The evil

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The evil ( Old High German Bosi , from Germanic * bausja- , low, '' bad ', exact etymology unclear) is the antonym for good and a central object of religion, religious studies, cultural studies, philosophy of religion and philosophical ethics. It is understood as the epitome of the morally wrong, or as a force that drives morally wrong action, occasionally also as a mythological, world affairs influencing force that is in a dualistic or antagonistic relationship to the good ; the evil was u. a. regarded as the source of evil . The adjective "bad" on which the noun is based is generally associated with something unpleasant or even harmful, in particular a behavior whose intent is willful and directed against the will of others or which is fundamentally disregarded. This rule of use also includes the designation of sinful behavior as evil, if it ignores religiously based norms or deliberately violates them.

The dog's foot is one of many symbols that are associated with evil.

philosophy

In philosophical ethics , an action or the will striving for it are generally designated as evil if the action is assessed as morally impermissible. However, different criteria are applied depending on the ethical position. For example, consequentialist theories assess the consequences of action, teleological the desired goals of action, deontological the goods or duties or rules concerned; Approaches based on ethical convictions and, in some cases, ethical ethics as well , often ignore the action and only judge the will. We can distinguish between two central concepts of evil. The privation theory of evil understands this as a mere lack of being. Representatives of this view include Plotinus , Augustine and Thomas Aquinas . The perversion theory, on the other hand, understands evil as a reality of its own, which actively reverses the order of good. Kant , Schelling and Kierkegaard are the main representatives of this view .

History of philosophy

In his collection of sentences Encheiridion 'Handbook of Morals', Epictetus describes that just as a goal cannot be set up to fail, the bad cannot be a goal and cannot have a primary cause in the world order and in being. Evil can, however, also be striven for as such. The will to evil raises the question of the origin of evil.

According to Augustine , evil comes into the world out of man's free will. Through original sin , man has lost his free will and is to blame for his suffering. Augustine sees all suffering as a consequence of man's original sin. Numerous philosophers and theologians (e.g. Augustine and almost all of them in the Middle Ages) characterize evil as insubstantial. It is a mere lack of good (a privativum ). For example, blindness is also analyzed as a privation : Blindness is not a positive quality, but simply a lack of vision. Just as cold is just the absence of warmth, so evil is just the absence of good or God.

Benedict de Spinoza characterized evil in his work Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata (German: 'Ethics in geometrical order') as a subjective ascription : what inhibits the self-assertion of the individual is called “evil” (according to him, this also applies vice versa for the term “good”).

De Sade recommended a turn to evil, according to which the evil can lead happy and prosperous criminal lives, while the good become the unfortunate victims of the evil. Evil people at de Sade are individualistic, purposeful egoists and cynics who are only concerned with their own enjoyment. Since they know neither solidarity nor compassion, they only cooperate for their own benefit. They therefore reject religions and worldviews that attach an independent value to the community of people, independent of individual benefit. The ideologies that led to millions of mass murders in the 20th century are therefore inconsistent with de Sade's conception of evil.

Evil is inherent and essential to human beings (cf. Immanence ), postulated by Immanuel Kant in 1793 in his religious-philosophical work The religion within the limits of mere reason . As a radical evil, it is an essential part of human nature, since it is not only a rational being, but also a being with empirical needs.

Friedrich Nietzsche declares evil to be a construct of Christian slave morality that reversed the original distinction between good and bad in good and bad .

Karl Jaspers presents three levels of the relationship between good and bad, at which people have alternatives and are therefore required to make a decision.

  1. Moral relationship: In Kant's sense, this relationship is between duty and inclination. It is bad to be guided by the immediate impulses. On the other hand, there is the domination of the immediate impulses by the will following moral laws. As on the other levels, it is not the concrete outcome of the action that decides whether the acting person is evil, but the selection of his drive.
  2. Ethical relationship: The relationship is only determined by the truthfulness of the motives. In the reality of acting under both the conditioned and the unconditional, the unconditioned makes the conditioned dependent. He deprives himself of his freedom of choice and thus evades his responsibility. Evil here is weakness that yields to inclination. Even the apparent goodness as a luxury of happy relationships is evil . The lack of alternatives is instrumentalized in order to spare the agent the conflict.
  3. Metaphysical relationship: Here the relationship between love urging to be and hate urging not to be determines the relationship between good and bad. Evil is only the will to evil (also expressed in the excuse of evil), which here is a will to destroy.

The first level is the strictest with regard to its demands on the agent: instinctuality of all kinds. On the second and weaker level, only a lack is the criterion for evil: the lack of will for good, for truthfulness. At the third and weakest level, a presence is the criterion for evil: the presence of the will to do evil.

What the three levels have in common is that the outcome of the action does not serve as a criterion for evil. No end can thus justify the means. The funds are in focus. This approach to the definition of evil, which is possible with carefully considered action, is a challenge both to the group of relativism, pragmatism and subjectivism, which restricts the space for alternatives through result-oriented preliminary evaluations, and to fundamentalism, which is hard-constructed, on the other.

The reference to the way of making a decision - to the way - instead of a reference to the results of action - to the goal - also has similarities with urbuddhist views, in which results are not evaluated and divine guidelines are followed, but driven by greed and a lack of effort to gain knowledge of evil behavior leads.

Moral realism

Some more modern philosophical positions, like Spinoza already, argue that point-of-view dependence is fundamentally essential for ethical judgments. This position is represented by various positions of moral relativism as well as some positions of pragmatism and subjectivism . The context dependency is emphasized differently by the different positions. The concrete assessment of the moral value depends on the context of the situation and the person making the assessment.

According to other ethical positions, there are firm moral truths, moral values ​​and goods that exist regardless of context. These positions too claim to live up to their own basic moral intuitions . Nevertheless, some ethical theories, especially deontological theories, have been criticized as rigorous . For example, when Kant resolutely rejects the principle “ought presupposes ability” ( see also ought claim ).

In various societies and their subsystems, especially in many religions , there are conventions that regulate the ethical evaluation of most actions. The importance of these conventions for the justification and validity of moral judgments is assessed differently. In the text What is Enlightenment, Immanuel Kant distinguished between a free, public use of reason and one that is tied to institutions. As a member of the learned republic, according to Kant's argument, a preacher would also have to put the conditions of application of his own religious conventions up for debate, but in his capacity as a member of his church he is justified and obliged to adhere to them without question.

The philosopher and existentialist Emil Cioran wrote:

"Shy, without dynamism, the good is incapable of communicating, the much more zealous evil wants to be transferred and achieves it, because it has the double privilege of being fascinating and contagious."

Some drafts of theological ethics take intermediate positions. Alfons Auer, for example, is of the opinion that ethical judgments derive their motivational horizon from religious convictions, but must be justified autonomously. After accessing value insights, normative statements must be justified. The former are therefore the conditional context of the justifications of norms. Theological statements are thus the interpretive context of an ethical argumentation that is independent of itself.

Gerhard Ringeling , for example, also emphasizes: Christianity has a certain cultural experience and from this it shapes its reception of new experiences. However, the integration of these experiences should also be seen as dysfunctional communication trends.

Dietmar Mieth differentiates as follows:

  • Social norms are not based on insight into reasons, but on the basis of social relationships and relieve people from constant reflection on behavior.
  • Moral norms, on the other hand, integrate and surpass biological or legal understandings of norms in the direction of a free orientation of human action and are judgments of preferential value, i.e. weighing up values ​​under given conditions, general or relative rules of priority in the event of a value conflict. We can therefore only speak of standards when the application clause has been clearly clarified.
  • Deontological norms are norms that always dictate or prohibit (for example: telling the truth and avoiding lies )
  • Teleological norms dictate or forbid with regard to the effects of the action and therefore precisely specify the circumstances (for example: the direct killing of an innocent life is not permitted).

Anyone who does not believe in the existence of (standpoint-independent) deontological norms can at least see these as justified in sharpening general insights into values ​​with the greatest urgency. According to Mieth, normative ethics has its strength in the delimitation of evil and thus in gaining a framework for the good and is therefore either formal or casuistic. Norms understood as avoidance imperatives designate what is no longer good (evil), but leave the good open as the material moral. For concrete judgments, contexts of experience are decisive, as was the case for Auer: more complex value judgments , which arise from the value conflict, are based on simple value insights - but simple value insights are by no means self-evident. The competence required for this is based on experience as integrating appropriation (not as empiricism , but as experience that is conveyed through symbolic patterns ). An ethos is formed from the interaction of value insights. Ultimately, the question of the right norms is not in the foreground, but rather the personal appropriation of morality ("How should I be? What can I do?"). This requires not only a normative, but also an attitude-pedagogical treatment of ethical problems.

According to Schmidt-Salomon , the concept of evil does not make sense from an ethical point of view, since nobody sees himself as evil. According to him, evil is essentially a battle term used to legitimize the exclusion and murder of allegedly evil others.

Religions

The following sections are not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

In religious studies two forms of evil are distinguished: on the one hand, evil in the human sphere (the opposite pole of the moral good), on the other hand, evil 'divine' or spiritual powers or forces that work in a harmful way or that have bad ethical influences are the " numinous evil"

In many religions (the typical example of Manichaeism is often judged more differently in recent research), and also in phases and parts of Christianity , there are tendencies that view the world as the scene of a battle between “good” and “bad”. The good elements ( gods / angels ) fight the bad elements (gods / demons ). In this concept, every person has the choice to choose either the good or the bad side.

Such a dualism is, however, in contradiction to a consistently understood monotheism : If God is the only cause in the world, no second (evil) power can be thought of as independent. In the dogmatic system of Christian teaching, evil was therefore always subordinated to God (for example as a fallen angel who could only act with God's permission). The ambivalence of this notion is already illustrated by the biblical account of how evil came into the world after creation (Gen 3): It crept into the garden in the form of a snake. It is expressly stated that it was a creature of God, which of course (like man) was particularly distinguished by its cleverness and bare hairlessness (a play on words in Hebrew). It is also possible to interpret the story in such a way that God himself provoked the violation of the commandment with his reasons, which some seem to be exaggerated.

Judaism

In Judaism, there is no “evil” as an independent force fighting against divine creation , since God as the omnipotent creator has power over everything and every creature was good at its creation. The Satan has the Christian understanding not appropriate function as "celestial accuser" and does not represent the personification of evil.

Ever since he has enjoyed the fruit of the tree of knowledge , man has had the freedom to act good or bad. The evil inclinations of man - the inclination to act contrary to the will of God - are referred to in Judaism as Yetzer hara ( Hebrew : יצר הרע, 'evil inclination'). In the Hebrew Bible the term appears twice, namely in Genesis 6.5 and Genesis 8.21. The Yetzer hara is not a demonic force, but a nasty variant of the impulses that humans fundamentally need for physical survival. So z. B. the need for food leads to gluttony or the need for reproduction leads to sexual abuse . The Yetzer hara is innate, but as the young person matures it is replaced by the Yetzer tov ('good inclination').

In Kabbalistic cosmology , evil is explained, among other things, with a separation of the connection between the divine properties manifested in the Sephiroth , severity and grace, that is, evil arises “from the original unity of good”. In Kabbalah, Sitra Achra (סטרא אחרא 'other side') is the other side in opposition to divine holiness. Qliphoth are metaphorically understood as enveloping bowls around “sparks of divine light emanation ”. They are spiritual obstacles that have their existence from God (אור Or 'light') in an external rather than internal sense. They appear in the descending "order of evolution " (Heb. סדר השתלשלות Seder hishtalschelus ) through Tzimtzum (God's self-contraction from his own midst) for the purpose of creating the world. Qliphoth cover the only reality of God like bowls cover the contained fruit. However, as metaphorical shells they also have good properties. As peel protects the fruit, so do they prevent the metaphysical divine emanation of light from being scattered. These are the shards of the inner six Sephiroth vessels, which could not withstand the flow of the infinite light of En Sof and therefore broke ( Schvirat ha-Kelim שבירת הכלים 'Break of the vessels'), but remained in the world.

Christianity

In Christianity the idea of original sin is widespread, which stems from the fall of the first couple and has passed on to every human being. Original sin is also used to explain the evil in the world, more precisely: for the evil caused by human individuals themselves (moral evil, malum morale ) or disastrous social structures. In addition, there is also talk of evil or evil that is not caused by humans and for which, in the opinion of some philosophers and theologians, God himself is responsible ( malum physicum et metaphysicum ) because he accepted it for the best of all possible worlds to create ( see also theodicy ).

According to another view, evil is not willed by God. The possibility of evil results from the fallibility of finite, conditionally free beings. Based on Augustine , ethical evil is understood as turning away from God, which happens against better understanding: Ultimately, it consists in the fact that man does not want to come from God and understand himself to be ordered to him and puts himself absolutely. God allows evil for the independence of creatures, above all for the sake of human freedom .

Daoism

In Daoism, the Dao has the meaning of an all-pervasive principle underlying the whole world. It is the highest reality and the highest mystery, the primordial unity, the cosmic law and absolute. From the Dao arise the “ten thousand things”, i.e. the cosmos, and the order of things also arises from it, similar to a law of nature, but the Dao itself is not an omnipotent being, but the origin and the union of opposites and thus indefinable.

The work of Dao brings about creation by producing the duality, the Yin and the Yang, light and shadow, from whose changes, movements and interactions the world emerges.

Les Très Riches Heures by the Duke of Berry, fol. 64 v , 1412/16: medieval idea of ​​the origin of evil: the angel Lucifer falls; it becomes the “evil counter-principle” of God

personification

There are personifications of evil in several cultures, such as the Christian devil , certain types of Arab jinn or the demons of Hinduism . What they all have in common - according to their evil nature - is that they bring misfortune and ruin.

Such personifications are often new interpretations of religious figures who have been displaced from their previous functions and from their status as protagonists through a change of religion . So was z. B. the horned Greek shepherd god Pan as a result of Christian proselytizing to a form of the devil, who also received horns and goat's feet (such a reinterpretation is a case of Interpretatio Christiana ).

The personification of evil as Satan or the devil can be found in many Western works of world literature, for example in Dante's Inferno , in Goethe's Faust or in Bulgakov's The Master and Margarita . In Goethe's Faust , the devil Mephistopheles describes himself as: "A part of that power // which always wants evil and always creates good." ( Goethe : Faust. The first part of tragedy , 1st act, study.)

There are also prominent leaders of the bad guys in numerous fantasy books and films: Morgoth and Sauron in JRR Tolkien , Voldemort in Harry Potter , the Emperor in Star Wars . Only in these fantasies are there dark rulers who also define themselves as evil. What all these figures have in common is a striving to constantly increase their power over as many beings as possible, solely for their own benefit, without scruples or moral concerns. According to some conceptions, evil is also viewed as an independent primal force that is sometimes personalized in demons, but sometimes also appears independently as absolute evil (e.g. in the Cthulhu myth ). The development of society, according to some, runs in cycles between ages of good, golden ages , and ages of evil, dark ages.

National assignment

In the context of historical considerations, there is sometimes a “national classification of evil” ( Franz Graf-Stuhlhofer ). Especially with regard to the events of the time of National Socialism , the evil caused by humans is clearly visible. This evil was perpetrated by certain perpetrators and made possible by many other people. When depicting these events, a certain one, namely the German nation, appears to be primarily responsible and therefore particularly evil. When dealing with such dark times, an assignment of evil is almost inevitable: Either individual people are shown to be primarily responsible (and the vast majority of the population as innocent or more or less as victims), or the participation and co-responsibility of one is shown emphasized by a large part of the population (such as the Wehrmacht exhibition on crimes by large parts of the Wehrmacht). Among the events related to World War II , however, there are many other crimes committed by nationals, such as: Sometimes under the joint responsibility of high politicians or generals.

Symbols

A prominent example of a symbol of evil is the drudenfoot (overturned pentagram ) standing on its point . But also skulls or - in relation to the signs of Christianity - inverted crosses ( Petrus cross ) are used today as symbols of evil.

It should be noted here, however, that these symbols were only declared to be signs of evil in modern times and were not in their original meaning and can even be found on old churches (example: the Marktkirche Hannover ).

Drudenfuß on the bell tower of the Marktkirche in Hanover

literature

philosophy

aesthetics

Theology and religion

  • Eugen Drewermann : Structures of Evil. Schöningh Verlag 1977 (1st edition, also in 1978 accepted doctorate as a habilitation thesis), 1988 (special edition) ISBN 3-506-72100-3 .
  • Friedrich Hermanni , Peter Koslowski (ed.): The reality of evil. 1998.
  • Friedrich Hermanni: Evil and theodicy. A philosophical-theological foundation. 2002.
  • Peter Koslowski (ed.): Origin and overcoming of evil and suffering in the world religions. 2001.
  • Paul Ricœur : Evil: A Challenge to Philosophy and Theology. Lecture in Lausanne 1985. Tvz Theologischer Verlag, Zurich 2006, ISBN 3-290-17401-8 .
  • Werner H. Ritter (Ed.): Occult fascination. Symbols of evil and perspectives of disenchantment. Theological, religious sociological and religious pedagogical approaches. Neukirchener, Neukirchen-Vluyn 1997, ISBN 3-7887-1655-X .
  • Elmar Willnauer: Think evil today. With Immanuel Kant and Hannah Arendt on a new approach to theology. Rhombos-Verlag, 2005, ISBN 3-93-723163-3 .

Biology (behavioral research)

psychology

Cultural history

Web links

Wikiquote: Evil  - Quotes

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Cf. keyword böse , in: Kluge , Etymologisches Dictionary , 24th edition, as well as the Wiktionary entry böse
  2. ↑ See entry böse in Wahrig, German dictionary , 6th edition, p. 304.
  3. ↑ Jörg Noller: Theories of Evil as an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 2017, ISBN 978-3-88506-788-7 , Chapter 1, p. 13 and 19th
  4. ↑ Karl Jaspers: Introduction to Philosophy . 1953, ISBN 3-492-04667-3 , Chapter 5: The unconditional requirement , last section: Good and bad .
  5. ^ Emil Cioran: The Missing Creation , suhrkamp tb 550, 1979 (French original: Le Mauvais Démiurge , 1969)
  6. ^ Alfons Auer: Autonomous Morality and Christian Faith . 2nd Edition. Patmos-Verlag der Schwabenverlag AG, ISBN 978-3-491-77521-3 .
  7. ↑ See article Böse, das in: RGG , 3rd ed., Vol. 1, Sp. 1343f.
  8. ^ The Birth of the Good Inclination ; Is one intrinsically evil?
  9. ↑ Genesis 6.5 , the same passage after Luther 1912 ; Genesis 8.21 , Luther 1912
  10. ^ Avot de-Rabbi Nathan , chapter 16
  11. ↑ Karl RH Frick : The Enlightened . Gnostic-theosophical and alchemical-Rosicrucian secret societies up to the end of the 18th century - a contribution to the intellectual history of modern times. Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1973, ISBN 3-201-00834-6 , p. 101 .
  12. ↑ Soncino Zohar, Schemoth, Raja Mehemna, page 43b ff.
  13. ^ Franz Graf-Stuhlhofer: About simplifying attempts at a national classification of evil. Dealing with the topic of evil in the didactic communication of the Nazi era. In: Society & Politics. Journal for social and economic engagement, vol. 51, issue 4/2014 and 1/2015, pp. 31–34.
  14. ↑ Micha Brumlik : Review: The violence of freedom. Is modernity a displacement project? Rüdiger Safranski on evil , in: Die Zeit , No. 39, September 19, 1997.