Argumentum a fortiori

The Latin idiom argumentum a fortiori is used linguistically (mainly in jurisprudence, theology or mathematics) with the meanings:

"From the stronger"
"above all"
"The more" or "the less"
"According to the more convincing reason"

used to express a proof of an assertion by an already proven stronger assertion. A logical conclusion based on this method is also referred to as a "first-right conclusion" (example: if it is forbidden to ride a bicycle in pairs, it is even more forbidden to ride a bicycle with three people). A distinction is made for the “first-right conclusion”

A maiore ad minus : No more big things
A minore ad maius : stopping from the smaller to the bigger

The argumentum a fortiori is mostly used to reinforce assertions, sometimes also to simulate a logical conclusion where none is present ( Petitio principii ).

To the subject

According to school grammar, strictly speaking , it should be called a fortior e . Occasionally, however, the suffix -ī in the ablative takes the place of the usual -e in classical Latin , even if this is rare in comparatives .

The argumentum a fortiori is a controversial topic of the philosophical relativism debates because an important argumentative- hermeneutical final form in the Talmud , kal va-chomer (Hebrew: קל וחומר), is related to it. While authors like Daube , who scientifically established the thesis of the fundamentally identical final form of Argumentum a fortiori and Kal va-homer in 1949, and Dov Gabbay defend the cultural invariance of reason , the u. a. of Eilberg-Schwartz represented relativistic counter-position to the ratio of the two circuits in this rationality debate for cultural-related validity limitation of logic to argue.

literature

Thomas Kyrill Grabenhorst: The argumentum a fortiori. A pilot study based on the practice of decision-making reasons (= European university publications. Series 2: Law. Vol. 1026). Lang, Frankfurt am Main [a. a.] 1990, ISBN 3-631-43261-5 (also: Frankfurt am Main, University, dissertation, 1990).
Egon Schneider (greeting), Friedrich E. Schnapp: Logic for lawyers. The basics of thought theory and the application of law. 6th, revised and expanded edition. Vahlen, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-8006-2997-6 , p. 158 ff.

supporting documents

^ David Daube : Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric. In: Hebrew Union College Annual. Vol. 22, 1949, ZDB -ID 1392696-2 , pp. 239-265, digitized version (PDF; 4398 MB) .

↑ Michael Abraham, Dov M. Gabbay , Uri Schild: Analysis of the Talmudic Argumentum A Fortiori Inference Rule (Kal Vachomer) using Matrix Abduction. In: Studia Logica. Vol. 92, No. 3, August 2009, ISSN 0039-3215 , pp. 281-364, doi : 10.1007 / s11225-009-9202-5 .

^ Naomi Janowitz, Andrew J. Lazarus: Rabbinic Methods of Inference and the Rationality Debate. In: The Journal of Religion. Vol. 72, No. 4, October 1992, ISSN 0022-4189 , pp. 491-511.

[1] David Daube : Rabbinic Methods of Interpretation and Hellenistic Rhetoric. In: Hebrew Union College Annual. Vol. 22, 1949, ZDB -ID 1392696-2 , pp. 239-265, digitized version (PDF; 4398 MB) .

[2] Michael Abraham, Dov M. Gabbay , Uri Schild: Analysis of the Talmudic Argumentum A Fortiori Inference Rule (Kal Vachomer) using Matrix Abduction. In: Studia Logica. Vol. 92, No. 3, August 2009, ISSN 0039-3215 , pp. 281-364, doi : 10.1007 / s11225-009-9202-5 .

[3] Naomi Janowitz, Andrew J. Lazarus: Rabbinic Methods of Inference and the Rationality Debate. In: The Journal of Religion. Vol. 72, No. 4, October 1992, ISSN 0022-4189 , pp. 491-511.