Company whirlwind

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The company Wirbelwind ( also: Wirbelwind (small) ) was a failed German tank offensive from August 11, 1942 to August 22, 1942 on the central section of the Eastern Front in the German-Soviet War . It is largely unknown as it was overshadowed by the German offensive in the south that culminated in the Battle of Stalingrad .

Goal setting

The aim was to eliminate a Soviet front arch , the "Sukhinichi Arch", by means of a pincer attack in the direction of Sukhinichi - Koselsk , to destroy the Soviet 10th and 16th Armies and to gain a permanent line of defense that would save strength. For this purpose, units of the 4th Army were to advance south on August 7th and units of the 2nd Panzer Army to advance north on August 9th.

However, the Soviet offensive of July 30th in the Battle of Rzhev forced the evacuation of units of the 4th Army provided for "Operation Whirlwind". Thereupon Hitler decided on August 7th to carry out “Wirbelwind” only with the southern arm. On August 8, the order to attack was issued, which ordered the 2nd Panzer Army to "combine the available forces with the strictest possible force, conduct the operation as tightly as possible and accelerate the operation as quickly as possible".

A total of 5 tank divisions ( 9th , 11th , 17th , 19th , 20th ) with 400 tanks and several infantry divisions attacked.

procedure

Because of the rain, the offensive began 2 days late on August 11th. The offensive was only successful on the first day when the 11th Panzer Division advanced as far as Uljanowo. The tank units encountered "heavily mined and fortress-like terrain" and made very slow progress over the next few days. According to Hermann Plocher , despite effective air and air defense support, there were only minor initial successes. Chief of the General Staff Franz Halder noted on August 17th "In the 2nd Panzer Army only very little progress with heavy losses".

The Soviet troops were under Stalin's Order No. 227 , which had recently been issued , which forbade any retreat and made it a criminal offense. On August 18, the attack finally stalled. On August 21, the OKW's war diary noted : “The attack is made very difficult by the swampy forest area. The own combat strength has sunk considerably, the tank units have suffered considerable losses. "

On the morning of August 22nd, strong Soviet armored forces counterattacked the right flank and made serious incursions. On the same day, according to Halder, Hitler decided, out of the understanding “that nothing more can be achieved”, to convert the attack “from a decision-seeking attack into a bondage attack” in order to tie up opposing forces.

On December 12, 1942, according to the minutes of his briefing at the Fuehrer's headquarters , Hitler said :

“Our biggest mistake this year has been the attack on Szuchinitishi . That was an example with the headline: This is not the way to start an attack. Wherever they could only attack, they attacked instead of summarizing it very narrowly and then quickly pushing through with the 5 armored divisions. We have about 500 tanks attached to Ssuchinitishi. But you managed to spill it. That is a 'glorious' act. "

Individual evidence

  1. List of code names for operational plans and headquarters in 1942. In: Percy Ernst Schramm (Hrsg.): War diary of the High Command of the Wehrmacht . Bonn undated, Volume 2, 2nd half volume, p. 1343. See also code names of German military operations in World War II
  2. Robert Forczyk: Tank Warfare on the Eastern Front . Pen and Sword 2014, p. 217.
  3. Bernd Wegner : The war against the Soviet Union 1942/43 . In: MGFA (Hrsg.): The German Reich and the Second World War . Stuttgart 1990, Volume 6, p. 907.
  4. ^ Andreas Hillgruber : Foreword to the war diary of the OKW, Volume 2, 1st half volume, p. 74 f.
  5. Hillgruber, p. 75.
  6. Printed in: Kriegstagebuch des OKW, Volume 2, 2nd half volume, p. 1286, (Document 18).
  7. Names of the armored divisions taken from the map in Wegner, p. 901.
  8. Hillgruber, p. 75.
  9. War diary OKW, Volume 2, 1st half volume, p. 578. Quoted from Wegner, p. 909.
  10. ^ Hermann Plocher : The German Air Force versus Russia, 1942 . Eschenburg Press 2017, p. 120.
  11. ^ Franz Halder : War diary. Daily records of the Chief of the Army General Staff 1939–1942 . Stuttgart 1962, Volume 3, p. 506.
  12. Wegner, p. 909.
  13. Wegner, p. 909. with reference to the OKW's war diary, entry from August 18.
  14. ^ War diary of the OKW, Volume 2, 1st half volume, p. 617.
  15. Kriegstagebuch OKW, Volume 2, 1st half volume, p. 526. and Halder: Kriegstagebuch , p. 508.
  16. Halder: Kriegstagebuch , p. 508. Quoted in Wegner, p. 910.
  17. Helmut Heiber : Hitler's situation discussions : The protocol fragments of his military conferences 1942 - 1945 . Stuttgart 1962, p. 92. See Wegner, p. 910.