Subsidy Code

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The subsidies code 1979 is as part of the so-called Tokyo round, one of the inch rounds regularly hosts the GATT (= General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; German : General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ) negotiated supplementary agreement. This is fully entitled "Convention on the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade".

The Subsidy Code contains an example list for export subsidies in the appendix . With the help of these criteria, it is by and large possible to distinguish the concept of subsidy from other non-tariff trade barriers (e.g. dumping ).

Invalid subsidies

In principle, it is not the aim of the Subsidies Code to restrict production subsidies. Art. 11 of the Subsidies Code only stipulates that subsidies should not damage the interests of another signatory state and that advantages that a signatory state derives from the Subsidy Code may not be nullified or diminished. However, the export subsidy is the subject of comprehensive regulations in the Subsidy Code. A distinction is made between export subsidies for raw materials, i.e. H. Agricultural, forestry and fishery products on the one hand and export subsidies for processed and mineral products on the other.

Export subsidies for raw materials

While according to Art. XVI Para. 3 GATT the contracting parties should endeavor to avoid subsidies for the export of basic materials, Art. X Para. 1 of the Subsidy Code obliges the signatory states not to grant export subsidies for basic materials in a way that the subsidizing State receives more than an appropriate share of world trade in the products concerned. For this vague legal term, Article X, Paragraph 1, Clause 2 and Paragraph 2 of the Subsidy Code set out several criteria.

Article 10 (3) of the Subsidy Code obliges the signatory states not to grant any export subsidies for raw materials on a market if these subsidies result in significantly lower prices compared to those of other suppliers on the same market (so-called "double price mechanism").

Export subsidies for processed and mineral products

These export subsidies are prohibited by the Subsidies Code. Art. IX, Paragraph 1 states that "no export subsidies may be granted for goods other than certain basic materials". Crucial deviations from the previously applicable regulation of Art. XVI GATT are that, on the one hand, mineral products are no longer classified as "raw materials" and that the "double price clause" (see above) of Art. XVI, Paragraph 4 of GATT has been abolished. In any case, this was hardly feasible because of causality problems when determining a "double price" based on export subsidies.

Defense against illegal subsidies

Transparency in subsidy practices

The purpose of the Subsidy Code is not only to specify permissible subsidies. Rather, a major concern is to fend off illegal subsidies more effectively than before. The greatest possible transparency when granting subsidies is seen as an important prerequisite. For this, Art. 7 Para. 3 Subsidies Code is relevant, according to which the signatory states may inform each other if a signatory state has violated the notification obligation of Art. XVI Para. 1 GATT. If the state concerned does not notify its subsidy practices within a very short period of time, these can be submitted by any signatory state to the Committee of the Subsidies Code.

Identification of " significant injury"

The requirement of Art. VI, Para. 6 a) GATT, that the initiation of anti-subsidy measures not only requires damage (to the importing state of subsidized products) as such, but that the damage must be of a significant extent, has been met by the contracting parties to GATT largely neglected. The subsidy code provides an effective remedy here. For the first time, it contains internationally binding damage rules that are also generally accepted. The definition of the term "damage" in the Subsidies Code corresponds to that in Art. VI, Paragraph 6 a) GATT. Furthermore, Art. 2 Subsidies Code requires the prior examination of the damage by an investigating authority specially set up by the importing state. The importing state in question may only levy countervailing duties to ward off the subsidies if it comes to the conclusion that there is significant injury.

The causality requirement

The investigating authority is not only responsible for determining the existence of material injury, but also examining and, if necessary, proving whether or that there is a causal link between the subsidies supporting the imports and the injury. The signatory states agreed on the formula that for the assumption of "significant injury" only "causation" through the subsidized imports had to be demanded. This new causality formula had shortly before been accepted by the contracting parties as part of the anti-dumping code. According to the Subsidy Code 'as well as the Anti-Dumping Code', it is no longer permissible to attribute other factors that simultaneously damage the relevant branch of industry or damage caused by other factors to the subsidized imports (Art. 6 No. 4) .

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Additional protocol to the Geneva Protocol of 1979 to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
  2. ↑ Dietrich Scheffler: Legal aspects of the subsidy problem in the GATT. In: Law of the International Economy. 1993, p. 404.
  3. ↑ P. Reszel: The determination of the injury in the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law of the European Communities. Dissertation, Osnabrück 1986. Heymann, Cologne / Berlin / Bonn / Munich 1987, ISBN 3-452-20750-1 , p. 92.
  4. ↑ Art. 3 Para. 4 of the Anti-Dumping Code of 1979.

literature

  • JH Jackson: Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, Materials and Texts. St. Paul, Minn. 1977.
  • V. Kelkar: GATT, Export Subsidies and Developing Countries. In: Journal of world trade law. 1980.
  • P. Low: The Definition of "Export Subsidies" in GATT. In: Journal of world trade law. 1982.