Controlled Impact Demonstration

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The test aircraft in different stages of the experiment: Top left in the test approach; the other pictures show the actual service.

Under the name Controlled Impact Demonstration ( English for demonstration of a controlled impact ), CID for short , the US aviation authorities FAA and NASA carried out a crash test with a remote-controlled passenger aircraft in 1984 . This was primarily intended to test a new type of fuel additive; At the same time, they wanted to collect various data on the safety of the occupants in the event of a crash. A disused four-engine Boeing 720 was selected as the test object .

After more than four years of preparation, those responsible crashed the fully fueled machine on December 1, 1984 on the premises of Edwards Air Force Base . The impact caused a spectacular fireball and the wreck burned for over an hour. The attempt is considered a failure with regard to the experimental fuel addition, but led to other suggestions for improving flight safety .

Goal setting

In a typical aircraft accident, fuel leaks from damaged tanks or pipes and forms a fine, highly flammable mist in the air that catches fire. This considerably reduces the chances of survival of the aircraft occupants: The FAA estimated that around a third of the victims in an accident succumb to the fire during the take-off or landing phase. When two jumbo jets collided on the runway of Tenerife Airport on March 27, 1977, causing the most serious accident in civil aviation to date, many passengers did not die directly from the impact, but from the consequences of the burning fuel that escaped (see the plane disaster in Tenerife ).

A new fuel additive developed by Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI), a long-chain polymer called FM-9, was designed to reduce the formation of such fuel clouds and their flammability. The kerosene mixed with it was called antimisting kerosene (German: 'non-fogging kerosene'), or AMK for short. It had already shown the desired properties in model tests and crash tests with decommissioned SP-2 Neptune naval aircraft and was now supposed to prove them under realistic conditions. To do this, they wanted to use remote control to crash a typical passenger jet in a controlled manner.

When planning this experiment, it quickly became clear that an experimental setup of this size could be used for a large number of other experiments. The focus was on the behavior of the AMK in the event of a fire after an impact. In addition, it was planned to investigate new developments to increase the likelihood of survival in the event of a fall, including redesigned seats and restraint systems , fireproof materials in the cabin and fireproof windows. Innovations on the flight recorder were also included in the tests. In addition, the forces acting on the aircraft on impact should be measured, in particular the structural loads on the aircraft fuselage, the cabin floor and the wings. It was planned to use the results of the sensor data to check, among other things, the predictive accuracy of computer models .

Attendees

The logos of the two lead organizations, FAA and NASA The logos of the two lead organizations, FAA and NASA
The logos of the two lead organizations, FAA and NASA

The US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), among other things responsible for safety regulations and guidelines ( FARs ) for air traffic in the USA, joined forces with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) for this experiment . On the part of NASA, the research centers Ames , Langley and Dryden in particular participated in the CID program. In addition, institutions of the US military , British and French institutions and a number of commercial enterprises took part; the latter were primarily to be assigned to the aviation industry, such as the manufacturers General Electric , Lockheed and Boeing .

The program was led by the FAA, which was also responsible for most of the experiments and provided $ 8.1 million to fund the project. NASA paid for the remaining US $ 3.7 million. She was primarily responsible for the remote control of the test aircraft and the development of a system for data acquisition. She also placed experimental seats in the aircraft and took over part of the evaluation.

Preparations

The preparations for the actual experiment took a total of four years. They included the exact specifications of the program objectives, structural changes to the test aircraft, the preparation of the planned crash site and 14 test flights, not including the flight with the crash experiment.

Planning the test procedure

Planning for the Controlled Impact Demonstration began in July 1980. The experiment was intended to simulate an accident in which it was typically possible for all aircraft occupants to survive, such as after a go - around or an aborted take-off. In order for the AMK to prove its effectiveness, conditions had to be simulated under which normal kerosene would in all probability ignite. In cooperation with the larger aircraft manufacturers, the FAA and NASA viewed the data of almost a thousand aircraft accidents that had occurred worldwide between 1959 and 1979 and developed a corresponding scenario from this. The predictions of analytical calculation models and findings from other experiments were also incorporated.

The test aircraft should rise to a height of about 2,300  feet (about 700 m) above the ground and then approach the target area with the planned flight parameters (speed, rate of descent , etc.) along a predetermined glide path . Up to a height of 400 feet (about 125 m), any leader of an experiment could determine the abort if their equipment showed critical failures. Between 400 and 150 feet, the decision height set for this flight , the decision to continue the approach rests solely with the pilot. Below 150 feet (about 45 m) the controlled fall had to be carried out in any case; an abort was considered too risky and could have resulted in an uncontrolled fall. In the target area, the aircraft should touch down fully fueled with AMK, with retracted landing gear and a flap position of 30 degrees. Immediately after the impact, it was planned that the wings would be damaged by special devices so that fuel could flow out of the tanks located therein and ignite, while the fuselage remained intact. The aircraft should slide around 300 to 350 meters further on a gravel runway and then come to a standstill.

Preparation of the crash site

The Edwards Air Force Base with unpaved runways trial in Backgrounds
By starting after a sample approach. The wing cutters can be seen below the aircraft .

As a testing ground was Rogers Dry Lake in the Salt Flat in the Mojave Desert selected. Here, Edwards Air Force Base has, among other things, several runways for test purposes. At the intended crash site, an area of ​​around 90 by 350 meters was covered with gravel and provided with reference markings. The plan was for the aircraft to touch down shortly before this runway and to come to a standstill there after a short slide. As a visual aid for the pilot, a large, X-shaped cross marked the point at which the aircraft should hit.

Between the point of impact and the start of the runway, eight metal devices, each weighing around 180 kilograms and almost 2.5 meters high, were cemented into the desert floor. If the leading edge of the wing hit one of these devices, its lower half would turn upwards, cut into the lower wing part and thus tear open the fuel tanks located there. Therefore, these instruments were called wing openers (German: ' wing opener ') or wing cutter (German: ' wing cutter '). In front of this, a fence made of easily breakable material was built, which should also help the pilot to approach the crash site. The extended center line of the runway was marked on the fence by an orange area.

About 90 meters behind the point of impact, a lighting system consisting of two rows with six posts each was set up, as is used for approach lighting on runways. They were each about 30 meters behind each other with a lateral distance of about 23 meters, which was significantly less than the wingspan of the test aircraft of around 40 meters. Each of these posts was about 3 meters high, consisted of light fiberglass tubes with predetermined breaking points and carried five lights of 300 watts each . In the event of a collision with the aircraft, they would break off and serve as a realistic ignition source for leaked fuel. As an alternative, it was planned that the kerosene would ignite when sparks from the gravel runway or destroyed aircraft parts.

In order to document the impact across the board, around one hundred synchronized photo and video cameras were installed around the crash site, including high-speed and thermal imaging cameras . The system was supplemented by cameras in two Bell UH-1 helicopters hovering near the crash site and in a Lockheed P-3 escort aircraft above the test aircraft.

Abort and failure procedure

Runway 25 south of the planned point of impact was intended for a landing after a controlled termination of the crash experiment. As an additional safety measure in the event of failure of the remote control, a border area was defined at the edge of the test area. If the aircraft had reached this without being under the control of the ground station, a signal would have been sent to the aircraft via an additional radio link, which would have initiated a self-destruction process. The engines would have been turned off and the control surfaces moved into a position that would have caused the aircraft to spiral into the ground.

Changes to the test aircraft

The test aircraft, a Boeing 720 , was painted with vertical stripes to make deformations easier to see
The passenger compartment was filled with dummies

A Boeing 720 was selected as the test aircraft. In terms of airframe, propulsion and equipment, this pattern represented the average of the aircraft used by the airlines at that time . The test aircraft had been bought by the FAA in 1960 for the training of its personnel and had reached the end of its useful life after more than 20,000 flight hours and over 54,000 take-offs and landings.

In June 1981 it was transferred to the Ames-Dryden Flight Research Facility in preparation for the CID program . The actual technical upgrade began in the summer of 1983. First, parts of the interior were removed to make room for the necessary adjustments. Seats and restraint systems were replaced with test equipment. Selected areas, for example parts of the cargo hold, were deliberately left in their original condition. The aircraft should generally comply with the rules and regulations of the FAA and the manufacturer. From October 1983 the cabling for measuring instruments, sensors and additional power supply was installed. In December 1983, the integration of the data acquisition systems and high-speed cameras began, the instrumentation of the cockpit was adapted and restructured for the planned remote control. The autopilot of the Boeing 720 was modified in such a way that it could be used for flight control via remote control. Unused functions of the autopilot have been deactivated in order to exclude them as a possible source of error.

The fuel and propulsion system was prepared for operation with AMK. This cannot be introduced directly into a gas turbine because it could lead to various technical problems, for example clogging of the engine filters. Therefore, AMK must be chemically degraded until it is so similar to normal Jet-A fuel that it can be processed by aircraft engines. For this purpose, General Electric installed a device called a Degrader on each of the four Pratt & Whitney JT3C-7 engines of the test aircraft , which prepared the fuel for the engine. In order to be able to attach the Degrader, the turbo compressors of the air conditioning and cabin pressure system were removed from the engines.

A first comprehensive system test was carried out on February 29, 1984. Installation and testing of the AMK system began on April 4, 1984. First, the Degrader was checked, attached to an engine and subjected to a ground test run. After the malfunctions had been rectified, the first engine run with a Degrader took place on April 11, 1984.

Another focus was on accident behavior, i.e. the ability of the airframe and restraint systems to protect the lives of passengers and crew in a typical take-off or landing accident. Among other things, technicians installed new seating systems that were supposed to absorb energy in the event of a crash, seats pointing against the direction of flight and a special restraint system for children. As a rule, the innovations were arranged right next to a conventional seating system so that a direct comparison could be made. Crash test dummies were placed on the seats in the passenger compartment and in the cockpit, and acceleration sensors were installed at various points on the aircraft . The aim was to measure the forces that acted on the occupants, the overhead lockers and the galley equipment upon impact.

Eleven high-speed cameras were installed in the passenger area and in the cockpit in order to be able to observe the dummies and the interior of the cabin. Additional high-speed cameras were installed in the aircraft's nose (next to the camera, the images of which were transmitted to the pilot for remote control) and on the vertical stabilizer. Uniform vertical stripes were painted on the fuselage so that deformations could be recognized more easily.

Further changes were used to test newly developed fire protection measures. Around half of the passenger seats were fitted with fireproof textiles. Emergency lighting was installed on the seats in the aisle, which in the event of a real accident should show passengers the way to the nearest emergency exits if smoke impaired visibility in the aircraft. In addition, several windows were replaced with new, fireproof developments. In previous tests, it took around 60 seconds longer to burn out compared to conventional windows.

The aircraft was also equipped with four different flight recorders . Three of these corresponded to types that were in use in passenger planes at the time, the fourth system was under development. Storage space in the galley was filled with dangerous goods packaging so that it could prove its indestructibility in practice.

Test flights

NASA pilot Fitz Fulton steered the aircraft from a control station on the ground

Beginning on March 7, 1984, a total of 14 test flights were undertaken with the Boeing 720 in order to test the various new systems. The AMK concentration in the tanks and engines was gradually increased and the performance of the systems was monitored. With the flights, data was collected for the further development of mathematical models for simulations, the aerodynamic behavior of the machine near the ground was determined and the hardware and software of the remote control were checked. They also provided the opportunity to become familiar with the flight characteristics and systems and to practice the approach to the subsequent crash site.

The Boeing was manned during the test flights, but was already flown for the most part by remote control. To do this, NASA test pilot Fitzhugh L. Fulton, from the Remotely Controlled Vehicle Facility in Dryden , steered the test aircraft from a control station on the ground. This was equipped with various instruments and two screens onto which video images recorded from the nose of the aircraft were transmitted. The controls essentially corresponded to those from the cockpit of the Boeing 720. The pilot and the copilot on board could deactivate the remote control and thus take control of the aircraft. The crew completed a total of 14 test flights with a total flight time of over 30 hours. More than half of this time, the aircraft was steered via remote control; the remote-controlled maneuvers include 9 take-offs, 13 landings and 69 CID profiles with approaches to the planned crash site at altitudes between 150 and 200 feet.

At the time, the Boeing 720 was the largest aircraft ever to be flown by remote control.

As a result of the test flights, the AMK Degrader and the remote control systems were revised. They also led to the realization that the task was a heavy workload for the pilot on the ground. Therefore, the devices that should help the pilot to navigate to the target have been improved. Among other things, the fence was set up in front of the wing cutters as a target aid . However, the success of all attempts to make the crash site more clearly recognizable was reduced by the low resolution of the video transmission from the aircraft to the control station. In addition, the specified requirements were relaxed by increasing the tolerances for the rate of descent, forward speed , pitch angle and the accuracy of the touchdown point.

procedure

CID slapdown.jpg
The aircraft hits the target with the left wing first, ...
CID pre-impact.jpg
twists as you slide, ...
CID post-impact 1.jpg
breaks the wing cutter in an inclined position ...
CID post-impact 2.jpg
and is wrapped in flames

On the morning of December 1, 1984, the test aircraft took off fully fueled for the 15th and last flight of the CID program from runway 17 at Edwards Air Force Base. Pilot Fulton steered the machine by remote control over the intended flight route into the target area. He was initially able to use the parameters for the final approach as planned, but in the further course flew in part significantly too low and too far to the right of the center of the runway. The workload increased steadily, which is why there were further deviations after corrections.

With regard to the decision height, the pilot assumed that he would get the deviations up to the impact in the tolerance range. He continued the approach. However, his control inputs led to a pilot induced oscillation : the aircraft began to oscillate around its longitudinal axis. As a result, it hit 90 meters from the target, with a bank angle of about 13 ° to the left. These values ​​were significantly outside the tolerance range.

Almost nine minutes after take-off, due to the left bank, the left outer engine (No. 1) first touched the ground. It was offset to the right of the runway center line, with its nose pointing to the left. The forward speed was 150  knots (approx. 275 km / h), the rate of descent was 18 feet per second (approx. 5.50 m / s), both of which corresponded to the target values. The machine turned around 40 ° around the yaw axis as it slid on and hit the wing cutter at an angle with a residual speed of around 120 knots (approx. 220 km / h) .

The inner right engine (No. 3) was hit first. A wing cutter penetrated the engine nacelle from the right and stopped the rotation of the turbine within around a third of a turn. A tenth of a second later, leaked fuel on the left of the engine ignited on the heat of the destroyed engine. The wing-cutter blade also hit fuel and oil lines and released lubricants, hydraulic fluid and AMK. Then the wing cutter broke off and turned upwards into the main fuel tank of engine no.3.Simultaneously with the destruction of engine no.3 , two more wing cutters penetrated the wing between this engine and the fuselage, one of them up to further cut the fuselage. Burning fuel got inside the fuselage and started a fire in the hold that continued into the cabin.

The flame that had developed on engine no. 3 struck the fuselage while the aircraft continued to slide and turned more and more around the yaw axis. The cut right wing broke off, causing even more fuel to escape at the break. Eleven seconds after engine # 1 hit the ground, the aircraft came to a standstill and the fire decreased significantly. In total, it had enveloped the fuselage for nine seconds. When the flames subsided, the exterior of the hull had not been visibly damaged by the fire. Within a minute and a half, a unit from the airport fire department began to fight the fire. It took more than an hour for it to go out completely.

Results

Because the aircraft slipped into the wing cutter at an angle, the actual course of the test deviated considerably from the plan. As a result, most of the individual experiments were compromised.

The main experiment on the fire-suppressing effect of the AMK developed completely differently than planned. The destroyed engine was an unintended heat source that had a major impact on further events. Aircraft engines are actually designed in such a way that in the event of a crash they fall off the aircraft before they catch fire. Engine no. 3, however, got stuck burning on the wing due to the special features of the wing cutter . The kerosene that ignited on the engine had already run through the Degrader, so it was more similar to normal Jet-A fuel and could no longer develop the special properties of the AMK. Lubricants and hydraulic fluid provided additional fire material. In addition, the remains of the hit engine and other parts shielded the fuel from the incoming air so that it could remain at the ignition source longer than intended in the test design.

The experimental set-ups for the accident behavior of the aircraft construction and the restraint systems were made partially unusable by various factors. Since the aircraft came up with the wing first, its rate of descent changed up to the impact of the aircraft fuselage relevant for the measurements. The rear part of the fuselage, in which the special test seats were located, should have touched down first. A sink rate of at least 15 feet per second was planned for the test, but the end of the fuselage only hit at about 6 feet per second (about 1.80 m / s), and thus with significantly less force than planned.

Even more devastating was that the damage caused by a wing opener on the fuselage and the fire inside the cabin had affected the deformation of the aircraft fuselage. For the same reasons, a large part of the measuring equipment was lost. For example, of the total of 27 seats equipped with sensors, two were directly affected by the wing cutter impact, and ten more were destroyed by the fire. The remaining 15 showed no structural deformation, which can be attributed to the low sink rate. The camera recordings from the passenger compartment led to the assumption that both the standard seats and the modified systems would have withstood the load multiples of the surcharge. The measurement data obtained flowed among other things into the development of databases and the improvement of computer models of the FAA and NASA to simulate the flight accident behavior of new designs.

The fire protection experiments also developed differently than expected due to the unplanned fire in the cabin. However, the more modern seat covers consistently performed better than the conventional ones. Since the fire burned mainly through the floor into the cabin, the CID experiment did not provide any reliable evidence of any differences between the new and the ordinary windows. Camera evaluations showed that the smoke had spread so strongly within 5 seconds in the front and 20 seconds in the rear part of the cabin that the view was completely restricted. Based on the time it takes to reach the emergency exits and operate the evacuation slides , the FAA assumed 33 seconds for complete evacuation. In her final report, she estimates that if the plane had been fully occupied, around a quarter of the 113 passengers would have survived the crash. However, the authors of the report themselves judged these assessments to be highly speculative.

The three common flight recorder types worked as expected and especially withstood the heat. However, the sample rates of some signals were too slow, despite being in line with FAA guidelines . A new type of recording device, on the other hand, only partially showed the expected performance. The tested dangerous goods packaging remained intact. The system for data acquisition, including photographic monitoring, also worked as desired.

Evaluation and consequences

The main purpose of the CID program - to demonstrate that AMK can be used to effectively prevent fire - is largely classified as a failure. The other experiments are seen partly as failed and partly as successful.

Perception in the media

The attempt had taken place in front of the public. The media interest had been so great in advance that the FAA had felt compelled to retrospectively implement crash test dummies with black and white skin, which had been delivered one after the other and accordingly placed one behind the other in the passenger compartment, in order to avoid associations with times of racial segregation . For the actual crash test, an area for representatives of the press was set up not far from the crash site. The television recording enabled millions of viewers to see the plane disappear in a ball of fire.

In the days after the attempt, news papers such as the New York Times , Newsweek , LA Times , the magazine and the science magazine New Scientist reported on the Controlled Impact Demonstration . The FAA had announced in the press conference immediately after the attempt that the AMK had worked. Nevertheless, the timely reporting unanimously evaluated the fire as a sign of a failure of the AMK and the failure of the main experiment.

Reactions from those involved

The extent of the fire came as a surprise to those involved. Flames were expected, but only to a lesser extent, so that the aircraft would slide away and there would be a much longer time for the passengers to evacuate. A failure of the AMK was initially assumed to be the cause. It was only through the evaluation of the photo and video documentation that it became clear that no fog from AMK had formed and ignited, but that lubricants, hydraulic fluid and already degraded fuel could be held responsible for the fire. Following the CID program, the FAA undertook a number of other tests to determine how the fuel could ignite. Although she came to the conclusion that AMK did not have the ability to avoid a fire from breaking out under all circumstances. Nevertheless, she agreed with the FM-9 developer ICI of the opinion that the AMK worked and prevented an even bigger fire. The FAA further ruled that the Controlled Impact Demonstration , due to its special features, is not comparable to any flight accident that has occurred in practice.

In the spring of 1985, a subcommittee of Congress decided not to prescribe the use of AMK for the time being. In the end, the FAA abandoned this venture altogether, and the development of fire suppressant fuel additives ceased. For ICI this meant the fruitless end of 17 years of research. The ICI manager David Lane attributed the hiring not to a failure of the AMK, but to the external impact of the spectacular fire. In politics and the public, this gave the impression that the addition did not work. In fact, the AMK attempt was a success.

As far as the further individual experiments brought usable results, they are considered successful. From the outset, several experiments only served to check regulations that had already been issued . A week before the test, the FAA had already set new standards for the fire resistance of seat covers and for emergency lighting on the floor. Other already established guidelines had to be revised as a result of the knowledge gained, for example with regard to the sampling rates of the flight recorders. Overall, the FAA sees the side experiments as a source of a lot of useful information.

NASA came to the conclusion that the crash landing, which was to be carried out for the CID program, represented an unusually high workload for the pilot. This could have been reduced with better technical support. Because of the multitude of findings that were gained from the data collected and that were reflected in measures to improve flight safety , NASA rates the experiment, which has failed at its core, as a success overall.

Repeat the experiment

On April 27, 2012, a Boeing 727-200 was brought to a controlled crash in the desert of Mexico on behalf of the Discovery Channel . The attempt took place in Mexico because the US authorities did not give permission for the crash. A film documentary was made about the crash.

Remarks

  1. ↑ a b This article uses, like the sources on which it is based, for flight altitudes and speeds the usual units of measurement feet and knots in aviation . Additional information in meters (m) or kilometers per hour (km / h) has been calculated and rounded and is for illustrative purposes only. The flight altitudes are measured relative to the ground .

literature

  • Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA . 1988 ( online [PDF; 2.3 MB ; accessed on May 9, 2010]).
  • FAA (Ed.): Summary Report - Full-Scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration Program . 1987 ( online [PDF; 5.5 MB ; accessed on May 9, 2010] FAA final report on the CID program).
  • Michael L. Yaffee: Antimisting Fuel Research and Development for Commercial Aircraft - Final Summary Report . Ed .: FAA . 1986 ( online [PDF; 5.8 MB ; accessed on May 9, 2010] FAA final report on the AMK program).

Web links

Commons : Controlled Impact Demonstration  - collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ a b c Braked fire . In: Der Spiegel . No. 45 , 1982 ( article online at Spiegel Online [accessed June 10, 2010]).
  2. ↑ Michael L. Yaffe: Antimisting Fuel Research and Development for Commercial Aircraft - Final Summary Report . Ed .: FAA. 1986, p. 9 ff .
  3. ↑ a b c d Controlled Impact Demonstration (CID) Aircraft ( Memento from April 18, 2015 in the Internet Archive )
  4. ↑ Donald D. Engen (FAA administrator): Speech to the House Committee of Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Transportation, Aviation, and Materials. (PDF; 740 kB) April 2, 1985, p. 3 , accessed on June 16, 2010 (English).
  5. ↑ Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 1 .
  6. ↑ a b c d e Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 4 .
  7. ↑ a b c d e f Controlled Impact Demonstration. NASA , accessed May 9, 2010 .
  8. ↑ a b Michael L. Yaffe: Antimisting Fuel Research and Development for Commercial Aircraft - Final Summary Report . Ed .: FAA. 1986, p. 41 ff .
  9. ↑ Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 5, 8 .
  10. ↑ a b c Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 13 ff .
  11. ↑ Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 6 .
  12. ↑ Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 16 ff .
  13. ↑ a b c d Michael Cross: Aircraft Crash 'was a success' . In: New Scientist . tape 106 , no. 1451 . Reed Business Information, April 11, 1985, ISSN  0262-4079 , p. 5 ( limited preview in Google Book Search [accessed May 28, 2010]).
  14. ↑ George Bible: Beyond the black box: the forensics of airplane crashes . JHU Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-8018-8631-7 , pp. 297, 301 f .
  15. ↑ Black and white in the fire test . In: Der Spiegel . No. 46 , 1984 ( article online at Spiegel Online [accessed June 10, 2010]).
  16. ^ Richard Witkin: Jet Crash-test of Fuel Safety Causes Fireball . In: The New York Times . December 2, 1984, Late City Final Edition, Section 1, pp. 1 ( Article preview online from the New York Times website [accessed June 10, 2010]).
  17. ^ Richard Witkin: Experts Study Explosion in Crash Test of Airliner . In: The New York Times . December 3, 1984, Late City Final Edition, Section A, p. 21 ( Article preview online from the New York Times website [accessed June 10, 2010]).
  18. ^ The Crash Test That Failed . In: Newsweek . Ed. 104, 1984 ( limited preview in Google Book Search [accessed June 14, 2010]).
  19. ↑ Penny Pagano: Fire Destroys Jet in Test of Flame-Resistant Fuel . In: Los Angeles Times . December 2, 1984, p. A1 ( Article preview online from LA Times website [accessed June 14, 2010]).
  20. ↑ Fireball In the Mojave . In: Time . December 10, 1984 ( article online on Time's website [accessed May 28, 2010]).
  21. ↑ a b c Michael Cross: Seventeen years' research up in flames . In: New Scientist . December 6, 1984, p. 5 ( limited preview in Google Book Search [accessed May 28, 2010]).
  22. ^ Larry Levy: The Crash of the 720 . In: Airline Executive Magazine . February 1985, p. 14 ( excerpts online [accessed on June 16, 2010]).
  23. ↑ Michael L. Yaffe: Antimisting Fuel Research and Development for Commercial Aircraft - Final Summary Report . Ed .: FAA. 1986, p. 47 ff .
  24. ↑ Michael L. Yaffe: Antimisting Fuel Research and Development for Commercial Aircraft - Final Summary Report . Ed .: FAA. 1986, p. 50 ff .
  25. ↑ a b FAA Historical Chronology, 1926–1996. (PDF; 2.1 MB) (No longer available online.) FAA , archived from the original on June 24, 2008 ; accessed on May 20, 2010 (English).
  26. ↑ George Bible: Beyond the black box: the forensics of airplane crashes . JHU Press, 2007, ISBN 978-0-8018-8631-7 , pp. 292 .
  27. ↑ Timothy W. Horton, Robert W. Kempel: NASA Technical Memorandum 4084: Flight Test Experience and Controlled Impact of a Remotely Piloted Jet Transport Aircraft . Ed .: NASA. 1988, p. 19 .
  28. ↑ Patrick Kevin Day: Discovery Channel crashes 727 in 'Curiosity' season premiere. Los Angeles Times , October 7, 2012, accessed October 17, 2012 .
  • FAA (Ed.): Summary Report - Full-Scale Transport Controlled Impact Demonstration Program . 1987 (English).
  1. ↑ p. 2 f.
  2. ↑ p. 1
  3. ↑ Appendix A
  4. ↑ vii
  5. ↑ a b p. 13 ff.
  6. ↑ a b p. 7 ff.
  7. ↑ a b p. 2, 49 ff.
  8. ↑ a b p. 46 ff.
  9. ↑ a b c p. 5 ff.
  10. ↑ a b p. 22 ff.
  11. ↑ a b c p. 32 ff.
  12. ↑ a b c p. 38 ff.
  13. ↑ a b p. 42 f.
  14. ↑ p. 11
  15. ↑ p. 16
  16. ↑ a b c d p. 17 ff.
  17. ↑ Appendix E
  18. ↑ p. 51 ff.
  19. ↑ a b p. 20 ff.
  20. ↑ p. 56 ff.
  21. ↑ p. 15.

Coordinates: 34 ° 50 ′ 51 ″  N , 117 ° 49 ′ 15 ″  W.

This article was added to the list of excellent articles on July 16, 2010 in this version .