Action theory (criminal law)

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The doctrines of action justify the reprehensibility of the action and the justification for the criminal liability of the behavior in criminal law .

The social doctrine of action has meanwhile largely established itself in criminal law because it includes the previous teachings (in particular the causal and final doctrine of action) and includes all conceivable cases (especially also acting through omission). Even if no theory of action can explain the term action conclusively and generally valid today, the case law has been able to agree on a theory of action. With the transfer of the intentional criteria to the facts of the case by the final action theory, however, the causal action theory is hardly represented.

The prerequisite is the action of a natural person , so that events caused by animals, forces of nature or the like. are caused, generally do not fulfill the concept of action. Behavior that is caused in a state of unconsciousness or that is caused by reflexes is also not to be subsumed under the concept of action. However, affects and automatisms must be distinguished from this. Another case of "non- action " is an act coerced by irresistible force .

The criminal liability of legal persons is discussed in corporate criminal law .

Final action theory

According to the final doctrine of action, an action is defined as will-based , consciously directed (purpose-oriented) human behavior. In connection with the final theory of action (established primarily by Hans Welzel ), modern criminal law has developed an objective and subjectively shaped concept of action. Thus were used spout supporting elements parts of the offense (so-called. Subjective facts) and were not over as after the causal action doctrine guilt elements considered.

The final doctrine of action shows deficits in the justification of negligence offenses and in relation to (unconscious) omission offenses , because there is no behavior directed towards the actualization of the facts and thus no actions in the sense of the final doctrine.

Causal theory of action

The causal doctrine of action (founded by Franz von Liszt ) sees the action as such when the outside world is changed by voluntary human behavior. According to this, action is any arbitrary human behavior. In its original form, this teaching counted everything objective to be injustice, but everything subjective to be guilty. In contrast to the final doctrine of action, the intent-bearing elements must be checked in the context of guilt. This then leads to the injustice no longer being limited by the motives of the agent. The scope of acts giving rise to wrongdoing is thereby greatly expanded, and criminal liability can then only be limited when the question of individual guilt is concerned.

Negative action theory

The negative doctrine of action defines the concept of action as an unlawful violation of the obligation to avoid legally disapproving consequences ( avoidable non-avoidance in guarantor position [Herzberg]). On the other hand, the objection is that a differentiation between omission and activity offenses is not made. Incidentally, the attribution of success consumes the avoidability of the consequences.

Personal action theory

The personal doctrine of action regards every expression of human personality as an action. The personal theory of action is criticized as being too undifferentiated and lacking in outline.

Social Action Doctrine

According to the social theory of action, an action is defined as will-based and socially relevant human behavior. The social theory of action has developed from the final theory of action.

The social doctrine of action is criticized in that it is always owed an evaluative consideration. The behavior cannot be evaluated without a recursion to the specific facts.

See also

Web links

literature

  • Georg Küpper , Limits of Normative Criminal Law Doctrine, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1990, ISBN 3-428-07018-6
  • Heribert Schumann, Criminal Law Injustice and the Principle of Self-Responsibility of Others, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1986, ISBN 3-16-645105-6
  • Isabel Vossgätter called Niermann, The social doctrines of action and their relationship to the doctrine of objective attribution, Peter Lang Verlag, 2004, ISBN 3-631-52323-8
  • Hans Welzel , On the final theory of action - a discussion with its critics, Mohr, Tübingen 1949
  • Hall, Karl Alfred, negligence in intent, Marburg 1959 (Marburg legal and academic treatises, NG Elwert Verlag Marburg)