The radical evil

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The radical ( e ) evil is an object of the history and moral philosophy . Immanuel Kant spoke about the “radical e ” evil as an anthropological constant, a predisposition to the tendency to act contrary to the moral law . Hannah Arendt used the expression “radical evil” with reference to Kant in her early work with regard to her search for explanations for the Holocaust as a code for a pattern of thought and action that underlies industrial mass murder.

The two positions use “radical” (from the Latin radix , root ) in different ways: Kant is about determining the “root” of evil, while Arendt means an extreme, a maximum form of evil without any restriction.

Immanuel Kant

In April 1792, Kant published the essay On Radical Evil in Human Nature in the Berlin Monthly , which he then included as the first piece in his work on Religion within the limits of mere reason , which appeared one year later .

Kant defines evil as an option for human freedom to act contrary to the “objective laws of morality” that determine what is good for him. According to Kant, evil is radical insofar as it is rooted in human nature as an inclination or "inclination to evil" ; H. it has anthropological status. The tendency to evil is here the "subjective [...] reason [...] of the possibility of a deviation of the maxims from the moral law" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 29 ) and must itself be considered an "act of freedom" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 21 ), which "[must] adhere to the moral faculty of arbitrariness" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 31 ) - otherwise the behavior cannot be judged morally at all .

So by nature man has a tendency to evil. In doing so, Kant distinguishes man's nature from his general concept of nature (cf. Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 21). “Nature” means the overall system of phenomena that are linked by the causal principle in cause-effect relationships. Kant had already opposed this nature in the Critique of Pure Reason with the possibility of transcendental freedom . In the “nature of man” or rather in the human being , freedom and causality are linked: If the concrete behavior is based on an individual “use” of transcendental freedom ( spontaneity ) based on reasons and maxims , it can be understood as responsible action. With the possibility of this individual use, human nature contains both the "disposition for good" and the "inclination to evil".

Kant already determined this tendency to evil in the Critique of Practical Reason (KpV) and in the Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals (GMS) . Kant speaks of the fact that man has a “powerful counterbalance” to the categorical imperative in his striving for happiness, the fulfillment of all needs and inclinations . Out of this arises “a natural dialectic”, which he describes as the “tendency” of human beings, “to reason against the laws of duty, and to cast doubt on their validity” ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 405 : GMS ). He takes up this idea again in the KpV . There he defines the tendency as “self-love” and “self-conceit”, as the tendency of man to “make himself the objective determinant of the will in general according to the subjective determinants of his will” ( Immanuel Kant: AA V, 47 : KpV ). I.e. Self-love, with its striving for happiness, becomes the unconditional law of one's own action through free determination of reason, instead of the moral law. So it is not the individual biological needs and personal inclinations themselves that make up the tendency towards evil, but the inclination of reason, which goes beyond this, to confuse these subjective and non-general determinants of the will with the objective ones and to make their fulfillment the unconditional maxim of one's own To take action. The categorical imperative is precisely the command to act for objective reasons: "[...] only act according to the maxim by which you can also want it to become a general law." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 421 : GMS ). Practical reason possesses in the “ respect ” for the moral law or for its differentiation from the principle of self-love a “driving force” in order to move the arbitrariness to the decision for the implementation of the moral law. According to Kant , only if man obeys the moral law is he autonomous , that is, he does justice to his being as a man. If, on the other hand, man is guided by his self-love and the pursuit of happiness, he is determined by others.

“This evil is radical because it corrupts the basis of all maxims; at the same time as a natural tendency not to be eradicated by human forces, because this could only happen through good maxims, which cannot take place if the highest subjective ground of all maxims is assumed to be corrupt; nevertheless it must be possible to predominate because it is found in man as a freely acting being. "

- Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 37

Evil is radical because, like the disposition to good, it is rooted in the depths of human freedom and can thus spoil the “basis of all maxims”. The disposition and inclination are not of the same rank, because the disposition to good necessarily belongs to the possibility of the human being, while the inclination to evil is “accidental for mankind” ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 25 ), i. H. the tendency towards evil is conceptually not essential for man, although it generally belongs to the human species. Kant distinguishes between the " disposition to animality " that humans have as biological living beings and the " disposition for humanity ", which defines human nature as a rational being, from the individual disposition "for his personality". Only through the latter is the individual a moral “being capable of attribution” ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 26 ), that is, a person who can be made individually responsible for his or her own deeds. The disposition for the personality consists in the "receptivity of respect for the moral law, as a sufficient driving force of the arbitrariness " ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 27 ). If the susceptibility to respect is now individually weak, then the individual inclination to evil, which Kant also describes as "corruption (corruptio) of the human heart" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 30 ), is very strong, whereby the disposition to Humanity is perverted to autonomy (cf. Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 30): instead of the moral law, individual inclinations and inclinations of the species determine action. Deficiencies on the other levels of the system intensify the slope, namely the “fragility (fragilitas) of human nature” and “the unfairness of the human heart” ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 30 ), i. H. special biological need and lack of truthfulness towards oneself. Evil is not its own "driving force", but rather the "perversity (perversitas) of the human heart" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 30 ): Respect for moral law is in the Determination of the will subordinated to self-love and thus the “moral order of the mainspring” ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 36 ) reversed.

According to Kant, evil actions are individually to blame and, despite the general tendency, must be individually accounted for. For Kant, however, only that which happens through one's own action is responsible. The tendency to evil itself cannot be the result of an empirical act, because it is defined as the subjective determining factor of the arbitrariness and therefore has to be a priori for every concrete (empirical) act. Kant solves the problem by postulating an "intelligible act" ( Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 31 ) in which the human being defines his highest maxim, on which all other maxims depend. This has a pure rational origin and no temporal origin and can, if at all, therefore only be known through pure reason and without any time conditions. From this point of view, every person is either good or bad by choosing his maxim. In an empirical assessment of the actions, they cannot be assessed according to the extremes, but fall into gray areas of indifference to the law or the mixture of self-love and respect (cf. footnote to Immanuel Kant: AA VI, 39).

Hannah Arendt

With regard to the experience of the Holocaust, the political theorist Hannah Arendt dealt with the question of radical evil and came to different views in early utterances and in the later course of her studies. In her thinking diary in June 1950, Arendt noted:

“Radical evil is that which should not have happened, that is, that which cannot be reconciled with, which cannot be accepted as a despatch under any circumstances, and that which cannot be ignored in silence. It is that for which one cannot take responsibility because its inferences are incalculable, and because among those inferences there is no punishment that would be adequate. This does not mean that all evil must be punished; but if one is to be reconciled or to turn away from it, it must be punishable. ”The radical evil in this splinter shows itself above all in its historical-moral consequences.

In a letter to Karl Jaspers from March 1951, she attempted a preliminary typification:

“I don't know what radical evil really is, but it seems to me that it somehow has to do with the following phenomena: the making superfluous of people as people (not using them as a means, which leaves their humanity untouched and only theirs Violate human dignity , but rather make it superfluous as people) ”.

In her main political work, Elements and Origins of Total Rule (1951 in English), she located the conditions for the occurrence of radical evil in the claim to total rule , also with regard to its possibilities (and not only with regard to the subsumption of the entire society under rule) to be total:

“But in their endeavor to prove that anything is possible, total domination, without actually wanting to, discovered that there can be radical evil. When the impossible became possible, it turned out to be identical to the impunable, unforgivable radical evil, which one can neither understand nor explain through the motives of selfishness, greed, envy, greed for power, resentment, cowardice. "

Between March and April 1953, Arendt noted in her thinking diary: “There is radically bad, but not radically good. The radical bad always arises when a radical good is wanted. "

In her 1963 Eichmann report in Jerusalem , she developed her concept of the “banality of evil”. Accordingly, evil was omnipresent in the ruling structure of National Socialism , aimed at abolishing human beings and gradually destroying all human beings industrially in the name of abstract goals of progress, until only functionaries of the "organized powerlessness" of the totalitarian system remain. But even these functionaries can be changed at any time, so that in the end they only survive as a function, but not as persons. Since Eichmann became the subject of violent accusations in Jerusalem , who wanted to see a trivialization or even an excuse of the Holocaust through sociological circumstances in Arendt's description, Arendt finally explained her position again in 1965 in a series of lectures that was first published from the estate under the title On Evil has been.

literature

  • Hannah Arendt, elements and origins of total rule , Munich 1996, p. 941.
  • Eichmann in Jerusalem. A report on the banality of evil From the American English by Brigitte Granzow (revised version by the author compared to the English first edition; new preface). Since 1986 with an "introductory essay" by Hans Mommsen. Expanded paperback edition. Piper, Munich et al. 15th ed. 2006, 440 pages (series: Serie Piper, vol. 4822- Earlier edition: ibid. Volume 308. This edition, last 2005, is based on the number of pages in this article) ISBN 978-3492248228 ISBN 3492248225 Again: ibid. 2010 (mentioned: 5th edition)
  • Excerpt: Adolf Eichmann. From the banality of evil. in Merkur (magazine) No. 186, August 1963; again in: The message of MERKUR. An anthology ... ed. Bohrer, Kurt Scheel. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 1997 ISBN 3608918256 pp. 152-169.
  • Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report on the Banality of Evil (first published in 1963. The edition since 1965 with the German “Vorrede” as “Postscript” in the “rev. And enlarged edition.”) Penguin Books, 2006 ISBN 0143039881 . Pages 1 to 136 (partly), the famous quote on page 233 engl. (corresponds to p. 347 German) and especially the keyword index. can be read online: Eichmann in Jerusalem in books.google.de
  • Hannah Arendt: About evil. A lecture on questions of ethics . Munich 2006, ISBN 3-492-04694-0 .
  • In English: Responsibility and Judgment.
  • Karl Jaspers: The radical evil in Kant . 1935. Again in: appropriation and polemics . Munich 1968, pp. 183-204.
  • In French: Le mal radical chez Kant. Translator Jeanne Hersch. In: Deucalion. Cahiers de philosophie, 4th ed. Jean Wahl . Zugl. Être et penser, 36. La Baconnière, Neuchâtel 1952. pp. 227-252.
  • Immanuel Kant: Religion within the limits of bare reason
  • Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals
  • Immanuel Kant: Critique of Practical Reason
  • Ulrich Dierse: Article Radical Evil . In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Volume 8 (1992), pp. 6-11.
  • Christoph Schulte : "Radically evil". The career of evil from Kant to Nietzsche. Munich 1991
  • Peter Trawny : The radical evil and the bureaucratic rule . In other words: Conceivable Holocaust. Hannah Arendt's political ethics . 2005, pp. 29-39.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 29 .
  2. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 21 .
  3. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 31 .
  4. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 21 .
  5. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 405 .
  6. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 47 .
  7. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 421 .
  8. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 37 .
  9. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 25 .
  10. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 26 .
  11. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 27 .
  12. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 30 .
  13. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 30 .
  14. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 30 .
  15. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 30 .
  16. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 36 .
  17. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 31 .
  18. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA VI, 39 .
  19. ↑ Hannah Arendt: Thinking Diary 1950–1973. Edited by Ursula Ludz & Ingeborg Nordmann in collaboration with the Hannah Arendt Institute Dresden. Volume 1, Munich & Zurich 2002, p. 7.
  20. ↑ Hannah Arendt: Letter to Karl Jaspers from March 4, 1951. In: Arendt / Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1926-1969 , Munich 1993, p. 202.
  21. ↑ Hannah Arendt: Elements and origins of total rule , Munich 1996, p. 941.
  22. ↑ Hannah Arendt: About evil. A lecture on questions of ethics , Munich 2006