Talk:Battle of the Coral Sea

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Draft entry

Replaced stub with draft entry. I'll tidy up details shortly - add links, check spelling, etc. Tannin 12:38 Dec 16, 2002 (UTC) Done. (At least for now). Tannin 13:34 Dec 16, 2002 (UTC) Just wondering, why does it say US had 2 large carriers and 3 cruisers? wouldn't it be better to write "2 large carriers and their escort"? because the cruisers didnt do anything, and generally they were used as escorts (at least in that time, when it was generally a defensive strategy to use carriers protected by anti-air destroyers/cruisers)... just a though. ugen64 01:47, Oct 7, 2003 (UTC) The convention when referring to larger naval task forces of the era is to name the aircraft carriers, battleships and cruisers and to talk about the smaller ships in more general terms. That is simply a function of numbers, as the sheer number of smaller ships would overwhelm virtually any account with a massive amount of detail. David Newton 00:50, 9 Nov 2003 (UTC)

Invasion of Australia

There was never "a reasonable probability that northern Australia would be invaded"; IJA had neither the manpower nor the shipping for it. IJA could not have successfully occupied Hawaii. See Wilmott and Barhart. Trekphiler (talk) 07:38, 18 September 2005

It depends whether "invaded" means "occupied" or "attacked by ground forces". Hawaii was a fortress compared to northern Australia in mid-1942. The Northern Territory had been at serious risk of some kind of surface attack since February, following the air raids on Darwin, February 19, 1942. The Battle of the Java Sea had all but destroyed Allied naval power in the eastern Indian Ocean and Arafura Sea; apart from subs, the main offensive presence was the obsolete cruiser HMAS Adelaide (1918). There were virtually no operational combat aircraft to the north west of a line between Perth and the tip of Cape York. Grant65 (Talk) 12:45, 19 September 2005 (UTC)

Saburo Sakai, a Japanese aviator who fought in this theater during most of 1942 (April - August) describes it as a hard-fought campaign the whole way through. (Any aircraft in New Guinea could have been redeployed back to Australia in the event of a Japanese victory). The only way this would even be plausible is if Japan launched an invasion in lieu of the Midway Operation, which they were already committed to by May 1942. Even if you grant the Japanese overwhelming victories at both Coral Sea/Port Morseby and Midway, Japan would still only have a slight edge over Allied naval forces, and certainly would lack the decisive air, land, and seapower (let alone logistics) necessary to launch an invasion. Read the CombinedFleet article on the Hawaiian invasion and then remember that Eastern Australia alone is as big as the Eastern Front or the China Theater with a somewhat sizeable population. In short, the Japanese may have talked about it, but any serious study would have shown it was utterly impractical. Palm_Dogg 03:43, 30 October 2005 (UTC)

Parshall's Shattered Sword (p. 52) states that Japan's military leadership was seriously considering an invasion of Australia if everything else went according to plan, such as a victory at Midway and successful operations against Fiji, Samoa, and New Caledonia. The Japanese Army was also wary that they wouldn't be able to reallocate enough units from the Chinese and Burma/India fronts for an invasion of Australia, but an Australia operation was under consideration. Cla68 (talk) 12:51, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

"seriously considering an invasion of Australia" They were "seriously considering" an invasion of the Soviet Union in August 1945, too. That was as much a fantasy. IJA leadership had no chance of lifting the divisions it would take; even given the abysmal performance of the MkXIV, IJA shipping wasn't adequate for it. And IJN was d*mn unlikely to offer 'em any without a quid quo pro, like support for an invasion of Hawaii, Yamamoto's favorite pipedream. I wanna know what dope these guys were smoking. 13:47, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

the current version is empty...due to last edit by Tommy515

Its pretty disturbing how often this article is being vandalised. Jeez Tommy515, if you want to say how great ur "mum" is say it elsewhere. Anyhow thanks to EricR for reverting it back. (Yamam 09:38, 17 February 2006 (UTC))

Clear one edit

I rewrote this:

" the Allies had lost a dozen battleships and carriers, and had been unable"

It's far from clear how many of each were sunk; specify. Also, attribute the famous quote, "scratch one flattop", or take it out. OK?

I also deleted this:

"a very close-fought encounter where an additional carrier might have tipped the balance."

It's far from clear this is so. Trekphiler 12:15 & 12:21, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

What does this mean: "two heavy cruisers, a large plane" Does it mean "Many planes?" " Aircraft carriers with their complements of planes? " While I'm here, what are the editors proposing to change?Witnessforpeace 03:08, 2 March 2007 (UTC)

"A large plane" was old vandalism -- I've fixed it, along with various other things by reverting the article back a few weeks. I'm not sure what your last question refers to. Grant | Talk 04:35, 2 March 2007 (UTC)

The Lexington did NOT sink

Yes it was out of action for a few weeks.But it is undeniable that it fought in the Battle of Midway,so dont write that the U.S.S. Lexington was a "casualty".The battle was a strategic draw. —The preceding unsigned comment was added by 76.22.84.93 (talk) 23:52, 15 April 2007 (UTC).

Excuse me,I was wrong,that was the Yorktown,do not change anything.

Tactical Draw

I think this is a well written article and with some additional work will get up to featured article quality. One point I'd like to make is that the analysis of the battle needs refinement:

"In tactical terms, the Japanese had achieved a narrow victory: one small carrier lost and a large carrier severely damaged against the Americans’ loss of a large carrier and significant damage to another. But from the Allied point of view, after five months of continuous defeat, a battle that came out almost even was close enough to a victory as not to matter."

This tactical analysis is debateable. I'm not saying it's wrong, but it is only partial. In terms of _ships_ sunk the Japanese won at Coral Sea. 1 American heavy carrier sunk (which sank hours later so the Japanese may not have been sure the day after) and a couple of smaller ships sunk vs. 1 light Japanese carrier and heavy damage to a heavy carrier plus some smaller ships sunk (destroyer at Tulagi and also a cruiser from the Shoho screen if I remember right).

Another analysis would look at aircraft. Because of the delay in the Lexington's sinking and interim repairs she was able to recover her planes and then when things went south a few hours later enough were flown over to the Yorktown that the she actually had a full complement of _undamaged_ planes the morning after the battle. The Japanese had to push undamaged planes over the side of the Zuikaku to make room for damaged planes of the Shokaku's. As I recall (it's been over 10 years) Saburo Sakai stated that the Japanese had only a couple of dozen planes ready to fly the morning after. Thus one could argue that tactically the U.S. owned the battlefield with the superior force intact (80 undamaged planes vs. 40 planes, some damaged). The Japanese may have had as many pilots able to fly after the battle but they lacked planes. --Erik

The usual standard is ships lost. Also, if CVs were unable to launch, it made no difference how many planes were available. Trekphiler (talk) 01:10, 3 January 2008 (UTC)

By the numbers

Since the losses in Japanese aircraft is being mentioned, the U.S. number should be also, or delete the Japanese. Trekphiler (talk) 12:10, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Fixed, per Funk and Wagnalls. Carnac the Magnificent 13:58, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Not Al Haig, either

I deleted Crace (not an independent command) & Inouye (not at sea), & added the IJN COs (independent commands & at sea); unless you intend to include Halsey, Ghormley, Kinkaid, et al., don't change it back. Trekphiler (talk) 13:58, 30 March 2008 (UTC)

Fitch and Hara were placed in Tactical Command by their respective task force commanders, and that fact ought to be mentioned somewhere. The achievements of the carriers at Coral Sea were due their OTCs--Fletcher flew his flag in Minneapolis and was, at best, McClellanesque when it came to warfare.

Don't talk to me about Fletcher. As far as I'm concerned, he was a coward at Guadalcanal & incompetent at Midway. Trekphiler (talk) 00:17, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

Fletcher had his issues, but he did, basically, win at Coral Sea and the Eastern Solomons. Historians are divided on his effectiveness. John Lundstrom, whose opinion I respect, is outspoken in his support for Fletcher's decision-making. But, other historians make a good, reasoned point that Fletcher could have been more aggressive, especially when he was supposed to be helping the American Wake Island garrison. Bruce Loxton blames Fletcher for enabling the Allied defeat at Savo Island because of his precipitate withdrawal from Guadalcanal. I'd say that it's fair to say that Fletcher's legacy is a mixed one. Cla68 (talk) 13:04, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

Mixed. That's for sure. He doesn't deserve the blame for Wake, tho. That's a bad rap. It came from Pye, who didn't want to risk losing his CVs, esp after what happened to Kimmel: getting court-martialed. Savo, he should get hammered. He pulled back to "fuel" for flimsy cause, & never bothered to inform his SOs or Turner, who was d*mn lucky (Kurita?) had less nerve than Fletcher. Which seems typical for IJN admirals, for reasons that escape me; cf Leyte. Except Tanaka, who was also smart; trouble was, he was too lippy, & they dumped him in a sewer in SWPA for it. He should've gotten Yamamoto's job. Or Yamaguchi's; if the damn fool hadn't decided to go down with Hiryū, he could've replaced Yamamoto. Be greatful he didn't. Be even more greatful he didn't have the job at the start of the war. Trekphiler (talk) 13:39, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

Unfortunately for the Japanese, and similar to many other militaries, including, sometimes, the U.S., many of the senior naval leaders, including Yamamoto, were in their positions for political reasons, and not necesarily based on effective combat leadership skills. Hara's Japanese Destroyer Captain points out that unless a naval officer graduated in the top tier of his class from Eta Jima and had served most of his career in battleships, he had very little chance of promotion to the top positions in the Navy, such as a fleet commander or to the general staff. So officers like Tanaka, who specialized in leading cruiser and destroyer forces, never really had a chance no matter how well they did in actual operations. The U.S. Navy seems to have done a better job as the war progressed of selecting officers for increased responsibility based on proven effectiveness in operations, for example, Arleigh Burke, who specialized in leading destroyer squadrons but was quickly moved up to operations officer for Mitscher's fast carrier fleet. Cla68 (talk) 16:07, 6 April 2008 (UTC)

Okinoshima

minelayer Okinoshima was not sunk during this battle. it was a week a later by a submarine.