Discourse ethics

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

As Discourse Ethics refers to those ethical that the accuracy of ethical statements (theories whose key criterion is linked to it prescriptive sentences) using a by rules designed with reasonable arguments discourse is obtained. Discourse ethics contains a cognitivistic metaethics because the community of those involved in the discourse can ideally determine what is right. Discourse ethics differs from conventional individual ethics in that its results come about in an intersubjective process. It is therefore also suitable as a means of solving problems that go beyond an individual, for example in politics and the global economy.

Discourse ethics was developed primarily in German-speaking countries by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas from the early 1970s and has also received international attention. An essential difference between the two positions is that Habermas refrains from attempting an ultimate justification and only refers to generally recognized rules of discourse, while Apel in the always necessary recognition of the other in linguistically conveyed communication an inevitable principle, an "a priori of the communication community" sees and deduces from this a legitimation of morality, which in practice establishes an ethics of responsibility .

In terms of content, discourse ethics is a procedure for determining generally valid (universal) statements about generally recognized moral principles. It builds on the consensus of all those involved in a communication who are willing to engage in reasonable arguments, whereby they are based on an ideal speaking situation in which they are only subject to the restriction of everyone participating fairly in the conversation. As a procedural ethics, discourse ethics does not give any concrete references to the evaluation of certain moral principles. These are only to be determined and assessed in a subsequent practical discourse.

prehistory

The theory of argument worked out in Aristotle in the rhetoric and in the topics , which was still significant in Cicero ( De oratore ), played a rather subordinate role in the philosophy of the Middle Ages and modern times . Only Herder , Hamann , Humboldt and Schleiermacher emphasized language again as a constitutive element of thinking. A well-developed theory, according to which communication is an instrument for determining truth, can be found in Charles Sanders Peirce , for whom knowledge arises in an (infinite) process of joint research. (CP 5.407) Peirce's approach to pragmatic semiotics was subsequently adopted by George Herbert Mead and Charles W. Morris . The communicative meaning of language is still in the figure of the language games at Ludwig Wittgenstein and in the theory of speech acts of Austin and Searle .

The validity of statements in the argumentative discussion was subsequently thematized by Stephen Toulmin and Chaim Perelman in the “new rhetoric”, for which arguments gain validity when an insightful, rational audience agrees. Only then does the difference between persuasion and conviction arise. At the same time, the representatives of Erlangen constructivism developed a dialogic logic . In 1971, Michel Foucault dealt critically with the influence of power on practical discourse in The Order of Discourse .

On the basis outlined in this way, Apel and Habermas began to develop discourse ethics from the early 1970s. Another background was with the representatives of critical rationalism guided positivism dispute . In 1967, Apel gave the lecture “The a priori of the communication community and the foundations of ethics” in Gothenburg, in which he advanced the thesis that “rational argumentation presupposes the validity of universal ethical norms”. Habermas starting point is his consensus theory of truth (1973). In addition, after the publication of his general social theory ( Theory of Communicative Action , 1981) in 1983, he took up and substantiated his reflections on general principles of ethics with the collection of essays “Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action”. In the course of time, transcendental pragmatics (Apel) and universal pragmatics (Habermas) have developed two lines of development in discourse ethics, which have mutually enriched each other through mutual additions and criticism.

Goal setting

Apel and Habermas wanted to find a way between scientism and relativism how norms can be universally justified without exposing themselves to Hume's skeptical argument that an ought cannot be derived from a being ( Hume's law ). Habermas explicitly criticizes Alasdair MacIntyre's statement that the attempt to justify ethics based on reason has failed. (1) Discourse ethics thus follows the claim of a deontological ethics of Kant. It assumes a good will, i.e. H. the willingness to enter into a rational discourse. (2) It is cognitivistic in the same way, so it tries to justify the demand for morality in a positive way. Moral statements can be true. (3) It is universalistic, so it claims its validity vis-à-vis everyone and for every action situation. It thus corresponds to the post-conventional stage of the developmental psychological justice theory of Lawrence Kohlberg , to which both Apel and Habermas refer. (4) Like the categorical imperative, it is a formalistic procedural ethics, i.e. it specifies a fundamental principle in which way norms of action are to be determined. The content-related ethical requirements are only to be determined in the respective discourse.

The main difference to Kant is that the determination of the ethical norms or maxims should not take place individually and subjectively, but in an intersubjective dialogue that is subject to certain rules. Apel and Habermas see Kant as a solipsistic monologue that has to be overcome. In contrast to Kant, Apel / Habermas also start from an empirically given lifeworld , the conflicts of which are to be resolved in a practical discourse. Apel characterizes discourse ethics as an "ethics of the solidarity-based responsibility of those who can argue for all discourse- capable problems in the lifeworld." Habermas describes this view as follows:

“The abstraction achievements that a formalistic ethics requires do not relate to historical boundary conditions and concrete contents of the conflicts that need to be regulated, but to something completely different. The hypothetical gaze of the morally judging subject brings individual actions and norms that have become problematic, possibly also a set of legitimately regulated interpersonal relationships, from the point of view of deontic validity. He does not cut this off from the context of the respective lifeworld, but from the self-evident validity, ie from the evidence of the lifeworld background. As a result, the norms that have become a problem are transformed into facts that can be valid, but also invalid. "

The principles

As the core of his form of discourse ethics, Habermas formulated two basic principles that have a status similar to that of Kant's categorical imperative. The discourse principle “D” states that norms are only valid if they “find (or could find) the approval of all those concerned as participants in a practical discourse”.

The discourse principle divided Habermas in his jurisprudential elaboration Facts and Norms also in a moral principle upon to do what is good for all alike, as well as a principle of democracy "for such action norms that occur in legal form and pragmatic means, ethical and political and moral reasons can be justified - not just for moral reasons. ”In contrast to Kant, who considered morality to have priority over law, with Habermas these are two equally important spheres. Habermas later added that the discourse principle was also suitable for the “deliberations of a political legislature”. The discourse principle therefore serves not only to lay the foundations of morality, but also to justify the modern constitutional state. With Habermas the way remains blocked to make moral considerations the basis of the legal formation. On the other hand, Apel, who sees the danger of dissolving discourse ethics in the conception of a morally neutral discourse principle, states: “The possibility or even the necessity of completely excluding morality from the areas of law and / or politics must by no means be admitted because this apparently against the ethical imperative of discursive co-responsibility for the consequences of everyone, especially collective activities. ”Without a moral claim, the discourses are no longer symmetrical for Apel, so that the equality of the participants in the discourse is also called into question.

The discourse principle is supported by the principle of generalization, which Habermas calls the universalization principle “U”. Every valid norm must meet the condition that the consequences and side effects which result from their general observance for the satisfaction of the interests of each individual (presumably) are accepted by all concerned (and preferred to the effects of the known alternative regulatory options) Only with the support of the requirement of general validity does discourse ethics achieve a status like the categorical imperative. This general rule of reasoning is "the bridging principle [...] which makes consent possible in moral arguments".

The principles established in this way go beyond the categorical imperative insofar as they determine the rules according to which a norm or a maxim can or should be obtained that is recognized as a general law. If one tries, like Kant, to gain this only from one's own deliberations, a tacit subjective residue always remains, even if one tries to be fair to other points of view and tries in thought experiments to take on the role of another in the evaluation of a norm, as in the universal one Hare's prescriptivism, or as in Adam Smith's idea of ​​an impartial observer . However, the conceptual role reversal is not dispensable, but must take place reciprocally and it must be examined abstractly, "whether a general practice under comparable circumstances could be easily accepted by each of the potentially affected people from the point of view of their interests." The role reversal described by Mead is enforced by the principle of universalization.

Full universalisability is only achieved when the perspectives of all those directly or indirectly affected by the norm are included in their determination and they can agree to it. In comparison to a monological assessment of the norms, it is crucial that each individual can bring his or her individual perspective into the discourse in an informal manner. The reasons for the norm are subject to public scrutiny, so the problems of cloudiness and imperfect knowledge are largely eliminated. This reciprocity of perspective creates the compulsion to incorporate the perspective of the other into the norm, and thus impartiality. In this regard, discourse ethics manages without a counterfactual construction like the veil of ignorance in John Rawls . What remains unspoken in the principles is that the validity of the norms cannot be constant over time, because interests and the assessability of the consequences and side effects can change because knowledge about them has developed further. Apel and Habermas see the transition from Kant's philosophy of the subject to the principle of discourse as a transition from the ethics of convictions to the ethics of responsibility, because the discourse systematically contains the claim to justify reasons.

Apel adopts Habermas' principle of universalization in principle, but sees this as "not yet the sufficient principle of a post-conventional ethics of responsibility." The principle of universalization alone does not solve the "problem of realizing the historical and social conditions of the application of discourse ethics in a world of primarily strategic action self-assertion systems. "Apel therefore formulates the principle of universalization as an imperative principle of action (U (h)):

"Act only on the basis of a maxim, of which you can assume, based on a real understanding with those affected or their lawyers or - alternatively - on the basis of a corresponding thought experiment, that the consequences and side effects that result from their general observance for the satisfaction of interests of every single person concerned, can be easily accepted in a real discourse by all concerned. "

What is important here is that Apel is not based on a norm, but on a maxim. Here it goes back to Kant in that the concrete action is based on an individual intention. With regard to the practical discourse situation, he also considers a restriction by a “complementary principle” to be necessary because strategic discourse behavior appears to him to be legitimate and even a “second-order duty” as long as an ideal discourse community is not established. If others gain unjustified advantages through violence, counter-violence can be justified. The supplementary principle, however, requires a teleological orientation towards an ideal discourse, namely: "As much preliminary work in the sense of strategy-free understanding as possible, as many strategic reservations based on a risk assessment as necessary." The addressee of morality should at least preserve the rules of universalizability that exist in practice , but improve if possible. With this concept, which is geared towards concrete actions, Apel leaves the approach of a purely abstract discussion of standards and at this point separates from Habermas beyond the question of the ultimate justification (see below). The general level of principles is the substructure of "Part A" of Apelian discourse ethics, while the concretization of the relevance for action based on the respective historical situation is called "Part B" by him. This part B has "the task of specifically considering the counterfactual character of the nonetheless necessary anticipation of the ideal as a problem of a historical ethics of responsibility." Apel's concern is that of "a situation-appropriate mediation between strategically unreserved - e. B. more honest and persuasive - communication with counterparties and such strategic practices - such as B. Offers and threats of retaliation in tough negotiations - which are dictated by the legitimate interest of self-assertion. ”At the same time, strategic behavior must always remain capable of moral consensus. This results in a systematic answer to “the dialectic of a real community of consensus and an ideal community of argument”.

Wolfgang Kuhlmann differentiated the general moral principle and differentiated four "basic norms", which in turn cover both the universalization principle and the Apelian complementary principle:

(N 1): argue rationally.
(N 2): Strive for a reasonable consensus.
(N 3): In all cases where your interests may clash with those of others, strive for a reasonable practical consensus with them.
(N 4): Always endeavor to contribute to the (long-term) realization of such relationships that come closer to the ideal communication community, and always ensure that the already existing conditions for the possible realization of an ideal communication community are preserved!

The fourth norm takes into account "that the practical discourse can also be suspended under certain circumstances, until initial conditions are realized through strategic action that make it appear sensible and justifiable to enter into a practical discourse with those involved and affected."

The formulation of the discourse principle, the “categorical imperative of discourse ethics”, by Dietrich Böhler focuses on the consensus as a regulative, but absolutely binding idea that results from dialogical reciprocity:

"Strive for that argumentation and that course of action that would find the justified approval of all as partners in real, purely argumentative discourses".

Justification problem

A justification for moral action cannot be given directly from the abstract principles. Apel tries to derive this justification from the a priori of the communication community. In a community of arguments, people carry out communicative actions through performative utterances, with which they claim validity. "Lies z. B. would obviously make the dialogue between the arguments impossible, but the same is also true for the refusal of critical understanding or the explication and justification of arguments. In short: the mutual recognition of all members as equal discussion partners is a prerequisite for the argumentation community. "

Apel recognizes the objection raised by Hans Albert against a final justification of the Münchhausen trilemma for the attempt at a formal logical deduction of knowledge, but claims that this is not comprehensive. By applying the Münchhausen Trilemma, the opponent of the claim to universalization is already recognizing the basic principles of the argument. Otherwise he commits a " perfomatic contradiction ". Therefore, a "reflection on the subjective-intersubjective conditions of the possibility of intersubjectively valid argument" must take place.

Habermas does not provide such an active justification. For him, there is “no metadiscourse to which we can refer to in order to justify the choice between different forms of argumentation.” Instead, he regards his discourse rules as a yardstick for every practical discourse that must always be used when determining the validity of a norm should be clarified in the discourse. “The universalization principle“ U ”is certainly inspired by“ D ”, but for the time being no more than an abductively won suggestion.” The factual content of a discourse cannot be derived from the principles of discourse ethics, but is something given from outside. Discourse ethics is the “touchstone” (Kant) of whether a norm stands up to the general principle of morality.

“The discourse ethical principle refers to a procedure, namely the discursive redemption of normative validity claims; to this extent the ethics of discourse can rightly be characterized as formal. It does not give any orientation in terms of content, but a procedure: the practical discourse. This is, of course, a process not for the creation of justified norms, but for checking the validity of proposed and hypothetically considered norms. Practical discourses must be given their content. Without the horizon of the lifeworld of a certain social group, and without conflicts of action in a certain situation in which the participants regard the consensual settlement of a controversial social matter as their task, it would be pointless to want to conduct a practical discourse. The concrete starting position of a disturbed normative agreement, to which practical discourses refer as antecedents, determines the objects and problems that are "pending" for negotiation. This procedure is therefore not formal in the sense of the abstraction of content. In its openness, the discourse depends precisely on the fact that the contingent content is “entered” into it. Of course, this content is processed in the discourse in such a way that particular value points of view fall out as inconsistent in the end. "

Both Habermas and Apel have been criticized with regard to their pragmatic justification claim based on various arguments, which largely go to the point that there is no logical bridge for a moral principle without a volitional decision of the argumentator to enter the discourse. From the critics' point of view, the principles of discourse would not be universally valid, but would only be rules of prudence in communicative practice. Therefore, discourse ethics could not overcome the problem of justification that already existed with Kant. This is also acknowledged by Apel and Habermas, although they insist that in practice the evidence of the argumentation context cannot be canceled. In particular, discourse ethicists reject the thesis that discourse is a special language game alongside others. “The discourse is not a special practice. Rather, the argumentation situation, like reason (conscience and similar competencies), is 'ubiquitous' in the sense that one cannot evade the compulsion to legitimize through silence or by doing something other than arguing. "

Rules of discourse

Habermas ideally demands intelligibility, truth, correctness and truthfulness for the validity of arguments. For this purpose, based on Robert Alexy , he formulates concrete rules of discourse that are constitutive procedural rules for the universalization principle “U”.

  • Logical-semantic rules without ethical content:
1.1 No speaker may contradict himself.
1.2. Any speaker who applies a predicate F to an object a must be prepared to apply F to any other object that is equal to a in all relevant respects.
1.3. Different speakers may not use the same expression with different meanings.
  • Dialectical rules with ethical content that require reciprocal recognition:
2.1. Each speaker can only assert what he himself believes.
2.2. Anyone who attacks a statement or standard that is not the subject of discussion must give a reason for this.
  • Rhetorical rules to ensure non-violent and equal participation in the discourse:
3.1. Every subject capable of speaking and acting is allowed to take part in discourses.
3.2.
(a) Anyone may problematize any assertion.
(b) Anyone may introduce any claim into the discourse.
(c) Everyone is allowed to express their attitudes, needs and wishes.
3.3. No speaker may be prevented from exercising his rights defined in 3.1 and 3.2 by coercion prevailing inside or outside the discourse.

These rules, which describe an "ideal speech situation", serve to create a discourse that is as free of domination as possible. They are tacitly contained and intuitively known in a pragmatically excellent speaking practice. It is therefore not a matter of mere conventions, but of “inescapable presuppositions , ie their violation leads to performative contradictions. A lie is e.g. B. not an argument that is convincing, but the attempt to persuade someone. ”The rules of discourse are counterfactual and apply in ideal discourse. In practical application they have the function of a yardstick, even if all participants in the discourse must be aware that they can never be fully realized. Precisely for this reason, empirical discourses must be guided by conventional institutionalized provisions (e.g. rules of procedure).

Böhler also points out that a discourse can only succeed if the arguments are true and reliable. Truly demands that word and intention agree, and reliably means that action corresponds to speech. Böhler formulates the validity claims made by Habermas as expectations of the acceptability of actions:

"A course of action is worthy of approval if and only if all possible discourse partners understand the complex act of NN (including its accompanying discourse )
(1.) not only semantically as the implementation of a certain schema, but also pragmatically as a comprehensible answer to an understood situation and to that extent as a template for a testable contribution to the discourse, namely performative and propositional,
(2.) if they would not pretend the same to interpersonal as being by the actor, but take it seriously and morally appreciate it as truly intended or genuinely wanted, i.e. as a credible utterance or utterance of life of moral quality,
(3.) if they also accept it as morally correct, that is, just towards those affected and as legitimate towards moral argumentation partners and
(4) if they would recognize its implicit propositional content, in particular the assumptions brought into play by the action (about a situation in the world) as true. "

In addition to the explicit rules of discourse, discourse ethicists assume an ideal speech situation that implicitly contains an obligation to the other participants in the discourse, which Böhler describes as follows:

“To take on a role in argumentative dialogue, that is, to want to understand something and assert it, means having recognized six previous dialogue promises as absolutely binding. Because "I" give others something to understand in the discourse, "I" promised as their dialogue partner
(1.) To be responsible for myself, i.e. to make myself available to others with testable discourse contributions as an autonomous discourse partner, in that> I <strive for pragmatic, contradictory and factually valid contributions to the dialogue,
(2.) to recognize the non-limitable community of all possible claim subjects, i.e. the universe of meaningful arguments or meaningfully arguable life claims as the last instance of meaning and validity, (self-critical and result-critical), i.e. also to look for possible better arguments,
(3.) To grant all others the same rights as dialogue partners, which includes unconditional respect for their rights to life and liberty (so that the principle of human dignity can be derived from this)
(4.) to be jointly responsible for the discourse as a possibility of responsibility now and in the future, i.e. also for the determination and the respective possible guarantee or guarantee - only possible in situation-related, fallible discourses. Improvement of (human) legal, ecological, social, political etc. conditions for realizing public discourses,
(5.) to be jointly responsible for the realization of the corresponding results of the discourse in everyday, political, social and cultural fields of practice,
(6.) to take into account the fallibility of situation analyzes and situation-related discourses in a responsible manner for the future, i.e. to keep their results revisable instead of recommending irreversible courses of action whose consequences or side effects may be incompatible with the other promises of discourse. "

Through this content-based characterization of the dialogue obligations, Böhler leads directly into practical discourses, the form and content of which cannot be directly derived from the principles of discourse ethics, but whose justification and legitimacy require an independent, subsequent discourse.

Application questions

In addition to the question of justification for discourse ethics, there is a broad discussion about how the principles of discourse ethics can come into play in practical discourses. “In what way can and should we orient our behavior towards the moral principle of discourse ethics?” Robert Alexy speaks of “discourses of their own kind”. Klaus Günther particularly emphasized that the application questions address a separate level of discourse ethics . As an application problem, the question of how the abstract discourse principle should be applied to concrete discourses is discussed. It does not deal with the content of concrete discourses or decision-making problems, but rather the “grammar of discourse” in the form of “reconstructive pragmatics”. Part B of the Apelian form of discourse ethics as a mediation between the general moral principle and the particular belongs to this area. At the application level, the question is how law and politics are related to one another, how the concept of consensus is to be understood, how an appropriate relationship between citizen and state is to be determined, what importance is attached to the issue of justice, in what relation the discourse ethics to the question of good life, how it is to be judged in comparison to other ethical concepts ( contractualism , communitarianism , virtue ethics or utilitarianism ) or whether there are special requirements for discourse ethics from certain spheres of the lifeworld. Apel is of the opinion "that discourse ethics is the only ethical conception which, as it were, naturally corresponds to the demand for a post-conventional macroethics of universal co-responsibility." According to Apel, this is supported on the one hand by the fact that the discourse principle makes everyone responsible for the success of a discourse and thus the recognition of the other is linked to shared responsibility. On the other hand, the idea of ​​discourse, in contrast to individual ethics, contains the tools to organize the division and regulation of joint responsibility, i.e. to enable the procedural control of collective activities “on a planetary scale”.

A fundamental application problem arises when, like Apel, morality is preceded by law, as state compulsion to enforce law can be justified from discourse ethics. Regarding this criticism expressed by Otfried Höffe , Apel refers to the bridge to the empirical-practical lifeworld, which is established by his complementary principle, so that "in strategically distorted interaction and communication situations it may be morally necessary to use open or hidden violence (e.g. Deception) as anti-violence violence or strategy counter-strategy ". It is important that the force used strategically is determined and limited by rules. It is precisely the “limitations and differentiations of the compulsory powers of the state” that give citizens the freedom to act morally. The reason why justice should be the guiding principle in a state remains open in any ethical concept. Like Kant, one has to assume a fact of reason or, like Rawls, a sense of justice. “Regarding these objections, it must be said that the never-to-be ruled out refusal of the willful affirmation of the recognition of the principle does not belong at all to the problem of justifying ethics. In this respect, this refusal cannot count as an argument (cf. Apel 1973, 413 against Popper) that could force a continuation of the reasoning. A limit of the transcendental-pragmatic discourse ethics is present here, however, not an incompleteness of the rational justification, but a meaning limit of every cognitivistic, ie appealing to insight, justification program against the problem of (good or bad) will. Here was the right of voluntarism since Duns Scotus ; but decisionism , which seeks to replace ultimate justification with ultimate decision, is a perversion of voluntarism. "

Micha H. Werner points out that the discourse principles can only claim negative validity. An argument that conforms to the rules of discourse may or may not be valid. Habermas states accordingly: “A moral obligation cannot result from the, as it were, transcendental necessity of inevitable arguments alone; Rather, it adheres to the special objects of the discourse - the norms introduced into it, to which the reasons mobilized in the consultation refer. ”The moral claim arises only from the claim to truthfulness of the discourse participants; only then is it ensured that the argument is not only put forward strategically, but also claims validity for all participants in the discourse, including the person making the argument. That is why truthfulness is constitutive of ideal discourse.

An application problem is also the question to be answered in every ethics: “Who is it, against whom we have moral obligations?” The question is particularly relevant with moral objects that cannot assert their own claims themselves, i.e. with topics such as responsibility for the future, environmental ethics , animal ethics or in medical ethics . Such an indirect claim to consideration of interests and needs of subjects incapable of arguing is not derived from the discourse principle itself, because the reciprocity assumed in the discourse is missing. An asymmetrical, non-reflective argument is required to include other claims. According to Werner, the practice of justifications shows that there is no argument that a rational argument for moral respect without reciprocity appears valid. The various reasons presented regularly appeal to intuition or compassion . This applies to the inclusion of living beings that are potentially able to argue (embryos, handicapped people, dementia) as well as to advocating all living beings that belong to their own species because they would normally be capable of discourse. The most effective argument seems to be to include all those who have the same interests and needs (e.g. avoiding pain, maintaining life), regardless of whether they are capable of discourse and grant them the right to (legal) representation, such as this is what Apel did in his variant of the imperative principle of universalization "U (h)".

The supplementary principle according to Apel, which describes the transition from the pure procedural principle to discourse practice as a realization and maintenance principle, "characterizes" - according to Dietrich Böhler - "the transition from the level of legitimation to the level of responsibility". From this, Böhler derives the justification for human dignity, as formulated as the highest social norm in the German Basic Law . "Discourse ethics can justify the central legal ethical norm insofar as it obliges the inviolability of the person, the recognition of their right to free judgment, including freedom of conscience and the protection of free communication." However, Böhler stresses that the concept of value "human dignity" is in The design of the content is subject to historical change, which is reflected in practical discourses on genetic engineering, abortion, euthanasia and civil liberties. A similar question is whether referendums or a parliamentary system are more suitable for meeting the demands of discourse ethics. The limits of such a content design result from the demand of discourse ethics for mutual recognition of plural reason, i.e. H. the historical values ​​are not tied to the individual and thus subjective rationality of an individual. "Both the dialogical form of the process of judgment formation (with procedurally regulated mutual recognition of the participants) as well as the final goal of the argumentative consensus, which is hardly ever redeemable, but which must be taken seriously and self-critically, contains the logic of application primacy over correctness and truth appropriateness. ”Since discourse ethics includes the recognition of human dignity, it is not only formal for Böhler, but also provides“ a moral orientation for personal judgment ”.

Wolfgang Kuhlmann addresses the question of whether statements like “You shouldn't lie” or “Promises are to be kept”, that is, general norms as addressed in the principle of universalization, can express what is morally correct at all. According to Albrecht Wellmer, norms are either too general, especially against the background of limited knowledge and a limited time, so that norms conflict regularly, or so specific and detailed that they lose their generality. For him, the ethics of discourse creates a utopian idea that ignores the practice of historical and cultural forms of life and other potentials of meaning. Habermas relied on Klaus Günther to reject this objection. According to Habermas, the task of the application discourse is to check the appropriateness of a norm and the coherence of its position in a system of rules so that there is a sufficient basis for interpretation in the specific case. "We would misunderstand the discursive character of public opinion and will formation if we believe we can hypostatize the real content of general argumentation requirements to a model of pure communicative socialization ." Kuhlmann emphasizes that the norm can only describe one type of action situation and for The specific application reference therefore still requires a possibly complex analysis against the background of the general moral principle. For him, the function of discourse ethics therefore lies primarily in the establishment of the moral principle so that it can be applied in relation to the situation. "So I plead - with Wellmer - for a deontological understanding of discourse ethics."

Matthias Kettner points out that the principle on which discourse ethics is based prohibits paternalism . Furthermore, discourse ethics, as procedural ethics, can be placed in front of other ethical concepts such as contractualism or utilitarianism in order to determine their scope of application, i.e. to create a “unitary focus” of morality. In this way it is prevented that “ ex cathedra (by moral“ experts ”) or by definition (by conceptual-theoretical preliminary decisions) a moral theory is imposed on the acting persons who want to deal morally correctly with a difficult situation that arises in practice that they have not even recognized as relevant for Pb. ”Conversely, the prohibition of paternalism does not mean that strategic arguments and action can be dispensed with in the practical world. However, this is always a “strategy counter-strategy” that can be defended discursively and that must not lose sight of the goal of an ideal discourse. In this sense, strategic behavior follows the regulative idea of ​​minimizing injustice.

Practical Discourses

The topics of practical discourse are the topics of applied ethics and thus affect almost all areas of practical life. The focus is on questions of medical ethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, euthanasia, genetics, questions of how social justice is to be determined, how intergenerational justice or intercultural dialogue can be established appropriately. Practical discourses are historical and fallible. You must therefore remain open to revisions. As procedural ethics, discourse ethics cannot make any substantive contribution to these topics. It can only comment on whether the discourse is conducted in such a way that it comes as close as possible to the ideal of a free, rational community of argument, and what can possibly be done to improve the conditions for the discourse.

"The broadest framework for discourse ethics, understood as the critical theory of ethics in society, is perhaps characterized by the task of developing a normative theory of that social rationality that is necessary for a rational discourse on the order of human coexistence" (Rainer Lepsius) are relevant. ”Philosophers are not prohibited from participating in practical discourses. This is done in a variety of ways. And this is what Apel and Habermas have done again and again. It is only necessary to mark and make it clear that their statements on everyday life are part of the discourse and not part of the overarching procedural ethics.

A typical example of a practical discourse is business ethics , in which theoreticians argue about the way in which ethical standards should be effective in the sphere of business. The spectrum ranges from Karl Homann , who advocates setting a political framework for the economy and, furthermore, conceding the economic subjects that they are allowed to move within this framework according to the principle of rationality, to Peter Ulrich , who in his integrative business ethics calls for ethical standards to be taken into account for all economic activity and tries to justify this based on discourse ethics.

reception

Detlef Horster criticizes Apel and Habermas' accusation of solipsism against Kant. When Kant asks the question of “the general validity and necessity of our knowledge” (KrV A 125), this is clearly a reference to communication with the other. Annemarie Pieper observes similarly : “When he [= Kant] speaks of 'consciousness in general', 'transcendental apperception' and the like, what is meant is an a priori structural peculiarity of human thought, which is precisely what connects people as people, their togetherness -Communication includes what enables. ”In particular, the process of moral will formation is“ an interpersonal event in which freedom is originally combined with freedom and thus establishes the binding nature of moral practice. Moral determination of will is thus an act of free recognition of other freedom, in which the ego in the other ego recognizes itself at the same time. ” Richard Rorty emphasizes that the practice of discourse ethics is“ an expression of the habits of today's liberal societies ”. Michael Walzer similarly characterizes discourse ethics as “an abstract version of contemporary democratic culture”.

Adela Cortina is of the opinion that the previous conceptions of discourse ethics with regard to the moral point of view fall short of Kant's claim, because they cannot think of Kant's fundamental thesis: “It is not possible to think anywhere in the world, even outside of it, without any restriction could well be considered as just disregarding a good will ”. “The transition from formalism [Kant] to proceduralism [of discourse ethics], from transcendental logic to transcendental or universal pragmatics, has decisive consequences for the autonomous subject and thus for the 'moral standpoint'. Essential dimensions of this point of view are now ignored, such as B. the moral driving force, the area of ​​inner freedom, self-compulsion, the specifically moral kind of reasonableness, the judging authority of moral judgment and even the regulative idea on which specifically moral legislation is oriented. "Cortina considers Habermas a" pragmatic socialism “That emphasizes justice and solidarity and neglects autonomy. Discourse ethics can be used to justify human rights, but it does not give instructions for individual moral subjects. Since the practical discourse does not reflect the consensus of an ideal argumentative community, morally good will is required so that the subject can at least hypothetically imagine the result of an ideal discourse. Without such a yardstick, there is no orientation in empirical reality. Habermas, however, replaces moral insight with the binding rules of law. The restriction to the justification of norms is not enough to justify a morality. Cortina sees the cause as a “confusion between moral and political will”. Her conclusion is: “Only the good will of those affected, their willingness to defend only generalizable interests, ensures the moral correctness of the result. So the good will is constitutive for the moral correctness (of norms). ”As a consequence of this insight, Cortina demands a doctrine of discourse ethics.

In dealing with Habermas, Ernst Tugendhat criticizes the fact that, even from an ideal discourse, one cannot draw any conclusions about the validity of moral principles without already assuming an egalitarian morality. In this respect, the justification of discourse ethics is circular. In “Truth Theories” (1973) Habermas made a condition that “only speakers are admitted to the discourse who, as agents, have the same chance to command and oppose, allow and forbid […]” could e.g. B. Slaves do not enter into a discourse with slave owners. Universalizability fails because of this limitation of the ideal speech situation. In the later version of the discourse rules (1983, see above) this restrictive condition is missing. Habermas then demands that those who enter the discourse implicitly recognize the principle of universalization. For Tugendhat this is no more than a tautology . ("If one recognizes the principle of universalization, the principle of universalization applies") With regard to the principle "D" of the real discourse, Tugendhat, like Cortina, criticizes Habermas for mixing the political level with the moral. Decisions by majority vote are not universal, but the Dezision a majority. “The assumption that concrete moral questions can or should be decided through a real discourse not only appears unfounded, but also absurd.” In particular, a consensus cannot be achieved if those affected are included in the discourse in dilemma situations. Tugendhat illustrates this with a drastic thought experiment widely used in moral philosophy, in which five terminally ill patients in a clinic are waiting for an organ transplant and another patient who is healthy in this regard has the necessary organs. Nobody in a neutral situation would probably agree to a consensus that the healthy patient must be sacrificed to save five lives.

Gerhard Schönrich points out that the universalization principle of discourse ethics does not offer an approach to conflict resolution if there is fundamental dissent. "If the consent to the secondary consequence cannot be given, then according to the internal logic of the universalization principle (U) it is to be denied as a whole." The reason lies in the self-legislation of people, which is also recognized by discourse ethics. A norm is only universal if the individual can express his position unhindered. This also gives the possibility of withdrawing from the common solution. “The interpersonal generalization proposed by discourse ethics must therefore be systematically supplemented by a previous intrapersonal generalization.” Schönrich further doubts that the concept of role assumption is suitable for making the position of another participant in the discourse understandable. For him, “it cannot be seen how the emotivism is switched off, so how the rationally controlled perspective assumption emerges from the alleged empathy.” The perspective assumption is a foreign interpretation that necessarily remains an interpretation and is therefore not freed from subjectivity. The individual self-interpretation cannot be controlled by reversing roles. Incidentally, the idea of ​​role reversal already logically presupposes a self that precedes the communicative situation.

Commenting on discourse ethics, Jean-François Lyotard states: “Consensus has become an outdated and suspect value. Justice is quite different. One must therefore arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not tied to that of consensus. ”In particular, the assumption of truthfulness in discourse is irredeemable. In Lyotard's understanding, justice includes the recognition of the heterogeneity of language games in the various types of discourse, so that these cannot be decided, but must be accepted. The relationship to the other is not determined by the mutual recognition of freedom, but by the mutual suffering of the other point of view. The universalization of a point of view is therefore not possible. His criticism that there is no meta-principle for the conflict of plurality of different types of discourse in order to find a consensus is countered by the discourse ethicists with the argument that the ideal discourse, based on the reason of the participants, also leads to a consensus of values ​​and thus to a higher-level rational solution . Apel admits that discourse ethics should not be paternalistic because it certainly poses the risk of totalitarianism, but comments: “On the other hand, however, it seems absurd if, in view of the international challenge of the ecological crisis and in view of the inevitable need for different socio-cultural coexistence for the first time Forms of life the discourse-ethical consensus-building is denounced as a danger for individual differences (e.g. by Lyotard); "

From Seyla Benhabib's point of view, emotional reactions in communication are neglected due to the discourse ethics, which is purely rational. "One of the main weaknesses of cognitive and procedural theories of ethics since Kant is that they neglect the emotional and affective foundations of moral judgment and behavior." What belongs to humans is that they are corporeal, finite, suffering and emotionally gifted. Unlike Habermas / Apel, Benhabib does not consider consensus but mutual understanding as the meaningful goal of a discourse: “Consensus alone can never be a criterion, neither for truth nor for moral validity. Rather, the rationality of the procedure that should lead to consent is philosophically relevant. Consensus must not be understood as an end goal, but as a process, as a collective search for truth and validity. "The idea of ​​consensus already implies a community and an orientation towards a community:" If I want to have a conversation, I have to be able to listen, I do must be able to understand your point of view; if I can't, the conversation ends, develops into an argument or doesn't even get going. Discourse ethics projects such moral conversations, which are based on mutual respect, onto a utopian community of humanity. "

For Julian Nida-Rümelin , discourse ethics is “an important part of a comprehensive normative ethics”. However, it is too oriented towards the " homo disputans ". He sees a major problem in the fact that norms require the consent of all in a practical discourse in order to be valid. However, this cannot be guaranteed in practice. “Discourse ethics does not offer a criterion for clarifying questions of justice. The conflict of interests can only be resolved through ethical standards of content and not through recourse to individual interests and the willingness to introduce them into an informal discourse. Cooperation in the sense of structural rationality requires a normative standpoint that goes beyond securing the communication requirements. ”Discourse ethics presupposes structurally rational actors and can only claim validity under these ideal conditions.

literature

Primary works

  • Karl-Otto Apel: The a priori of the communication community and the foundations of ethics: On the problem of a rational justification of ethics in the age of science. In: Ders .: Transformation of Philosophy. Frankfurt a. M. 1973, Vol. 2, pp. 358-435 (Orig .: 1972).
  • Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and Responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ​​1988.
  • Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ​​1983. ( Texts online , link currently inactive)
  • Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics . Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ​​1991. ( texts online , link currently inactive)
  • Wolfgang Kuhlmann : Reflexive ultimate justification. Studies on transcendental pragmatics . Freiburg / Munich: Alber, 1985.
  • Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Contributions to discourse ethics: Studies on transcendental pragmatics . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, ISBN 978-3-8260-3321-6 .

Secondary literature

Collections of articles
  • Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, ISBN 978-3-518-28599-2 .
  • Dietrich Böhler, Matthias Kettner, Gunnar Skirbekk : Reflection and responsibility. Disputes with Karl-Otto Apel . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003, ISBN 3-518-29218-8 .
  • Holger Burckhart, Horst Gronke (Hrsg.): Philosophize from discourse: Contributions to discourse pragmatics. Festschrift for Dietrich Böhler, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, ISBN 978-3-8260-2334-7 .
  • Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz (Ed.): Perspektiven der Diskursethik . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004 ( Introduction ( Memento from June 7, 2007 in the Internet Archive ); PDF; 91 kB)
  • Wolfgang Kuhlmann (Ed.): Morality and Morality. Hegel's Problem and Discourse Ethics . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1986, ISBN 978-3-518-28195-6 .
  • Heinz-Ulrich Nennen (Ed.): Discourse. Concept and realization . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, ISBN 978-3-8260-1754-4 .
  • Marcel Niquet / Francisco J. Herrero / Michael Hanke (eds.): Discourse ethics. Foundations and Applications . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2001, ISBN 978-3-8260-2112-1 .
Monographs
  • Dietrich Böhler : Commitment from the discourse: Communicative thinking and responsibility . Alber, Freiburg 2012, ISBN 978-3-495-48187-5 .
  • Klaus Günther: The sense of appropriateness. Discourses of application in morality and law . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, ISBN 978-3-518-57927-5 .
  • Matthias Kettner: Discourse Ethics: Moral Reason in Practice . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2013, ISBN 978-3-518-29219-8 .
  • Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Discourse Ethics. Theories - Developments - Perspectives , Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2000, ISBN 978-3-05-003574-1 .
  • Gerhard Schönrich: Discourse on occasion. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1994. (stw; 1111) ISBN 3-518-28711-7 .
  • Uwe Steinhoff: Critique of communicative rationality. A presentation and criticism of the philosophy of communication theory by Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel . Mentis, Paderborn 2006. ISBN 3-89785-473-2 .
  • Peter Ulrich: Integrative Business Ethics. Basics of a life-serving economy . 4th edition. Bern / Stuttgart / Vienna: Paul Haupt, 2008, ISBN 978-3-258-07261-6 .
  • Allbrecht Wellmer: Ethics and Dialogue. Elements of moral judgment in Kant and in discourse ethics . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1986, ISBN 978-3-518-28178-9 .
  • Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, ISBN 978-3-8260-2444-3 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ The prehistory of discourse theory is presented in detail in: Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011; see also: Helge Schalk: Kulturelle Welten - The Universes of Discourse (accessed on February 4, 2012; PDF; 87 kB), which already shows the concept of discourse in Peirce (CP 2.517ff).
  2. ↑ Stephen E. Toulmin: The Uses of Arguments, Cambridge 1958
  3. ↑ Chaim Perelman, Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca: The new rhetoric. A Treatise on Arguing. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 2004 (Original: La Nouvelle Rhétorique, Paris 1958)
  4. ↑ Horst Gronke, Jens Peter Brune: Keyword “Discourse / Discourse Theory”, in: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy. 2nd, revised and expanded edition. Meiner, Hamburg 2010
  5. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner: Introduction, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Hrsg.): For the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 9
  6. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: The a priori of the communication community and the foundations of ethics: To the problem of a rational justification of ethics in the age of science. In: Ders .: Transformation of Philosophy. Frankfurt a. M. 1973, Vol. 2, pp. 358-435, 397
  7. ↑ Jürgen Habermas, Truth Theories, in: Helmut Fahrenbach (Hrsg.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday, 1973, pp. 211–266, printed in: Preliminary studies and supplements to the theory of communicative action, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1984, pp. 127–183
  8. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983
  9. ^ Marcel Niquet: Morality and Compliance Validity. Prolegomena to a realistic discourse theory of morals, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 10
  10. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 55
  11. ^ Marcel Niquet: Morality and Compliance Validity. Prolegomena to a realistic discourse theory of morals, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 9; explicitly also: Jürgen Habermas; Morality and morality. Do Hegel's objections to Kant also apply to discourse ethics ?, in: Wolfgang Kuhlmann (Ed.): Morality and Morality. The problem of Hegel and the ethics of discourse, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1986, 16–37; likewise Karl-Otto Apel with direct reference to this essay: Limits of Discourse Ethics? An attempt at an interim balance sheet, in: Journal for philosophical research, Vol. 40, H. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1986), 3-31
  12. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: The transcendental pragmatic foundation of communication ethics and the problem of the highest level of a development logic of moral consciousness, in: ders. Discourse and responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, 306-369
  13. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, in: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 127ff ( online  ( page no longer available , search in web archives )  Info: The link was automatically marked as defective. Please check the link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. )@1@ 2Template: Dead Link / solomon.tinyurl.alexanderstreet.com  
  14. ↑ Critically comments u. a .: Detlef Horster : The Kantian "methodical solipsism" and the theories of Apel and Habermas, in: Kant studies, 73rd year • Issue 4. 1982, 463-470
  15. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, ​​1988, 116
  16. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: What makes a way of life 'rational'? In: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 35
  17. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 103; Habermas refers in FN 73 (p. 123) to a similar formulation by Friedrich Kambartel , a representative of Erlangen constructivism , in: Friedrich Kambartel: Moralisches Argumentieren, in ders. (Ed.): Practical Philosophy and Constructive Philosophy of Science, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1974 , 54ff; almost identical to the word, but with the reference to the rationality of the discourse: "D": "The norms of action to which all those possibly affected as participants in rational discourses could agree are valid." In: Jürgen Habermas: facticity and validity, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992 , 138
  18. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: facticity and validity, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 139
  19. ↑ Immanuel Kant: For Eternal Peace, B 21 Note: "Rather, my external (legal) freedom is to be explained as follows: it is the authority not to obey any external laws other than to which I have been able to give my consent." ( AA VIII, 350 )
  20. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: facticity and validity, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 135-137
  21. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: a genealogical consideration of the cognitive content of the ought, in: The inclusion of the other. Studies on political theory, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996, 11– 64, 64
  22. ↑ Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Discourse Ethics. Theories - Developments - Perspectives, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2000, 33
  23. ↑ Criticism in this respect is expressed by the Spanish philosopher Adela Cortina : Ethics without morals. Limits of a post Kantian ethics of principles, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 278–295 (see section Reception)
  24. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Confrontations in the testing of the transcendental-pragmatic approach, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1998, 727
  25. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics: Can the rationality differences between morality, law and politics itself still be justified by the discourse ethics normatively-rationally ?, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29-61, 32
  26. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Confrontations in the testing of the transcendental-pragmatic approach, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1998, 737
  27. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 75, cf. 103
  28. ↑ Niels Gottschalk-Mazouz: Discourse Ethics. Theories - Developments - Perspectives, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 2000, 17
  29. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 67
  30. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 157
  31. ↑ see already Immanuel Kant: Critique of Judgment B 157 ff ( § 40 Of Taste as a Kind of Sensus Communis , AA V, 293ff); specifically: George Herbert Mead : Spirit, Identity and Society, ed. by Charles W. Morris, 9th edition Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 29 (“Due to the internalization or acceptance of the social communication process, the individual creates the mechanism for reflective thinking (the ability to direct his actions taking into account the expected consequences of various alternative actions ); it can make itself an object and live in a moral and scientific world common to all; it becomes a moral being whose impulsive goals are transformed into the conscious pursuit of desired goals ")
  32. ^ Richard Mervyn Hare: Freedom and Reason. Pathmos, Düsseldorf 1973, 136
  33. ^ Adam Smith: Theory of ethical feelings [1759], Meiner Hamburg 1977, 231
  34. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 59
  35. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 75
  36. ↑ Klaus Günther : The sense of appropriateness. Application discourses in morality and law, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, 37
  37. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich : On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1994, 21
  38. ↑ Klaus Günther: The sense of appropriateness. Application discourses in morality and law, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, 48
  39. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich: On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1994, 20
  40. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, 134
  41. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and responsibility. The problem of the transition to post-conventional morality. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, 123
  42. ↑ Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 561
  43. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: "Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics". In: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29-61, 36
  44. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Contributions. in: Willi Oelmüller (Hrsg.): Transzendentalphilosophische Normegründung, Paderborn 1978, 160-173, 171
  45. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: "Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics". In: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29-61, 35
  46. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner: Introduction, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Hrsg.): For the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 9
  47. ↑ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Reflexive final justification. Studies on transcendental pragmatics. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1985, quoted from Werner, 23
  48. ↑ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Reflexive final justification. Studies on transcendental pragmatics. Freiburg / Munich: Alber, 1985, 214
  49. ↑ Dietrich Böhler: Discourse ethics and the principle of human dignity between idealization and responsibility for success, in Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 201-232
  50. ^ Dietrich Böhler: Credibility of the discourse partner. An (economic) ethical thrust of the Berlin discourse pragmatics and discourse ethics. In: Bausch, Böhler, Rusche (Ed.): Economy and Ethics. Strategies Against Morality? Ethics and Economy in Dialogue Vol. 12, Lit, Münster 2004, pp. 105–148, 124; similar in: Idea and commitment to responsibility for the future, in: Thomas Bausch, Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke, Thomas Rusche, Michael Stitzel, Micha H. Werner (eds.): Future responsibility in the market economy, Lit Münster 2000, 34–69, 52; as well as in: Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 559
  51. ↑ 400
  52. ↑ Hans Albert: The alleged paradox of consequent fallibilism and the claims of transcendental pragmatics, in: Journal for philosophical research, Vol. 41, H. 3 (Jul. - Sep., 1987), pp. 421-428; similar: Carl Friedrich Gethmann and Rainer Hegselmann: The problem of the justification between decisionism and fundamentalism, in: Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 8, 1977, pp. 342–368
  53. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: The conflict of our time and the requirement of a basic ethical-political orientation, in: Funkkolleg practical philosophy. Ethik I, Fischer, Frankfurt 1980, 267–291, here 279 and 287
  54. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 117-118
  55. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: The inclusion of the other. Studies on political theory, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996, 60
  56. ↑ Jürgen Habermas, J. (1983a): Discourse Ethics - Notes on a Justification Program. In: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M., 53-125, 113
  57. ↑ See e.g. B. Karl-Heinz Ilting : The claim to validity of moral norms, in: Wolfgang Kuhlmann, Dietrich Böhler (ed.): Communication and reflection. For the discussion of the transcendental pragmatics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 612–648, or Thomas Rentsch : The constitution of morality. Transcendental Anthropology and Practical Philosophy, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 59
  58. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Limits of Discourse Ethics? An attempt at an interim balance, in: Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, Vol. 40, H. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1986), 3 - 31
  59. ↑ Audun Øfsti: Modifications: Essays on Philosophy of Language and Philosophy of Science, Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg 1994, 145, quoted from: Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as Maximenethik: From the foundations of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 80
  60. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Preliminary studies and additions to the theory of communicative action, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1984, 354
  61. ↑ Robert Alexy: "A theory of practical discourse." In: Oelmüller, Willi (ed.): Norms justification - norm enforcement, materials for norm discussion, Vol. 2, Paderborn 1978, pp. 22-58
  62. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 97-99; see also the table at: Martin F. Meyer: Habermas Discourse Ethics in the Context of Modern Moral Justification. In: Heinz-Ulrich Nennen (Ed.): Discourse. Concept and realization. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, 77–94, here 87–88
  63. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 101
  64. ↑ Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 556 or Dietrich Böhler: Credibility of the Discourse Partner. An (economic) ethical thrust of the Berlin discourse pragmatics and discourse ethics. In: Bausch, Böhler, Rusche (Ed.): Economy and Ethics. Strategies Against Morality? Ethics and Economy in Dialogue Vol. 12, Lit, Münster 2004, pp. 105–148
  65. ↑ Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 563
  66. ↑ Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 565
  67. ↑ Böhler refers here to his article: Dietrich Böhler: Discourse ethics and the principle of human dignity between idealization and responsibility for success, in Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 201-232
  68. ↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 20
  69. ↑ Robert Alexy: Theory of Legal Argumentation. The theory of rational discourse as a theory of legal justification, Frankfurt a. M. 1983 (first edition 1978), 38
  70. ↑ Klaus Günther: The sense of appropriateness. Discourses of application in morality and law. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988
  71. ↑ Dietrich Böhler, Horst Gronke: Keyword “Discourse”, in: New Handbook of Philosophical Basic Concepts, Alber, Freiburg 2011, 555
  72. ^ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Contributions to discourse ethics: Studies on transcendental pragmatics. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, 115
  73. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner: Introduction, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Hrsg.): For the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 9
  74. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics: Can the rationality differences between morality, law and politics itself still be justified by the discourse ethics normatively-rationally ?, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29-61, 30
  75. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Political Justice. Foundation of a critical philosophy of law and state, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1987, 27
  76. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics: Can the rationality differences between morality, law and politics itself still be justified by the discourse ethics normatively-rationally ?, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29-61, 46
  77. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel with direct reference to this essay: Limits of Discourse Ethics? An attempt at an interim balance sheet, in: Journal for Philosophical Research, Vol. 40, H. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1986), 3-31, FN 4
  78. ↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 51–52
  79. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: The inclusion of the other. Studies on political theory, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1996, 63
  80. ↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 53
  81. ↑ Ernst Tugendhat : Philosophical Essays, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 371, quoted from: Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 54
  82. ↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 59–62
  83. ↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics: From the justification of principles to action orientation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, 77-78
  84. ↑ Dietrich Böhler: Discourse ethics and the principle of human dignity between idealization and responsibility for success, in Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 201-232, 205
  85. ↑ Dietrich Böhler: Discourse ethics and the principle of human dignity between idealization and responsibility for success, in Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 201-232, 209; Critical to this: Micha Brumlik : On the unfounded human dignity from the spirit of discourse ethics - against the hermeneutic compromise in the euthanasia debate !, in: Ethik und Sozialwissenschaften, 2 (3/1991), 377-380
  86. ↑ Bruno S. Frey , Gebhard Kirchgässner : Discourse Ethics, Political Economy and Referendums ( Memento of the original from August 8, 2008 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was automatically inserted and not yet checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 3.3 MB), in: Analysis and Criticism, 15 (1993), 129–149; Critical to this: Michael Baurmann, Hartmut Kliemt: Referendums, negotiations and the veil of insignificance ( Memento of the original from June 5, 2015 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 2.9 MB), in: Analysis and Criticism, 15 (1993), 150–167 @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.analyse-und-kritik.net @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / analyze-und-kritik.net
  87. ↑ Dietrich Böhler: Discourse ethics and the principle of human dignity between idealization and responsibility for success, in Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 201-232, 212-213
  88. ↑ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Discourse ethics - Act or norms ethics ?, in: Holger Burckhart, Horst Gronke (Ed.): Philosophizing from the discourse: Contributions to discourse pragmatics. Festschrift for Dietrich Böhler, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 329–342
  89. ^ Albrecht Wellmer: Ethics and Dialogue. Elements of moral judgment in Kant and in discourse ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1986, 64 and 81ff
  90. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 138
  91. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 391
  92. ↑ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Discourse ethics - Act or norms ethics ?, in: Holger Burckhart, Horst Gronke (Ed.): Philosophizing from the discourse: Contributions to discourse pragmatics. Festschrift for Dietrich Böhler, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 329–342, here 342
  93. ↑ Matthias Kettner: Area-specific relevance. On the concrete generality of discourse ethics, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 317-349
  94. ↑ Matthias Kettner: Area-specific relevance. On the concrete generality of discourse ethics, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 317-349, 343
  95. ↑ Matthias Kettner: About some dilemmas of applied ethics. In: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, pp. 9-28, 20.
  96. ↑ Matthias König: The three-step model of business ethics using the example of discourse ethics . ( Memento of the original from April 13, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 185 kB) In: zfwu, 2/2 (2001), pp. 155–180. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.zfwu.de
  97. ↑ Detlef Horster: The Kantian "methodical solipsism" and the theories of Apel and Habermas. In: Kant studies, 73rd year, issue 4 (1982), pp. 463-470.
  98. ↑ Annemarie Pieper: Ethics as a relationship between moral philosophy and anthropology. In: Kant Studies 69 (1978), pp. 314–329.
  99. ↑ Annemarie Pieper: Ethics as a relationship between moral philosophy and anthropology. In: Kant Studies 69 (1978), pp. 314–329, 327.
  100. ↑ Richard Rorty: The primacy of democracy from philosophy. In: ders .: solidarity or objectivity? Three philosophical essays. Reclam, Stuttgart 1988, 82-125, 86
  101. ↑ Michael Walzer: Local Criticism - Global Standards, Rotbuch, Berlin 1996, 28
  102. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals , first sentence after the preface ( AA IV, 393 )
  103. ^ Adela Cortina: Ethics without morals. Limits of a post Kantian ethics of principles. In: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, pp. 278-295, 285.
  104. ^ Adela Cortina: Ethics without morals. Limits of a post Kantian ethics of principles. In: Karl-Otto Apel, Matthias Kettner (Ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, pp. 278-295, 294.
  105. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Truth Theories, in: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday, 1973, pp. 211–266, quoted from: Ernst Tugendhat: Vorlesungen über Ethik, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 164
  106. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Discourse ethics - Notes on a justification program, in: Moral consciousness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 53–126, here 97–99
  107. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Discourse ethics - Notes on a justification program, in: Moral consciousness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 53–126, here 103
  108. ^ Ernst Tugendhat: Lectures on Ethics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 169
  109. ^ Ernst Tugendhat: Lectures on Ethics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 170
  110. ^ Ernst Tugendhat: Lectures on Ethics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1993, 171
  111. ↑ Critical to Tugendhat: Karsten Malowitz: Ernst Tugendhat and the Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Refutation Program, Journal for Philosophical Research, (49), 4 / Oct.1995, 595–604
  112. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich: On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1994, p. 36.
  113. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, p. 19, see also pp. 145-146.
  114. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich: On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1994, p. 53.
  115. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich: On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1994, p. 57.
  116. ↑ Gerhard Schönrich: On occasion discourse. On the limits of discourse ethics and the price of ultimate justification. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1994, p. 62.
  117. ^ Jean-François Lyotard: The postmodern knowledge. Edited by Peter Engelmann, 5th edition Passagen, Vienna 2006, p. 106/190.
  118. ↑ Jean-François Lyotard: Der Widerstreit, 2. corr. Edition Fink, Munich 1989, 191
  119. ↑ On the Habermas - Lyotard conflict, see Manfred Frank : The Limits of Understanding. A ghost talk between Lyotard and Habermas, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988
  120. ↑ Jean-François Lyotard: Der Widerstreit, 2. corr. Aufl. Fink, Munich 1989, 11–12: “Considering 1.) the impossibility of avoiding conflicts (the impossibility of indifference) and 2.) the lack of a universal type of discourse for their arbitration or, if one prefers, the inevitable Partiality of the judge: if not the place of a conceivable legitimation of the judgment (the "good" chain), at least seek a possibility to save the integrity of the thinking "
  121. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse ethics before the problem of law and politics: Can the rationality differences between morality, law and politics itself still be justified by the discourse ethics normatively-rationally ?, in: Karl-Otto Apel, Mattias Kettner (ed.): On the application of discourse ethics in politics, law and science, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 29–61, 33
  122. ↑ Seyla Benhabib: In the shadow of Aristotle and Hegel. Communicative Ethics and Controversies in Contemporary Practical Philosophy. In: Even in context. Gender studies. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, 66
  123. ↑ Seyla Benhabib: In the shadow of Aristotle and Hegel. Communicative Ethics and Controversies in Contemporary Practical Philosophy. In: Even in context. Gender studies. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, p. 66.
  124. ↑ Seyla Benhabib: In the shadow of Aristotle and Hegel. Communicative Ethics and Controversies in Contemporary Practical Philosophy. In: Even in context. Gender studies. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1992, p. 71.
  125. ↑ Julian Nida-Rümelin: Structural Rationality, Reclam, Stuttgart 2001, 110–112