Battle of Issus

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Battle of Issus
Part of the Wars of Alexander the Great

Alexander battling Darius at the Battle of Issus
DateNovember, 333 BC
Location
Result Macedonian victory
Belligerents
Macedon,
Greek allies
Persia
Commanders and leaders
Alexander the Great Darius III
Strength
37,000 infantry,[1]
5,000 cavalry
68,000 regular infantry,[2]
12,000 cavalry,
10,000 Immortals,
10,000 Greek mercenaries
Casualties and losses
500 30,000

The Battle of Issus (or more commonly The Battle at Issus) occurred in southern Anatolia, on November 333 BC. The invading troops led by the young Alexander of Macedonia, outnumbered roughly 4:1, defeated the army personally led by Darius III of Persia in the second great battle for primacy in Asia. After Alexander's forces successfully forced a crossing of the Hellespont (the Dardanelles) and defeated a favored Persian general in a prior encounter, the Battle of the Granicus, Darius took personal charge of his army, gathered a large army from the depths of the empire, and maneuvered to cut the Greek line of supply, requiring Alexander to countermarch his forces, setting the stage for the battle near the mouth of the Pinarus River and south of the village of Issus.

Eventual accounts tell of bodies piled within the waters high enough to dam its flow and that the river ran red with blood. So while Alexander is known to have repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining contact with the beach (to his sub-commander on the left (seaward) flank, it is safe to assume a lot of action that day along all the water course in its 2.5 km travel through the small narrow rough hilly coastal plain that prevented the Persians, with their greater numbers, from outflanking the attacking Greeks.

Initially, Alexander chose what was apparently unfavorable ground to an attack across (rough, briar choked, uphill) which was in fact a feint meant to pin and hold the Persian forces. This surprised Darius who mistakenly elected to hold position while Alexander then led the true attack personally on the right while instructing the Macedonian phalanx trained infantry, his main body, to make contact and just hold the main Persian army in check; thus in essence he advanced to take up a defensive posture. Meanwhile Alexander personally led the more elite Greek Companion Cavalry against the Persian left up against the hills, and cut up the enemy on the less encumbering terrain generating a quick rout. After achieving a breakthrough, Alexander demonstrated he could do the difficult and held the cavalry successfully in check after it broke the Persian right. Alexander regrouped, then turned the body into the right flank of the Persian center, butchering Darius' body guard and under generals, provoking a panic and flight by that emperor himself, and causing a general rout generating a smashing one-sided victory. His pursuit of Darius was delayed and generally impeded by the fleeing Persian troops and camp followers, although he pursued Darius' chariot until after dark some 24 to 25 km before giving up the chase.

Combatants

  • Macedonians and their other Greek allies led by Alexander, with about 5,000 cavalry, 26,000 infantry.
  • Persians under Darius III with some 68,000 regular infantry, 10,000 Persian Immortals, 10,000 Greek mercenaries, and 12,000 cavalry.[2][3]

Location

The battle took place south of the ancient town Issus, which is close to present-day Iskenderun (a Turkish equivalent of "Alexandria"), Turkey (which was actually founded by Alexander to commemorate his victory), on either side of a small river called Pinarus. At that location the distance from the gulf of Issus to the surrounding mountains is only 2.6 km, a place where Darius could not take advantage of his superiority in numbers.

Speculation on the location of the Pinarus has taken place for over 80 years. Older historians believed it to be the Deli Tchai river, but historians N.G.L. Hammond and A.M. Devine have made convincing claims that the Pinarus is actually the Payas River, the latter using eye-witness examination of the river, which may not have drastically changed since antiquity.

Their evidence is based on Callisthenes' accounts of the measurements of the battlefield and distances marched by both armies in the prelude to the battle and distance given by Diodorus after the battle.

  • see above reference

Prelude

Movements to the battlefield.

Alexander set out into Asia in 334 BC and defeated the local Persian satraps at the Battle of the Granicus. He then proceeded to occupy all of Asia Minor.

While Alexander was in Tarsus he heard of Darius massing a great army in Babylon. If Darius were to reach the Gulf of Issus he could use the support from the Persian fleet under Pharnabazus still operating in the Mediterranean Sea, thus easing his supply and possibly landing troops behind the enemy. Alexander kept his main army at Tarsus but sent Parmenion ahead to occupy the coast around Issus. In November, Alexander received reports that the great Persian army had advanced into Syria, to a town named Sochi. Alexander decided to mass his scattered army and advance south from Issus through the Pass of Jonah.

Darius knew that Parmenion held the Pass of Jonah and thus chose a northern route of advance. The Persians captured Issus without opposition, and cut off the hands of all the sick and wounded that Alexander had left behind. Now Darius found out he had placed his army behind the Macedonians and had cut their supply lines. He then advanced to the south and got no further than the river Pinarus before his Scouts spotted Alexander marching North. Darius had to set up camp on this narrow coastal plain.

The Motives

Initial dispositions of Persian and Macedonian forces.

There is much debate as to the motives of Alexander and Darius preluding Issus. A strong and convincing modern perspective, based on Curtius, is that Darius was forced to move camp to terrain that favored Alexander because Alexander was fighting defensively due to a recommendation by his war council and Parmenion. Darius' large army could not be supported in the field during winter and his cities in Phoenicia were already in unrest at the arrival of Alexander. Darius was forced to move his large army to a small battlefield, which overwhelmingly favored Alexander's smaller force.

Alexander was waiting for Darius to come south around the Amanus Mountain range because the pass Darius would have used, the Belen Pass, was much closer to Sochi and offered the quickest access to the area Alexander defended. Alexander was waiting 10 miles to the west of the Belen Pass at Myriandrus to spring a trap on Darius as he crossed through the Belen Pass or through the Pillar of Jonah if he moved north, where Darius' army would be disorganized and disjointed in the narrow crossing. Darius instead moved north from Sochi and around the mountains, emerging behind Alexander's position and on his supply and communication lines. Thus Alexander was forced to march to Darius, who had caught him off guard in a large flanking maneuver. This gives the illusion that Darius was the one acting defensively, since Alexander was forced to march to him.

The Battle

The Macedonians advanced through the Pillar of Jonah. Alexander led his Companion cavalry on the right flank and he set his Thessalian Greek allied cavalry on the left of the Macedonian phalanx with Parmenion in command.

Darius formed his line with his heavy cavalry concentrated next to the coast on his right, followed by the Greek mercenary phalanx (historian A.M Devine places them at a strength of 12,000, comparable to the Macedonian phalanx). Next to the Greek phalanx Darius spread his Persian infantry, the Cardaces, along the river and into the foothills, where they wrapped around to the other bank and threatened Alexander's right flank (the formation resembled gamma, Γ). Arrian gives an inflated figure of 20,000 to these troops. Darius positioned himself in the centre with his best infantry, the Greek mercenaries, and his royal cavalry guard. According to some historians, like P. Stratikis, he was trying to "copy" the Hellenic battle formation of the Battle of the Granicus.

Alexander's decisive attack.

The Persian cavalry charged Parmenion and the allied cavalry across the river to open the battle. Alexander's left wing once again became the crux of the battle, like at Gaugamela two years later, where Parmenion held the wing long enough against superior Persian numbers so that Alexander could make his calculated cavalry strike against Darius and break the Persian army. The Hypaspists led by Alexander, on foot, delivered an assault during this time across the riverbed on the Cardaces and managed to punch a hole through the Persian line.

Alexander then mounted a horse at the head of his Companion Cavalry and led a direct assault against Darius who fled from the battlefield. Alexander then saw his left flank and center in trouble, let Darius flee, and crashed into the rear of the Greek mercenaries. The Greek mercenaries broke up. The Persians then saw their Great King gone, the battle being lost, and abandoned their positions in full rout. The Macedonian cavalry pursued the fleeing Persians for as long as there was light. There was significant carnage after the battle due to the massive, unorganized retreat and the pursuing Macedonians. Arrian mentions Ptolemy I as saying that Alexander and his bodyguards, while pursuing Darius, came upon a gap which they effortlessly crossed on the bodies of dead Persians.

Aftermath

The Battle of Issus was a decisive Macedonian victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present.

Depictions of the battle

Notes

  1. ^ Macedonian army is 42,000 in total according to Warry (1998).
  2. ^ a b Engels (1920) and Green (1990) estimate the total size of Darius' army to be no larger than 100,000 at Issus due to the logistics of fielding more than 100,000 soldiers in battle being extremely difficult at the time. Delbrück (1978) further estimates Darius' army to be 25,000 in total.
  3. ^ In ancient sources, Arrian and Plutarch said 600,000 soldiers in total, Diodorus and Justin said 400,000, and Curtius Rufus said 250,000.

Sources

Ancient

Modern

  • Delbrück, Hans (1920). History of the Art of War. University of Nebraska Press. Reprint edition, 1990. Translated by Walter, J. Renfroe. 4 Volumes.
  • Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London.
  • Fuller, John (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the Great. New Jersey: De Capo Press.
  • Green, Peter (1974). Alexander of Macedon: A Historical Biography.
  • Rogers, Guy (2004). Alexander: The Ambiguity of Greatness. New York: Random House.
  • Warry J. (1998), Warfare in the Classical World. ISBN 1-84065-004-4.

External links

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