Trust game

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The trust game is a social dilemma that can be analyzed within the framework of game theory . It is a two-person game with a trustor or trust-giver (A) and a trustee or trust-taker (B). The trustor can entrust the trustee with a task. First of all, the trustor decides whether or not to trust the trustee. If he decides in favor of the first variant, the trustee can again decide whether he a) abuses the trust placed in him or b) honors it. These options result in three alternative courses of action, which, however, result in different payouts for each of the two participants. The trust game can be represented as a so-called sequential game (the game tree is optimally represented here) or as a simultaneous game (the matrix form is optimally represented). A payout matrix is ​​selected here for illustration:

A doesn't trust B. A trusts B; B abuses trust A trusts B; B honors trust
Payout for A 0 - 1 1
Payout for B 0 2 1

A rational trustee will now choose to abuse the trust placed in him, as this will give him the highest payout. Since a trustor suspects this, he will not trust you at all. As a result, both actors go away empty-handed. This dilemma can be solved, on the one hand, by the fact that the trustor has experience of the trustee and thus the behavior of the trustee is predictable. On the other hand, the trustor can also exercise control over the trustee and impose sanctions if the trust is misused. With the instrument of control, the desired behavior of the trustee is to a certain extent "forced" by the trustor. Therefore this solution corresponds to the exercise of power by the settlor over the trustee (with the sanction as a corresponding means of power). If, on the other hand, the problem can be overcome by having (credible) experiences, such as an advantageous reputation of the trustee with regard to his loyalty or his character, then the game of trust can actually be solved through trust. In this case, the good reputation would be the basis of trust on which the trustor can base his expectations.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Vincent Buskens, Werner Raub: Social mechanisms of rational trust: A theoretical sketch and results from empirical studies. In: Andreas Diekmann, Thomas Voss (eds.): Rational choice theory in the social sciences. Applications and problems. Oldenbourg, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-486-56644-X , p. 191.
  2. ↑ Marcus Wiens: "Trust in economic theory. A microfounded and behavioral analysis" LIT-Verlag, Münster 2013. ISBN 978-3-643-11974-2 .