Theoretical monism
Theoretical monism is the opposite of theoretical pluralism in the theory of science ; according to this, only a single theory (or at most a set of logically consistent theories) for a particular area of knowledge can appear as true and certain knowledge.
Since Certism, in contrast to Fallibilism , seeks to find an absolutely secure basis for the ultimate justification for the logical derivation of all theoretical truths, there can only be one theory for it. What is inconsistent with this cannot help but be wrong.
The foundation of knowledge should have a guarantee of truth, such as produced by positivism in recourse to the “solid basis” of the given sense data. In addition, there is the demand for invariance or stability of the knowledge base. Examples are the methodological views of Descartes , Hugo Dingler or Moritz Schlick .
Associated with this is an economy or economy principle when introducing new elements of knowledge. However, if a new element is introduced, old contradicting parts of the theory must be eliminated.
swell
- ↑ Helmut F. Spinner: Pluralism as a model of knowledge. Frankfurt 1974. p. 36 ff.
- ↑ Helmut F. Spinner: Justification, Criticism and Rationality. Vol. I. Vieweg Braunschweig 1977. ISBN 3-528-08376-X . P. 208f
literature
- Hugo Dingler, (Ed. Paul Lorenzen): Structure of the exact fundamental science. Munich 1964.