Ethics of conviction

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The ethics of conviction is a type of moral theories that assess actions according to the intention to act and the realization of one's own values and principles, regardless of the consequences of the action taken after the action . Ethicists, too, must, however, thoroughly and appropriately assess the expected consequences of their actions before their actions and include them in their judgment of a morally correct action. The term was introduced into the ethical discussion as a technical term by Ernst Troeltsch , Max Scheler and above all by Max Weber with a not completely identical meaning. With Scheler the opposite term is “ ethics of success ”, with Weber “ ethics of responsibility ”; Troeltsch particularly contrasted the so-called objective-theological ethics of goods , which are based on the success of the action. Weber defined the ethics of convictions in such a way that "the intrinsic value of ethical action [...] alone should suffice for its justification". In the 18th and 19th centuries the ethics of convictions played a central role in Christian ethics .

Examples

An example of ethics of conviction is the attitude of Jehovah's Witnesses , who refuse blood transfusions , even if this endangers the life of the person concerned. A contrast to ethics that are primarily oriented towards the consequences of actions - this is often referred to as ethics of responsibility or ethics of success - arises in decision-making situations in which there is a moral dilemma . In Germany it is fundamentally forbidden to weigh human lives against one another. However, there was a special regulation in accordance with Section 14 of the Aviation Security Act in the event of terrorist attacks by aircraft, according to which armed interference can also be permitted if the death of bystanders is accepted as a result; This provision was declared by the Federal Constitutional Court to be incompatible with the Basic Law and therefore void . Another example is abortion and the decision to preserve unborn life.

Antiquity

The idea of ​​ethics based on convictions can already be found in antiquity, for example when the attempt at a good action is considered good for Plato ( Phaedrus 274 a / b). The attitude developed as a virtue can be understood as an attitude in Aristotle ( EN 1103 a, 9–10, 1106 a, 6–7, 1120 b, 7–9). In the Stoa in particular , the intention (intentio) of an action was the measure of happiness. Augustine also represented an ethic of conviction .

Ethics of conviction in Kant

Immanuel Kant undoubtedly represented a kind of ethics of conviction, which, however, does not stand in opposition to an ethics of responsibility, but at best to a mere "ethics of success". Max Weber by no means cited Immanuel Kant as an example of an ethic of conviction. It was only later commentators who ascribed this characterization to Weber. Others have rejected the distinction between ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility in general and specifically with regard to Kant. Kant's position results from the foundation of the metaphysics of morals . Here Kant states:

"Everywhere in the world there is nothing in the world, indeed it is possible at all to think apart from the same, what could be considered good without restriction, other than good will alone."

- GMS, AA IV 393

“The good will is to be valued far more highly, not through what it brings about or achieves, not through its suitability for the attainment of any superior purpose, but solely through willingness, that is, in itself, good and, considered for itself, without comparison than everything that could only ever be brought about through him in favor of any inclination, yes, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. "

- GMS, AA IV 394

“Finally, there is an imperative which, without taking as a condition any other intention to be attained by a certain behavior, commands this behavior immediately. This imperative is categorical. It does not concern the matter of the action and what is to result from it, but the form and the principle from which it itself follows, and the essential = good of it consists in the disposition that success may be whatever it wants. This imperative may be called that of morality. "

- GMS, AA IV 416

This statement by Kant has often been interpreted as if he were only concerned with the goodwill and not interested in the effect of an action. Max Scheler's criticism is exemplary:

“In this sentence the wrong ethic of conviction is almost absurd. Wanting something whose reality 'is not important to us' is, as Sigwart already emphasized, a will 'that does not want what it wants'. The behavior required by Kant is therefore impossible at all. In addition, however, the sentence is based on the wrong opinion that it can be considered moral if it becomes the content of the will, `` occasionally '' the suffering of others through an act of help, a moral disposition (be it from ourselves or from others) to lay the day '. "

In this criticism, Scheler overlooked the fact that Kant basically assumed that an intended action is assessed in terms of the expected success and that this is considered good. Kant discusses the question of whether an action that is good in success is also morally good. If someone helps a single, decrepit uncle, that is good in itself. However, this action is only morally good if it is based on the motive to make life easier for the uncle and if it is not primarily based on self-interest, for example to secure his inheritance. With Kant it says:

“I am passing over all actions that have already been recognized as contrary to duty, regardless of whether they may be useful for this or that purpose; because with them there is not even the question of whether they might have done it out of duty, since they even contradict it. I also put aside the actions that are really obligatory, but to which people have no direct inclination, but still carry them out because they are driven to do so by a different inclination. "

- GMS, AA IV 397

“For what is supposed to be morally good is not enough that it conforms to the moral law, it must also be done for the sake of it; otherwise, that compliance is only very accidental and annoying, because the immoral cause will indeed produce legal acts from time to time, but repeatedly illegal acts. "

- GMS, AA IV

One can therefore not reduce Kant's ethics to a pure ethics of convictions, but must note that the foreseeable success of action plays a decisive role for Kant.

The ethics of convictions at Max Weber

Max Weber analyzes the ethics of opinion in politics as a profession . It is a speech that Weber gave to Munich students on January 25, 1919, under the impression of the Munich Soviet Republic . The talk is not the development of an ethical theory, but the warning not to give ideology priority over what is politically justifiable in political debate . In particular, the speech went against the notion that the end justifies the means. In this sense, a policy based on a conviction is legitimate, but with regard to the effects of political action, it should be based primarily on an ethics of responsibility :

“No matter how convincingly one demonstrates to a convinced, ethical syndicalist that the consequences of his actions will be an increase in the chances of reaction, heightened oppression of his class, an inhibition of its advancement - and it will make no impression on him. [...] The ethicist only feels “responsible” for the fact that the flame of pure conviction, the flame z. B. the protest against the injustice of the social order, does not go out. To stir them up again and again is the purpose of his, judged from the point of view of possible success, quite irrational deeds, which can and should only have exemplary value. "

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ernst Troeltsch: Grundprobleme der Ethik [1902], Collected Writings Volume 2, Göttingen 1922, Reprint Scientia, Aalen 1977, 626
  2. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values, Niemeyer 1916, Part III: Material ethics and ethics of success ( online )
  3. ↑ Max Weber: The sense of the 'freedom of values' of the sociological and economic sciences, in: Collected essays on the science of science, Tübingen 1922, 7th edition, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1977, 467ff
  4. ↑ Max Weber: The sense of the 'freedom of values' of sociological and economic science , first 1917, u. a. also in: Collected essays on the science of science, 467ff.
  5. ↑ See e.g. B. Gerald Hubmann: Ethical conviction and political action. Jakob Friedrich Fries and the German tradition of ethics . At the same time: Frankfurt (Main), Univ., Diss., 1996. Heidelberg: Winter, 1997, 391 S., ISBN 3-8253-0536-8 (Frankfurt contributions to German studies; Volume 30).
  6. ↑ Federal Constitutional Court, 1st Senate: Federal Constitutional Court - decisions - nullity of the launch authorization in the Aviation Security Act: the federal government's lack of legislative power for the use of armed forces with specifically military weapons in the fight against natural disasters and particularly serious accidents - Aviation Security Act, Section 14 (3) with the right to life Incompatible with the guarantee of human dignity, insofar as the use of armed violence affects people on board the aircraft who are not involved in the crime. February 15, 2006, accessed June 5, 2018 .
  7. ↑ Hans Reiner : Mind and Attitude, Die Sammlung 13 (1958) 292ff
  8. ↑ Hans Reiner: The dispute over the stoic ethics, Journal for philosophical research 21 (1967), 261-281
  9. ^ Hans Reiner: ethics of conviction and success, archive for legal and state philosophy 40 (1953) 522-526
  10. ↑ See e.g. B. Harald Köhl: Kant's ethics of convictions. At the same time: Berlin, Freie Univ., Diss., 1986. Berlin; New York: de Gruyter, 1990, X, 166 pp., ISBN 3-11-012309-6 (Sources and Studies on Philosophy; Volume 25). Shen-chon Lai: Orientation and Justification of Norms. Kant's ethics of convictions in modern discussion . At the same time: Münster, Univ., Diss., 1998. Neuried: Ars Una, 1998, VIII, 206 S., ISBN 3-89391-071-9 (German University Edition ; Volume 71).
  11. ↑ See e.g. B. Bernward Grünewald: Mind or Responsibility? On the absurdity of opposing ethics of conviction and responsibility , in: Kant as a point of reference for philosophical thought, ed. v. H. Busche et al. A. Schmitt. Würzburg: Königshausen u. Neumann 2010, pp. 85-100, on Weber in particular p. 86, note 2. ISBN 978-3-8260-4290-4 .
  12. ↑ Max Scheler: The formalism in ethics and the material ethics of values, Niemeyer 1916, 4th edition 1954, 140
  13. ^ Eberhard Schmidhäuser: Gesinnungsethik und Gesinnungsrecht, in: Karl Lackner (Hrsg.): Festschrift for Wilhelm Gallas on his 70th birthday, de Gruyter, Berlin 1973, 81-98, 84
  14. ↑ Max Weber : Politics as a Profession (1919). With a foreword by Robert Leicht . Frankfurt am Main: Gutenberg Book Guild, 1999, 85 pages, ISBN 3-7632-4902-8 . The text can also be viewed online .

literature

  • D. Baumgardt: ethics of conviction or ethics of success? , in: Philosophische Studien 1 (1949), pp. 91–110.
  • H. Reiner: Art. Gesinnungsethik , in: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Bd. 3, 539f.
  • H. Reiner: ethics of conviction and ethics of success , in: ARSP 40 (1953), pp. 522-526.

Web links

Wiktionary: Ethics of convictions  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations