basis on the metaphysics of ethics

The Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals ( GMS for short ) is a work by Immanuel Kant , which was published by JF Hartknoch in 1785 . It is Kant's first fundamental work on ethics , which he published at the very old age of 61, after having previously formulated his theoretical philosophy with the Critique of Pure Reason . In the GMS, Kant pursues the goal of drafting a moral philosophy that is based solely on considerations of pure reason and the principles of which are derived neither from a metaphysical worldview nor from experience determined by chance influences. Pure practical reason, according to Kant, is the ability to act for reasons that are not based on interest-driven motives and are raised without reference to experience. From the basic concepts of good will and duty , Kant developed the concepts of the categorical imperative ( KI ) with its various formulas, respect for the moral law and the dignity of the human being as an autonomous person . Reason-following morality is not based on a supreme value, but follows a procedure to determine the reasons of human action as good or right. In the last part of the GMS, Kant tries to justify the general validity of the AI, which is based on the idea of freedom , in a complicated “deduction” .

Kant assigns the task of demarcation to his theoretical philosophy to the Critique of Practical Reason . A corresponding work appeared three years later. There the thoughts of the GMS are further elaborated and deepened. The GMS is just a foundation because it focuses on determining the basic principles of morality. The elaboration of individual rules of morality is reserved for a metaphysics of morals , for which the GMS only does the preparatory work. The extent to which the text later published with this title fulfills the task assigned to it in the GMS is regarded as unclear in the reception. The GMS was sold out in bookshops so quickly that a second, slightly revised and expanded edition appeared just a year later.

Classification in Kant's work

Kant had already given lectures on ethics in the pre-critical phase and made various statements that he wanted to write a future metaphysics of morals. He had the idea of ​​good will and the categorical imperative in mind as early as 1772. Up until that time, Kant had oriented himself more towards the British moral philosophers (Shaftesbury, Hume) and the meaning of moral feeling. He then postponed this intention and concentrated entirely on the elaboration of theoretical philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason . The basic approaches to justifying the Kantian ethics can already be found in the second part of the Critique of Pure Reason, in methodology (KrV B 825, see also on the architecture of pure reason, B 860–879). Originally Kant had probably not planned to write a separate elaboration on the theoretical foundations of moral philosophy. The reason to write such a work seems to have been Christian Garve's criticism of the Critique of Pure Reason and his publication of a translation and commentary of Cicero's De officiis . Garve's work is not mentioned in the GMS, but Kant researchers see clear traces of a critical examination of his work in the GMS. While Garve and Cicero established the moral duties of human nature, its desires and the cardinal virtues , Kant was of the opinion that morality arises solely from the self-legislation of practical reason. Duty must therefore be a concept of reason that has been purified from desires.

In the foundation of the metaphysics of morals, much is dealt with and introduced according to the matter, which is later found in the Critique of Practical Reason, partly more explicitly worked out. The foundation is therefore suitable both as a guide to the latter and indispensable for a more precise understanding of the second critique. Kant deals with practical ethics in their application and their principles in more detail in the Metaphysics of Morals , an old work from 1797. Kant did not write a separate moral doctrine with empirical content, the practical anthropology mentioned in the GMS (388). The anthropology in a pragmatic way from 1798 describes only practical customs and manners as a stock of knowledge of a "world wisdom". For Kant, pragmatic, in contrast to practical, means “that which contributes to welfare”. To understand the fundamentals, Kant's lectures on ethics, which are held at the same time, are often helpful (cf. vol. 27 of the academy edition). Supplementary explanations on ethics can be found in Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason from 1793, which deals with the question of evil and also contains statements on practical anthropology.

structure

The relatively short work of a good 100 pages is divided into the following sections:

preface

1. Section: Transition from the common moral knowledge of reason to the philosophical
2. Section: Transition from the popular moral world wisdom to the metaphysics of morals
3. Section: Transition from the Metaphysics of Morals to the Critique of Pure Practical Reason

After introductory remarks on the classification of the GMS and on his method, Kant starts in the first section with the "common moral knowledge of reason". With a “step into the field of practical philosophy” (405) he wants to free them from that which does not count as pure rational knowledge. This includes folk wisdom as well as psychological or religious factors. As a method, he refers to the critical questioning of his material, "as Socrates did" (404; Mäeutik ).

Kant is not concerned with finding a new morality, but with self-enlightenment of the moral consciousness that is broadly anchored in human practice. After analyzing the concepts of good will in and of itself and duty towards oneself, the first formulation of the categorical imperative (KI) is at the end of GMS I. In the second section, Kant analyzes AI as the supreme principle of morality. The picture drawn here then provides the basis for the "metaphysics of morals". Kant first explains his considerations through various formulations of the AI ​​and some concise, but also much discussed examples, until he comes to the concept of human dignity at the end of the section. Only then does Kant ask in the third section why man is autonomous , why the previously analytically enlightened moral philosophy is based on the basic idea of ​​freedom and why the moral law described in this way has general validity. Kant carries out the question of validity as a “critique of pure practical reason”.

content

preface

In the preface Kant describes the character and method of his writing. For this purpose, a classification into the system of philosophy takes place , which is classically divided according to the Stoa into logic, physics (natural science) and ethics (moral theory). For the purpose of further analysis, Kant opposes the then prevailing division according to Christian Wolff into theology, psychology and physics. Logic is strictly not empirical; H. there are no judgments based on experience. Nature and ethics can be empirical as well as purely rational. As far as they are purely rational, i.e. H. based only on the result of intellectual achievements without the influence of empirical views, it is metaphysics . Metaphysics of Morals thus deals with morality insofar as it is examined purely rationally ( a priori ) and not empirically. (410) According to Kant, moral doctrine should be free of speculation and be based on objective principles. This already follows from the concepts of duty and law (388). Normative facts are objective. Only in this way can the laws of morality claim universal validity and rational necessity. If they were based on empirical experience, such as psychology, the moral rules would be subject to chance influences; they would be contingent and dependent on human nature and practice. Moral rules are free from interests (inclinations). Kant thus assumes that moral statements can be judged as right or wrong ( realism ). This view, represented by Kant, is controversial in moral philosophy ( non-cognitivism ). The minimal anthropological assumption of Kant is that the human being is both a sensory being and a rational being who can reflect on his knowledge and has the ability to act independently of his subjective interests.

The GMS thus serves, in addition to the “search for” the highest moral principle, to clarify the question of the conditions for the possibility of making statements and is, in this respect, a metaethical script. But Kant is not only concerned with “ exploring the source of the principles that lie a priori in our reason, but because morals themselves remain subject to all sorts of corruption as long as that guideline and supreme doctrine of their correct judgment is missing”, he regards it as a task the philosophy of delivering this guide. For Kant, a fundamental premise of his ethics is that humans are autonomous in the enlightened sense. This is why Kant also speaks of moral laws as laws of freedom in contrast to the laws of nature , which state what happens (descriptively), while the laws of freedom determine what should happen (prescriptively) (387). For Kant, moral norms have the character of a law if they are necessary and generally applicable. The necessity arises from reason. What is contrary to reason cannot be a moral law. Generality says that every reasonable being would without exception (424) arrive at an identical solution when assessing an action and the rule of action on which it is based.

At the end of the preface Kant says of his method “that it is the most appropriate if one comes across common knowledge for the determination of the supreme principle of the same analytically and back again from the examination of this principle and its sources for common knowledge, in which its use , wants to take the path synthetically. ”(392) The juxtaposition of analytical and synthetic does not refer to the distinction between analytical and synthetic methods that Kant makes in the Prolegomena (AA IV, 276). Rather, Kant means in the GMS a concept analysis in parts GMS I + II and a concept derivation (deduction) in GMS III. Kant also speaks (393) of the “search” of the KI (= GMS I / II) and its “establishment” (= GMS III).

Transition from the common moral knowledge of reason to the philosophical one

The concept of goodwill in itself

Kant begins to deal with common moral knowledge by setting an abstract, purely theoretical standard for the concept of the good . This theoretical standard, which initially does not make any material statement, is:

"It is not possible to think in the world, even outside of it, at all that could be considered good without restriction, other than a good will alone." (393)

Behind this sentence stands the insight of Kant that it is not possible to clearly fill the concept of the good in terms of content; be it that “good” refers to objects (things, facts, ideas), properties or actions. Depending on the context , a material conceptual content can be assessed differently as good or bad, good or bad or harmful and right or wrong. Using the standard of goodwill, Kant clearly distinguishes himself from other moral systems (such as virtue ethics , consequentialism or naturalistic ethics ). With the opening sentence Kant provokes the reader of his time. Because the definition of a highest good would have been bliss or God. He names a large number of examples from different categories to substantiate his thesis. On the one hand, there are instrumental values ​​such as intellectual talents (intellect, wit, judgment), character traits (courage, determination, perseverance, moderation, self-control, sober reflection) or gifts of luck (power, wealth, honor, health). Whether one of these values ​​is good depends on the will with which it is linked. On the other hand, it is the state of bliss, the summum bonum of tradition, which is expressed in intrinsic goods of well-being and satisfaction. The advancement of one's own happiness is a natural purpose to which man ceaselessly strives because of his urges as the supreme purpose. But it is changeable in terms of content and always indefinite and therefore not sufficient as a yardstick for good. Here, too, it takes good will to be able to call it good; for with bliss can also be connected with arrogance, selfishness or ignorance. Similar insights can already be found in Seneca , whose writings Kant knew well. In the analytical philosophy of the 20th century, for example, George Edward Moore , Georg Henrik von Wright and John Leslie Mackie provided detailed analyzes of the concept of the good, which came to similar conclusions as Kant .

Kant gives here a criterion, albeit not a sufficient one, to check whether something is unreservedly good that is already found in a similar form in Adam Smith . The question is what a reasonable, impartial viewer (God?) Would say about each of these. (393) Only someone who is also of good will proves to be worthy of happiness. Cognitive skills and virtues are useful even for a criminal, contentment can lead to negligence. None of these things are inherently of good value. The gifts of nature and luck are "good for many purposes" (394), but not without restriction. Kant critically points out that "the more a cultivated reason devotes itself to the enjoyment of life and happiness, the further a person deviates from true contentment" (395), which leads to misology (hatred of reason) can be enough. One cannot force happiness, which is true even for science, if it strives for a state of mental happiness. By rejecting eudaemonia , the moral principle that has prevailed since antiquity, Kant acts in a similarly revolutionary manner in ethics as in theoretical philosophy. However, this focuses on material concepts and less on ideas that combine eudaemonia with the virtue of efficiency ( areté ) or honesty (honestas). And the Stoa already represented a duty ethic in antiquity , to which Kant evidently refers.

After Kant has shown that the traditional values , also represented in the history of philosophy , are only relatively or conditionally good, he investigates how one can determine whether something is good. Feeling and willing, urges and inclinations, the satisfaction of needs have a clear significance with regard to happiness. Here reason is more detrimental to the “enjoyment of life” (395). The function of practical reason with which man is naturally endowed is different. According to Kant, your task is to produce good will. (396) Therefore, when searching for “what could be considered good without restriction”, ie what is absolutely good, he must abstract from his inclinations - even if this is difficult in practice - and pretend that it is only purely practical Reason alone could be used for moral judgment. This argument of Kant that the purpose of human nature is to determine good will through practical reason (teleological argument) is controversial.

Kant's concept of the will should not be confused with a wish. Part of the will is “the mobilization of all means as far as they are in our power”. (394) Anyone who does not intend to carry out the corresponding action despite insight does not yet have goodwill. Part of goodwill is that it is an actual and not just a possible motive . Moreover, for Kant, whether an action is morally good does not depend on the actual consequences. It may be that people with limited mental or physical abilities do not achieve a desirable consequence or that they misjudge their actions. Because of that alone, they cannot be accused of moral misconduct. It can generally be the case that the goal of an action is not achieved despite care and great effort. But that doesn't make an action morally bad. On the other hand, if someone performs an act without goodwill and in doing so achieves a desirable consequence, those involved have been lucky, but the act as such cannot be judged morally good. (394) However, the conclusion drawn in this context that Kant does not care what consequences an action has is not valid. Anyone who has a good will has necessarily taken care of the consequences of their actions. Here there is no difference between Kant and, for example, an intentionalist rule utilitarianism . For Kant, looking at the consequences is necessary, but not sufficient.

Acting out of duty

The concept of duty helps to “clarify” the concept of good will further. A duty can only arise where there is a difference between an actual state and a target state. Kant says that the concept of duty includes that of good will. (397) This is because man has desires and inclinations that make him strive for something that does not necessarily correspond to good will. If man were a pure intellectual being without sensual strivings (Kant: holy beings like God or an angel), he would always make reasonable decisions and there would be no difference between good will and action. The concept of moral duty in Kant is a pure understanding concept without an empirical basis. As such, inclinations are neither good nor bad. That is why the behavior of animals cannot be called good or bad. It is only because a person not only has inclinations but also reason that he can recognize what is good. Reason tells him what to do, regardless of interests and inclinations, so that things are good. To do what is ought is his duty solely for reasons of reason, even if it is sometimes difficult for him because of his inclinations. Moral duties are not external duties, such as those from codified laws, but internal duties towards oneself, which are based on the rational insight into what the good will prescribes for the agent. What is duty is self-determined (autonomously) determined by reason. Duty is not externally determined (heteronomous), i.e. neither Prussian nor pietistic , as Kant has repeatedly assumed, but is based on an inner conviction (not feeling) of compulsion (obligation). Moral duty, unlike an external duty, cannot be an excuse for serve an act, but is precisely the ascription of a responsibility .

Kant differentiates between non-dutiful and dutiful action ( legality ) and acting out of duty (morality). One can act dutifully without having the insight into the good or without even wanting the good. You only act morally well with a good will if you also want what is ought out of an understanding of duty. One acts out of duty if one wants to fulfill one's duty regardless of one's inclinations or rules of prudence. If one is honest or gives help to others out of fear of social ostracism or of punishment in the hereafter, there is no moral motive for Kant, but one merely obeys the commandments of legality dutifully.

Kant explains his concept of acting out of duty using four didactic examples. When a shopkeeper sells his goods to all customers for the same price, he is doing it out of wisdom, knowing that customers will trust him and come back. With this motive of prudence, he acts dutifully because he does not discriminate against anyone. If, however, his main motive is to treat all customers fairly as an honest businessman and not want to take advantage of them, then he acts morally with good will and thus out of duty. The fact that customers trust him and come back is just a side effect. The second example is about the duty to sustain one's life. If this happens out of fear and worry, then appropriate action is oriented towards your own benefit and is only dutiful. But if you do the same, although you don't care about life out of grief (anymore), you act against your tendencies to commit suicide or to take excessive dangers and thus out of duty. When you are doing charity to help other people, you are acting out of duty. But if this happens primarily because one takes pleasure in the action or out of ambition, the act is only dutiful - looking after children, for example, can be intended as help or just be fun or just because of the good reputation. The fourth example is the promotion of one's own bliss. This is at least an indirect obligation, because too many worries or poor health can prevent you from fulfilling your duties as a result - for example with a doctor who does not protect himself from infection or who overloads himself with his workload.

Kant critics have reproached him with the fact that his ethics of duty is inhuman or dry Protestant because it consists only in overcoming his inclinations and therefore compels him to lead a joyless life. Schiller's poem on this is famous: “Scruples of conscience: I am happy to serve my friends / but unfortunately I do it with inclination / and so I often annoy me / that I am not virtuous. / Decisium: There is no other advice / you must seek to despise them / and then do with disgust / what duty calls upon you. ”According to this, a notorious thief who suppresses his vice would act more morally than someone who steals is initially repugnant. But that is not Kant's position. At no point did he say that acting with inclination was bad or incompatible with morality. For him, GMS is about showing that morally good behavior is determined exclusively by reason. Action is not morally good if the inclinations are the decisive motive and not the rational insight into duty. Even mostly good inclinations such as compassion do not guarantee morally correct behavior. You could also help a criminal to escape out of compassion. However, a positive attitude towards duty is helpful and desirable, as Kant emphasizes in his doctrine of virtues. (MST AA VI, 484)

Kant himself noted critically that one can never be sure of one's motives for an action. It is possible that even with what at first glance appears to be an unreservedly good action in the subsurface of consciousness, completely different subjective motives play a decisive role. "In fact, it is absolutely impossible to determine a single case with complete certainty through experience, since the maxim of an otherwise obligatory act was based only on moral reasons and on the idea of ​​his duty." (407) Possibly an act of which one thinks that it was done out of duty, in fact it was only dutiful.

Respect the law

On the basis of the thesis that morally good action consists in fulfilling the commandment of duty, i.e. to do what reason commands based on the insight into good will, Kant states that an action does not have its value in its purpose, but because of the principle of volition (a maxim, see below) according to which it happens. Reasonable insight makes an action rationally necessary. Therefore:

"Duty is the necessity of an act out of respect for the law." (400)

Respect for the law is the motive for rational action out of duty. For Kant, reason has a motivating force. Although this respect is a feeling, it has nothing to do with sensual inclinations and subjective interests, because it arises solely from reasonable considerations. That is why the feeling of respect belongs “to the a priori elements of the foundation of morality like the practical law itself.” The moral law consists in realizing what is rationally recognized as good. If you act out of inclinations or interests and do not follow your duty, you are violating the moral law. Then you have no respect for the law.

“The direct determination of the will by law and the consciousness of it is called respect, so that this is viewed as the effect of the law on the subject and not as the cause of it. [...] The object of respect is therefore only the law, namely that which we impose on ourselves and yet as necessary in itself. "(401 FN)

Respect is the result of the autonomy (self-regulation) of human reason and arises independently of influences that reason cannot control. With respect, the objective moral law becomes a subjective reason for action. One cannot have respect for inclinations, but one can have respect for the law as the reason for sensible action. Respect for the law (law: extrinsic) must be distinguished from respect for the law (morality: intrinsic). Respecting the law does not necessarily mean acting out of duty. Günther Patzig considers the assumption of respect for the law independent of empirical experience to be problematic. He also sees in it a reason for Kant's rigor. On the other hand, if respect were accepted as an empirical feeling, it would be easier to explain that this feeling is inferior to other tendencies in human practice.

Maxims

The concept of the maxim appears in the GMS for the first time in connection with the value of an action, which is not based on the purpose of an action, but on the maxim under which the action is carried out (399). Kant's definition of a maxim is:

“The maxim is the subjective principle of will; the objective principle (that is, that which all rational beings would also subjectively serve as the practical principle if reason had full power over the ability to desire) is the practical law. "(400 FN)

A maxim is a subjective principle of action for various cases in an area of ​​life that a person chooses in order to then orientate their actions towards the pursuit of a purpose. In action theory, Kant assumes that people, if they do not act solely on the basis of affects, but freely and consciously, then always act according to maxims. Every decision to act is based on a maxim. As subjective principles, maxims also contain the motive for action, i.e. a purpose. Because they are chosen subjectively, maxims have no legal character. Their selection is arbitrary and they are not linked to a universal claim. Maxims are not spontaneous, but well-considered because they arise from "desires and inclinations [...] through the cooperation of reason" (427). On the other hand, maxims do not have to be aware of every action. They can even be internalized without separate reflection in the context of personal development (this is analogously the case, for example, with the grammar of language). They are the intentional structure underlying the desired action. This means that maxims are suitable for providing assistance with regard to decisions in specific life situations. Similar rules of life can be found in everyday morality (honest lasts the longest) or in religious commandments (you should not kill). Because the maxims are a principle for the acting subject, Kant always formulates them with reference to the first person, i.e. not as imperatives, which in turn are objective principles.

Maxim are only given an objective character when they are combined with the concept of duty and the principle of generalization in the categorical imperative. Only under this condition, when they claim validity for all rational beings in the same action situation, are maxims of morality concerned. Therefore you can z. For example, do not claim that the maxim to sing a song every day is a moral imperative according to Kant. Only when the maxim refers to a moral duty does it become the basis of a good act. Maximums that are connected with duty limit the scope of permissible intentions to act. If one does not find a maxim for an intention that corresponds to the moral law, this must be rejected for moral reasons. Maxims can have different degrees of generality. One can therefore form hierarchies of maxims. The very general rule "If I can, I help other people" is z. B. the maxim “I work free of charge as a paramedic during natural disasters”. Tobias Kronenberg suggests z. For example, on the highest level, we consider maxims of attitude, then character formation and finally principles of action. From the possibility of the hierarchy of maxims it follows that maxims must be restricted or specified with regard to concrete situations in order to be able to adequately express the central idea of ​​a particular issue. The more general, more formal maxims do not lose their validity.

Because they are an essential element of the categorical imperative and form the yardstick for concrete action (see below), Kant also speaks of a maxim ethics . Here one can conceptually make an analogy to virtues and virtue ethics .

The derivation of the categorical imperative

After clarifying the concepts of duty, respect for the law and maxim, Kant can determine the moral law, the supreme principle of the moral law, objectively, even if this determination remains purely formal.

“Since I have deprived the will of all impulses that could arise from the observance of any law, nothing remains but the general regularity of actions in general, which alone should serve the will to the principle, that is, I should never proceed other than that I could also want my maxim should become a general law. "(402)

This is the first formulation of the categorical imperative in the GMS. It is a formal rule with no material content. It is based on maxims and not on concrete actions. The maxim must be able to be willed and, as a general law, it must claim universal validity. In addition, this law should serve the will alone, i.e. H. it applies to people who autonomously, independently of any influences, determine their will based on reason alone.

Kant clarifies the idea of ​​generalization with the example of a false promise, when someone promises something even though he already knows that he cannot keep the promise. If necessary, prudence can allow such a promise in special exceptions (for example in the case of the Heinz dilemma ). But if everyone acted like this, nobody would believe a promise anymore, so that the institute of the promise could not even exist. Therefore, according to the AI, the maxim of making such a promise in an emergency is wrong. Reinhard Brandt warns that generalization in Kant does not mean that one always asks what would happen if everyone followed the maxim. Kant's question, whether I can reasonably want the maxim of my action to become a general law, is directed to the action of a particular subject who checks whether his or her maxim is in contradiction to an imagined legal order. The question of what it would be if everyone did that is z. B. nonsensical with regard to a maxim to play golf every Monday morning on a certain golf course. Generalization in the sense of AI does not mean that a maxim becomes an instruction for everyone, but that everyone who wants to carry out a certain action has to check in a context-related manner whether the maxim behind it contradicts the moral law.

Kant emphasizes that the categorical imperative agrees with general human reason. Philosophy does not need this just to “describe what is good, what is bad, dutiful or contrary to duty” (404). The function of philosophy is merely to protect “innocence” from going astray and the “natural dialectic that is one Tendency to "reason" against those strict laws of duty. That is the task of "a complete criticism of our reason". (405)

Transition from popular moral world wisdom to the metaphysics of morals

Popular philosophical wrong turns

After deriving the concept of duty and the categorical imperative from general human reason, Kant begins the second section with an examination of philosophical concepts that are unsustainable for him in comparison to his maxim ethics. On the one hand, there are the philosophers who doubt the possibility of morality in the face of self-love (= egoism ) of man and see reason as an instrument for the pursuit of interests guided by inclinations. Viewed historically, Kant addresses positions such as those of Epicurus , Hobbes or Hume ; Among his contemporaries, a corresponding attitude can be found among the materialists of the French Enlightenment ( La Mettrie , d'Holbach , Helvétius ). Such a position is based on experience, from which, according to Kant, in fact no moral obligations can be derived. (407) Reasons for moral action can be found in reason alone, without any empirical evidence. Only in this way can one be sure that it is not some hidden motive of self-love that determines action. Duty and law are pure reflection concepts and not abstractions of empirical facts. Moral laws can be universalized. They apply “not only to humans, but to all rational beings in general” (408). This unrestricted validity means that moral laws are “absolutely necessary” before reason.

Even more problematic is a moral philosophy based on examples. Because in order to be able to select examples as relevant at all, one must already have an idea of ​​what is morally correct ( Petitio principii ). Examples can only serve to illustrate, but they cannot be used to justify valid ethics that are free of contradictions.

Kant considers popular philosophy to be absolutely sensible if it serves to disseminate insights, the justification of which was previously derived philosophically. But if you want to look for the justification of ethics through philosophy according to “popular terms”, “it brings to light a disgusting mishmash of interlinked observations and semi-sensible principles, in which shallow heads feast [...]”. (409) If one follows these relativistic or eclectic concepts, one will find “now perfection, now bliss, here moral feeling, there fear of God, something of this something, of that also something in a wonderful mixture” (410), without one A moral justification free of empirical contingencies is also only sought.

Only pure reason can put a stop to this colorful hustle and bustle and also has an unmatched motivational power. "Because the pure duty and the moral law in general, mixed with no extraneous addition of empirical incentives, has so much more powerful influence on the human heart through the path of reason than all the other driving forces." (410) While Popular philosophy gains its insights “by groping with the aid of examples”, whereas Kant wants to “pursue and clearly present the practical faculty of reason from its general rules of determination to where the concept of duty arises from it.” (412)

Rational will and imperatives

Kant begins his analysis with the conceptual definition of the will, which does not simply follow natural causality. Rather, reasonable beings have the ability to develop objectively necessary principles that are valid for everyone and understandably well-founded ("according to certain laws", 427) in their imagination and to act according to them. Objective here means: disregarding all subjective inclinations, interests and perspectives. The moral law follows a principle of order that is independent of the laws of nature and also creates a different kind of obligation. In volition, the doer introduces himself as someone who actually intends to achieve an end by all legitimate and available means. Willing is a psychological process in which the willing becomes the origin (causality) of an action. If one disregards other driving forces, "the will is nothing but practical reason." (412) But because there are other driving forces in humans, the will is "not in itself completely in accordance with reason" (412). In the case of a “holy” being, there would only be one willing that would correspond to pure reason. But because the human being also has other driving forces - this is one of Kant's implicit basic anthropological assumptions - the willing becomes an ought. (449)

From the difference between the subjective will, which is at least partly determined by inclinations, and what reason regards as correct for reasons, there arises an inner compulsion, a felt command to follow what is objectively recognized as good. The formulation of such a command, which always expresses an ought, is called an imperative. Imperatives are ought claims (practical judgments) and not commands (imperativistic speech acts) “All imperatives now either hypothetically or categorically dictate.” (414) Hypothetical imperatives are the formula of the means-end rationality. They are commandments of prudence or practical rules that state that a certain means must be used in practice, a certain action must be carried out in order to achieve a given goal, a certain end. They are conditional ought claims based on empirical practical reason that follows inclinations and interests. Practical common sense can lead to the decision not to eat a whole bar of chocolate, but it does not make moral claims. No one is obliged to act by hypothetical imperatives. Practical reason derives its reasons from experience, the sources of which are nature, including personal needs, inclinations and interests.

A categorical imperative, on the other hand, dictates an action regardless of whether it is useful or beneficial. It does not follow a material purpose, a “matter of action”, but is oriented towards “the form and the principle from which it itself follows” (407) and is not restricted by any condition. But as an unconditional ought requirement, it has a necessary force due to the self-referentiality of pure practical reason, which is autonomous and sets its ends a priori on the basis of synthetic-practical judgments. Pure practical reason draws its reasons out of itself, it is practical for itself and sets its laws autonomously, i.e. without recourse to empirical experience.

The formulas of the categorical imperative

While hypothetical imperatives are “principles of will”, the categorical imperative has the character of a law, an unconditional commandment (420). With a hypothetical imperative, one must know the condition of its application in order to know which rule applies. The categorical imperative has its validity regardless of any application condition. The concept of the categorical imperative contains the legality (general validity and necessity in the light of pure reason), the ought (duty) and the fact of a subjective rule of action, a maxim. There is no other restrictive condition. With these building blocks one can derive the formal basic formula of the AI:

"The categorical imperative is only one, namely this: only act according to the maxim by which you can also want it to become a general law." (421 / BA 52 = universalization formula UF)

Due to its legal character, the AI ​​is valid for all rational beings, therefore for all people. By combining the maxim (subjective principle) and the general law (objective principle) with the help of the word "simultaneously" in the AI, Kant creates a bridge between the purely abstract concept of duty and the maxim chosen against an empirical background. Exactly when maxims comply with the limitation of the moral law, they acquire an over-subjective character. The AI ​​transforms a subjective want into an objective ought. The AI ​​is the supreme principle of the moral law, of which the GMS contains a large number of formulations. In the reception a total of five types are worked out from this , which are referred to as independent formulas.

In addition to the basic formula (= universalization formula UF), the following formulations are usually referred to as separate formulas (436):

• "Act as if the maxim of your action should become a general natural law through your will." (421 / BA 52 = natural law formula NF)
• "Act in such a way that you use humanity both in your person and in the person of everyone else at the same time as an end, never just as a means." (429 / BA 67 = human formula or an end in itself SF)
• "Act in such a way that the will through its maxim can at the same time regard itself as generally legislative." (434 / BA 76/77 = Autonomy Formula AF)
• "Act according to the maxims of a general legislative member to a merely possible realm of purposes" (439 / BA 84 = realm of purposes - formula RF)

Kant himself speaks of three “practical principles” for representing the AI, namely NF, SF and AF (431), but later also of “three ways of presenting the principle of morality” and here of NF, SF and RF (436). Contrary to other interpretations, Paton gives the formula of autonomy an independent position because it also has a special position in the “Critique of Practical Reason”.

The formulas express different aspects, but are otherwise equivalent for Kant. He emphasizes several times that there is only one categorical imperative. However, the basic formula is still so abstract that one can only derive the idea of ​​concrete duties from it to a limited extent. Only the further formulations convey the substance of the AI. They serve as an illustration and have an explanatory function, so that it makes sense to use them in order to better grasp the full meaning of the AI. The AI ​​is a necessary and a sufficient condition for the admissibility of maxims. Accordingly, when checking whether a maxim of action according to the AI ​​is permissible, the AI ​​formulas must be taken into account in their entirety.

The basic formula is to be regarded as an unconditionally objective principle because every rational being would follow it if only his reason succeeded in completely overcoming his inclinations at all times. As an objective principle, the basic formula is pure form , yet without any content. Nevertheless, the basic formula of the AI ​​is not formalistic. The salary is inserted into the formula of the KI on the one hand by the content of the respective maxim. The concept of the maxim is to be seen in AI like a variable in mathematics . The maxims thus serve to mediate between the abstract general principle of the moral law and the concrete individual actions and the entire breadth of the empirical world. The significance for Kant's considerations on the application of the AI ​​results from the fact that both in the introduction to the metaphysics of morals (MS AA VI 225) and in the introduction to the doctrine of virtues (MST AA VI 389) the basic formula is the supreme moral law appears in similar formulations. The SF then also forms the background of the supreme principle of the doctrine of virtues, according to which it is the duty of every human being to "make human beings an end in general." (MST AA VI 395) The second material aspect in AI is the acting subject, the on the one hand it is also the object of the actions of others as well as of itself and on the other hand, through its needs and inclinations, it is the determining factor of its purposes and thus its maxims. If another subject were to set up a maxim that would limit my freedom, I could rightly object to it. But everyone else would also have such a right with regard to my maxims. The AI ​​systematically contains an intersubjective relationship that is shaped by the purposes, i.e. H. Needs, inclinations and interests of all acting subjects. From this principle of reciprocity it follows that the purposes of the other subjects of action are just as relevant to me as my own purposes, which I have to observe and thus respect when defining my maxims. (SF) The realm of purposes is then the purely intellectual sphere in which all the purposes are thought so that they do not contradict one another. (RF) So you can get the different variants of the KI by exploring the basic formula without adding any additional content. This is the reason why Kant emphasizes several times that there is only one AI. The other material imperatives, which also categorically command, are then the subject of the metaphysics of morals, which is divided into an outer doctrine of duties (legal doctrine) and a doctrine of inner duties (doctrine of virtues).

The test of the categorical imperative

A central function within the categorical imperative is played by maxims. The AI ​​asks you to carry out a self-examination when choosing your maxims. First of all, the question of whether I can think that the corresponding maxim can become a general law must be answered positively. Nobody can demand that others follow certain rules, e.g. B. treat fairly, if he does not accept these rules for himself. Only when a generalization is logically tenable, i.e. when I cannot wish for an exception for myself, is a perfect one, i.e. H. unrestricted duty justified before. In the case of perfect duties, inclinations in the maxims and their purposes must not play a role. (421) The perfect duties include, for example, paying debts, the prohibition of suicide out of boredom (MST § 6), lying (MST § 9) or respect for human rights ( Peace AA VIII, 385–386). If the maxim is conceivable, but not desirable according to the usual standards, then it is an imperfect obligation (not determined in terms of degree). The amount of “philanthropy” (Peace AA VIII 385) that we are to give to others is not unlimited or absolute. Nobody will want all people to live exclusively for charity (Peace AA VIII 385). If one further distinguishes whether the duty is against oneself or against another, then four cases of duties arise. Kant points out that he chose this arbitrary division of duties in order to better explain the concept of duty in its particularities. In the background, he ties in with the doctrine of duties of the natural philosophers of his time, for example Samuel Pufendorf , who distinguished duties towards God, towards himself and towards others. What is special about Kant is that he only ties in with reason and renounces any external determination of morality (by God or nature).

It is not like looking for possible actions based on a maxim. Rather, the test procedure starts with a presented concrete action. In all the explanatory examples (see below on the natural law formula), Kant starts from a sensual drive that needs to be evaluated. The moral value of an action is then judged according to the maxim on which the action is based. So one must first try to recognize which principle or possibly which principles are behind this intended action. Do I want to protect a child who I forbid from harm, do I want to punish them or do I want to encourage them to act morally? The maxim could be: "I forbid my children to do anything that would endanger themselves (to an unacceptable extent)." The second step is the AI's testing of the maxim. Can you want all parents (always) to forbid their children from endangering themselves? Would such a maxim, if everyone followed it, lead to no one applying it anymore? The appropriateness of the maxim results from the specific situation. If the specific example is about cycling to school, the safety of the way to school, the age of the child, his ability to assess risks in traffic, his prudence, etc. to be billed on.

A somewhat different interpretation of the test procedure can be found in Reiner Wimmer , who describes the NF as the first step in the explication of the basic formula as an assessment method for maxims and norms by way of universalization (see below) and considers it problematic. In contrast, the three other forms fulfill the task of illustrating AI as the basic principle of moral reasoning, namely as a triad from the perspective of the self (AF), from the perspective of the other (SF) and from the perspective of the community (RF) .

In addition to “being able to think” and “being able to want to”, i.e. the principle of generalization (UF), the other AI formulas must also be considered when examining the maxims. This is the only way to ensure that a maxim is also legal. In the example, does the prohibition affect human dignity or is the child only being instrumentalized? (SF) Is the prohibition wanted by myself or is it just based on unjustifiable conventions? (AF) Is this prohibition in accordance with the conceivable totality of all permissible maxims that concern the upbringing of children? (RF) Can one maxim of self-interest in the realm of ends be reconciled with all other maxims? As a person affected by my action, would I also judge this action to be correct? (Swap roles) When assessing actions and maxims, critical judgment is always required in order to be able to correctly assess the circumstances of the action and the choice of the associated maxim. It is part of the essence of moral commandments that they “still require judgment that has been sharpened through experience [...]” in order to “make it effective in his way of life in concrete terms” (389), according to Kant in the preface to the GMS. The assessment of an intention to act is also pragmatic, i.e. H. the question of the ultimate justification of the generality of a maxim does not arise; it is sufficient to exercise reasonable care. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant points out that what matters to him is the moral relevance of a maxim. A maxim "is only then morally valid if it is based on the mere interest one takes in observing the law." (KpV AA V, 79)

In order to find approaches to the content of the AI ​​test procedure, various criteria can be used to assess whether one can apply (think or want to) a maxim from a moral point of view.

1. Logical consistency: There must be no logical contradiction within the maxim.
2. Transcendental pragmatic condition: A maxim must not lead to a self-contradiction.
3. Acceptance of the consequences: The empirical consequences of an intended action must be able to be assessed positively.
4. Teleological determination: the natural expediency of a thing must not be violated by a maxim.
5. Rational Agency: A maxim must not contradict reasonable considerations (common sense) and must be practical.

The criteria mentioned here are merely interpretations that are helpful when assessing the Kantian provisions of “being able to think” and “being able to want to” with regard to concrete moral questions in order to improve the plausibility of the justification.

Kant himself brought an important test criterion into play. In the text On Eternal Peace it says: "All actions related to the right of other people, whose maxim is not compatible with publicity, are wrong." (). Maxim, which are not suitable for withstanding a public discussion, cannot morally An act according to such a maxim cannot be truthful. Lying, cheating, stealing and similar acts violate the moral law. "Everyone sees the moral law as one that he can publicly declare." Rainer Enskat formulates from this Thoughts out a categorical imperative of publicity: "Act in such a way that the maxim of your will is compatible with its publicity at all times!"

One problem with AI is the question of whether and how one can determine whether a maxim is only allowed and not also required. Kant says: “The action that can coexist with the autonomy of the will is permitted; which does not agree with it is forbidden. ”(439) But this does not result in any demarcation from something that is required. A maxim “I do half an hour of sport every day” certainly does not contradict “being able to think”. But you can hardly want it to be an obligation for everyone to do sport every day. On the other hand, no one will consider such a maxim immoral. Permitted maxims would therefore be those in which neither the maxim itself nor its opposite lead to moral rejection, while in the case of a required maxim, the omission cannot be intentional. Kant formulates this negatively: “If we now take care of ourselves every time we breach a duty, we find that we really do not want our maxim to become a general law, because that is impossible for us, but rather the opposite of it rather remain a law in general; ”(424) This passage describes the free rider problem , a behavior that is not permitted in any respect according to the AI.

Another problem (which affects every moral system) is that maxims relate to empirical facts. When examining maxims, one must therefore deal with empirical knowledge or the conceptual description of, for example, physiological or psychological conditions. This can always mean that there are misjudgments and errors in the judgments ( fallibilism ). Schönecker / Wood think that this already appears in Kant's first example of the natural law formula (see below). They also consider the process of generalization to be problematic with regard to obligations towards oneself, at least when it is applied to the NF.

The natural law formula

The natural law formula expresses the fact that one should be able to regard the chosen maxims as universally valid as a natural law. The “as if” emphasizes that this formula is a thought experiment , an imaginary similarity, an analogy . Maxims thought as law have the same position in the sphere of reason as a natural law does in nature. Every rational being must act in the same way in the same situation for the same reasons for a maxim presented as a law of nature. Every reasonable being can then adjust to this. But if everyone knows that his maxim must also be thought of as a law of nature for everyone else, then he cannot want a maxim that is not coherent with the will of all other rational beings. In this thought, Bernward Grünewald particularly emphasizes the principle of intersubjectivity associated with AI . It already follows from this thought that one's own freedom must coincide with the freedom of all other rational beings. Everyone is equally responsible. Any form of oppression or defraudation is not permitted. The principle of generalization is particularly expressed here.

Kant explains the meaning of the natural law formula using four examples. These are each formulated in such a way that they fail the AI ​​test procedure, but you can see that the opposite corresponds to an acceptable maxim. (424) Although Kant only uses illustrative examples for explanation, these are so fundamental that Otfried Höffe sees them as an introduction to the discussion of material ethics, even if they cannot be the basis of a system of duties.

In Kant's first example, a complete duty to oneself is the prohibition of suicide when tired of life, since man is naturally endowed with a will to survive and is also an end in itself for himself. A maxim to take one's own life based on a negative worldview is in contradiction to the natural principle of self-love (teleological argument that Kant used). In addition, self-love cannot serve to preserve and destroy life at the same time (logical argument). In addition, one can hardly ask everyone who is in despair of life to kill himself immediately (generalization; reason argument).

In the second example, a complete duty to others is the maxim not to deceive others with false promises, e.g. B. To borrow money that cannot be repaid in the first place. Otherwise the institute of the promise would no longer be effective and, above all, the deceived one would never consent. (Self contradiction) Since the concept of a promise already includes compliance with it, there is also a (conceptual) logical contradiction here.

According to the third example, people have a duty towards themselves to develop their abilities and to keep themselves physically and mentally fit, because otherwise they cannot take advantage of many of the opportunities that arise (consequentialist argument). If a person violates this duty - as Kant assumed - out of pure pleasure in enjoyment, neglecting talents can lead to the fact that he cannot exercise this enjoyment at all due to insufficient skills. (Self contradiction) One can also see a contradiction to a person's willingness here, because wanting also implies ability, which is severely limited without the developed abilities. (logical argument) But the extent to which a person works on his personality is subject to his individual assessment. In this respect, this duty is only imperfect. You cannot ask anyone to work on self-perfection without ceasing. On the other hand, it would be of considerable disadvantage for the whole of humanity and thus also for the individual if everyone left their talents idle (reasoning argument).

The situation is similar with the commandment to provide assistance in the fourth example, in which Kant demonstrates an imperfect duty to others. Basically everyone is obliged to do so; after all, everyone wants to be helped in an emergency. (consequentialist argument) But whether someone directs his life entirely in a charitable way is fundamentally up to him. On the other hand, a world in which no one helps anyone without immediate consideration is quite conceivable, the "ability to think" does not trigger any contradiction. The duty is imperfect because the lack of willingness to help only contradicts the "ability to want". Kant justifies this inability to want to be with the fact that there are always cases where a person is dependent on cooperation and willingness to help (on “love and participation”, 423). (Reason argument) Schönecker / Wood point out that Kant uses an empirical assumption here, namely the fundamental property of humans to be emotionally attached. Kant is inconsistent insofar as he builds on an empirical premise in deriving his justification, although a world of reasonable beings is also conceivable, which are endowed without friendly emotions. Günther Patzig regards Kant's explanation as an appeal to well-understood self-interest and in this respect it is no longer a moral argument. If one assumes - according to Höffe, an argument that Kant does not find - that humans as a social being are naturally helpful, a teleological contradiction arises.

The formula for an end in itself

After Kant has demonstrated the various forms of duty based on the natural law formula, he starts again and asks whether the AI ​​is valid for all rational beings. (426) In doing so, he turns his gaze from the rule of action for the individual subject to the totality of those persons affected by morality. Kant now draws attention to the fact that the will is always intentional , that is, directed towards a purpose. Because pure practical reason disregards all subjective givens, a purpose that "is given by mere reason [...] must apply equally to all rational beings." (427) The search for an objective and yet material purpose leads to the question for something that has absolute value, that could be a purpose in itself. Without such a value, practical reason would have no point of reference, so it could not be objective. This question opens the view from the deontological ethics of duty to a material ( axiological ) ethics of values. Leonard Nelson saw this as a "relapse of Kant from the ethics of law to ethics of goods". Other authors see precisely in this step the reason why Kant's ethics has a practical meaning and is not just formal. Kant gives the answer as a postulate (which he only systematically justifies in GMS III):

"Now I say: man, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in itself, not just as a means for arbitrary use for this or that will, but must in all his, both for himself and for others Acts directed towards being, can at any time also be regarded as an end. "

A person, the reasonable person ("humanity" here in Kant denotes the rational ability of every human being or a rational being) is therefore the objective reason for self-determination, because he is the carrier of practical reason. Out of practical reason, man must also recognize that every being that has the property of practical reason is to be regarded as an end in itself. The human being is therefore intrinsically valuable and must never be instrumentalized as a relative purpose with a mere object character. The SF always demands recognition and respect for a reasonable being. But this does not mean that one should not use people as a means at all, because this is the case in almost all social relationships. The only requirement is that, as a self-determined person, they have to make a reasonable decision. As a rule, one acts morally correctly if the people concerned can agree to the action. However, the SF is not only a minimum requirement, an exclusion criterion to avoid personal injury, but can also be interpreted positively because people can only be treated as a purpose in themselves if one takes their individual purposes into account.

Kant examines this "idea of ​​humanity as an end in itself" (429) on the basis of the examples that he also used in the investigation of the natural law formula. A useful test criterion with regard to the SF is the question of whether a wrong maxim inappropriately restricts the ability to set purposes, the rational ability to act. A suicide destroys a person and treats him not as an end in itself, but as a pure body, as an object. Intervention in the human body for purely instrumental reasons is generally not permitted, for example in organ trafficking , through self-mutilation or through taking excessive risks. Nor can one dispose of one's own body at will. However, Kant's explanations do not offer any assistance in the matter of euthanasia , because this can also be done out of respect for the person. Even the false promise to repay a loan, although one cannot do it, is in contradiction to the formula for an end in itself (SF), since the lender is deliberately harmed, i.e. only treated as a means to achieve an end. All cases of paternalism, coercion or fraud are similar. By withholding appropriate information about the intention to act, the person concerned is restricted in his freedom of action and autonomy. The unwillingness to develop one's skills may not be in direct contradiction to the SF (being able to think). But: "With regard to the accidental (meritorious) duty towards oneself, it is not enough that the action does not conflict with humanity in our person, as an end in itself, it must also agree with it." (430) (Being able to want) As a natural disposition, humans strive for greater perfection, according to Kant. (Teleological argument) Even with failure to provide assistance, it is true that one cannot want to, because otherwise the human end would be harmed. It is a duty to promote the happiness of others. “For the subject, which is an end in itself, whose ends must also be my ends as much as possible if that idea is to have an effect on me.” (430) Here, too, Kant sees a reason in human nature which counts the pursuit of bliss. You have to take this fundamental striving of other people into account in your own actions. (teleological argument)

The idea of ​​the end in itself only becomes clear when one has in mind the transcendental philosophical reflection of Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. One cannot think one's own ends without thinking of oneself as a being that sets ends. The practical subjectivity of every rational being means that it strives for its own being as a free subject. To be an end in oneself means for man to be able to realize himself in his particular purposes. If a person is treated only as a means in his humanity, this means that one deprives him of the possibility of setting his own end, of self-legislation. In the SF, therefore, Kant does not speak of human beings, but of "humanity", which must not be used as a means alone. In doing so, he does not relate this formula to man as an empirical phenomenon, but to the purely intellectual aspect of man as intelligence in a world of understanding. (Kant's expression: homo noumenon) Because for Kant only a being capable of reason is also a being capable of morals, while the human being, as homo phenomenon, is subject to his empirical instincts and the laws of causality. A being is morally capable if it has reason and can act accordingly autonomously and self-determined (AF) (rational agency). And precisely in this ability lies its value as an end in itself. In view of the material content of the SF, the question arises how Kant can speak of the fact that this formula is one with the general formula UF. This is only possible if a material content can also be derived from the UF. This arises from the idea of ​​good will and duty. If one were not to regard a person as an independent end in themselves, if one were not ascribing autonomy and dignity to him, that would be incompatible with good will and thus contrary to duty. (437) This also applies to the demand to make the purposes of other people your own (RF) and thereby promote their happiness (430).

In a footnote, Kant denies the golden rule (in the negative formulation) its suitability as a fundamental moral imperative. On the one hand, it does not contain any precept of duties towards oneself. So you can neither use it to justify the prohibition of suicide nor the requirement to develop one's talents. On the other hand, it also lacks the right to “love obligations towards others”. According to the Golden Rule, you can only be obliged to help if you can expect with some certainty that you will also be helped. If you are not interested in outside help, you do not need to help, because the Golden Rule is based on reciprocity ( contractualism ), a commandment of prudence and not morality. It depends on the empirical wishes and needs of the agent in question. Indeed, even with regard to obligations towards others, it is at least problematic. Are those who have no property allowed to steal without hesitation? As the dispossessed, you could easily grant those in possession the right to steal. However, if one follows the principle of benevolent interpretation and takes the principle of impersonal generalization and uninvolved neutrality as a perspective for the golden rule (especially in the positive formulation), at least the differences to AI are reduced considerably.

In conclusion, Kant states on the SF that this is the “highest restrictive condition of the freedom of action of every person”. (430/431) Because of its general validity, this limit does not come from experience but from reason. However, some utilitarians question the absolute validity of the formula for an end in itself when it comes to balancing the harm of a few against the harm of many. ( Trolley problem and other moral dilemmas) The formula for an end in itself is given special weight in the metaphysics of morals, both in the doctrine of law and in the doctrine of virtues, because it is used by Kant in dealing with many examples.

The formula of autonomy

“Autonomy is the ability to set up and obey moral laws freely and in a self-determined way.” In practice, it is the “ability to choose one's own way of life.” The formula of autonomy is based on “the idea of ​​the will of every reasonable being, as one general legislative will. ”(433) The question of whether a maxim can be thought of as a general law already implies the idea that the questioner, when answering, becomes the legislator within the framework of the moral law.

"The will is therefore not only subjected to the law, but subject to such a way that it must also be regarded as self-legislative, and precisely for this very reason, first of all, subject to the law (of which it can consider itself the author)." (431)

The fact that humans can decide what to do presupposes a self-determined will that influences the action. The will is only autonomous, however, if it is not determined by others (heteronomous), but is free to establish and obey moral laws. Only a free will enables self-legislation. Through self-legislation, man is both the subject (object) and the legislator (subject) of the moral law. Autonomy is therefore not freedom of choice, but the self-submission to a self-given law based on reason. One follows what one has recognized to be reasonable. And if you accept that as your duty, you act morally. From the perspective of reason, this insight is not just an invitation, but a (logical) necessity.

Kant derives the idea of ​​independence from interests from the idea of ​​the legislative will. Because if the will were guided by some kind of interest, it would not be autonomous. The conceptual necessity of lack of interest also arises from the fact that there would otherwise have to be another law above the will that determines the content of interests. It cannot be concluded from this that the function of AI is to establish positive rules for moral conduct. Rather, the following applies: “The action that can coexist with the autonomy of the will is permitted; which does not agree with it is impermissible. ”(439) The subjective choice of maxims as such is not fundamentally restricted by the additional criterion of freedom of interest obtained with the autonomy formula, but only limited to the maxims that can be chosen at all. Kant does not carry out the test based on his examples for this formula (AF), but points out in a footnote that this is also possible. (432) The idea of ​​independence from individual interests was formulated pragmatically by John Rawls with the concept of the veil of ignorance in his theory of justice .

Reiner Wimmer has the thesis “that human autonomy is a necessary and sufficient condition for being able to see and treat oneself and others as ends in oneself”, whereby the AF logically precedes the SF, because “the idea of ​​the will of every reasonable one Essence as a general legislative will (B 70 = IV 431) implied with Rousseau [FN Wimmer: social contract, book I, chap. 6] the 'idea of ​​the dignity of a rational being who obeys no law other than that which is at the same time itself (B 76 f. = IV 434).' “By being autonomous, i.e. H. able to act morally according to a law set by his own will, he can think of himself, but also any other reasonable being, as an end in itself and as a member of an intellectual realm of purposes (see below) and a special value, a dignity claim. The idea of ​​autonomy is taken as the basis in many discourses of practical ethics , for example in education, medical ethics or feminist ethics. However, the concept of autonomy is often reduced to the ability to self-determination, i.e. to an empirical, external freedom from coercion. In Kant, on the other hand, the ability to legislate oneself is the inner freedom to set maxims in the course of reflections that are independent of interests, inclinations and desires.

The formula of the realm of purposes

The realm of ends is “the systematic connection of different rational beings through common laws”. (433) The realm of purposes is a “well-coordinated state of subjective setting of purposes”, the members of which are capable of self-legislation and also obey it. With the new formula, Kant expands the horizon of the notion of AI beyond the subject. The idea is already implicitly contained in the SF, since it is aimed at all reasonable beings as an end in itself. In the AF, too, the generalization leads to the insight that self-legislation does not only apply to one's own person, but must also be recognized for all other sensible persons if one does not want to get into contradictions.

“Reasonable nature exists as an end in itself. This is how man necessarily imagines his own existence; so far it is a subjective principle of human action. But this is also how every other rational being presents its existence according to the same reasoning ground that also applies to me, so it is at the same time an objective principle from which, as a supreme practical reason, all laws of the will must be able to be derived. "(429)

The realm of purposes is an intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis), only fictitious, something thought, which as an ideal can never be fully realized. If the realm of ends were to become real in an ideal world, all people would act according to reason and there would be no need for ethics. In the realm of ends, individual interests are disregarded. Members of the realm of ends are themselves rational beings setting ends, who at the same time understand each other as ends in themselves. The links in the realm of ends are self-actualizing when they follow reason. Every rational being is therefore at the same time subject, insofar as it is the end of each other, and also supreme, as it autonomously determines the laws, which, however, must include the recognition of the other rational beings as an end in themselves. (433)

By expanding the consideration of AI to include the community of rational beings, the scope of action is again restricted. For, according to Kant, moral duty rests “merely on the relationship of rational beings to one another, in which the will of a rational being must at all times be regarded as legislative, because otherwise it could not think of it as an end in itself” (434). which, from a subjective point of view, could agree with the criteria of the AI ​​from the preceding formulas and are coherent, may be impermissible in the realm of purposes if they do not agree with the reasonable and coherent purposes of the other members. Günther Patzig, for example, develops a second-level universalization principle that calls for the principle of solidarity, “because one can reasonably expect that all members of a community will agree to the principles according to which society should live if this is one of the principles belongs that every capable person is obliged to help worse-off members of society to the extent that at least their primary needs can be satisfied. "In a similar way, Patzig derives responsibility for future generations:" The principle of reason itself makes it clear to us that We, who ourselves cannot wish to live on a waste dump that has been depleted and poisoned, are therefore obliged to spare our descendants, as far as it is up to us, from such an extreme situation. "

Human dignity

The demand to always treat people as an end (SF) and the principle of reciprocity in the RF lead to an insight into the dignity of every reasonable being. Respect for every other person follows their dignity as an objective law.

“And what is it then that justifies morally good disposition or virtue to make such high demands? It is nothing less than the share that it gives the rational being in general legislation and thereby makes it fit for a member in a possible realm of ends, for which it was already determined by its own nature, as an end in itself and precisely because of that as legislative in the realm of ends, as free in respect of all natural laws, obeying only those who exist themselves and according to whom its maxims can belong to a general legislation (to which it is at the same time subject to itself). For nothing has any worth but that which the law determines. Legislation itself, however, which determines all worth, must for that very reason have a dignity, that is, unconditional, incomparable value, for which the word respect alone gives the appropriate expression of the appreciation that a rational being has to make of it. Autonomy is therefore the basis of the dignity of human and every rational nature. "(435/436)

In this passage of the GMS, Kant turns again (as in the explanation of the SF) from the question of how one should act morally, which behavior is right, to the question of what is valuable in itself. The categorical imperative thus changes from a rule of action to a standard of value that arises from the idea of ​​autonomy, the meaning of the person as an end in itself and the coherence of all reasonable beings in the realm of ends. Because the reasonable person must never be just a means, he has an absolute and not just a relative value.

“In the realm of ends, everything has either a price or a dignity. What has a price, something else, as an equivalent, can also be put in its place; what, on the other hand, is above all price and therefore has no equivalent, that has a dignity.

Whatever relates to general human inclinations and needs has a market price; that which, even without presupposing a need, is in accordance with a certain taste, that is, a pleasure in the mere pointless play of our emotional powers, an affectation price; but that which constitutes the condition under which something can be an end in itself has not only a relative value, i.e. a price, but an intrinsic value, i.e. dignity. "(435)

The direct connection to the formula of autonomy results from the following statement by Kant: "Now it follows indisputably from this: that every rational being [SF:] as an end in itself, with regard to all laws to which it may always be subject, at the same time [AF:] must be able to view it as generally legislative, because it is precisely this propriety of its maxims for general legislation that distinguishes it as an end in itself, in the same way that this its dignity (prerogative [= privilege]) above all mere natural beings entails [...] ”( 438)

In the case law of the Federal Constitutional Court, human dignity is linked to the AI's end-in-itself formula: “The sentence 'man must always remain an end in himself' applies unreservedly to all areas of law.” (BVerfGE 45, 187, 228 of June 21, 1977) no direct connection can be found in the GMS. Kant only developed his concept of dignity after he discussed the AF and the RF after the SF. So one can relate the concept of dignity either to the last formulas or to the AI ​​as a whole.

The thesis that can be found on various occasions: "Belonging to the human species is sufficient that one is entitled to full respect for human dignity" cannot be substantiated in the GMS. According to Kant, only persons, and these are only beings capable of reason, can lay claim to respect. This leads to the problem that all non-rational beings are excluded from respect as objects of morality, because the Kantian moral principle is mutually constructed in an egalitarian manner. Embryos, very young children, but also the mentally handicapped or permanently in a coma are excluded from being treated as an end to themselves and not just as a means. The same problem also applies to the discourse ethics of Jürgen Habermas , the theory of justice by John Rawls or the contractualism of Thomas M. Scanlon. This is a result that cannot be systematically avoided if one builds an ethics on the principle of reciprocity. From this problem it follows that many questions of bioethics (such as the subject of abortion or embryo research) cannot be solved using the end-in-itself formula, but only using the generalization according to the basic formula and the test criterion of “wanting to”.

Transition from the metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure practical reason

In the first two sections, Kant “only” explained the basic concepts of his moral philosophy analytically. The investigation into whether the validity of the concepts of good will, duty and autonomy can also be substantiated in material terms is now to be addressed in the third section of the GMS. Kant divides the third section into five headings, some of which also characterize the philosophical theses he represents. Each section ends with a question that has not yet been resolved, which prepares the next section.

"1. The concept of freedom is the key to explaining the autonomy of the will ”(446)

Without the idea of ​​freedom, there is absolutely no way of developing an idea of ​​acting independently for reasons. The assertion that man is not free in his thinking is itself a judgment that can only be justified under the thought of freedom and is therefore self-contradictory. This causality of freedom is comparable to the causality of nature, but independent of it. A will without such legality is simply not conceivable as a concept. Because the laws of nature cannot directly influence the will, the will is its own legislator, i.e. autonomous, because it receives no external impetus. Kant calls this freedom from natural necessity negative freedom. Free will has its own spontaneity and its own kind of causality, because it can independently produce effects in the world. It is an independent starting point for change processes in the world. The will is not to be equated with the freedom of choice, because the purely rational will leads to the moral law, which does not contain any arbitrariness. Such freedom, the ability to create your own reasonable rules, only results in positive freedom, which Kant equates with pure practical reason and calls autonomy. Freedom of choice is an expression of the conflict between inclinations based on natural laws and the ought from the purely rational will. This is described with the short formula "You can, because you should".

"2. Freedom must be presupposed as a property of the will of all rational beings. "(447)

The existence of freedom must be inferred from the existence of moral commandments. Because moral commandments presuppose the idea of ​​freedom. Without such an idea of ​​freedom they would be pointless. Kant does not claim that there is freedom objectively. He only points out that it would be a contradiction to assume that one can act morally and at the same time assume that pure practical reason is not independent of natural causality. Since moral commandments have their origin in pure reason, the assumption of freedom must apply to all rational beings and not just to man. This confirms the generality and necessity of moral commandments, hence the categorical imperative. However, this is still not proof that freedom exists objectively. The idea of ​​freedom is only necessary for a reasonable being who acts practically.

"3. Of the interest attached to the ideas of morality. "(448)

If one cannot prove freedom, the question arises, in view of the comprehensive natural causality, whether moral laws apply to a rational being at all. Here an answer could result from metaphysics - for example morality as God's commandment or as a law of nature. The skeptic would also ask why one should accept moral laws at all. Kant does not investigate this question because he assumes that everyone gifted with reason can also see that moral action is based on reason. Anyone who consciously opposes reason out of egoism or other inclinations acts unreasonably and cannot then be convinced with arguments of reason. No moral system can force an A-moralist to accept moral obligations. Interest in the moral point of view only arises when one has already adopted the moral point of view. But that, as well as a natural striving for happiness, is no proof that the moral law applies. Kant sets against it:

“As a reasonable being, therefore belonging to the intelligible world, man can never think of the causality of his own will in any other way than under the idea of ​​freedom. [...] The concept of autonomy is inseparably connected with freedom, but with this the general principle of morality, which in the idea of ​​all actions of rational beings is just as fundamental as the natural law of all appearances. "(452/453)

Kant points out that there may be a "suspicion of a circle" (433) in which the idea of ​​freedom is used for its own justification, so that the whole conception of the GMS would remain unfounded. You can only get out of the circle if you think yourself not only subject to the laws of causation, but also understand yourself as a member of the intellectual world. This world of the mind should not be imagined in a sensual experience. The intellectual world is the sphere of reason in which one can go beyond what can be sensually experienced and develop independent ideas - including "the autonomy of the will, including its consequence of morality" (453). One belongs not only to a sensual, but also to an intelligible world. So man is able to take two positions at the same time. As a member of the intellectual world one has to think of oneself “as a cause acting a priori.” (450) This means “an independence from the determining causes of the sensory world.” (452) This independence also includes the possible solution of actions from moral-psychological influences. But where the interest in morality comes from remains to be explained.

"4. How is a categorical imperative possible? "(453)

After Kant made preliminary considerations on the deduction of the possibility of AI in the first three sections of GMS III, he now draws the conclusions. By deduction (447), Kant does not mean a logically formal conclusion, but - rather from a legal point of view - a derivation from established facts.

1. Man experiences himself as a being endowed with reason. He cannot deny this without contradicting himself.
2. Because there is no conception of practical reason without freedom, free will, i. i. human autonomy can be assumed. Every conscious action is based on a decision.
3. As a member of the intellectual world, man can form a will that is its own cause of actions. The choice of practical reason determines the action autonomously.
4. Because man is also a member of the world of the senses, he is also subject to natural causality and thus to his desires and inclinations.
5. If man were a pure intellectual being, he would only act morally well; if he were a pure sense being, he would be exclusively instinctual.
6. Because the world of the mind can reflect on the world of the senses, it can influence needs and inclinations and set rules to which a person can freely submit. “The moral ought is thus one's own necessary will as a member of an intelligible world and is only thought of as an ought so far from it, as at the same time it regards itself as a member of the sensible world.” (455) The rational will directed towards practice thus becomes Legislator of action.
7. As a reasonable and autonomous being, man must recognize the moral law (the duty to act according to what he recognizes as good). The conceptual form of the moral law is the categorical imperative.

One problem with this relationship is that in practical action man does not consistently follow the intellectual world, but often gives in to inclinations. It is the problem of weak will ( akrasia ), the meaning of which has been discussed since ancient times.

"5. From the outer limit of all practical philosophy "(455)

Because freedom as the idea of ​​reason goes beyond experience, the maxims as principles of action cannot be experienced either. The opposition (the dialectic) of causality and freedom (455) cannot be resolved in theoretical philosophy. Man can think himself freely in the world of the mind, but as an appearance in the world of the senses is subject to natural causality. Freedom is nevertheless the ground of being of moral autonomy. However, the reason for the moral motivation cannot be deduced from experience. Knowledge of the limits of pure reason leads to the renunciation of speculative use of practical reason, the effectiveness of which must be taken for granted. In the Critique of Practical Reason (§ 7, AA V 43–50), Kant coined the philosophy of the “fact of reason”.

reception

overview

The main criticisms of Kant's ethics were formulated as early as the middle of the 19th century. These are in particular the contradiction between duty and inclination and the rigorism associated with it ( Schiller ), the accusation of the empty form and subjectivity (of moral inwardness) ( Hegel ), the lack of justification for morality ( Schopenhauer ), the lack of consideration the moral attitude ( Trendelenburg ) or the lack of positive impulses for action ( Feuerbach ).

On the other hand, especially in the 20th century, a number of moral-philosophical drafts have been submitted through which Kant's ethics are either to be further developed or to be integrated into competing systems. Discourse ethics ( Karl-Otto Apel , Jürgen Habermas ) and the theory of justice ( John Rawls ), both of which see themselves as a further development of Kant's ideas, have acquired particular importance . The attempt to create a closer link between Kant and on the principle of generalization utilitarianism produce, have Marcus G. Singer and Richard Mervyn Hare made. More recently, Derek Parfit has presented a concept of a moral philosophy in which he developed a combination of the ideas of contractualism, utilitarianism and Kantian ethics. On the other hand, Neo-Aristotelianism, such as Alasdair MacIntyre , Philippa Foot or Martha Nussbaum in the USA or Robert Spaemann in Germany, is critical of Kant in the spirit of Trendelenburg.

In response to Schiller's criticism, who held Kant in high esteem that pure rationality is not sufficient for morality, but that sensuality and reason, duty and inclination must be brought into harmony, Kant himself confirms in his religious writing (AA VI 23f. Footnote) that it is better to do one's duty with real joy, but the inclination as a result cannot be allowed to influence the duty, because for this the absolute necessity applies. Natural inclinations are in themselves good, that is, irreproachable, and it is not only in vain, but it would also be harmful and blameworthy to try to exterminate them; one only has to tame them so that they do not exterminate one another, but can be used to harmonize in a whole, called bliss. (AA VI 45).

Hegel confronts Kant with empty formalism, which makes no statements about the material content of morality. In doing so, Hegel overlooks the fact that human dignity already becomes the objective yardstick in the human formula. The categorical imperative is also only the touchstone for the maxims, the material content of which is to be measured against an objective criterion.

Schopenhauer's argument against Kant's ethics of duty says that the unconditional ought, interpreted by him, is a substitute for the commandments of God and thus Kant maintains a moral doctrine in the logic of Christian tradition. This position can also be found in the more recent discussion. It is not unconditional insofar as, for Kant, moral behavior occurs intentionally “in accordance with duty” and “out of duty”. Schopenhauer relies on pity in morality , whereas Kant would refuse, since he considers feelings as the basis of morality to be unacceptable, since one can simply be wrong with them. Kant closes the work by formulating the problem of why one should act morally at all: And so we do not understand the practical, unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we do understand its incomprehensibility, which is everything that is fair from philosophy to the The limit of human reason in principle strives, can be demanded. (BA 128)

Individual reviews

Hegel

Hegel dealt critically with the Kantian ethics early on and in the course of his work. On the basis of a manuscript from 1798 in which Hegel comments on the metaphysics of morals, the early biographer Karl Rosenkranz states: “He was already striving here to combine the legality of positive law and the morality of inwardness, which knows itself as good and bad to unite a higher concept, which in these commentaries he simply called life, later called morality. He protested against the suppression of nature by Kant and against the dismemberment of the human being into the casuistry created by the absolutism of the concept of duty. ”In the fragments“ The Spirit of Christianity and its Fate ”, Hegel sets the idea of ​​a holistic life with Christ, in which Both law and inclination work together in a living fullness, contrary to the separation of law and inclination he read in Kant. The law (duty) in Kant displaces life through the concept and sets it in the generality that opposes the particularity of the individual, whereby life is torn apart. The compulsory character of the moral law, as outlined by Kant, means that man is not really free. His duties appear to him as something external to which he has to submit. In a short formula: "Love does not express an ought" [...] "Only through love is the power of the objective broken." Kant himself formulated the decisive objection to this point in the GMS. For him, pity or love can be a motive for moral action, but not a reason. "Because love as an inclination cannot be offered, but doing good out of duty itself, if there is no inclination at all, even if it resists natural and unconquerable aversion, is practical and not pathological love, which lies in the will and not in the dependence of feeling, in principles of action and non-melting participation; but this alone can be offered. ”(399) In his essay on the scientific treatment of natural law (1802/1803) Hegel deals with the formula of the categorical imperative. Because, in his opinion, every subjective purpose can be formulated as a maxim in such a way that its form can be thought of as a general law, the procedure of the categorical imperative is an incentive for arbitrariness for Hegel, so that Kant exchanges arbitrariness for what is morally necessary. Arbitrariness is even negative, an incentive to violate morality. Accordingly, he comments polemically:

"But the analytical unity and tautology of practical reason is not only something superfluous, but also something wrong in the twist it receives, and it must be recognized as the principle of immorality."

Hegel's fundamental criticism is based on the fact that the subjective determination of the good supposedly leads to the fact that there is no way from pure practical reason to a material standard that can fill the moral law with content. For example, one can have a maxim that one wants to respect property, just as one can set up a maxim that one always wants to oppose any form of property. For Hegel, both maxims are compatible with KI, the idea of ​​a general law. According to Hegel, the institute of property must already exist before the AI ​​can be applied to it. It is part of the social order that has become, the rules of which Hegel calls morality. For him, this morality is the manifestation of the objective spirit in reality, which, in his view, is ignored by Kant. Hegel saw the mechanism that material content becomes the subject of otherwise formal AI via the maxims. His reproach of the emptiness of content is directed against the concept of good will, which is only formed from pure reason. From this, in his view, one cannot derive an objective yardstick which does not already bring its material basis with it through an empirical content, for Hegel just morality. A Kantian could argue against Hegel's example of property that it is conceivable that everyone follows the maxim that there should be no property, but that one can hardly want this maxim. After all, who would build wealth at all if he could be deprived of the fruits of his labor at any time? In addition, Hegel ignores the fact that Kant derived the institute of property in legal doctrine “as a law of permission of practical reason” (MSR AA VI 247–247) from the legality of external freedom. In general, Hegel is accused of confusing Kant's "procedural logic formalism" with a logical formalism. To this end, noted Jurgen Habermas in defense of discourse ethics , Kant's following a procedural ethics, in addition to:

“Neither Kant nor discourse ethics expose themselves to the objection that, because of the formal or procedural determination of the moral principle, they only allow tautological statements. These principles not only require logical or semantic consistency, as Hegel falsely assumes, but the application of a substantially substantive point of view: It is not about the grammatical form of normative universal sentences, but about whether we can want a disputed norm under the has general legal force in the given circumstances. "

Schopenhauer

Schopenhauer's declared intention is to destroy Kant's ethics, which have increasingly become the dominant doctrine since its appearance, in order to make room for his own morality, the ethics of compassion. Like Hegel, he praised Kant's arguments against eudaemonism. Schopenhauer's argument against Kant's ethics of duty says that the unconditional ought, interpreted by him, is a substitute for the commandments of God and thus Kant maintains a moral doctrine in the logic of Christian tradition. This assessment can also be found in the more recent discussion. It is not unconditional insofar as, for Kant, moral behavior occurs intentionally “in accordance with duty” and “out of duty”. According to Schopenhauer, it implies a hidden egoism, because all examples can be traced back to mutuality ( reciprocity (sociology) ). With regard to the Schopenhauer u. a. The example of assistance given here can be countered by saying “that the generalized maxim of the hard-hearted man, he may turn and turn as he wants, does not keep up with the cases in which he is not helped, depending on the condition of his consent her that he was secured against need. Rather, everyone is now authorized by the maxim to refuse help, provided that he is secured against need for his part, regardless of the situation of the person to whom help is refused. Consequently, in the will, which wants the maxim of hard-heartedness as law, the will is necessarily included in the case of one's own need, which is not in and of itself impossible, and consequently it is a self-conflicting will . ”Schopenhauer also holds against Kant that the concept of the“ purpose in itself ”is a contradictio in adjecto , because a purpose is always something wanted and not something that already exists. Schopenhauer relies on pity in morality , whereas Kant would refuse, since he considers feelings as the basis of morality to be unacceptable, since one can simply be wrong with them. Kant closes the work by formulating the problem of why one should act morally at all: And so we do not understand the practical, unconditional necessity of the moral imperative, but we do understand its incomprehensibility, which is everything that is fair from philosophy to the The limit of human reason in principle strives, can be demanded. (463)

Vittorio Hösle says of Schopenhauer's vehement criticism: “The most famous emotionalist criticism of Kant's ethics, Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion, reveals a complete inability to deal with the radical difference between the question of validity, which has to do with the reasons why something is good , and to grasp the psychological question that analyzes the causes of why someone acts morally. Schopenhauer may be partially right about the motivation problem, but he does not grasp the normative problem. He simply assumes that altruistic behavior is morally good and then asks what psychological forces lead people to such behavior. But the crucial question of whether altruistic behavior is more than stupid, whether it is something that should be, is not only not answered by Schopenhauer, he does not even understand the question. "

Feuerbach

Ludwig Feuerbach was initially a supporter of the Kantian ethics. In the course of breaking away from Hegel and the ideas of idealism, however, he also became a sharp critic of a pure ethic of reason. The categorical imperative negates human individuality. “Not out of respect for the law, out of respect for the other (even if not precisely this accidental person), for the other who is identical to me, out of respect for the human being, that is, human identity is absolute. Autonomy is unnatural self-compulsion, self-indulgence. ”For him, morality was the result of feelings of pleasure and displeasure. He claimed, “Morality is as good an empirical science as medicine.” Feuerbach had the poverty and need of the workers in early capitalism in mind, against which Kant's ethics of reason offered no remedy. That is why he polemicized “The arrogant categorical imperative from the standpoint of abstract philosophy is, however, from the standpoint of nature only a very modest pious wish. The imperative transforms anthropology into an optative. ”Feuerbach formulated his own categorical imperative from his anthropological-materialistic perspective:“ This results in the following categorical imperative: Don't want to be a philosopher in contrast to humans, be nothing more than a thinking person; do not think as a thinker, d. H. in a faculty torn from the totality of the real human being and isolated for itself; think as a living, real being, [...] think in existence, in the world as a member of it, not in the vacuum of abstraction, as an isolated monad, as an absolute monarch, as an impassive, otherworldly god - then you can trust it reckon that your thoughts are units of being and thinking. "

Trendelenburg

In a detailed analysis, Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg confronts Kant with the fact that he calls himself material approaches in his considerations, but does not deal with Aristotle and thus misses an essential approach of a eudaemonistic ethic that is not subject to his (Kant's) criticism. The Aristotelian concept of perfection is not included in Kant because Kant restricts himself to talent and skill in determining inner perfection (KpV AA V 41). Kant has "not the inner purpose, not the perfection of human nature, which is unanimous with its own inner ends and which has its measure in itself, in the idea of ​​its being." Kant only directed himself against concepts that were aimed at to tie in the special nature of human nature. With Aristotle, however, the principle is the search for concrete universality in human nature, while Kant himself makes the formal, but empty universality the standard. Aristotle also rejects the determination of the good by an external quantity (enjoyment, acquisition, wealth, honor, knowledge) or a one-sided criterion. For him, the good must be sufficient in itself for both the individual and the community, because man is a being made for the community ( zoon politikon ). According to Aristotle, this sufficiency can only be found in the very peculiar nature of man. Plants and animals also have life and feelings, so that what is peculiar to man, according to Aristotle, is the active life according to reason. Such an active life attains excellence ( arete ) when it is virtuous. In the case of virtues, a further distinction must be made between the ethical virtues (virtutes morales), which merely follow reason, and the spiritual virtues (virtutes dianoetes), which focus on thinking itself and in which prudence is paramount. The virtuous life is only completed when it is connected with an inner attitude, with lust. So Aristotle derived the foundations of moral life from the anthropological structure of man, which Kant strictly rejects.

Trendelenburg now denies Kant's thesis that all material principles are subjective and connected with feelings of pleasure and displeasure and follow the principle of self-love and bliss. For ethics reach its highest point of bliss (eudaemonia) in the self-realization of reason, which is expressed in a virtuous life. Material contents are only valuable for Aristotle if they are subordinated to reason. Kantelenburg's goal of designing ethics for all sensible beings in general and not just for humans seems excessive and one-sided. The concepts of good will and reasonable necessity are also included in Aristotle's philosophy. In addition, Kant z. B. has taken a material approach into his ethics with the formula for an end in itself. In addition, Kant needs exogenous facts such as the postulates of freedom and the existence of God so that he can move on to the material contents of his ethics. Kant even induces Schiller's misjudgment himself by speaking of duty as a “compulsion for an unwanted purpose”. Kant would have been more successful if he had made the idea of ​​the human being the starting point of his ethics instead of the formally general. Then it would have been possible for him, with Aristotle, to consider pleasure as the basis of moral character formation in his ethics.

Scheler

Basically, Max Scheler is of the opinion “that Kant rightly rejects any ethics of goods and purposes as wrong from the start.” This also includes ethics of success, hedonistic ethics or other concepts that are merely based on a posteriori empirical-inductivist foundation. For its part, Scheler's criticism of Kant begins fundamentally with the Kantian separation of reason and sensuality.

“Only a final abolition of the old prejudice that the human mind is somehow exhausted by the opposition between 'reason' and 'sensuality' or that everything has to be brought under one or the other, makes the construction of a priori material ethics possible . This fundamentally false dualism, which almost forces us to overlook or misinterpret the peculiarities of entire areas of the act, must disappear from the threshold of philosophy in every consideration.

As a phenomenologist, Scheler criticizes the fact that Kant does not question his epistemological method as such. For Scheler, every act of knowledge is a phenomenological fact. And the phenomenological view of the essence of the acts of knowledge shows that there are not only rational, but also emotional acts of knowledge.

“What we are definitely calling for here - vis-à-vis Kant - is an apriorism of the emotional and a separation of the false unity that previously existed between apriorism and rationalism. 'Emotional ethics', in contrast to 'rational ethics', is by no means necessary 'empiricism' in the sense of an attempt to gain moral values ​​from observation and induction. Feeling, preferring and pursuing, loving and hating the spirit has its own a priori content, which is as independent of inductive experience as the pure laws of thought. And here as there there is an examination of the essence of the acts and their materials, their foundations and their connections. And here as there there is 'evidence' and the strictest precision of the phenomenological statement. "

Regarding Kant's epistemological concept, according to which blind, disordered (chaotic) views are only ordered through the mind, Scheler says: "... I can only accept this attitude with the words of a very original 'hostility' or with 'distrust' in everything To call 'given' as such, fear and fear of it as the 'chaos' ”. For Scheler, apriori is not only pure reason, but also an original sense of value that stands next to thinking and is primarily to perception. The phenomenological approach to values ​​is not normative, but a descriptive process based on intuitive experience. With this approach, Scheler can no longer accept Kant's whole concept, including the categorical imperative. He criticizes that the determining factor for action lies solely in the subject for Kant. In doing so, he denies that for Kant it is not the individual person, the concrete subject, but all rational beings as such that form the point of reference. Scheler calls the duty formulated by Kant a compulsion not only against individual inclinations, but even against insights. In Kant's concept of duty there is, as it were, a blind inner command, so that duty only has an essential restrictive and negative character. In addition, Scheler expresses the opinion that not only the sense of duty is decisive, but “listening to the commands of authority and turning to what tradition says is also important.” The feeling of respect for the law is assessed Scheler purely formally:

“But respecting a law, because it is a law, is something that, in strict purity, can never move a sentient being and has never moved. Otherwise every law of nature, e.g. B. Ohm's law, also demand 'respect'. "

In interpreting Kant's respect for the law in a purely formal manner, Scheler overlooks the fact that Kant here explicitly creates a bridge to the world of feeling, even if respect is “only” a feeling that is “brought about by reason”. Scheler reproaches Kant for having excluded feelings of love and joy from ethics. Love, which for Scheler is decisive for ethical striving, is excluded from Kant as a moral value because it cannot be offered. Scheler speaks here of "desolate moralism".

expenditure

• Immanuel Kant: Akademie-Textausgabe, Vol. 4: Critique of pure reason (1st ed. 1781); Prolegomena; Basis on the metaphysics of ethics; Metaphysical beginnings of the natural sciences , de Gruyter, Berlin 1978 ( online )
• Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals . With an introduction, comments, personal and subject registers as well as an updated bibliography, newly edited by Bernd Kraft and Dieter Schönecker. Meiner, Hamburg 1999, ISBN 978-3-7873-1443-0
• Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals . Ed., Incorporated. and ext. by Jens Timmermann. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, ISBN 3-525-30602-4 .
• Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals . Commentary by Christoph Horn , Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27002-8 .

literature

For the introduction

• Tim Henning: Kant's ethics. An introduction . Reclam, Stuttgart 2016, ISBN 978-3-15-019384-6
• Herlinde Pauer-Studer : Introduction to Ethics . WUV, Vienna 2003, ISBN 3-8252-2350-7 (1st chapter)
• Dieter Schönecker: Foundations for the Metaphysics of Morals , In: Kant-Lexikon Volume I, ed. by Marcus Willaschek, Jürgen Stolzenberg, Georg Mohr, Stefano Bacin, de Gruyter, Berlin 2015, 947–955

To deepen

• Henry E. Allison: Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, ISBN 978-0-19-969153-1
• Jürg Freudiger: Kant's justification of practical philosophy. Systematic position, method and argumentation structure of the "foundation of the metaphysics of morals" . Haupt, Bern 1993, ISBN 3-258-04714-6 .
• Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Fundamentals for the metaphysics of morals. A cooperative comment . 4th supplementary edition, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt a. Main, 2010, ISBN 978-3-465-04096-5
• Heiner F. Klemme : Kant's "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals": A systematic commentary , Reclam, Stuttgart 2017, ISBN 978-3-15-019473-7
• Christine Korsgaard : Creating the Kingdom of Ends . Cambridge University Press, New York 1996
• Bernd Ludwig: Education about morality. On Kant's foundation of a metaphysics of morals , Klostermann, Frankfurt 2020, ISBN 978-3-465-04411-6 .
• Philipp Richter: Kant's foundation for the metaphysics of morals . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2013, ISBN 978-3-534-26258-8 .
  • Transcendental foundation of practical philosophy. Kant's method of laying the foundations for morality , dissertation, Darmstadt 2014
• Dieter Schönecker , Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". An introductory comment . 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, ISBN 3-8252-2276-4 .
• Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason . Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-476-01886-5 .
• Friedrich Kaulbach : Immanuel Kant's "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". Interpretation and commentary . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1988, ISBN 3-534-02400-1 .
• Jens Timmermann: Kant's groundwork of the metaphysics of morals. A Commentary . Cambridge et al. a., Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008 [Reprint] = 2007, ISBN 978-0-521-86282-0 .
• Jens Timmermann (Ed.): Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. A Critical Guide (= Cambridge critical guides), Cambridge 2009.

Web links

• Text of the academy edition in the Bonn Kant corpus
• Full text at zeno.org
• Kirchmann's 1870 edition: archive.org , HathiTrust.org , Gleichsatz.de

Secondary literature

• Otto Friedrich Bollnow : "... ALONE A GOOD WILL". To the beginning of the "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals" (PDF file; 129 kB)
• Georg Geismann : The formulas of the categorical imperative according to HJ Paton, NN, Klaus Reich and Julius Ebbinghaus1 , Kant studies , 93 (2002) pp. 374–384
• Georg Geismann: Morality, religion and history in the philosophy of Kant , year book for law and ethics, 8 (2000) pp. 437-531
• Jean Grondin: On the phenomenology of the moral 'law' (PDF file; 57 kB); Kant studies 91 (2000), pp. 385-394.
• Bernward Grünewald : Practical Reason, Modality and Transcendental Unity. The problem of a transcendental deduction of the moral law . Published in: H. Oberer and G. Seel (Eds.): KANT. Analyzes - Problems - Criticism, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1988, pp. 127–167
• Bernward Grünewald: Form and Matter of Pure Practical Reason. About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas . Published in: Metaphysics and Criticism, FS for Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183-201
• Thomas Gutmann : Dignity and Autonomy. Reflections on the Kantian tradition (PDF file; 277 kB)
• Otfried Höffe : Freedom and the categorical imperative . Lecture in the series “Kant lives. A series of speeches from Hamburg on the 200th anniversary of the Enlightenment's death. ”ZEIT Foundation and Patriotic Society of 1765, Hamburg January 14, 2004
• Robert Johnson:  Kant's Moral Philosophy. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Christine M. Korsgaard : Kant's formula of universal law . In: Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 66 (1985), pp. 24-47
• Peter-Paul Müller-Schmid: Kant's autonomy of ethics and legal theory and the Thomasische natural law thinking , year book for Christian social sciences, 27 (1986), pp 35-60
• Guido Löhrer: Kant's problem of a normativity out of pure reason , published in: Gerhard Schönrich (Hrsg.): Normativität und facticity. Skeptical and transcendental philosophical positions following Kant, Dresden: Thelem, 2004, pp. 187–207.
• Tore Nordenstam: Kant and the Utilitarians . Ethical Perspectives 8 (2001) 1, pp. 29-36.
• Philipp Richter: Summary of the reasoning behind the foundation ( memento from June 26, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF file; 85 kB)
• Markus Rothhaar: Between Kant and the Basic Law: Human dignity and the problem of the "purpose in itself"
• Jörg Schroth: The premature conclusion to the non-consequentialism in the Nelson and Kant interpretation . In: Uwe Meixner and Albert Newen (eds.): History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis, Volume 6: History of Ethics, mentis, Paderborn 2003, pp. 123–50
• Jens Timmermann: Kantian Dilemmas? Moral Conflict in Kant's Ethical Theory , Archive for the History of Philosophy 95 (1/2013), pp. 36–64
• Dietmar von der Pfordten : On the dignity of the human being with Kant ( Memento from May 17, 2017 in the Internet Archive )
• Katrin Wille: Moral or practical judgment: On the pragmatics of the Kantian ethics

Others

• Kant's ethics in discussion . Statements by Reinhard Brandt, Andrea Esser, Rainer Forst and Anton Leist in information philosophy
• Kant and Kantian Ethics (MultiMedia Resources on Kantian Moral Philosophy)
• Kant for beginners: Kant, Sophie and the categorical imperative , video series in the BR-alpha media library
• Christian Weilmeier: Fundamentals of the Metaphysics of Morals , introductory lecture (Video 9:23)

Remarks

1. ↑ The page references for the GMS in the article text refer to the Academy edition, Volume IV
2. ↑ Kant defines his anthropology as follows: “The physiological knowledge of human beings is based on the experience of what nature makes of man, the pragmatic on what he, as a free-trading being, makes of himself, or can and should do "(AA VII, 119)
3. ^ Critical: Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 54, Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 172 and Henry E. Allison: Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, 83-84; Positive: Friedrich Kaulbach: Immanuel Kant's “Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals”. Interpretation and commentary. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1988; for an overview see: Philipp Richter: Kants' Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2013, FN 41, 164–165
4. ↑ This interpretation can be found in Philippa Foot : The Reality of the Good. Moral-philosophical essays, Fischer, Frankfurt 1997, here: Morality as a system of hypothetical imperatives, 89–108, 99, and: Virtues and Vices, 108–128, 121
5. ↑ In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant describes respect as the “awareness of the immediate compulsion of the will through law” (KpV AA V 117). Respect is associated with a certain feeling of sublimity, which Kant describes lyrically: “Duty! You exalted great name, which you do not grasp in you anything popular, which has ingratiation with you, but demand submission, but also do not threaten what natural aversion aroused and frightened in the mind, in order to move the will, but merely draw up a law, which finds its way into the mind of its own accord and yet acquires reverence for itself against will (although not always compliance), before which all inclinations fall silent when they secretly counteract it: which is the origin worthy of you, and where is the root of your noble ones Descent, which proudly rejects all kinship with inclinations, and from which root is the indispensable condition of that value which people can give themselves alone? ”KpV AA V 98
6. ↑ Tobias Kronenberg: Maximen in Kant's Practical Philosophy, Diss. Karlsruhe 2016, 143–144: “Every person has a multitude of concrete principles of action that are structured by his or her principles into a more or less systematically organized and coherent network, at the center of which is conviction the person stands. "
7. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, 24–31, who in this regard both Rüdiger Bittner: Hypothetical Imperative, Journal for Philosophical Research 34 (1980), 210–226, and Günther Patzig: The logical form of practical sentences in Kant's ethics (1966), in: ders. Ethik ohne Metaphysik, 101–126, criticized. Also relevant: George Nakhmikian: Kant's Theory of Hypothetical Imperatives, Kant-Studien 83 (1992), 21–49 and Bernd Ludwig: Why there are no hypothetical imperatives. Some comments on an incorrectly asked question regarding Kant's theory of practical sentences, in: Heiner F. Klemme, Bernd Ludwig, Michael Pauen (eds.): Enlightenment and Interpretation, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1999, 105–124
8. ↑ A common enumeration is that according to Herbert J. Paton, who names three main formulas with UF = I, ZF = II and AF = III and two sub-formulas with NF = Ia and RF = IIIa, Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation about Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 152-153; Georg Geismann describes a different view : The formulas of the categorical imperative according to HJ Paton, NN, Klaus Reich and Julius Ebbinghaus1 , Kant-Studien , 93 (2002) 374–384, for which AF is not one of the independent formulas of AI; this reading can be found e.g. B. also with Otfried Höffe: Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion of the moral, journal for philosophical research; 31 (1977), 354–384, 355–356, Reiner Wimmer lists further passages on this discussion: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 299
9. ↑ In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant defines the power of judgment as “the ability to subsume under rules, that is, to distinguish whether or not something is subject to a given rule (casus data legis)” (KrV B 171); similar in the criticism of the power of judgment as the "ability to think the particular as contained under the general" (AA V, 179)
10. ↑ On the power of judgment as a link between theory and practice see: “Gemeinspruch”, AA VIII 275; Parallel passages in the KpV on “pure practical judgment” AA V 67 and AA V 69: “The rule of judgment under the laws of pure practical reason is this: Ask yourself whether the action you intend if it is according to a law of Nature, of which you yourself would be a part, should happen, you could see it as possible through your will? "
11. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 229-230; A more detailed analysis of this question can be found in: Fiete Kalscheuer: Autonomy as a reason and limit of the law: The relationship between the categorical imperative and Kant's general legal law, de Gruyter, Berlin 2014, 38–53
12. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 134; In doing so, they use (see p. 141) constructed maxim examples for Kant's criticism, which according to the criteria of Horn / Mieth / Scarano (2007: 232–239) do not appear to be acceptable in the sense of the reason argument, such as the “Maxime “To cheat a certain person at a certain time by making a false promise and claiming the (case-by-case) maxim would avoid rejection in the generalization test. But one could ask whether such a maxim has the properties of a maxim at all and is not too specific, and what if everyone chose such a maxim for individual cases? Wouldn't the generalization criterion apply after all, because you can't want everyone to work with such specialized maxims? A second example is the maxim of collecting antique clocks without ever selling them again, because this does not pass the generalization test in the sense of the ability to think due to the expected collapse of the market, without explaining why this is a moral problem and also without it to take into account the fact that such a thing B. is a generally accepted practice in art markets. This case should easily fall within the range of permitted maxims. Peter Baumanns speaks of the fact that maxims must be “morally suitable”: Kant's ethics: the basic theory, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, 62–63; so also Kant: cf. KpV AA V 74. The examples given by Schönecker Wood do not seem to meet this requirement.
13. ↑ The clarity of the example is disputed. Critical: Foundation for the metaphysics of morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 234, Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 293, and Henry E. Allison: Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, 83-84; Positive: Otfried Höffe: Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion of the moral, journal for philosophical research; 31 (1977), 354–384, 375, and Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 80–81
14. ↑ The metaphysical investigation announced in the heading of GMS II begins in this new approach. Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 123
15. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 149, criticize that the positing as an end in itself is not a justification for the fact that only sensible beings have value. This idea, based on the principle of reciprocity, is not further substantiated by Kant, so that it is problematic for Kantian ethics to assign an independent value to unborn life, severely mentally handicapped people or animals.
16. ↑ In the Critique of Practical Reason it says: “The moral law is sacred (inviolable). Man is indeed unholy enough, but mankind in his person must be holy to him. In the whole of creation everything that one wills and what one can do something about can also be used merely as a means; only man, and with him every rational creature, is an end in himself. He is the subject of moral law, which is sacred by virtue of the autonomy of his freedom. It is precisely because of this will that every will, even every person's own, self-directed will, is restricted to the condition of attunement to the autonomy of the rational being, namely not to subject it to any intention that is not based on a law which is based on the will of the could arise from suffering subjects themselves is possible; So never to use this merely as a means, but at the same time as an end. "(KpV V 87)
17. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 157, different opinion: Markus Rothhaar: Autonomy and human dignity at the end of life. To clarify a controversial field of terms, in: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Marcus Knaup (Hrsg.): What does it mean to die in dignity? Against the normalization of killing, Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2015, 101–114, because euthanasia is implicitly also a violation of the ban on suicide
18. ↑ “That: I think I have to be able to accompany all of my ideas; for otherwise something would be imagined in me which could not be thought at all, which means as much as the imagination would either be impossible, or at least be nothing for me. "(KrV B131-132)
19. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective purpose - Kant's formula for its own end of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 207, with reference to Christine Korsgaard: Creating the kingdom of ends, Chicago 1996, 122 and 128ff, and Barbara Herman: The Practice of Moral Judgment, Cambridge / Mass. 1993, 55, and with the reference to KdU AA V 431 and MST AA VI 392: "The ability to set a purpose at all is the characteristic of mankind (to distinguish it from animal life)"
20. ↑ Kant describes the connection between SF and AF several times, e.g. For example: "For rational beings are all subject to the law that each of them should never treat themselves and all others merely as a means, but at all times at the same time as an end in itself. From this, however, arises a systematic connection of rational beings through common objective laws, i.e. a kingdom which, because these laws aim at the relationship of these beings to one another, as ends and means, can be called a kingdom of ends (of course only an ideal) " (433)
21. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Human dignity as an ethical principle, in: Höffe, O., Honnefelder, L., Isensee, J., Kirchhof, P. (Ed.): Genetic engineering and human dignity. At the borders of ethics and law, Cologne 2002, 111–141., 132, quoted from: Thomas Gutmann: Würde und Autonomie. Reflections on the Kantian tradition , p. 6; similar: Friedo Ricken: Homo noumenon and homo phaenomenon, in: Otfried Höffe (Hrsg.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative commentary, Klostermann, Frankfurt 2000, 234–252, 239
22. ↑ Friedrich Schiller: Xenien 383 = Ein Achter (Complete Works, Volume 1, 3rd Edition Munich 1962, p. 299): “In the theoretical field nothing more can be found, but the practical sentence still applies: You can, because you shall!"; probably with reference to KpV V 159: “But just follow the sanctity of duty and become aware that one can do it because our own reason recognizes this as its commandment and says that one should do it, that means, as it were, over one's head completely elevate the sense world itself, [...] ”, cf. also KrV B 835
23. ↑ In the Critique of Judgment, Kant describes freedom as something that can be known (res facti = scibilia) because of its indisputable practical reality, while he describes the other two regulative ideas “existence of God” and “immortality of the soul” only as something believable (res fidei = credibilia ) considered. KdU AA V 468-469; In the KrV it says: “But whether reason itself in these actions, by which it prescribes laws, is not again determined by other influences, and what is called freedom with regard to sensual impulses, not again with regard to higher and more distant causes May nature be, that is of no concern to us in practice, since we only question reason about the prescription of behavior at first, it is a mere speculative question that we can put aside as long as our intention is to do or not . “(KrV B 831); a deeper discussion of this problem from the perspective of compatibilism can be found in Wolfgang Spohn in: The core of free will .
    The thesis of the fact of reason and its significance for moral philosophy is highly controversial. Literature on this: Dieter Henrich, The concept of moral insight and Kant's theory of the fact of reason (1960), reprinted with minor changes in: Gerold Prauss (Hrsg.), Kant. To the interpretation of his theory of recognizing and acting, Cologne 1973, 223-254; Lewis White Beck: The Fact of Reason. On the problem of justification in ethics, Kant studies 52 (1960/61), 271–282; Gerold Prauss, Kant on Freedom and Autonomy, Frankfurt 1983 (in particular § 11); Rüdiger Bittner, Moral Law or Autonomy, Freiburg 1983; Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, Cambridge 1990; Marcus Willaschek, Practical Reason. Action theory and moral justification in Kant, Stuttgart 1992 (§ 10)
    
24. ↑ Similar passages: “Pure practical reason does not want one should give up the claims to happiness, but only, as soon as duty is mentioned, ignore them at all” (KpV, AA V, 93); [had] "I did not fail to note that [...] it was not suggested to man that he should renounce his natural purpose, happiness, when it comes to the fulfillment of duty." (Common saying, AA VIII, 278)
25. ↑ Hegel's criticism can be found u. a. in: The Spirit of Christianity and His Fate (Hegel's Theological Youth Writings, ed. by Herman Nohl , Tübingen 1907, reprint 1991, also: Works Volume 1, 274–418), Faith and Knowledge (1802, in: Works Volume 2), About the scientific types of treatment of natural law (1802/1803, in: Works Volume 2), Philosophy of Spirit (1806/1807). Sections VC c. "The law-testing reason" and Vl. C. “The self-assured spirit. The Morality ”, Basics of the Philosophy of Law (1821), Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Section about Kant (1817ff, works volume 20; works in 20 volumes. Based on the works from 1832 to 1845, newly edited by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1969–1971, online )
26. ↑ “For this formalism to be able to express a law, it is necessary for some matter, a determinateness to be posited which constitutes the content of the law, and the form which is added to this determinateness is unity or universality; that a maxim of your will must at the same time apply as a principle of general legislation, this basic law of pure practical reason expresses that any definiteness that constitutes the content of the maxim of the special will is posited as a concept, as universal. But every determinateness is capable of being incorporated into the conceptual form and set as a quality, and there is nothing at all that cannot be made into a moral law in this way. "Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: On the scientific treatment of natural law, its place in practical philosophy and its relation to the positive jurisprudence, works. Volume 2, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1979, 460
27. ↑ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: About the scientific types of treatment of natural law, its place in practical philosophy and its relationship to the positive legal sciences, works. Volume 2, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1979, 462 Hegel formulates the same criticism in his legal philosophy:

    “As essential as it is to emphasize the pure, unconditional self-determination of the will as the root of duty, just as the knowledge of the will only gained its solid foundation and starting point through the thought of its infinite autonomy through the Kantian philosophy (see § 133) To a great extent, the adherence to the merely moral standpoint, which does not pass into the concept of morality, reduces this gain to an empty formalism and moral science to a rhetoric about duty for the sake of duty. From this point of view no immanent doctrine of duty is possible; One can certainly take in a substance from outside and thereby come to special duties, but from that determination of duty, as the lack of contradiction, the formal agreement with itself, which is nothing other than the establishment of abstract indeterminacy, cannot be determined be passed over from special duties, even if such a special content is considered for action, a criterion lies in / that principle, whether it is a duty or not. On the contrary, all wrongful and immoral conduct can be justified in this way. - The wider Kantian form, the ability of an action to be presented as a general maxim, brings about a more concrete idea of ​​a state, but contains no further principle than that lack of contradiction and formal identity. The fact that there is no property contains just as little contradiction as that this or that individual people, family etc. does not exist or that no people at all live. If it is otherwise fixed and presupposed that property and human life should be and be respected, then it is a contradiction to commit theft or murder; a contradiction can only arise with something that is, with a content that is based on as a fixed principle beforehand. In relation to such an act, an act is either in agreement with it or in contradiction. But the duty, which should only be wanted as such, not for the sake of content, the formal identity is precisely this, to exclude all content and determination. "(Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 135, Werke Volume 7, 251 –252)

28. ↑ Rainer Enskat: Vernunft und Judgmentskraft, Alber, Freiburg / München 2018, p. 41, notes on this: “Apart from the fact that Hegel thoroughly misjudges the› dijudicative ‹, critical function of the categorical moral imperative, he neglects in the shadow of the misled Assumption of the immanence of the moral or of the mind, almost systematically, the practical significance of the action prefix “act so that ...” of this imperative. This makes Hegel the most important founder of the misleading and misleading tradition of an ethics of conscience imputed to Kant ”.
29. ↑ The argument can already be found in the essay on natural law: “The proposition“ property is property ”is replaced by its true meaning:“ The identity which this proposition expresses in its form is absolute ”, the meaning is interfered with:“ the matter of it, namely property is absolute ”and every determinateness can immediately be made a duty. The arbitrariness has a choice among opposing determinations, and it would only be awkward if no such reason could be found for any action, which no longer only has the form of a probable reason as with the Jesuits, but takes the form of right and duty could; and this moral formalism does not go beyond the moral art of the Jesuits and the principles of the doctrine of happiness, which coincide. ”, Hegel, Werke Volume 2, 463

Individual evidence

1. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, XVI
2. ^ Letter to Herder dated May 9, 1768, AA X 74
3. ↑ Reflexion 6725, AA XIX, 141–142, The distinction between hypothetical imperatives directed only at a means / end relationship and an absolutely necessary end can be found in the text as early as 1764: “Investigation into the clarity of the principles of natural theology and the Moral ”, AA II 288-298
4. ↑ Eckart Förster: "What may I hope?" On the problem of the compatibility of theoretical and practical reason in Immanuel Kant, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 46 (1992), 168-185, 171
5. ↑ Eckart Förster: “What may I hope?” On the problem of the compatibility of theoretical and practical reason in Immanuel Kant, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 46 (1992), 168-185, 174-177
6. ^ Max Klopfer: Ethics classics from Plato to John Stuart Mill. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2008, 299
7. ↑ Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 20
8. ↑ On the Socratic method in Kant see the "Lecture on Pedagogy" (AA IX, 477)
9. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Philosophy of Freedom. Beck, Munich 2012, 69
10. ↑ Malte Hossenfelder : The Philosophy of Antiquity, 3rd Stoa, Epicureanism and Skepticism, 2nd edition Beck, Munich 2017, 19
11. ↑ Heiner F. Klemme : Kant's "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". A systematic commentary, Reclam, Ditzingen 2017, 42
12. ↑ Dieter Schönecker: Common moral and philosophical understanding of reason on the first transition in Kant's foundation, Kant studies 88 (1997), 311–333, 314
13. ↑ Franz von Kutschera : Fundamentals of Ethics, 2nd ed. De Gruyter, Berlin 1999, 325
14. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Immanuel Kant. Beck, 9th edition Munich 2020, p. 180
15. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 14-15
16. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160-177, 170
17. ^ Max Klopfer: Ethics classics from Plato to John Stuart Mill. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2008, 302
18. ↑ see Kant: KdU AA V, 434; Gemeinspruch AA VIII, 279 and 289; MST AA VI, 391
19. ↑ Seneca: Epistulae morales , 124.13
20. ↑ Principia ethica [1903], Reclam, Stuttgart 1984
21. ^ The Varieties of Goodness. Routledge & Kegan, London & Humanities Press, New York 1963
22. ^ John Leslie Mackie: Ethics. The invention of right and wrong, Reclam, Stuttgart 1981
23. ^ Max Klopfer: Ethics classics from Plato to John Stuart Mill. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2008, 303
24. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Philosophy of Freedom. Beck, Munich 2012, 68; similar: Henry E. Allison: Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. A Commentary. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2011, 1
25. ↑ Maximilian Forschner: Guter Wille und Haß der Vernunft, in: Otfried Höffe (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative comment. Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2000, 66–82, 70
26. ^ Oswald Schwemmer: Philosophy of Practice, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main, 1980, 142-143; Otfried Höffe: Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Philosophy of Freedom. Beck, Munich 2012, 125–126
27. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 53
28. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Introduction, in: Otfried Höffe (Hrsg.): Critique of practical reason. Classic laying out. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2011, pp. 17-18
29. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Philosophy of Freedom. Beck, Munich 2012, 187
30. ↑ Marcia Baron: Acting out of duty, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kants Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 80–97, 91
31. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 170
32. ^ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion of the moral, journal for philosophical research; 1977, 31, 354-384, 367; Kant formulates this in KpV, V 71–72
33. ^ Friedrich Schiller, Werke, Nationalausgabe, Vol. 1, 357, quoted from: Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 181–182
34. ↑ Marcia Baron: Acting out of duty, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kants Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 80–97; Allen W. Wood: Kant's Ethical Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999, 29
35. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 182
36. ↑ similar in the KpV AA V 47
37. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 83
38. ↑ Ina Goy: Immanuel Kant on the moral feeling of respect, Journal for philosophical research, 61 (2007) 3, 337-360, 337; see also KpV AA V 73
39. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 172
40. ↑ Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 103
41. ^ Jens Timmermann: moral law and freedom. Investigations on Immanuel Kant's theory of free will, the Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 190–191
42. ↑ Günther Patzig: Moral Motivation, in: Günther Patzig, Dieter Birnbacher , Walter Ch. Zimmerli: Die Rationalität der Moral , Bamberger Hegelwochen 95, publication server Universitätsbibliothek Bamberg, 39–55, here 51
43. ^ Parallel passages: KpV AA V, 19 and MS AA VI, 225
44. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 104; Kant: One maxim is a "rule of the agent, which he makes himself a principle for subjective reasons" (MSR, AA VI, 225), see also KrV B 840
45. ^ Jens Timmermann: moral law and freedom. Investigations on Immanuel Kant's theory of free will, the Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 16; Herbert James Paton: The Categorical Imperative: An Inquiry into Kant's Moral Philosophy. Berlin 1962, 52
46. ↑ Marcus Willaschek : Practical Reason: Theory of Action and Moral Justification in Kant, Verlag JB Metzler, Stuttgart 1992, 297 FN 11
47. ↑ Alfred Trendelenburg: The conflict between Kant and Aristotle in ethics, in: Historical contributions to philosophy. Mixed papers, Volume 3, Bethge, Berlin 1867, 171–214, 173
48. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 104
49. ↑ Christian Illies: the supposed emptiness of the categorical imperative, in: Kant and the Berlin Enlightenment. Files of the IX. International Kant Congress, Volume 3, de Gruyter, Berlin 2001, 47–54, 47
50. ^ Jens Timmermann: moral law and freedom. Investigations on Immanuel Kant's theory of free will, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 151; see also KpV, AA V 20
51. ^ Otfried Höffe: Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion of the moral, journal for philosophical research; 1977, 31: 354-384, 357
52. ↑ Marcus Willaschek: Practical Reason: Theory of Action and Moral Justification in Kant, Verlag JB Metzler, Stuttgart 1992, 69
53. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, 123–126, see also: Rel. AA VI 31f
54. ^ Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation into Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 161
55. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: A Philosophy of Freedom. Beck, Munich 2012, 122
56. ↑ Reinhard Brandt: Immanuel Kant - What remains? Meiner Hamburg, 2nd edition 2010, 97
57. ↑ Kronenberg lists examples with which the literature tried to criticize Kant with absurd maxims and arguments ( Alasdair MacIntyre , Franz Brentano , GEM Anscombe ): Tobias Kronenberg: Maximen in Kant's practical philosophy, Diss. Karlsruhe 2016, 152–155
58. ^ Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 62
59. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 102-103
60. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 166
61. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, 36
62. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective end - Kant's formula for the end in itself of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 202
63. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, XIV
64. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, 7
65. ↑ Bernward Grünewald: Form and Matter of Pure Practical Reason About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas, in: Metaphysik undkritik, Festschrift für Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183–201, 187
66. ^ Klaus Steigleder: Kant's moral philosophy. The self-referentiality of pure practical reason. Metzler, Stuttgart 2002, 64-65
67. ↑ Bernward Grünewald: Form and Matter of Pure Practical Reason About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas, in: Metaphysik undkritik, Festschrift für Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183–201, 187
68. ↑ Fiete Kalscheuer: Autonomy as the basis and limit of the law: The relationship between the categorical imperative and Kant's general legal law, de Gruyter, Berlin 2014, 53
69. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 127
70. ↑ Thomas Pogge: The Categorical Imperative, in: Otfried Höffe (Hrsg.): Basis for Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative comment. Klostermann, Frankfurt 2000, 172-193, 172
71. ^ Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation into Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 156
72. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 223
73. ↑ Bernward Grünewald: Form and matter of pure practical reason. About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas, in: Metaphysik undkritik, Festschrift für Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183–201, 196
74. ↑ Bernward Grünewald: Form and matter of pure practical reason. About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas, in: Metaphysik undkritik, Festschrift für Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183–201, 199
75. ^ Hariolf Oberer: Morals and legal laws a priori, in: Kant - Analyzes - Problems - Criticism, Volume III, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1997, 157-200, 164-165
76. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 224; Rainer Wimmer: "The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics". In: Kant Studies 73 (1982), pp. 291-320; Christian FR Illies : Orientation through universalization: The categorical imperative as a test for the morality of maxims. In: Kant Studies 98 (2007), pp. 306-328; critical Norbert Hoerster : Kant's categorical imperative as a test of our moral duties, in: M. Riedel (Ed.), Rehabilitation of practical philosophy, Vol. II, Freiburg 1974, pp. 455-475
77. ^ Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation into Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 175
78. ↑ Samuel Pufendorf: "About the duty of man and the citizen according to the law of nature". Edited and translated by Klaus Luig, Insel, Frankfurt 1994
79. ^ Jens Timmermann: moral law and freedom. Investigations on Immanuel Kant's theory of free will, Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 3
80. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 227
81. ↑ Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 292
82. ^ Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation into Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 162, in detail: Otfried Höffe: Universalist Ethics and Judgment: An Aristotelian View of Kant, in: Ludger Honnefelder (Ed.): Sittliche Lebensform und Praktische Vernunft, Schöning, Paderborn 1992, 59–82
83. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 232-239
84. ↑ Also mentioned in: Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant-Studien 73 (1982), 291-320, 305
85. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VIII, 381 .
86. ^ A lecture by Kant on ethics. On behalf of the Kantgesellschaft. Edited by Paul Menzer, Berlin, 1924, p. 52, on this in detail: Johannes Keienburg: Immanuel Kant and the public of reason, de Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2011, 110 - 136
87. ^ Rainer Enskat: Reason and Judgment, Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2018, 79
88. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 133
89. ↑ Peter Baumanns: Kant's ethics: the basic theory, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, 61
90. ↑ Bernward Grünewald: Form and Matter of Pure Practical Reason About the baselessness of allegations of formalism and solipsism and the relationship between the categorical imperative and its explanatory formulas, in: Metaphysik undkritik, Festschrift für Manfred Baum, ed. v. S. Doyé, M. Heinz, U. Rameil, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 183–201, 195
91. ↑ Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 293
92. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's non-empirical generalization: on the legal example of false promises, in: ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative comment. Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2000, 206-233, 206-207
93. ↑ Otfried Höffe: Kant's non-empirical generalization: on the legal example of false promises, in: ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative comment. Klostermann, Frankfurt, 2000, 206-233, 227
94. ^ Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 8283
95. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 138-139
96. ↑ Günther Patzig: Ecological Ethics - Within the Limits of Mere Reason, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983, 7
97. ^ Otfried Höffe: Kant's Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion of the moral, journal for philosophical research; 1977, 31: 354-384, 383
98. ↑ KpV AA V 34: "Of course, it is undeniable that all willing must also have an object, and therefore a matter."
99. ^ Leonard Nelson: The critical ethics in Kant, Schiller and Fries [1914], in: Collected writings, ed. by Paul Bernays, Volume VIII, 27–192, Meiner, Hamburg 1971, 54
100. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective purpose - Kant's formula for the end in itself of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 202, with reference to MST AA VI 380– 381
101. ↑ Comparison: KpV AA V 87 and 131, KdU AA V 449 and human history AA VIII 114 ff
102. ↑ Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant-Studien 73 (1982), 295, Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in which. (Ed.): Basis for Metaphysics of Morals, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 126
103. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 152
104. ↑ Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysik der Sitten, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 127
105. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective purpose - Kant's formula for the end in itself of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 203–204
106. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective end - Kant's formula for the end in itself of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 208
107. ↑ Markus Rothhaar: Human dignity as a principle of law: A reconstruction based on legal philosophy, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2015, 159
108. ↑ Christoph Horn: Humanity as an objective purpose - Kant's formula for the end in itself of the categorical imperative, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 195–212, 205–206
109. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 253-254
110. ↑ Thomas Nisters: Kant's Categorical Imperative as a Guide to Human Practice, Alber, Freiburg 1989, 31–38
111. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 177
112. ↑ Thomas Gutmann: Dignity and Autonomy. Reflections on the Kantian tradition , p. 4
113. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 152, see MST AA VI 395, 423, 449
114. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 145
115. ^ Probable beginning of human history AA VIII, 112
116. ↑ Fiete Kalscheuer: Autonomy as the basis and limit of the law: The relationship between the categorical imperative and Kant's general legal law, de Gruyter, Berlin 2014, 54
117. ^ Herbert James Paton: The categorical imperative: an investigation into Kant's moral philosophy. Berlin 1962, 218
118. ↑ Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 294
119. ^ Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 91
120. ↑ Reiner Wimmer: The double function of the categorical imperative in Kant's ethics, Kant studies 73 (1982), 291-320, 295-296; the reference to Rousseau's social contract can also be found in Dieter Sturma: Kant's ethics of autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (ed.): Kants Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 173
121. ↑ Thomas E. Hill, Jr .: The meaning of autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kants Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 178–192, 178
122. ↑ Markus Rothhaar: Autonomy and human dignity at the end of life. To clarify a controversial field of terms, in: Thomas Sören Hoffmann, Marcus Knaup (Hrsg.): What does it mean to die in dignity? Against the normalization of killing, Springer VS, Wiesbaden 2015, 101–114, 104
123. ↑ In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant speaks of the "corpus mysticum of rational beings" (KrV B 836)
124. ↑ Thomas Gutmann: Dignity and Autonomy. Reflections on the Kantian tradition , p. 7
125. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 161–162
126. ↑ Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in ders. (Ed.): Basis for Metaphysics of Morals, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 132
127. ^ Philipp Richter: Kant's> Foundation for Metaphysics of Morals <, WBG, Darmstadt 2013, 91
128. ^ Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Culture and Autonomy. Hegel's further development of Kant's ethics and their actuality, Kant-Studien 84 (1993), 185–203,188; Thomas E. Hill, Jr .: Kantian Pluralism, Ethics 102 (1992), 743-762, 754
129. ↑ Günther Patzig: Ecological Ethics - Within the Limits of Mere Reason, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983, 7
130. ↑ Günther Patzig: Ecological Ethics - Within the Limits of Mere Reason, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983, 13
131. ↑ junction: MST AA VI 434-435
132. ↑ Dietmar von der Pfordten: On the dignity of people in Kant, in: Yearbook Ethics and Law 14 (2006) 501-517, 504-506; different view: Thomas Gutmann: in: Ludger Honnefelder, Dietmar Sturma (ed.): Yearbook for Science and Ethics 15, (2010), de Gruyter, Berlin 2010, 4–37, 12, who points out that Kant uses the terms dignity and an end in itself used in exchange
133. ↑ Thomas Pogge: The Categorical Imperative, in: Otfried Höffe (Hrsg.): Basis for Metaphysics of Morals. A cooperative comment. Klostermann, Frankfurt 2000, 172-193, 182
134. ↑ Thomas Gutmann: Dignity and Autonomy. Reflections on the Kantian tradition , p. 9
135. ^ Richard Mervyn Hare : "A Kantian Approach to Abortion", in: ders .: Essays on Bioethics, Oxford University Press, London, 1993, similar in: Abortion and the Golden Rule , Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1975, 4/3, 201-222. German translation: »Abortion and the Golden Rule«, in: Anton Leist (Hrsg.): To life and death. Moral problems associated with abortion, artificial insemination, euthanasia, and suicide. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1990, pp. 132-156; general: Anton Leist (Ed.): Um Leben und Tod, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1990
136. ↑ Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals". 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 145, Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 276
137. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 269
138. ↑ see also KrV B 472-479
139. ↑ Jens Timmermann: Explanations, in ders. (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2004, 142
140. ↑ Karl Ameriks: Kant and the problem of moral motivation, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kants Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 98–116, 99
141. ↑ see also Critique of Pure Reason, B 368
142. ↑ Cf. KrV B 74, where Kant speaks of the “receptivity of impressions” and the “spontaneity of concepts”.
143. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 286
144. ↑ Dieter Sturma: Kant's Ethics of Autonomy, in: Karl Ameriks, Dieter Sturma (Ed.): Kant's Ethik, Mentis, Paderborn 2004, 160–177, 165
145. ↑ A breakdown of the deduction into individual steps can be found in the Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 288–289 and Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, “Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals”. 4th edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2011, 198–203
146. ↑ Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals. Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, 274
147. ↑ see Kant's remarks on the 3rd antinomy in the Critique of Pure Reason, KrV B 560 ff
148. ↑ Karl Rosenkranz: GWF Hegel's Leben (WBG, Darmstadt 1977, reprint of the Berlin 1844 edition), 87, quoted from: Albena Neschen: Ethics and Economics in Hegel's Philosophy and in Modern Business-Ethical Drafts, Meiner, Hamburg 2008, 57; Rosenkranz probably had the manuscript lost today.
149. ↑ Albena Neschen: Ethics and Economics in Hegel's Philosophy and in Modern Business-Ethical Drafts, Meiner, Hamburg 2008, 57–60, with reference to Hegel, Works Volume 1, 322–326, as well as Annette Sell: Life as living together. The concept of life in Hegel's fragments “The spirit of Christianity and its fate, in: Andreas Grossmann, Christoph Jamme (Ed.): Metaphysics of the Practical World: Perspectives Following Hegel and Heidegger: Festgabe für Otto Pöggeler, Rodopi, Amsterdam 2000, 222 -237
150. ^ Hegel, Works Volume 1, 363
151. ↑ Reinhard Brandt: Immanuel Kant - What remains ?, Meiner, Hamburg 2010, 88-89
152. ^ John Silber: procedural formalism in Kant's ethics, files of the 4th International Kant Congress. Mainz. 6-10 April 1974. Part II.2: Sections. Edited by Gerhard Funke. Berlin / New York 1974, 149-185, 181
153. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Explanations on Discourse Ethics, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1991, 21
154. ↑ David Bollag: Why Immanuel Kant's ethics are so closely related to the Jewish religious law ; Jeanine Grenberg: Kant and the Ethics of Humility, Cambridge University Press 2010; Gordon E. Michalson Jr.: Fallen Freedom. Kant on Radical Evil and Moral Regeneration, [1990], Cambridge University Press 2008; Dieter Witschen: Kant's moral theology: Ethical approaches to religion, Lit, Münster 2009; Allen C. Wood: Kant's Moral Religion. [1979], Cornell University Press, New York 2009
155. ↑ Arthur Schopenhauer: The two basic problems of ethics , therein: Price publication on the basis of morality, § 7, 2nd edition Leipzig, Brockhaus 1860, 155–159
156. ↑ Joachim Aul: Aspects of the universalization postulate in Kant's ethics, in: Rüdiger Bubner, Konrad Cramer, Reiner Wiehl (eds.): Kant's Ethik Today, New Hefts for Philosophy 22, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht: Göttingen, 1983, 62–94, 71
157. ↑ Julius Ebbinghaus : Interpretation and misinterpretation of the categorical imperative, Bouvier, Bonn 1948, reprinted in: Collected essays, lectures and speeches, Darmstadt 1968, 91, also in: Collected writings, Volume I, ed. by Hariolf Oberer and Georg Geismann, Bouvier, Bonn 1986, 279–296, 290
158. ↑ Arthur Schopenhauer: The two basic problems of ethics , therein: Price publication on the basis of morality, § 7, 2nd edition Leipzig, Brockhaus 1860, 161
159. ^ Vittorio Hösle: Practical Philosophy in the Modern World, 2nd edition, Beck, Munich 1992, 27
160. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach: on moral philosophy (1868), critically revised edition by Werner Schuffenhauer, in: Solidarity or Egoism. Studies on ethics by and after Feuerbach, Berlin 1994, 427
161. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach: on moral philosophy (1868), critically revised edition by Werner Schuffenhauer, in: Solidarity or Egoism. Studies on ethics with and after Feuerbach, Berlin 1994, 428
162. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach: on moral philosophy (1868), critically revised edition by Werner Schuffenhauer, in: Solidarity or Egoism. Studies on ethics with and after Feuerbach, Berlin 1994, 428
163. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach, The principles of the philosophy of the future, collected works, edited by the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences by Werner Schuffenhauer, Vol. 9, p. 334
164. ^ Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: The conflict between Kant and Aristotle in ethics, in: Historical contributions to philosophy. Mixed papers, Volume 3, Bethge, Berlin 1867, 171–214, 178
165. ↑ Trendelenburg (p. 179) refers to the Nicomachean Ethics I.
166. ^ Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: The conflict between Kant and Aristotle in ethics, in: Historical contributions to philosophy. Vermischte Abhandlungen, Volume 3, Bethge, Berlin 1867, 171–214, 183–184, with reference to KpV AA V 22 (Proposition II)
167. ↑ ^{a b} Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg: The conflict between Kant and Aristotle in ethics, in: Historical contributions to philosophy. Vermischte Abhandlungen, Volume 3, Bethge, Berlin 1867, 171–214, 191, with reference to MST AA VI 386
168. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 4
169. ↑ Eiichi Shimonissé: The phenomenology and the problem of laying the foundations of ethics based on the experiment by Max Scheler, Nijhoff, Den Haag 1971, 8ff and Susanne Weiper: Triebfeder und Höchstes Gut, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, 142 ff
170. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 60
171. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 61
172. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 63
173. ↑ Bert Heinrichs: Kant's Applied Ethics, Phil. Yearbook 119th Volume / II (2012), 260–282, here 268
174. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 194f
175. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 197
176. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 229 FN
177. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values. Niemeyer, Halle 2nd edition 1921 [1913], 230