Philippa Foot

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Philippa Ruth Foot (born Bosanquet , born October 3, 1920 in Owston Ferry , Lincolnshire , † October 3, 2010 in Oxford , Oxfordshire ) was a British philosopher and was one of the founders of current virtue ethics . The trolley problem she deals with is one of the much-received dilemmas of ethical debates.

Live and act

Philippa Foot was born in England in 1920. Her mother, Esther Cleveland Bosanquet, was the second daughter of US President Grover Cleveland . From 1939 she studied philosophy, politics and economics at Somerville College , Oxford . From 1942 to 1945 she worked in the field of economics as a research assistant at Nuffield College and the Royal Institute of International Affairs . From 1947 to 1969 she taught philosophy at Somerville College, from 1949 as a fellow and lecturer in philosophy. Between 1960 and 1976 she was visiting professor at Cornell , MIT , Berkeley and Princeton Universities in the USA . From 1976 until her retirement in 1991, she taught as professor of philosophy at the University of California in Los Angeles . In 1976 she was admitted to the British Academy and in 1983 to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences . She lived and worked last in Oxford .

Philippa Foot was best known for her work in the field of ethics . Along with Alasdair MacIntyre and Elizabeth Anscombe, she was one of the founders of modern virtue ethics . In her work she mainly used the work of Aristotle .

Most recently, Foot had come out with her monograph The Nature of the Good (Natural Goodness) , in which she developed a comprehensive theory of the concept of the good . The “ trolley problem ” she raised , an ethical dilemma, also became known .

She was temporarily married to the historian Michael Foot .

ethics

In her writings, Foot dealt with topics of moral philosophy, especially metaethics , virtue ethics , applied ethics and the relationship between rationality and morality .

In the field of metaethics she turned against emotivism and prescriptivism and took a naturalistic position. Foot rejected the prescriptivism assumption of a dichotomy of facts and values . In their opinion, it is not up to our subjective decision what counts as the justification for a moral judgment. Judging and moral judgments are logically linked to statements of fact. The facts represent objective reasons for the value judgment.

Ethics virtues are of central importance in Foots. In addition to the traditional cardinal virtues of courage, moderation, wisdom and justice, she attached great importance to the virtue of benevolence or charity . Virtues are usually beneficial to the people who possess them. They protect us from morally reprehensible behavior and motivate us in situations in which a certain action is not easy for us. They allow us to consider the consequences of our actions.

Foot believed that moral judgments are hypothetical . Their validity depends on the actors having the appropriate interests and desires. In doing so, she attacked the notion of deontological ethics that moral reasons in themselves are sufficient reasons to act.

Works (selection)

Michael Reuter: Bibliography of the works of Philippa Foot , in: Thomas Hoffmann, Michael Reuter (Ed.): Of course well. Essays on the philosophy of Philippa Foot. Ontos-Verlag, Heusenstamm near Frankfurt am Main 2010, 323–332.

  • Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy , Berkeley: University of California Press; Oxford: Blackwell, 1978
  • Natural goodness . Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001. - German translation: The nature of the good , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2004, ISBN 3-518-58396-4 ; Table of contents ; Review (PDF file; 80 kB)
  • Moral dilemmas. And Other Topics in Moral Philosophy , Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002, ISBN 0-19-925284-X

literature

Web links