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The hermeneutics ( ancient Greek ἑρμηνεύειν hermēneúein , German , explain ' , interpret' translate ') is the theory of interpretation of texts and understanding . In understanding, man uses symbols . He is embedded in a world of signs and in a community that uses a common language. There is meaning not just in texts, but in all human creations . Developing this is a hermeneutical task.

In antiquity and in the Middle Ages , hermeneutics served as a science and art for the interpretation ( exegesis ) of basic texts, especially the Bible and laws . In modern times , their scope has expanded. It developed into a general doctrine of the requirements and methods of appropriate interpretation and a philosophy of understanding. With the insight into the limits of human knowledge, which was decisively promoted by Immanuel Kant , the problem of the historical ties between human thinking and understanding has arisen for hermeneutics since the 19th century. As the most influential exponent of philosophical hermeneutics in the 20th century, Hans-Georg Gadamer turned this limitation into the positive and placed understanding in the context of a fundamentally never-ending conversation about the interpretation of important evidence of historical and cultural tradition.

The term hermeneutics as such only emerged in modern times and was first used as a book title by the Strasbourg philosopher and theologian Johann Conrad Dannhauer . General hermeneutics deals with the interpretation of texts or of signs in general. Special hermeneutics deals with the problems associated with the interpretation of texts, as they arise from the individual subjects of law , theology , literary studies , historical studies or art history . Traditionally, it has a stronger connection to the humanities and was used by Wilhelm Dilthey as a methodological foundation. The reflection of the conditions for interpreting, interpreting and understanding non-text-bound works of music and their interpretation or works of the visual arts is called hermeneutics. According to the idealistic view, understanding is a being in which the world interprets itself. An intuitive approach understands understanding as something immediate, which precedes all reflection and underlies all knowledge and discursive thinking.

Conceptual origin

Hermes , the messenger of the gods

In ancient Greece , the oracle of Delphi neither gave concrete instructions nor completely hid its meaning, rather it indicated. Hermeneutic art was supposed to illuminate the language of the gods. The etymological derivation of hermeneutics from the messenger of the gods Hermes is controversial, but a common root can be assumed. In Greek mythology , Hermes was not only the messenger of messages from the gods, but also the translator of these messages. Without his interpretation, they would remain cryptic . In this mythology, Hermes is also considered the inventor of writing and language . The ἑρμηνεύς (Hermeneus) belongs to the same root word and appears in Plato in two forms: as a poet who conveys the message of the gods, and as a rhapsode who interprets the works of the poets. As ἑρμηνευτικὴ τέχνη (hermeneutikè téchne, téchne: old Greek: ability, craftsmanship, craft), the term ἑρμηνευτική is first handed down to Plato in connection with religious prophecy.

historical development

Although the conceptual fixation of hermeneutics and its systematic development into a separate epistemological area did not fall until the early modern period, its historical roots go back much further. Hermeneutics as the art of interpretation has its origins in ancient exegesis , the Jewish interpretation of the Tanakh and in ancient Indian teachings. The interpretation of biblical texts then became the actual engine of the development of a differentiated hermeneutics as a scientific discipline.

Ancient hermeneutics

Exploring the meaning

Hermeneutics had early applications in Greek religion, mythology, and ancient philosophy. The art of divination explored the hidden meaning of an object and was called mantic (μαντεία). Interpretation was concerned with the meaning behind the obvious meanings. In the exegesis (exégesis = interpretation, explanation) of Homer's works , the meaning of the words and the sentences was initially commented on. Only on a deeper level was it a matter of discussing and interpreting the allegorical (αλληγορειν - express it somewhat differently). Socrates provoked his fellow citizens by asking what the truth about their future fate and their souls would be. He subjected their answers to a harsh critique of the meaning and tried to show that everything must be questioned in order to gain a solid starting point.


According to Plato , the two sides of being that are to be understood are the sensually perceptible nature and the non-sensually perceptible essential being . The soul does not strive for the sensually perceptible quality, but for the essential being. For each of the things, complete spiritual knowledge comes about in five steps:

  1. the name (which we pronounce aloud),
  2. the linguistically expressed definition of the term (composed of nominal and statement words, e.g. "the circle is the same distance everywhere from its center"),
  3. that which can be perceived by the five senses (e.g. made by the draftsman or the turner),
  4. conceptual knowledge (comprehension by the rational mind, cognitive conception of such things),
  5. that which can only be recognized through deepening in reason and is the true archetype, the idea of the thing (ideal or intelligible reality or essence, the pure, non-sensual truth, the originally perfectly essential).

The approach to the inner essence of things can only take place free of falsifying passions:

“Only when names, defining descriptions by means of language, sensual views and perceptions in relation to their statements about the essence of things in dispassionate teachings are corrected through diligent mutual comparison, and when we use the right dialectical method without passionate righteousness , then only works us the light of purely spiritual perception and conception of pure reason of the inner nature of things. "

- Plato : Seventh letter


With Aristotle , in addition to the statement as an expression and as the elementary basis of logical thinking, every statement is always related to the question of what is meant by it. Even the statement itself was understood in classical Greece as an interpretation (ἑρμηνεύειν). The statement converts what is internally thought into an expressed language. The interpretation of what is spoken requires the opposite path from the utterance to the intended expressive intention: "The ἑρμηνεύειν thus turns out to be a process of conveying meaning, which goes back from the outside to an inside of meaning."

The allegory

In the ancient interpretation of texts in both Greece and Judaism , allegory was important. It is about finding a hidden meaning of the texts that differs from the literal meaning. The Stoa made a significant contribution to the development of allegorical methods of interpretation , which in turn influenced the Jewish interpretation of the Bible, in particular of Philo of Alexandria . Even Origen as early Christian commentator of the Bible was assumed that in addition to the literal sense in the Scriptures, especially a higher mental and spiritual sense is present. Early Christian dogmatics had to deal with the conflict of meaning between the special salvation history of the Jewish people, as contained in the Old Testament, and the universalistic preaching of Jesus in the New Testament. Influenced by Neoplatonic ideas, Augustine taught the ascent of the spirit via the literal and the moral to the spiritual. In his opinion, things are also to be understood as signs (res et signa). Even the realm of things accordingly requires an opening up of the meaning of creation.

Medieval exegesis

In the Christian Middle Ages the tradition of ancient exegesis was continued in its basic structure of dichotomy. The subject was the Bible . The patristic hermeneutics, which Origen and Augustine had combined, was developed by Cassian into the method of the fourfold sense of writing and systematically presented. The limits of textual criticism were determined by a doctrine , the exegetical code. The reason was the conflict between the dogmatics of interpretation and the results of new research at the time. According to this doctrine, the Bible had an outer coat, the cortex , which surrounded a deeper core, the nucleus . At the cortex level, grammar and semantics were interpreted in terms of the literal sense ( sensus litteralis ) and the historical sense ( sensus historicus ), while at the core level ( nucleus ) the deeper meaning, the sententia , was explored. For this purpose, the nucleus was divided into three depths of the formations of importance. At the first nucleus level, the moral meaning ( sensus tropologicus ) was explored, by which the behavior of people should be guided. On the next lower level were the christological and ecclesiastical meanings ( sensus allegoricus ), with which the beliefs should be explicated. At the deepest level of the nucleus , exegesis was concerned with the sensus anagogicus , the leading sense, which makes clear the depth of the mystery of Revelation and thus points to the future. The deepest meanings that concerned the heavenly mysteries were considered to be inexplicable for people in this world . They are only revealed to them in the hereafter ( revelation ).

Reception of Roman law

The tradition of legal hermeneutics took on a new meaning when jurisprudence became an economically and politically relevant art in the struggle of the rising urban bourgeoisie against the nobility. The struggle for the correct interpretation of legal texts led to a secularized hermeneutic methodology. It has become a method of interpretation for thought products of the past. Legal processes should be influenced with reference to recognized historical authorities. It was not only important to understand the Roman jurists, but also to apply the dogmatics of Roman law to the modern world. From this a close connection of the hermeneutical to the dogmatic task grew in jurisprudence. The doctrine of interpretation could not be based on the intention of the legislature alone. Rather, it had to raise the “ground of the law” to the hermeneutical standard.


Painting by Lucas Cranach the Elder Ä. 1532 Philipp Melanchthon

Recovery of the relevant

The subject of hermeneutics, which developed anew with the Reformation and Humanism at the beginning of the sixteenth century, was the correct interpretation of texts that contain what is actually decisive that is to be regained. This was particularly true of Biblical Hermeneutics . The Protestant Reformation, which was essentially based on the validity and interpretation of the Bible for its legitimation , gave hermeneutics lasting new impulses. The reformers polemicized against the tradition of church teaching and its treatment of the text with the allegorical method. They demanded a return to the wording of the Holy Scriptures. The exegesis should be objective, object-bound and free from all subjective arbitrariness.

Luther and Melanchthon

Martin Luther emphasized that the key to understanding the Bible lies within itself ("sui ipsius interpres"). Every Christian has the ability to interpret and understand the scriptures themselves ( Sola scriptura principle). According to Luther, one should not approach Scripture with a preconceived opinion, but pay attention to its own wording. Scripture interpretation must not prevent Scripture from saying its own cause, or the scripture interpreter will interrupt the word.

"So the writing is ain't easy. That is fine if the schrifft interprets itself [...] "

- Martin Luther : Sermon 1522

Philipp Melanchthon relied on the humanistic tradition of rhetoric in developing an early Protestant hermeneutic. The conceptual vocabulary was taken from ancient rhetoric . Melanchthon reinterpreted the ancient rhetorical terms for the proper study of books (bonis auctoribus legendis). The requirement to understand everything as a whole goes back to the relationship between “caput et membra” (head and members): the other members are subordinate to the head. Associated with this was a shift in emphasis away from the conception of an effective personal speech (“ars bene dicendi”) to the intelligent reading and interpretation of texts (“ars bene legendi”): “The preoccupation with rhetorical theory does not serve to generate eloquence , but rather to provide methodical tools for the young people to be trained in order to competently assess elaborated texts. "

Matthias Flacius

Melanchthon's student Matthias Flacius emphasized the dogmatic unity of the canon, which he played off against the individual interpretation of the New Testament writings. In doing so, he severely restricted the Lutheran principle “sacra scriptura sui ipsius interpres”. He underlined the need for proper language skills to understand supposedly dark passages in the Bible, which he clarified by systematically using parallel passages from the Holy Scriptures. Often he was able to build on studies by Augustine and other church fathers. The difficulties that hampered the understanding of the Bible are purely linguistic or grammatical: “Language is a sign or an image of things and, as it were, a kind of glasses through which we look at things themselves. If, therefore, the language is dark either in itself or for us, then we recognize the things themselves with difficulty through it. "


Johann Conrad Dannhauer

Ars critica

During the Renaissance , textual criticism (ars critica) developed as an independent discipline. She tried to preserve the original form of the texts. The existing tradition was broken up or transformed by the uncovering of its buried origins. The hidden and distorted meaning of the Bible and the classics should be sought again and renewed. By going back to the original sources, a new understanding should be gained of what had been corrupted by distortion and abuse: the Bible through the teaching tradition of the Church, the classics through the barbaric Latin of scholasticism . The revitalized study of the traditional classics of Roman and then also Greek antiquity led, in connection with the printing press, to a considerable expansion of the interpretation and interpretation of texts. The need arose for a new methodology of the sciences that were sprouting up everywhere. A new organon of knowledge should replace or complete the Aristotelian one. Only now did hermeneutics come to terms with it.

Johann Conrad Dannhauer

Johann Conrad Dannhauer conceived his hitherto little noticed work “ Idea Boni Interpretis ” from 1630 as “hermeneutica generalis”. In 1654 he published his work “Hermeneutica sacra sive methodus exponendarum sacrarum litterarum”: For true interpretation and “elimination of darkness”, the incorruptibility of the judgment, the examination of the preceding and the following, the observance of the analogy , the core statement (Scopus) and the purpose of the text, the author's knowledge of the language used and the consideration of translation errors. Dannhauer emphasized the importance of general hermeneutics:

“Sicut enim non est alia grammatica Juridica, alia Theologica, alia Medica, sed una generalis omnibus scientiis communis. Ita Una generalis est hermeneutica, quamvis in objectis particularibus sit diversitas. "

"Just as there is not a legal grammar here, a different theological grammar there and another medical grammar, but a general one that is common to all, so there is a general hermeneutic, even if there is a difference in the individual subjects."

- Johann Conrad Dannhauer

The aim of hermeneutics is to explain the true meaning of speech and to delimit it from the false. Dannhauer was concerned with a general science of interpretation, with a philosophical hermeneutics that should also provide other faculties such as law, theology and medicine with the tools to interpret written statements. This universal orientation was a propaedeutic science that could be counted as logic in the classical spectrum of science .


The theological hermeneutics of the early Enlightenment rejected the doctrine of verbal inspiration and sought general rules of understanding. Historical biblical criticism found its first hermeneutical legitimation at that time.

Baruch de Spinoza

Spinoza's hermeneutics defends the freedom of philosophy over theology. The script should be examined critically and historically in a free and impartial manner. What cannot be taken from it in full clarity cannot be assumed. Spinoza's Tractatus theologico-politicus , published in 1670, contains a criticism of the concept of miracles and makes the claim of reason that only what is reasonable, i.e. what is possible, may be recognized. That which is offended by reason in Scripture demands a natural explanation. It is not the purpose of the Bible to teach science. Therefore the difference between reason and belief must not be canceled. The Word of God teaches love for God and charity . It is not identical to the script. This only conveys the knowledge that is necessary to understand the divine commandment to love. The other speculations in the Bible about God and the world do not constitute the core of Revelation. The entire content of the scriptures is adapted to human comprehension and imagination. The miracle stories are therefore to be interpreted largely metaphorically . The method of the explanation of the scriptures should correspond to the method of the explanation of nature and adhere to data and principles. Texts should be asked for clues about their origin and transmission history. The biblical teachings should become understandable from the historical context of their origin.

“I have shown that Scripture teaches nothing philosophical, but only piety and that its entire content is adapted to the comprehension and preconceived notions of the people. Whoever wants to adapt it to philosophy must of course ascribe many things to the prophets, which they did not even dream of, and must misinterpret their opinion. On the contrary, whoever makes reason and philosophy the handmaid of theology, must accept the prejudices of an ancient people as divine things and capture and blind the spirit through them. "

- Baruch de Spinoza

Johann Martin Chladni / Chladenius

Johann Martin Chladni

With the interpreter's “Sehepunkt” in 1742, Johann Martin Chladni introduced an aspect into the hermeneutic theory that has remained topical in various respects: “Those circumstances of our soul, our body and our whole person which make or cause us to be ourselves We want to name a thing this way and not differently. ”According to Chladni, Leibniz coined the expression“ point of view ” , who used it to denote the irreversible perspectivism of the monads . Objectivity is only possible when the point of view is taken into account, because this is the only way to adequately take into account the individual "changes that people have from something". Chladni is therefore concerned with the correct understanding by tracing back to the point of view that guides her. A linguistic objectivism that would disregard the point of view would completely miss the point. This is the basic tenet of universal hermeneutics.

Georg Friedrich Meier

Like Chladenius, Georg Friedrich Meier also belonged to the Age of Enlightenment with his work on the art of interpretation that appeared in 1757 . Meier extended the hermeneutic claim far beyond the text interpretation to a universal hermeneutics, which was directed to signs of all kinds, natural as well as artificial. Understanding therefore means classifying in a context of signs that encompasses the whole world. According to Meier, who takes up Leibniz's idea of ​​the best of all worlds , the harmony of the world as a whole depends on the fact that every sign can refer to another because an optimal sign context is given in this world.

Chladenius and Meier consequently have their point of departure in Leibniz's thinking in different ways. Grondin sees two fronts of the current discussion of hermeneutics outlined in this: “On the one hand, the challenging ubiquity of perspectivism (which, after 19th century scientism, believed it had to be called relativism ) in the continental area, on the other hand, the semiotic infiltration of the hermeneutic Thinking in structuralist linguistics , on which postmodern deconstructivism , for which every word signals a drift of signs, feeds. "

Immanuel Kant

The fact that the hermeneutic approaches committed to the rationality concept of the Enlightenment no longer played a role and seemed completely forgotten goes back to the effect of Kant , whose criticism of pure reason in epistemological terms resulted in the collapse of the Enlightenment-rational worldview. In Kant's distinction between the world of phenomena, as conveyed by the human cognitive apparatus, and the “things in themselves” lies “one of the secret roots of romanticism and of the boom that has happened to hermeneutics since then.” With the insight promoted by Kant in For hermeneutics, since the 19th century the problem of the historical ties between human thinking and understanding has posed the limits of human knowledge.

19th century

Friedrich Ast

The thesis of the hermeneutical circle was probably first put forward by the classical philologist Friedrich Ast (1778 to 1841):

“But if we can now only recognize the spirit of ancient times through its revelations in the works of writers, but these themselves again presuppose the knowledge of the universal spirit, how is it possible, since we always only do one thing after the other, but not being able to grasp the whole at the same time, to know the individual, since this presupposes the knowledge of the whole? The circle that I can only recognize a, b, c and so on through A, but this A itself again only through a, b, c etc., is indissoluble if both A and a, b, c are thought of as opposites which mutually condition and presuppose one another, but their unity is not recognized, so that A does not first emerge from a, b, c etc. and is formed by them, but precedes them, pervading them all in the same way, a, b , c are nothing more than individual representations of the one A. In A then there are already a, b, c in the original way; these links themselves are the individual unfolding of the one A, so there is already A in each in a special way, and I don't need to go through the entire infinite series of details in order to find their unity. "

- Friedrich Ast : Basics of grammar, hermeneutics and criticism

Schelling's pupil explained historical understanding in this sense by means of a “basic law”: It is important “to find the spirit of the whole from the individual and to understand the individual through the whole; the first the analytical , the second the synthetic method of knowledge. ”According to Ast, the spirit of the whole is represented in every single element. The idea of ​​the whole is not first awakened by the combination of all its individual elements, but already "with the conception of the first individuality". Understanding and explaining a work is "a true reproduction or replication of what has already been formed."

Friedrich Schleiermacher

Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834)

The theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher set fundamental accents for the development of hermeneutics in the 19th century . For Schleiermacher, hermeneutics was the art of understanding and the technique of correct interpretation. He reacted to the fundamental uncertainty caused by Kant, which had arisen in relation to human reason: Since Kant, their efforts to understand have been viewed in principle as limited, perspective and hypothetical . Schleiermacher emphasized: “The hermeneutic business must not begin where understanding becomes uncertain, but rather from the very beginning of the enterprise, trying to understand a speech. Because the understanding usually only becomes uncertain because it has been neglected earlier. ”He therefore wanted to take precautions against a possible misunderstanding: the individual thought should be interpreted from the whole of the life context from which it arises.

According to the rules of art, two levels of text interpretation should be observed: the grammatical, which breaks down the linguistic context of the written testimony, and the psychological, which seeks to reveal the author's motives, to such an extent that the interpreter ultimately takes over the authors understands better than he himself was able to. With this expansion, hermeneutics loses its traditional relationship with texts as conveyors of truth. Instead, these are understood as expressing the psyche, life and historical epoch of the author, and understanding is equated with reliving and reliving the consciousness, life and the historical epoch from which the texts originate. Referring to the biblical exegesis that Schleiermacher had in mind, he argued that the authors could only be understood from the perspective of their entire life situation. Hermeneutics becomes a general art teaching to empathize with the life behind a given intellectual product. An interpreter tries to put himself in the position of the author in order to understand the creative act and in this way to uncover the possible meaning of the work of art. He connects this theory of "settling in", which Schleiermacher calls divination , with a general metaphysical theory, according to which the author and reader are both expressions of one and the same super-individual life (of the spirit) which has developed through world history .

Schleiermacher already introduced the strangeness of what is to be understood as one of the central topics in the hermeneutic discussion. He starts from a fundamental difference between the understanding subject and what is to be understood. Overcoming this difference is the task of hermeneutics as the art of understanding and is fundamentally possible. This optimism that the strangeness of what is to be understood can be overcome in principle has had a lasting impact on further hermeneutical discussions.


Johann Gustav Droysen first introduced "understanding" as a scientific term to describe the method of historical sciences. He distinguished it from “developing” or later “recognizing” for the philosophical-theological method and from “explaining” for the mathematical-physical method. The possibility of understanding is based on the spiritual and sensual nature of the human being: every inner process manifests itself in a corresponding externally perceptible process. This can be perceived by another person and then causes the same inner process in him.

Hermeneutics became the basis for all historical humanities , not just theology. The psychological interpretation became - in Schleiermacher's successor and based on the romantic doctrine of the unconscious creation of genius - the increasingly decisive theoretical basis of the humanities as a whole. The new epistemological interest had prevailed with August Boeckh in his lectures on "Encyclopedia and Methodology of Philological Sciences" (1877). Boeckh was a student of Schleiermacher. Understanding is its own kind of knowledge that grasps the individual in an intuitive way. Boeckh defined the task of philology as “knowing what is known”. He distinguished between different modes of interpretation, namely the grammatical, the literary-generic, the historical-real and the psychological-individual.

Wilhelm Dilthey

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911)

With Wilhelm Dilthey , the idea of ​​the humanities was systematically re-founded on an understanding and descriptive psychology. Man lives in contrast to nature and has experiences. The experience is the only thing that is immediately certain: "We explain nature, we understand psychological life." Accordingly, Dilthey distinguishes between two types of psychological knowledge, namely descriptive and dissecting psychology on the one hand and explanatory and constructive psychology based on the scientific method on the other. Understanding is above all the method of descriptive and dissecting psychology. The soul life is understood by this as a primarily given, single connection. In this, not only the components, but also their connections, hence the transitions from one state of mind to the other, together with the effect that leads from one to the other, are originally given in inner perception, that is, experienced. Understanding is not based on purely intellectual acts of knowledge, but on the “interaction of all emotional forces in the perception.” On the other hand, explanatory or constructive psychology tries to derive psychological phenomena from a causal connection. But this is not originally given in perception, that is, it is not experienced. Instead, it is constructed constructively from a limited number of elements with the help of connecting hypotheses. Both psychological modes of knowledge complement each other. Descriptive psychology summarizes mental phenomena in fixed, descriptive terms. These in turn provide the basis for the formation of hypotheses in explanatory psychology.

The whole is the unit of life. The individual should be understood from the context of the whole. The structure of life is interpreted analogously to a text, it builds its unity out of its own center. The whole determines the meaning and meaning of the parts, each part expresses something of the whole: “In understanding, we start from the context of the whole, which is given to us alive, in order to make the individual tangible for us.” Understanding of history presupposes a "historical sense" - just as the meaning of a single word is understood from the sentence, the sentence gets its meaning through the context of the whole text and the text is only really understood if all the traditional texts are used for interpretation can be used. The historical understanding spreads over all individual givens and becomes universal because it finds its basis in the totality of the spirit.

Under the impression of the brilliant upswing and prestige of the natural sciences in the 19th century, Dilthey is primarily concerned with demonstrating and reserving a clearly defined area of ​​responsibility for the humanities by making demarcations based on the natural sciences:

“We master this physical world by studying its laws. These laws can only be found when the experiential character of our impressions of nature, the connection in which we stand with it, insofar as we are nature ourselves, the living feeling in which we enjoy them, recede more and more behind the abstract apprehension the same according to the relations of space, time, mass, movement. All these moments work together to the effect that the person switches himself off in order to construct this great object of nature from his impressions as an order according to laws. It becomes the center of reality for man.
But the same person then turns backwards from her to life, to himself. This decline of man into the experience through which nature is there for him, into life, in which only meaning, value and purpose appear, is this another great tendency which determines scientific work. A second center is created. Everything that mankind encounters, what it creates and what it acts, the systems of purpose in which it lives itself out, the external organizations of society to which the individual people are grouped - all of this only receives a unity here. From what is sensually given in human history, understanding goes back to that which never falls into the senses and yet has an effect and expresses itself in this exterior. "

- Wilhelm Dilthey 1910.

Hermeneutics is thus referred to that historical ground without which spiritual scientific knowledge according to Dilthey cannot be achieved, since the cultural-historical prerequisites are constitutively given to every individual human life . The demarcation of the humanities hermeneutics from natural scientific methods he accomplished among other things with the example of the psychology. Dilthey countered the "explanatory" psychology, which he saw in the vicinity of the natural sciences' mode of knowledge based on the formation of hypotheses and causalities, with a psychology based on the understanding of the context of experiences. Dilthey spans the historical-hermeneutical horizon widely:

“From the distribution of trees in a park, the arrangement of the houses in a street, the practical tools of the craftsman to the criminal sentence in the courthouse, things have become history every hour. What the spirit has transferred from its character into its expression of life today will be history tomorrow when it is there. As time progresses, we are surrounded by Roman ruins, cathedrals, pleasure palaces of autocracy. History is nothing that is separate from life, nothing that is separate from the present due to its temporal distance. [...] It only understands what the spirit has created. Nature, the object of natural science, encompasses reality produced independently of the work of the spirit. Everything that humans have effectively imprinted their mark on forms the subject of the humanities. "

- Wilhelm Dilthey 1910.

Dilthey's endeavors to develop a universal methodology for the humanities based on “historical processes of the soul” and to distinguish them from the objects and working methods of the natural sciences had a lasting effect. With his philosophy of life he wanted to go back to a constant behind all relativity and designed an influential type theory of world views that should correspond to the multi-sidedness of life.

20th century

Heinrich Rickert

Heinrich Rickert distinguished the concept of historical understanding from that of psychological understanding in the sense of reliving. The facts in history acquire their historical significance only through their relation to cultural values. These are not realities, but unreal structures of meaning. History is only about those temporal processes which at the same time prove to be the carriers of these semantic structures. Historical understanding is therefore the grasping of the unreal sense structures of culture. The psychological reliving as a way of knowing the mental processes brings real processes and no unreal sense structures to experience. Therefore it has to be conceptually separated from historical understanding. With this fundamental differentiation of the concept of understanding, Rickert influenced both Georg Simmel and Max Weber .

Martin Heidegger

Martin Heidegger (1889–1976)

Martin Heidegger also charged hermeneutics with meaning by trying to make it understandable - less in his main work Being and Time than in his lectures in the early 1920s - as the basis of human care and coping with life. Understanding is a constitutive element of the entire human condition, an "existential". Understanding is no longer a behavior of human thinking among others, but the basic movement of human existence . Dasein itself is distinguished by its understanding of being, it has a hermeneutical essence. Existence always means understanding. It is about an understanding interpretation of what existence is and what it understands itself to be. For Heidegger, hermeneutics is neither a merely theoretical interpretation nor a doctrine of interpretation. Rather, it is a more stretched attempt to determine the essence of interpretation first and foremost from the hermeneutical: It must be determined from the essence of existence that interprets itself in the world and in history. His concept of understanding is based on an "understanding of something" in everyday life as an indispensable prerequisite for all practical skills:

“This, let's call it 'practical' understanding, Heidegger thinks of it as 'existential', i. H. as a mode of being or basic mode by virtue of which we get along and try to get along in the world. Understanding means less a 'way of knowing' than a caring way of knowing about the world. [...] This is in line with the fundamental endeavor of hermeneutics to achieve what is in front of, or rather: in or behind the statement, in short about the soul that expresses itself in the word. There is no doubt that Heidegger follows this striving for hermeneutic understanding in order to radicalize it nonetheless through the universal embedding of understanding in the care structure of existence. […] But it would be a misunderstanding of Heidegger's intentions if one were to think that the self-interpretation of existence should take place outside of language. [...] It cannot be a question of misunderstanding or repressing the language. Heidegger just wants you to hear the manifest concern of existence in every spoken word. "

- Jean Grondin

Heidegger's concept of “thrownness”, which reflects the historical perspective that is attached to all understanding, is in line with Dilthey's “criticism of historical reason”:

“Hermeneutics has the task of making one's own Dasein in its character of being accessible to this Dasein itself, to communicate it, to pursue the self-alienation with which Dasein is struck. In hermeneutics, a possibility develops for existence to understand and be for oneself. "

- Martin Heidegger

Man thus becomes a being that relates to himself. This relationship is an immediate, pre-predicative and pre-reflexive awareness of being-in-the-world and not a reflexive self-knowledge. Understanding precedes reflection. The sides of being-in-the-world are understanding, being, and worry. They are the basis of knowledge and discursive thinking. An important hermeneutic function is fulfilled by freedom. Man does not have freedom as a quality, but the opposite is true:

“Freedom, the ek-sistent, concealing being-is possessed by human beings, and this so originally that only it grants humanity the sufficient reference to a being as a whole, which only establishes all history and is sufficient. [...] Freedom, understood in this way as letting beings be, fulfills and implements the essence of truth in the sense of revealing beings. The 'truth' is not a characteristic of the correct sentence that is uttered by a human 'subject' of an 'object' and then somewhere, one does not know in which area, 'applies', but the truth is the revelation of beings which west an openness. All human behavior and attitudes are exposed in their openness. Therefore man is in the manner of ek-sistence. "

- Martin Heidegger : On the essence of truth

In hermeneutics, Dasein should be made aware of the basic structures of its being. Heidegger's early sketched out philosophical hermeneutics, which he did not follow through any systematic elaboration until his death, attained far-reaching importance for the debate about hermeneutics in the 20th century.

Hans-Georg Gadamer

As the most influential exponent of philosophical hermeneutics in the 20th century, Hans-Georg Gadamer placed understanding in the context of a fundamentally never-ending conversation about the interpretation of important testimonies to historical and cultural tradition. Gadamer received the impetus for the subsequent lifelong preoccupation with a universal philosophical hermeneutics in Heidegger's Freiburg lecture on the “Hermeneutics of facticity” in 1923. In the introduction to his major work, Truth and Method , published in 1960, Gadamer outlined the main features of his hermeneutic teaching as follows:

“It is part of the elementary experience of philosophizing that the classics of philosophical thought, when we try to understand them, make a claim to truth on their own which contemporary consciousness can neither reject nor surpass. [...] If we make understanding the object of our contemplation, the goal is not an art theory of understanding as traditional philological and theological hermeneutics wanted to be. Such a doctrine of art would fail to recognize that, in view of the truth of what speaks to us from tradition, the formalism of artistic ability would claim a false superiority. […] The following investigations believe to serve an insight that is threatened by obscuration in our times flooded with rapid changes. What changes forces its attention incomparably much more than what stays with the old. This is a general law of our spiritual life. The perspectives that arise from the introduction of historical change are therefore always in danger of being distortions because they forget the concealment of the persistent. "

- Hans-Georg Gadamer 1960.

Gadamer rejects the approach of immersing oneself in the spirit of bygone times, as historicism sought. The tradition in which we live is not a cultural tradition, which consists of texts and monuments alone and conveys a linguistically written or historically documented meaning. Rather, the communicatively experienced world itself is constantly handed over to us as an open totality. According to Gadamer, hermeneutic effort succeeds wherever the world is experienced and unfamiliarity is lifted, where there is illumination, insight, appropriation, and ultimately also where the integration of all knowledge of science into the personal knowledge of the individual succeeds. He emphasizes the opportunity to productively use the time gap between the viewer and the object of the tradition:

“But the exhaustion of the true meaning that lies in a text or in an artistic creation does not come to an end somewhere, but is in truth an endless process. Not only are new sources of error eliminated, so that the true meaning is filtered out of all sorts of cloudings, but new sources of understanding arise which reveal unexpected references to meaning. The time interval provided by the filtering is not of a closed size, but is in constant motion and expansion. "

- Hans-Georg Gadamer 1960.

Central to Gadamer's approach to gaining hermeneutical knowledge is the discussion to be conducted under a common question:

“Having a conversation means placing yourself under the guidance of the cause towards which the interlocutors are directed. Having a conversation demands not to argue the other person down, but on the contrary to really consider the factual weight of the other opinion. [...] Whoever has the 'art' of asking is someone who knows how to defend himself against being held down by the prevailing opinion. Whoever owns this art will look for everything that speaks for an opinion. Dialectic consists in trying not to hit what is said in its weakness, but first brings it to its true strength. "

- Hans-Georg Gadamer 1960.

The subjective location-relatedness of individual thinking and cognition is turned positively by Gadamer, because it stimulates a fruitful encounter and examination of what has been handed down and exposes a false prejudice to the test. To block out any prejudice is tantamount to the naivety of historical objectivism.

“So there is certainly no understanding that is free from all prejudices, however much the will of our knowledge must be directed towards escaping the ban of our prejudices. The whole of our investigation has shown that the certainty afforded by the use of scientific methods is insufficient to guarantee truth. This is particularly true of the humanities, but does not mean a reduction in their scientific character, on the contrary, it legitimizes the claim to special human importance that they have been making since time immemorial. The fact that in their cognition the own being of the knower comes into play denotes the real limit of the 'method', but not that of science. What the tool of the method cannot do, must and can actually be done through a discipline of questioning and research that guarantees the truth. "

- Hans-Georg Gadamer 1960.

For Gadamer, the character of the happening of the experience is independent of a subject. In the process of language and understanding, the previous togetherness of the subjective and the objective is expressed before any synthesis and subject-object dialectics. The subject is incorporated into the event. The subject does not do, rather the thing does itself through the subject. The subject instruments neither the things of this world nor the language. Objectivity as a product of the activity of the subject and as object adequacy of subjective contents of consciousness is excluded. The occurrence of understanding presupposes a productive adjustment to what is happening, closeness would be a hindrance. Understanding is not the activity of a subject. It is the event, the very immediate, comparable only to the experience of the beautiful in art. Truth is not a result or a process, it happens to us. All understanding is being included in a truth event. Man is not a subject. In his life he can usually shape less as a subject than he would like. He was born into a context of life with traditional rules. More happens to him than he would like: “The subject of the game is not the players, but the game is only represented by the players.” The game takes hold of the players in its course. There are no object references, only a recognition of oneself. Truth can only come about as a direct experience in the experience of recognition and in the feeling: That is it.

Misch, Lipps and Bollnow

As an alternative to the Heidegger-Gadamer tradition, Dilthey's hermeneutics has developed in contrast to Husserl and Heidegger in Misch, Lipps and Bollnow. Not ontologically oriented, she joins Dilthey's critique of Kant. Her aim is to relate philosophical concepts back to life and to prove their genesis from life itself. Georg Misch , a student of Dilthey, gave Hans Lipps exercises on the theory of meaning at the University of Göttingen in 1923/24 and four lectures on logic from 1929 to 1934 and introduction to the theory of knowledge . He tried to redefine the relationship between life and knowledge, between life and concept. In his book Philosophy of Life and Phenomenology , published in 1930, he deals with Heidegger and Husserl.

Misch's logic ideas were further developed by Lipps. In 1938 Lipp's investigations into a hermeneutic logic appeared . For him, reality is the field of application of philosophy. Philosophy is the hermeneutics of reality and as such is tied to language. Gadamer said: “What has been done in England in the wake of Wittgenstein , Austin , Searle to prospect in the rock of the language has not only a predecessor, but a great counterpart in Hans Lipps. It is almost inexhaustible information that Lipps gains from querying the language ”.

Even Otto Friedrich Bollnow comes from the circle around mixed. His further development of Dilthey's hermeneutics can be characterized as a philosophy of life . For him, life is the mainstay of art and science. From there he gains access to the different kinds of understanding.

Newer approaches

Gadamer's examination of historicism, on which his new conception of philosophical hermeneutics is essentially based, laid foundations on which the subsequent critical reflection of a contemporary hermeneutics is based to this day. Above all, Gadamer's assertion of an authoritative validity of classical texts and works of art in relation to the contemporary horizon as well as his turn against a methodological set of instruments that are supposed to secure the acquisition of objectivity and truth in the humanities have triggered contradictions.

Karl-Otto Apel

With the establishment of a complementary relationship between "explanatory" natural sciences and "understanding" humanities, Karl-Otto Apel combines a methodically developing ideology-critical claim which, for him, is particularly important with regard to non-European cultures:

“For them, the necessity arises from the beginning to work out a quasi-objective, historical-philosophical reference system at the same time as the hermeneutical reflection on their own and foreign traditions , which makes it possible to classify their own position in the world-historical context, without it Contribution has been created by the European-American civilization. Due to the inevitable alienation of their own tradition, they are immediately made aware of the fact that spiritual meanings of the world, e.g. B. religious moral value systems are to be understood in the closest connection with the social forms of life (the institutions). What they are looking for above all is a philosophical-scientific orientation, which conveys the hermeneutical understanding of one's own and other traditions of meaning through sociological analyzes of the respective economic and social systems. "

- Karl-Otto Apel 1973.

Analogous to the psychotherapeutic doctor-patient situation, a partial termination of the hermeneutic communication in favor of objective knowledge methods is necessary. In addition to hermeneutical procedures, the "objective structural analyzes of the empirical social sciences should be used to explain, for example, the non-literary constellations of interests in the political and also in the history of ideas ."

In contrast to hermeneutical understanding, psychological and socio-psychological behavioral analyzes are similar to the prognostically relevant knowledge of natural science; like these, they enable “a technical rule over their object”, as they would be expressed in the manipulation of consumers by the advertising specialist or the voters by the politician trained in demoscopy . From these considerations, according to Apel, "the methodological demand for a dialectical mediation of the social-scientific 'explanation' and the historical-hermeneutical 'understanding' of the tradition of meaning under the regulative principle of a 'suspension' of the irrational moments of our historical existence."

Paul Ricœur

Assuming that hermeneutics is initially directed towards rules for the “interpretation of written documents of our culture”, the French philosopher Paul Ricœur raises the question of the transferability of a methodology of text interpretation to the acquisition of knowledge in the human sciences in general. The starting point of his investigation is the thesis that human action, like a text, is “an unfinished open work, the meaning of which remains in the balance.” The text as a whole is just as individual as a living being or a work of art:

“As an individual, he can only be grasped through a process of narrowing down and specifying genre terms that relate to the literary genre, the category of texts to which this text belongs, and the structures of the various other categories that are in overlap this text. "

- Paul Ricœur 1971.

There is always more than one way of constructing or reconstructing a text.

“The logic of validation opens up a framework for interpretation between dogmatism and skepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to oppose interpretations to one another, to choose between them and to look for agreement, even if this agreement can only be beyond our reach. "

- Paul Ricœur 1971.

For Ricœur, structural text analysis only amounts to “surface semantics”, while the reader's actual understanding and comprehension require deep semantics. “The deep semantics of the text is not what the author wanted to express himself, but what the text is about, i. i.e., it deals with the non-ostentatious references in the text. And the non-ostentatious reference of the text is that world that can be opened up by the deep semantics of the text. […] Understanding has little to do with the author and his situation. It wants to understand the world interpretations opened up by the text. Understanding a text means following its movement from the meaning to the reference, from what it says to what it is about. ”Thus the meaning of texts of a mythical character consists in the invitation to take the text as the starting point for a new worldview .

For Ricœur there is also an analogous depth semantics for the interpretation of social phenomena, “i. H. the development of a world that is no longer just an environment, the design of a world that is more than a mere situation: Can't we say that in the social sciences, too, with the help of structural analyzes, we progress from naive to critical interpretations, of surfaces -Interpretations of depth interpretations? "

Jürgen Habermas

As an important proponent of critical theory , the sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas has also dealt with Gadamer's hermeneutics. The inclusion of sociological research approaches and an emancipatory critique of ideology connects him with Apel, the demand for meta and deep hermeneutics with Ricœur. Habermas criticized above all that the dialogically gained hermeneutic consensus in the sense of Gadamer could also be the result of an ideologically veiled ruling structure that had to be uncovered. Just as psychoanalysis provides the appropriate tools for uncovering individual clouding of consciousness, so ideology criticism has to deal with false social consciousness in a sociological way.

Gadamer's confrontation with the positions taken by Habermas and Apel triggered a mutual learning process. Gadamer clearly rejected the analogy between psychoanalysis and criticism of ideology, since, even with reference to the competence of an emancipatory social science, it is not appropriate to attest a society that does not see itself as a patient in need of treatment to have a false awareness. Gadamer was encouraged by Habermas to subsequently work out the critical potential of his hermeneutics more clearly. Habermas, on the other hand, turned away from the paradigm of a sociologically expanded psychoanalysis and developed a universalization of the hermeneutic basic category of understanding in the model of an ethics of discourse free of domination . In this regard, Grondin observes a "profound solidarity" between Gadamer and Habermas, which leads to the community "against the new challenge of deconstructivism and neo-historical postmodernism ."

Intercultural Hermeneutics

The Austrian philosopher Hans Köchler - with echo of Apel's view of non-European cultures - sought to work out how Gadamer's hermeneutics can serve as the basis for a “dialogue between civilizations”. In 1974, Köchler saw the cultural-philosophical aspects of international cooperation as being shaped by the “dialectic of cultural self-understanding” and used Gadamer's concept of “horizon merging” to explain the understanding between different cultures. Köchler also applied his hermeneutically accentuated criticism of the paradigm of the “ conflict of civilizations ” to the theory of international relations.

Hermeneutic intentionalism

Hermeneutic intentionalism aims to capture the thoughts and intentions of the author. Paul Grice and Quentin Skinner were important representatives of this direction in the 20th century . Skinner makes a strict distinction between the retrospective significance of a historical work ( significance ) and the significance that the work has for its author ( meaning ). From the significance, neither the significance of the work for the author nor the significance of the work itself can be inferred. Rather, the meaning of a work is always identical to the meaning that this work has for its author. For, according to Skinner, it is the author's intentions that determine the meaning of the work. Ultimately, the author fixes what his work means. The work consumer can only determine this meaning and retrospectively relate the work to its effects. The meaning of the work defined by the author must not be violated.

The process of understanding as a spiral shape

Jürgen Bolten would like to replace the term “circle” with the term “hermeneutic spiral”. The anticipation of the whole of the text is constantly being corrected through a more precise understanding of the individual. The process of understanding therefore leads to a constant increase in understanding and is therefore not a circular return to its starting point:

“Understanding a text therefore means understanding the features of the text structure or content and the text production, taking into account the history of the text and reception as well as reflecting on one's own interpretation standpoint in the sense of a mutual justification. The fact that there can be neither wrong nor correct, but at most more or less appropriate interpretations, follows from the […] historicity of the constituents of understanding and the associated ineluctibility of the hermeneutic spiral. [...] Corresponding to the spiral movement, the interpretation regarding the formation of hypotheses is subject to a mechanism of self-correction. "

- Jürgen Bolten : The hermeneutic spiral.

Psychology of understanding

In psychology , understanding is described as a constructive and reconstructive process through which new information is endowed with as much meaning as possible. This process is closely linked to perceiving and remembering . When understanding, humans rely on existing cognitive structures . Information is interpreted as belonging to a certain schema . Schemas in this sense are structures of thought and knowledge that contain assumptions about concrete objects, people, situations and the nature of their relationships. These are real psychological units that are systemically structured. Notes from the current input point to a specific scheme. The information is then interpreted in the light of the expectation based on existing schemes. The rest of the image is filled with information relevant to the schema. As soon as information is interpreted as belonging to a certain scheme, the existing old structures can change unnoticed.

As prior knowledge structures, schemas influence the integration of new information. They fulfill the following functions:

  1. Only the information that appears relevant to existing schemas is included ( selection ).
  2. Certain gaps are opened based on expectations, which are filled from the concrete information offered ( expectation ).
  3. Scheme-related information receives more attention than schema-relevant information and is therefore better retained ( attention ).
  4. Only the meaning and not the form of information is processed further ( abstraction ).
  5. Information is interpreted in relation to the existing schemes ( interpretation ).
  6. The processed information is combined with the schemas to form a new system or is incorporated entirely into it ( integration ).

The concept of understanding, which goes back to Dilthey in the sense of an inner re-experience, is partly criticized as speculative and dogmatic. The fact that an “understanding psychologist” becomes convinced that he has seen through certain interrelationships in their essence lacks scientific objectivity . Other scientists can contradict this subjective belief based on their own understanding of the same facts. The criterion of verifiability therefore does not apply.

Hermeneutics of Nature

Hermeneutics of nature aims at an experience of nature in which either (a) the split between nature and the human world criticized as 'artificial' can be abolished or in which (b) the dichotomies that have already become obsolete and are derived from the opposition between naturalism and culturalism can be lifted in favor a critical theory of the 'cultural artificiation of nature'.

The hermeneutics of nature always includes two things: (1) the application of hermeneutic methods to the constitution and research of scientific objects of investigation with the aim of a hermeneutic recording and restoration of nature as a presupposed, integral object that has been lost through the cognitive pluralization of the natural sciences; (2) a revision of philosophical hermeneutics that claims to be “dialogue with nature”.

At least six basic types of hermeneutics of nature can be distinguished as ideal types:

  1. Hermeneutics of nature based on body experience and / or everyday, pre-predicative experience of nature (Merleau-Ponty; Toadvine).
  2. Hermeneutics of nature as a further development of the program of “social natural science” (G. Böhme).
  3. Hermeneutics of nature as the idea of ​​a “different natural science” that involves an “erotic attitude towards nature” (following H. Marcuse).
  4. Hermeneutics of nature as a continuation of the hermeneutic phenomenology of scientific research (Kockelmans; Crease; Ginev; Heelan)
  5. Hermeneutics of nature within the program of deep ecology (A. Naess).
  6. The program of a hermeneutics of nature based on certain tendencies within environmental philosophy (McKibben; Vogel).

Objective hermeneutics

The objective hermeneutics was especially by the sociologist Ulrich Oevermann , a former assistant of Jürgen Habermas developed as a social science research approach. It is both constitutional theory of the sociological subject and research methodology analogous to Hegel's dictum of a dialectic of “content” (here: constitutional theory ) and “method”. The adjective "objective" is aimed at the subject of the hermeneutic interpretation of meaning: the meanings of representational signs or texts. It is intended to distinguish this research approach from those traditions of hermeneutics that focus on understanding the subjectively intended meaning. The subjective sense, according to the view of objective hermeneutics, can only be inferred from the meanings of objective signs, which are thus the primary object of the hermeneutic interpretation of meaning. The hermeneut can only interpret the meanings of what is said, generated by intersubjectively valid linguistic rules, not directly what is meant. At best, what is meant can be inferred from it. In addition, it could be that the meaning of what was said was not subjectively intended by the speaker. In addition, social-scientific hermeneutics also included meanings that no one had intended subjectively, such as meanings of the social unconscious or the psychological unconscious. The name “Objective Hermeneutics” refers exclusively to the difference between what is said and what is said. Objective hermeneutics therefore by no means claims, as is repeatedly mistakenly believed, to deliver objective interpretations.

The objective hermeneutics arose in the project "Parents and Schools" of the Berlin Max Planck Institute for Human Development . At that time Oevermann was one of the leading quantifying educational researchers in Germany, shaped by the Mannheim School of Social Research and Popper's falsificationism . His move to Jürgen Habermas and to the Frankfurt School (and to Berlin) then seems to have caused a rethink. Objective hermeneutics is also understood as the fulfillment of Adorno's claim to social research that protects the “non-identical”, the peculiarity of the case, and does not prematurely, as is often the case in quantifying research, subsume under pre-established categories. It sees itself as well as the redemption of a research methodology after Charles Sanders Peirce , who with his theory of signs and logic to the classic circuit of the deduction and induction , the abduction adjoined. Objective hermeneutics should, to a certain extent, enable complex abductions, not least with regard to the particularity of a case, in a practical research manner.

See also


Philosophical Hermeneutics
  • Hans Peter Balmer : Understanding, understanding, acknowledging. An attempt at the linguistic quality of existence . readbox unipress, Münster 2018, ISBN 978-3-95925-090-0 .
  • Franco Bianco (Ed.): Contributions to Hermeneutics from Italy. Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 1993, ISBN 3-495-47744-6 .
  • Axel Bühler: Untimely Hermeneutics. Understanding and Interpretation in Enlightenment Thinking. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1994, ISBN 3-465-02632-2 .
  • Axel Bühler: Hermeneutics. Basic texts for an introduction to the theoretical principles of understanding and interpretation. Synchron - Wissenschafts-Verlag der Authors, Heidelberg 2003, ISBN 3-935025-40-8 .
  • Wolfgang Detel : Spirit and Understanding. Historical foundations of modern hermeneutics (= philosophical treatises. 104). Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2011, ISBN 978-3-465-03711-8 .
  • Andreas Dorschel : About the hermeneutic defense of prejudice and why it does not succeed. In: Andreas Dorschel: Thinking about prejudices. Felix Meiner, Hamburg 2001, ISBN 3-7873-1572-1 , pp. 69–86.
  • Günter Figal : The sense of understanding. Contributions to hermeneutic philosophy (= Reclams Universal Library . No. 9492). Reclam, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-15-009492-5 .
  • Günter Figal: Questions of understanding. Studies on phenomenological-hermeneutic philosophy (= philosophical investigations. 21). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009, ISBN 978-3-16-149805-3 .
  • Günter Figal (Ed.): International Yearbook for Hermeneutics (IJH). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2002 ff., ISSN  1619-7569 .
  • Markus Gabriel, Malte Dominik Krüger: What is Reality? New Realism and Hermeneutic Theology, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2018, ISBN 978-3-16-156598-4 .
  • Hans-Georg Gadamer : Truth and Method. Basic features of a philosophical hermeneutics. Mohr, Tübingen 1960.
  • Hans-Georg Gadamer, Gottfried Boehm (ed.): Seminar: Philosophical Hermeneutics (= Suhrkamp-Taschenbücher Wissenschaft. 144). 2nd Edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1979, ISBN 3-518-07744-9 .
  • Jean Grondin: Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics. 2nd, revised edition. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001, ISBN 3-534-15076-7 (excellent and concentrated historical overview).
  • Hans Ineichen: Philosophical Hermeneutics. Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 1991, ISBN 3-495-47492-7 .
  • Karen Joisten : Philosophical Hermeneutics . (Academy Study Books - Philosophy). De Gruyter, 2009. ISBN 9783050044002 .
  • Matthias Jung: Hermeneutics for the introduction (= for the introduction. 408). 4th, completely revised edition. Junius, Hamburg 2012, ISBN 978-3-88506-065-9 (brief systematic introduction, referring to newer philosophical questions, especially in connection with Gadamer's hermeneutics).
  • Hans Ulrich Lessing (Ed.): Philosophical Hermeneutics (= Alber texts philosophy. Vol. 7). Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 1999, ISBN 3-495-47968-6 (text collection from Dilthey to Ricœur).
  • Oliver Robert Scholz: Understanding and Rationality. Investigations into the foundations of hermeneutics and philosophy of language (= Philosophical Treatises. 76). 2nd, revised edition. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2001, ISBN 3-465-03136-9 (also: Berlin, Free University, habilitation paper, 1996/1997).
  • Jörg Schreiter: Hermeneutics - Truth and Understanding. Presentation and texts. Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1988, ISBN 3-05-000664-1 .
  • Helmuth Vetter : Philosophical Hermeneutics. On the way to Heidegger and Gadamer (= series of the Austrian Society for Phenomenology. Vol. 13). Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al. 2007, ISBN 978-3-631-53869-2 .
  • Dieter Teichert : The infinity of language and the limits of understanding , in: U. Arnswald et al. (Eds.): Hermeneutics and the limits of language.
Hermeneutics as a method in the humanities, cultural and social sciences
  • Emilio Betti: Hermeneutics as a general methodology of the humanities (= philosophy and history. 78/79, ZDB -ID 507041-7 ). Mohr, Tübingen 1962.
  • Otto Friedrich Bollnow : Studies on Hermeneutics. 2 volumes (Vol. 1: On the philosophy of the humanities. Vol. 2: On the hermeneutic logic of Georg Misch and Hans Lipps. ). Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 1982–1983, ISBN 3-495-47482-X (vol. 1), ISBN 3-495-47513-3 (vol. 2).
  • Hennig Brinkmann : Medieval hermeneutics. Niemeyer, Tübingen 1980, ISBN 3-484-10365-5 .
  • Rafael Capurro : Hermeneutics of specialist information. Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 1986, ISBN 3-495-47593-1 (also: Stuttgart, University, habilitation paper, 1989).
  • Wilhelm Dilthey : Collected writings. I-XII. 1914–1936, continued from 1962 ff. (Up to 2006: 25 volumes).
  • Johann Gustav Droysen : History. Lectures on encyclopedia and methodology of history. Edited by Rudolf Huebner. Oldenbourg, Munich et al. 1937.
  • Kurt Eberhard : Introduction to the theory of knowledge and science. History and practice of the competing paths of knowledge (= Kohlhammer-Urban pocket books. Vol. 386). 2nd, revised and expanded edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart et al. 1999, ISBN 3-17-015486-9 (with rules deduced from abduction logic for a validity-oriented hermeneutics).
  • Toni Hildebrandt, Tobias Keiling: An image that can be understood is language? On the history of image hermeneutics. In: Dominic E. Delarue, Johann Schulz, Laura Sobez (eds.): The image as an event. On the legibility of late medieval art with Hans-Georg Gadamer (= Heidelberg Research. Vol. 38). Winter, Heidelberg 2012, ISBN 978-3-8253-6036-8 , pp. 127-160.
  • Ulrich HJ Körtner : Introduction to theological hermeneutics. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2006, ISBN 3-534-15740-0 .
  • Ronald Kurt: Hermeneutics. A social science introduction (= UTB. 2572). UVK-Verlags-Gesellschaft, Konstanz 2004, ISBN 3-8252-2572-0 .
  • Hans Lipps : Investigations into a hermeneutic logic (= philosophical treatises. 7). Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1938, (4th edition. (= Hans Lipps: Werke. Vol. 2). Ibid 1976).
  • Susanne Luther and Ruben Zimmermann (eds.): Study book hermeneutics. Biblical interpretation through the centuries as a learning field for text interpretation. Portraits - Models - Source texts (with CD-Rom), Gütersloher Verlag, Gütersloh, 2014, ISBN 978-3-579-08137-3 .
  • Georg Misch : Philosophy of Life and Phenomenology. A discussion of the Dilthey direction with Heidegger and Husserl. In: Philosophischer Anzeiger. Vol. 3, 1928/1929, ZDB -ID 538825-9 , pp. 267-368, 405-475; Vol. 4, 1929/1930, pp. 181–330, (Also special reprint: F. Cohen, Bonn 1930; 2nd edition. Teubner, Leipzig et al. 1931; 3rd edition (unchanged reprint of the 2nd edition). With an afterword for the 3rd edition. Teubner, Stuttgart 1967).
  • Stephan Meder: misunderstanding and understanding. Savigny's foundation of legal hermeneutics. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-16-148418-5 .
  • Friedrich Schleiermacher : Hermeneutics and Criticism (= Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft. 211). With an appendix of Schleiermacher's texts on the philosophy of language. Edited and introduced by Manfred Frank . 7th edition. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1999, ISBN 3-518-27811-8 .
  • Jörg Schönert, Friedrich Vollhardt (Hrsg.): History of hermeneutics and the methodology of the text-interpreting disciplines (= Historia Hermeneutica. Series Studia. 1). Walter de Gruyter, Berlin et al. 2005, ISBN 3-11-018303-X .
  • Helmut Seiffert : Introduction to Hermeneutics. The teaching of interpretation in the specialist sciences (= UTB. 1666). Francke, Tübingen 1992, ISBN 3-7720-1692-8 (relatively concise, clear introduction with a focus on classical areas of applied text hermeneutics: theology, law, philology, history).
  • Peter Szondi : Introduction to literary hermeneutics. Edited by Jean Bollack and Helen Stierlin. Study edition of the lectures, vol. 5. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1975.
Hermeneutics and Critical and Transcendental-Pragmatic Philosophy
  • Hans Albert : Critique of Pure Hermeneutics. Anti-realism and the problem of understanding (= the unity of the social sciences. Vol. 85). Mohr, Tübingen 1994, ISBN 3-16-146246-7 .
  • Karl-Otto Apel : The explain: Understanding controversy in a transcendental-pragmatic view. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1979, ISBN 3-518-06109-7 .
Hermeneutics and Deconstruction and Other Newer Methods
  • Emil Angehrn : Interpretation and Deconstruction. Studies on hermeneutics. Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist 2003, ISBN 3-934730-68-X .
  • Georg W. Bertram: Hermeneutics and Deconstruction. Contours of a discussion of contemporary philosophy. Wilhelm Fink, Munich 2002, ISBN 3-7705-3643-6 .
  • Peter Brooks, Hugh B. Nisbet , Claude Rawson (Eds.): The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Volume 8: Raman Selden (Ed.): From Formalism to Poststructuralism. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et al. 1995, ISBN 0-521-30013-4 .
  • Christa Bürger : Text analysis as a critique of ideology. For the reception of contemporary entertainment literature. Athenaeum, Frankfurt am Main 1973, ISBN 978-3-7610-0350-3
  • Philippe Forget (Ed.): Text and Interpretation. Franco-German debate (= UTB. 1257). Wilhelm Fink, Munich 1984, ISBN 3-7705-2176-5 .
  • Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht : This side of hermeneutics. The production of presence (= Edition Suhrkamp. 2364). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2004, ISBN 3-518-12364-5 .
  • Robert C. Holub: Crossing Borders. Reception Theory, Poststructuralism, Deconstruction. The University of Wisconsin Press. Madison, WI 1992.
  • Jochen Hörisch : The rage of understanding. On the critique of hermeneutics (= Edition Suhrkamp. 1485 = NF 485). Extended reprint. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1998, ISBN 3-518-11485-9 (a brilliantly written essay on the critique of hermeneutics).
  • Jacques Lacan : Écrits (= Points. Sciences humaines. 5, ZDB -ID 2185611-4 ). Éditions du Seuil, Paris 1966.
  • Harro Müller: Hermeneutics or Deconstruction? On the conflict between two modes of interpretation. In: Karl Heinz Bohrer (Ed.): Aesthetics and Rhetoric. Readings on Paul de Man (= Edition Suhrkamp. 1681 = NF 681, Aesthetica). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1993, ISBN 3-518-11681-9 , pp. 98-116.
  • Paul Ricœur : The Conflict of Interpretations. Selected articles (1960–1969). Alber, Freiburg (Breisgau) et al. 2010, ISBN 978-3-495-48367-1 .
  • Hugh J. Silverman: Textualities. Between Hermeneutics and Deconstruction (= Continental Philosophy. 6). Routledge, New York NY et al. 1994, ISBN 0-415-90818-3 .
  • Toni Tholen : Experience and Interpretation. The dispute between hermeneutics and deconstruction (= problems of poetry. Vol. 26). Winter, Heidelberg 1999, ISBN 3-8253-0883-9 (also: Diss., Univ. Frankfurt am Main 1996).

Web links

Wiktionary: Hermeneutics  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. See Winfried Nöth : Handbuch der Semiotik . 2nd edition, Metzler, Stuttgart [u. a.] 2000, ISBN 978-3-476-01226-5 .
  2. See Ineichen, p. 21.
  3. “The connection is probably too obvious to be true. In modern philology almost everywhere he was viewed with superior skepticism. However, it has not yet been able to achieve a better interpretation, so that the question of the origin of the word field ἑρμηνεύειν must remain open here. ”Grondin, p. 39.
  4. Seiffert, p. 9.
  5. ^ Gerhard Ebeling: Hermeneutics . In: Kurt Galling: Religion in the past and present . Vol. 3, 3rd edition, Tübingen 1959. “ Hermes sen” is an analogous term for the process of interpreting.
  6. See Grondin, p. 37 f. with further references to the Platonic corpus: Politikos 260d, Epinomis 975c, Definitions 414d. For example, Politikos 260d f .: τί οὖν; εἰς ταὐτὸν μείξομεν βασιλικὴν ἑρμηνευτικῇ, κελευστικῇ, μαντικῇ, κηρυκικῇ, καὶ πολλαῖς ἑτέραις τούτων τέχναις συγγενέσιν, αἳ σύμπασαι τό γ ἐπιτάττειν ἔχουσιν [...] (trans .: What then? Do we want the rulers of art in one mix with the interpretive, exclaiming commands or with the art of divination and heraldry and many other related arts, which also belong to a field?)
  7. José Faur : Golden Doves with Silver Dots: Semiotics and Textuality in Rabbinic Tradition . Bloomington 1986.
  8. ^ Tzvetan Todorov : Théories du symbole . Paris 1977. Tzvetan Todorov Symbolism and Interpretation . London 1983.
  9. Cf. the collections of source texts in H.-G. Gadamer / G. Boehm (ed.), Seminar: Philosophical Hermeneutics, stw 144, Frankfurt a. M. 1976 and more recently S. Luther / R. Zimmermann (ed.), Hermeneutics study book. Biblical interpretation through the centuries as a learning field for text interpretation. Portraits - Models - Source Texts (with CD-Rom), Gütersloh 2014.
  10. Tzvetan Todorov 1997 and 1983.
  11. a b c Cf. Winfried Nöth: Handbuch der Semiotik . 2nd edition, Metzler, Stuttgart [u. a.] 2000.
  12. Plato, Seventh Letter 343b f.
  13. Plato, Seventh Letter 342a ff.
  14. Plato, Seventh Letter 344b
  15. "In this way, Aristotle's logical-semantic script> Peri Hermeneias <, which deals with the statements that can be true or false [...], can be reproduced in Latin through> De interpretatione <." Grondin, p. 37.
  16. Grondin, p. 37.
  17. ^ Augustine, De doctrina christiana
  18. ^ Umberto Eco : Semiotics and Philosophy of Language . Munich 1985.
  19. See Martin Luther, WA 7; 98, 40-99, 2
  20. Martin Luther, WA 10 3; 238, 10 f.
  21. Philipp Melanchthon's “Rhetoric”, ed. by J. Knape, Tübingen 1993, 107, 158. Quoted in Grondin, p. 62.
  22. Flacius, De ratione, p. 7. Quoted from Grondin, p. 65 f.
  23. Grondin, p. 77
  24. Lutz Danneberg found a particularly old, perhaps the first, evidence for hermeneutica in the sense of interpretativa in Alexander Richardson († 1621) in a comment that was not printed during his lifetime. See Lutz Danneberg, Logic and Hermeneutics in the 17th Century , in: Jan Schröder (ed.), Theory of Interpretation from Humanism to Romanticism - Jurisprudence, Philosophy, Theology , 2001, pp. 75 ff.
  25. Johann Conrad Dannhauer, Idea Boni Interpretis Et Malitiosi Calumniatoris Quae Obscuritate Dispulsa, Verum Sensum à falso discernere in omnibus auctorum scriptis ac orationibus docet, & plenè respondet ad quaestionem Unde scis hunc esse sensum non alium? , Glaser, Argentorati 1630
  26. Johann Conrad Dannhauer, Idea Boni Interpretis , 5th ed. 1670, p. 10
  27. ^ Johann Conrad Dannhauer, Idea Boni Interpretis , 5th ed. 1670, p. 11
  28. Baruch de Spinoza: Tractatus theologico-politicus , 1994, p. 97
  29. Baruch de Spinoza: Tractatus theologico-politicus , 1994, p. 114
  30. Baruch de Spinoza | Tractatus theologico-politicus , 1994, p. 221
  31. JM Chladenius, Introduction to the correct interpretation of reasonable speeches and writings, Leipzig 1742. Quoted from Grondin, p. 85.
  32. Grondin, p. 86. Cf. excerpts from Chladenius in German translation in K. Daugirdas, Johann Martin Chladenius, The general hermeneutics and their application to history, in: S. Luther / R. Zimmermann (ed.), Hermeneutics study book. Biblical interpretation through the centuries as a learning field for text interpretation. Portraits - Models - Source Texts (with CD-Rom), Gütersloh 2014, 217–222.
  33. Grondin, p. 87 f.
  34. Grondin, p. 90.
  35. Grondin, p. 100.
  36. ^ Friedrich Ast | Basic lines of grammar, hermeneutics and criticism , Landshut 1808, p. 179 f.
  37. Friedrich Ast, Basics of Grammar, Hermeneutics and Criticism , Landshut 1808, p. 178 ff.
  38. Friedrich Ast, Grundlinien der Grammar, Hermeneutik und Critique , Landshut 1808, p. 186
  39. Friedrich Ast, Grundlinien der Grammar, Hermeneutik und Critique , Landshut 1808, p. 187
  40. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: General Hermeneutics from 1809/10, p. 1272; quoted from Grondin, p. 106.
  41. Cf. Ineichen, p. 121 ff.
  42. Seiffert, p. 29.
  43. Schleiermacher distinguishes a "lax practice" of hermeneutics from a "stricter practice". The stricter practice "assumes that the misunderstanding arises of its own accord and that understanding must be willed and sought on every point" (Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, § 14.1), while in the more lax practice "understanding arises by itself" ( ibid.).
  44. Johann Gustav Droyen, floor plan of History , Berlin 1862, p 4 ff.
  45. ^ Dilthey, Ideas about a descriptive and dissecting psychology , Berlin 1894, p. 1314
  46. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey, Ideas about a descriptive and dissecting psychology , Ges. Schriften Bd. V, Stuttgart 1974, p. 172
  47. Wilhelm Dilthey, Ideas about a descriptive and dissecting psychology , Ges. Schriften Vol. V, Stuttgart 1974, pp. 139 to 175
  48. ^ Dilthey, Ideas about a descriptive and dissecting psychology , Berlin 1894, p. 1342
  49. Dilthey, The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities , Ges. Werke Vol. VII, Leipzig 1927, p. 146 ff.
  50. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities . Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 53.
  51. Ineichen, p. 147 f.
  52. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities . Quoted from Lessing (ed.), P. 72 f.
  53. ^ Heinrich Rickert, The Limits of Scientific Concept Formation. A logical introduction to the historical sciences , 3rd and 4th ed., Tübingen 1921, p. 404 ff.
  54. Georg Simmel, The Problems of the Philosophy of History , Leipzig 1892, p. 14 ff.
  55. Max Weber, On some categories of understanding sociology , Logos Vol. IV, 1913, p. 253 ff.
  56. Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache , Pfullingen 1960, p. 97 f.
  57. Grondin, p. 135, p. 143 and p. 136.
  58. Martin Heidegger: Complete Edition, Frankfurt am Main 1975 ff., Vol. 63, p. 12; quoted from Grondin, p. 141.
  59. Martin Heidegger, Vom Wesen der Truth , 8th edition, Frankfurt am Main 1997, p. 18
  60. ^ Jean Grondin: Introduction to Gadamer . Tübingen 2000, p. 8.
  61. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method . Volume 1, 6th edition, Tübingen 1990, p. 2 ff.
  62. On Gadamer's analysis of historicism, see Hannes Kerber: “The concept of the history of problems and the problem of the history of concepts. Gadamer's Forgotten Critique of Nicolai Hartmann's Historicism ”, in International Yearbook for Hermeneutics 15 (2016), pp. 294-314.
  63. Gadamer, Art. Hermeneutics , in: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Vol. 3, p. 1071
  64. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method . Volume 1, 6th edition, Tübingen 1990, p. 303.
  65. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method . Volume 1, 6th edition, Tübingen 1990, p. 373.
  66. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method . Volume 2, 2nd edition, Tübingen 1993, p. 64.
  67. Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method . Volume 1, 6th edition, Tübingen 1990, p. 494.
  68. Gadamer, Truth and Method , Tübingen 1975, p. 98
  69. Cf. Ineichen, Philosophische Hermeneutik , chap. VIII, pp. 200-210.
  70. Five years before the publication of Gadamer's main work, Emilio Betti had proposed four canons of interpretation in 1955, which were supposed to guarantee hermeneutical objectivity. See Ineichen, pp. 208 f.
  71. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy . Vol. 2: The a priori of the communication community . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973; quoted from Lessing (Ed.), p. 251.
  72. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy . Vol. 2: The a priori of the communication community . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973; quoted from Lessing (Ed.), p. 253.
  73. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy . Vol. 2: The a priori of the communication community . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973; quoted from Lessing (Ed.), p. 255.
  74. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy . Vol. 2: The a priori of the communication community . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1973; quoted from Lessing (Ed.), p. 257.
  75. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 260.
  76. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 276.
  77. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 280.
  78. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 282.
  79. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (ed.), P. 289 f.
  80. Paul Ricœur: Understanding Sociology. Basic features and development tendencies . Munich 1972 (first publication 1971). Quoted from Lessing (Ed.), P. 292.
  81. Grondin, p. 183 f.
  82. Grondin, p. 186.
  83. ^ Hans Köchler: Philosophical Foundations of Civilizational Dialogue. The Hermeneutics of Cultural Self-comprehension versus the Paradigm of Civilizational Conflict . University of Malaya Library, Kuala Lumpur 1997 (3rd International Seminar on Civilizational Dialogue, Kuala Lumpur, September 15-17, 1997).
  84. ^ Hans Köchler: Cultural-philosophical aspects of international cooperation . In: Zeitschrift für Kultur-Austausch , Vol. 28 (1978), pp. 40-43 (lecture to the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan , March 1974). See also the anthology Hans Köchler (Ed.): The Cultural Self-comprehension of Nations . Erdmann, Tübingen 1978, ISBN 3-7711-0311-8 .
  85. On Köchler's approach cf. Andreas Oberprantacher: Towards a Hermeneutics of Mutual Respect and Trans-cultural Understanding: Köchler's Foundation of Civilizational Dialogue . In: FR Balbin (Ed.): Hans Köchler Bibliography and Reader . Manila / Innsbruck 2007, pp. 151-162, ISBN 978-3-900719-04-3 .
  86. Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas , 1969, in: James Tully, Meaning and Context. Quentin Skinner and his Critics , Cambridge 1988, p. 44 ff.
  87. Jürgen Bolten, The Hermeneutic Spiral. Reflections on an integrative literary theory , in: Poetica 17 (1985), H. 3/4., P. 362 f.
  88. The scheme as a cognitive structure goes back to Henry Head (1920), Jean Piaget (1928) and Frederick Charles Bartlett (1932).
  89. Basically e.g. B. the contribution by JW Alba and L. Hasher, Is memory schematic? , in: Psychological Bulletin, 93, 1983, pp. 203 ff.
  90. See PW Thorndyke and FR Yekovich, A Critic of Schema-based Theories of Human Story Memory , Poetics 9, 1980, 23–49; JW Alba and L. Hasher, Is memory schematic? , in: Psychological Bulletin 93, 1983, pp. 203 ff; RC Anderson and PD Pearson, A schema-theoretic view of basic processes in reading , in: In PD Pearson, R. Barr, ML Kamil, P. Mosenthal (Eds.), Handbook of reading research. Longman, New York 1984; SP Ballstaedt, H. Mandl, W. Schnotz, SO Tergan, understanding texts, designing texts. Urban & Schwarzenberg, Munich 1981
  91. Ginev, Dimitri 2014: Hermeneutik der Natur / Hermeneutische Naturphilosophie [Version 1.0]. In: Glossary of natural philosophical basic terms. http://www.naturphilosophie.org/naturhermeneutik-glossar/
  92. a b Ginev, Dimitri 2014: Hermeneutics of Nature / Hermeneutic Natural Philosophy [Version 1.0]. In: Basic Concepts of Natural Philosophy. http://www.naturphilosophie.org/naturhermeneutik/
  93. Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1966. Sens et non-sens. Paris: Gallimard.
  94. Toadvine, Ted 2009: Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy of Nature. Northwestern University Press, Evanston.
  95. ^ Böhme, Gernot 1997: The project of a phenomenology of nature. In: Böhme, Gernot / Schiemann, Gregor (ed.): Phenomenology of Nature. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt / M .; Böhme, Gernot 2005: Nature experience: talking about nature and being nature. In: Gebauer, Michael / Gebhard, Ulrich (ed.): Nature experience. Paths to a hermeneutics of nature. The Gray Edition, Zug: 9–27.
  96. Marcuse, Herbert 1962: Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud. The Beacon Press, Boston.
  97. Kockelmans, Joseph 1993: Ideas for a Hermeneutic Phenomenology of the Natural Sciences. Kluwer, Dordrecht.
  98. ^ Crease, Robert 1995: The Play of Nature: Experimentation as Performance. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
  99. Ginev, Dimitri 1997: A Passage to the Hermeneutic Philosophy of Science. Amsterdam, Rodopi.
  100. Heelan, Patrick 1997: Why a Hermeneutic Philosophy of Natural Science? Man and World 30: 271-298.
  101. Naess, Arne 2004: Here I Stand. An interview with Arne Naess. Environmental Philosophy 1: 6-19.
  102. ^ McKibben, Bill 1989: The End of Nature. Anchor Books, New York.
  103. ^ Vogel, Steven 2003: The Nature of Artifacts. Environmental Ethics 25 (2): 149-168.