs of the author.

Other variants of such positions admit that even the author may be ignorant and in error about at least some aspects of the fictional world he has created. His description of the characters and events in the fictional world he created could, for example, logically imply that certain other events must have happened in it that the author himself never thought of. Correspondingly, it could also be that his statements or beliefs show logical or dramaturgical inconsistencies , so that one would like to say: The author is telling or thinking the story (his own story, which he has come up, mind you!) Is not quite correctly.

swell

  1. ↑ Putnam, H. (1988): Representation and Reality , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, argues in a similar direction .
  2. ^ See: Boghossian, P. (2006). Fear of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  3. ↑ Harré, R. (1986). Varieties of Realism. Oxford: Blackwell.
  4. ↑ E.g. Margolis, J. (1991). The Truth about Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell.
  5. ↑ E.g. Harré, R., & Krausz, M. (1996). Varieties of Relativism. Oxford: Blackwell.
  6. ↑ Quine, WVO (1960). Word and Object. MIT Press

literature

  • Baghramian, Maria (ed.): Relativism , New York, NY [u. a.]: Routledge, 2004
  • International journal of philosophical studies 12.3. Special Issue on Relativism, 244-374, 2004
  • Nozick, Robert: Invariances: the structure of the objective world , Cambridge, Mass. : Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2001, ISBN 0-674-00631-3
  • Quine, Willard van Orman: Ontologische Relativitaet und Andere Schriften , Stuttgart: Reclam, 1975, ISBN 3-15-029804-0 (partly translated by Quine, WVO: Ontological Relativity and Other Essays . NY: Columbia University Press 1969 )

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