Theoretical pluralism

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Theory pluralism or theoretical pluralism is in the philosophy of science , the methodology , which in science demands a variety of theoretical alternatives to promote through their mutual critical examination of the progress of knowledge. In contrast to this is the theoretical monism , which is usually only represented implicitly.

Theory pluralism was developed by Paul Feyerabend in connection with his critique of empiricism. Hans Albert and Helmut Spinner connected it to the epistemological position of fallibilism . On the other hand, theoretical monism is often linked with the methodological position of certism or the demand for a final justification of the theoretical statements asserted.

With analogous epistemological arguments, in addition to pluralism of theories, pluralism of methods can also be demanded. Examples of this are Karl Popper's methodological pluralism ( logic of research ) or Paul Feyerabend's method anarchism ( against the pressure to use methods and knowledge for free people ).

According to Karl Popper, Thales broke with the dogmatic tradition, which only allows one school opinion, and founded the critical tradition, which allowed a variety of doctrines, all of which try to approach the truth through critical discussion.

Theory pluralism as a methodology

"Theory pluralism" does not just want to disparagingly describe the chaotic or "crisis" state, as it can be found more or less permanently in certain scientific disciplines. Rather, "pluralism of theories" as a methodology calls for a comparative critique in the first place, to seek or reinvent as many useful alternatives as possible for each scientific hypothesis or theory to be tested. The excellent method of organizing the progress of knowledge accordingly is given in the comparison of theories .

Theory pluralism is based on the epistemological basic insight that empirical facts are only observed in the light of theories or in the form of general terms (which themselves represent, as it were, undeveloped theories) and that their conceptual understanding is relevant for cognition. "One finds prejudices through contrast and not through analysis."

There are neither definitive reasons nor definitive refutations; because observation hypotheses including the background knowledge involved can possibly be refuted. Therefore, alternative theories are always required to allow critical cross-checking. Theory pluralism is thus a direct consequence of consistent fallibilism.

Incidentally, in this context speculative or metaphysical statements are not absolutely worthless for empirical knowledge; for they can namely be understood as a program of knowledge and thus used to construct new empirical-scientific theories.

"The progress of science takes place through construction and criticism, whereby the invention of theoretical alternatives and the invention and production of useful experimental situations - or the search for relevant facts - play an important role. The scientific doctrine of criticism therefore includes a theoretical pluralism, the expressly emphasizes the positive importance of alternatives for problem-solving behavior and also takes into account the possibility of progress in knowledge in a counter-intuitive and in a counter-inductive direction. "

If the theory of the progress of knowledge via research programs, as Imre Lakatos intended, is supplemented by the idea of ​​“association-like” progress, the alternative theory monism vs. Theory pluralism is obsolete or canceled in a comprehensive, newly interpreted program.

criticism

Max Weber basically advocates that positions that are as divergent as possible should be represented at the universities. He believes that university lecturers' "class ratings" are at most acceptable if the conditions for scientific pluralism are met. "Because radical doubt is the father of knowledge." However, since such conditions are practically non-existent at universities, he considers freedom from values ​​to be the only possible university policy solution.

Margherita von Brentano reproaches the advocates of theoretical pluralism for concealing a “monopoly pluralism” behind the demand for pluralism; because alternative concepts remained excluded in the reality of higher education and science policy due to given structures.

Wolfgang Krahl objects to the demand for permanent theoretical pluralism that it comes into conflict with the demand for maximum effectiveness in the natural sciences and therefore has few chances of realization. A change from sometimes pluralistic to sometimes non-pluralistic phases is to be expected more realistically. To a certain extent, however, pluralism is already given by the fact that if theories fail, they are not immediately given up in favor of a successor theory, but are given a chance to prove themselves.

swell

  1. ^ Paul K. Feyerabend: Problems of Empiricism. In: RG Colodny, (Ed.): Beyond the Edge of Certainty. Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy. Volume II, Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1965; How to be a good empiricist. In: Philosophy of Science, The Delaware Seminar. Volume II, 1963.
  2. ↑ "He used to advocate pluralism of theories, now he advocates a plurality of forms of life because he considers openness to other forms of life and the willingness to learn from them to be desirable and even a kind of rationalism." (Gunnar Andersson: Requirements, Problems and Progress in Knowledge. In: Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Andersson: Requirements and Limits of Science. Tübingen 1981, ISBN 3-16-942722-9 , p. 6)
  3. ↑ Karl R. Popper: The world of Parmenides. The origin of European thought. Piper, Munich / Zurich 2005, ISBN 3-492-24071-2 , p. 57.
  4. ↑ for more details see Rainer Greshoff, Gesa Lindemann, Uwe Schimank: Comparison of Theories and Integration of Theories - Discipline-historical and methodological considerations for the development of a paradigm-conveying "conceptual framework" for sociology (PDF; 272 kB)
  5. ↑ All universals are dispositional. Theoretical and empirical terms cannot be separated. (Karl Popper: Logic of Research. Tübingen 1984, p. 378 f)
  6. ^ Paul K. Feyerabend: Against the method pressure. Sketch of an anarchist epistemology. Frankfurt 1976, p. 50.
  7. ↑ Gunnar Andersson: Are falsificationism and fallibilism compatible? In: Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Andersson: Requirements and limits of science. Tübingen 1981, p. 266.
  8. ↑ Hans Albert: Construction and Criticism. Essays on the philosophy of critical rationalism. Hamburg 1972, p. 199.
  9. ↑ Patrick A. Heelan: Association-theoretical consideration of the progress of knowledge. In: Gerard Radnitzky, Gunnar Andersson: Requirements and limits of science. Tübingen 1981, p. 339 ff.
  10. ↑ Max Weber: The sense of the 'freedom of value' of the sociological and economic sciences. 1917. In: Collected essays on science. Mohr, 1988, ISBN 3-8252-1492-3 , p. 496.
  11. ↑ Margherita v. Brentano: Scientific pluralism - On the function, genesis and criticism of a battle term, In: The argument. 13, 6/7, 1971, pp. 476-493; see. also Horst Heimann: The controversy about scientific pluralism. The Response of Social Sciences and Pluralist Democracy to the Challenge of the New Left. In: From Politics and Contemporary History . Supplement to The Parliament , 1974.
  12. ↑ Wolfgang Krah: On the demand for theoretical pluralism in permanence. In: Journal for General Philosophy of Science. Vol. 11, No. 2. / September 1980.

literature

  • Helmut F. Spinner : Theoretical Pluralism. In: Hans Albert (Ed.): Social theory and social practice. Eduard Baumgarten on his 70th birthday. Meisenheim 1971, p. 17ff.
  • Hans Albert : Treatise on Critical Reason. 4. verb. Edition. Tübingen 1980.
  • Alwin Diemer (ed.): The pluralism of methods and theories in the sciences. Meisenheim am Glan 1971.
  • Helmut F. Spinner: Pluralism as a model of knowledge. 1st edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1974 (stw 32); Review: Alfred Schramm, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), pp. 90-93. .

Web links