Anti-subsidy measures

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Anti-subsidy measures are activities based on international agreements to ward off (inadmissible) subsidies .

According to the experiences made with subsidies, especially export subsidies , the opinion of economics is unanimous that such support measures are only useful in rare exceptional cases. For this reason, at the beginning of the so-called Tokyo Round, which was concluded in 1979, the need to create effective regulations, in particular against subsidies (and other non-tariff trade barriers), was recognized.

Principle tariffs only

This principle, which is standardized in Art. XI, Paragraph 1 of the GATT (= General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ; German : General Customs and Trade Agreement ), is not yet actually anti-subsidy measures. However, this is already based on the knowledge that non-tariff trade barriers, including subsidies, are very difficult to control in practice. The contracting parties have therefore committed themselves in the regulation mentioned to only use customs duties for trade control.

Unfortunately, the tariffs only requirement is only a principle against which a variety of exceptions are permissible.

Legal basis of Art. VI GATT

This provision includes the possible countermeasures both against dumping and against (inadmissible) subsidies. In accordance with Art. VI, Paragraph 3 of the GATT, anti-dumping duties are used against dumping if the price difference is a result of private law.

For countermeasures against subsidies (or premiums), Art. VI Para. 3 GATT is also relevant. This provision provides for countervailing duties, i. H. Special duties that are levied "in order to render ineffective any premium or subsidy granted directly or indirectly for the manufacture, extraction or export of a commodity", according to sentence 2 of the aforementioned standard.

Requirements for anti-subsidy measures

In order for an importing state to be able to impose countervailing duties on the foreign state producing the subsidized imported goods, the following conditions must be met in the state importing the subsidized goods in accordance with Art. VI, Paragraph 6 a) GATT: The foreign subsidy means that a) an existing branch of industry must be significant be harmed or b) threatened with harm, or c) the establishment of an economic sector must be significantly delayed.

The exporter's discriminatory economic policy as such is therefore not sufficient to justify countervailing tariffs in the importing country. Rather, there must also be "damage" corresponding to the aforementioned requirements in the importing country itself or in a third country which also exports the goods in question to the importing country. Certain problems arise not only with the interpretation of the term "damage", but also with regard to the causality requirement. After all, Art. VI, Para. 6 a) GATT does not speak of "damage" in general, but expressly states that countervailing duties to ward off foreign subsidies may only be imposed if the subsidization has resulted in "significant damage" to a domestic branch of the economy .

Defense against subsidies in the EU

Legal bases

For the area of ​​the EU (then the EC), protective regulations have existed since 1968 against "practices of dumping, premiums or subsidies from countries that do not belong to the EEC . This is essentially VO (EEC) 459/68 of April 5, 1968.

In contrast to the explained rules of the GATT regarding countermeasures against subsidies, according to the prevailing view in Europe, subsidies are understood to mean only state grants or grants made from state resources. Furthermore, according to European legal opinion, only "measures which distort competition" are regarded as relevant under subsidy law, which give the manufacturers of the subsidized goods an unfair price or competitive advantage.

The anti-subsidy measures of Regulation (EEC) No. 3017/79 and Recommendation No. 3018/79 ECSC presuppose "significant damage" on the one hand. On the other hand, the anti-subsidy measures can be imposed independently by the importing country itself. However, the Community institutions are only obliged to levy countervailing duties if the interests of the Community have been violated. Ratio legis is the public interest protection against damage through subsidies that distort competition.

"Injury" and Causality

After the Community had left the damage requirement open in the original version of Regulation (EEC) No. 459/68, with regard to the term "damage" it now follows the regulation in Art. VI, Paragraph 6 a) GATT, which governs approval of defense measures requires a "significant" damage. As far as the requirement of causality between damage and subsidy is concerned, on the one hand the subsidy in question does not need to be the main cause of the damage, but on the other hand - after deducting all other factors that may have contributed to the damage - it must still be considered causal in itself can be assessed as "significant" damage before intervention under EU law is possible. With regard to the constituent element "significant damage", however, a certain amount of leeway is allowed.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Dietrich Scheffler: Legal aspects of the subsidy problem in GATT , in: Law of the International Economy (RIW) , 1993, p. 403.
  2. ↑ Basically: RE Baldwin: Nontariff Distortions of International Trade , Washington DC 1970; also: L. Quambusch: Non-tariff trade barriers; a contribution to their systematization, application and elimination , Cologne, Institute for Economic Policy at the University of Cologne, 1976, each passim
  3. ↑ See on this: P. Bratschi: General Customs and Trade Agreement (GATT) , Zurich 1973, p. 37.
  4. ↑ See Art. VI, Paragraph 6 b) GATT.
  5. ↑ a b For more information on the requirement for damage as a prerequisite for the levying of countervailing duties : P. Reszel: The determination of damage in the anti-dumping and anti-subsidy law of the European Communities , Diss. (Osnabrück), Cologne, Berlin, Bonn, Munich, 1987, p. 29 ff.
  6. ↑ OJ L 93, 1968, p. 1 ff.
  7. ↑ J.-F. Beseler: Defense against dumping and subsidies by the European Communities , Baden-Baden 1980, p. 41
  8. ↑ H. Laubereau: Anti-dumping and equalization tariffs , in: Regul (Ed.): Taxes and tariffs in the common market , Baden-Baden, delivery December 1978, p. 6.
  9. ^ EA Kramer: Competition as a Protected Object of Anti-Dumping Law , RIW / AWD 1975, p. 121 ff.
  10. ↑ J.-F. Beseler: Defense against dumping and subsidies by the European Communities , Baden-Baden 1980, pp. 93, 99.

literature

  • JH Jackson: Legal Problems of International Economic Relations, Cases, Materials and texts , St. Paul, Minnesota 1977
  • V. Kelkar: GATT, Export Subsidies and Developing Countries , JWTL 1980
  • C. Eiselstein: The European Community in the World Economic System , Diss. (Tübingen), Berlin 1987