Categorical imperative

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The categorical imperative is the fundamental principle of ethical action in Immanuel Kant's philosophy . As a criterion as to whether an action is morally good, the question is whether it follows a maxim whose validity would be acceptable to everyone, at any time and without exception, and whether all persons concerned are treated not as a mere means to another end , but also as an end in itself . The term is presented as a determination of the good will by Kant in the foundation of the metaphysics of morals and developed in detail in the Critique of Practical Reason . In one of its basic forms it reads: "Act only according to the maxim by which you can also want it to become a general law." Kant responded to direct criticism with an example in the essay On a supposed right to lie out of human love .

General

Kant claims that “the mere concept of a categorical imperative also provides the formula for it” ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 420 ). By this he means that the mere determination of the “categorical imperative”, which means “unconditional command” in the terminology, can determine the content of this command, at least in terms of form. This form is that of the general public. Since it is an unconditional command, it must be something that confronts the will of every "finite rational being" and thus also every human being as a requirement ( commandment ), the validity of which does not depend on special provisions of this being and his will (such as Inclinations, or acute needs), or circumstances.

“... since the imperative contains, besides the law, only the necessity of the maxim to be in accordance with this law, but the law contains no condition to which it was restricted, nothing remains but the generality of a law to which the maxim of the action is left should be appropriate, and what conformity the imperative alone actually presents as necessary. "

- Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 420

The categorical imperative applies to finite rational beings per se and is therefore also general in this respect. Therefore, he takes all people under all conditions in the duty , or he describes the universal form of compulsory at all. This becomes clear, among other things, in the following formulation of the categorical imperative ("legal formula"):

"Act only according to the maxim by which you can also want it to become a general law."

- Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 421

In contrast to rule utilitarianism , in which rules of action are only evaluated according to the benefit they produce, and in contrast to action- consequentialism , which evaluates actions only according to their consequences, the categorical imperative is deontological , i. H. it refers to the concept of duty . It is not evaluated what the action causes, but what the intention is. If the will is good, then the action is also morally justified. The will to good alone is what is morally good.

Formulas

In the second section of the foundation , different formulations, the “formulas” of the categorical imperative, are developed. The exact formulation is different in each case, and further formulations are added in the Critique of Practical Reason . These formulations are usually sorted as follows:

Universalization formula An end in itself formula
  • "Act only according to the maxim through which you can also want it to become a general law." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 421 )
  • "Act according to the maxim which can make itself a general law at the same time.")
  • "Act in such a way that the maxim of your will can apply at any time at the same time as the principle of general legislation." ( Immanuel Kant: AA V, 30 )
  • "[Act in such a way] that the will through its maxim can at the same time regard itself as generally legislative." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 434 )
  • "Act in such a way that you use humanity both in your person and in the person of everyone else at the same time as an end, never just as a means." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 429 )
  • "Because reasonable beings are all subject to the law that each of them should never treat themselves and all others merely as a means, but at all times as an end in themselves." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 433 )
Natural law formula Purpose-rich formula
  • "Act as if the maxim of your action should become the general law of nature through your will." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 421 )
  • "Act according to maxims that can also have themselves as general laws of nature as their object." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 437 )
  • "Accordingly, every rational being must act as if through his maxims he were at all times a legislative member in the general realm of ends." ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 438 )

Kant explains the universalization formula as follows: “Autonomy, i. i. the suitability of the maxim of every good will to make itself a general law is itself the sole law that the will of every rational being imposes on itself ”( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 444 ). The connection between the formulas, whether some or all are different developments of the same thought or whether they express slightly different points of view in Kant's thinking, has not been conclusively clarified. This question is a frequently discussed problem in the Kantian literature.

Kant's assumed terms

mandatory

Kant defines the concept of duty as follows: "Duty is the necessity of an action out of respect for the law" ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 400 ). Reason enables us to know the moral law. An act of duty is an act of respect for the law. Duty should be the motive for action, not joy, averting evil or the like. Anyone who is commanded by conscience to act in a certain way has an obligation to act in this way. It is important to note that people should not only act in accordance with duty (according to duty), but motivated by respect for the law ( out of duty). Every act of duty is dutiful, but not every act of duty is dutiful. One only obligation contemporary action that is not done out of respect for the law, but by inclination or rational calculation, has no positive moral value. Although the visible act of duty does not differ from that which is merely dutiful, it is the motive that determines the moral value.

Categorical imperative, maxim

Kant is of the opinion that good will is the only absolutely good thing. Talent, character or favorable circumstances can also be used for bad purposes, but goodwill is in itself to be valued positively and is therefore the highest good. The construction of an ideal of goodwill is a prerequisite for its ethics. Its starting point is that an action is conditioned by practical reason. Furthermore, the factors that determine action are not natural laws, but practical (i.e., through the will as possible imaginable) principles:

  • Maxims (subjective principles): self-imposed rules of action that express a will
  • Imperatives (objective principles): determined by practical reason; Advice, morally relevant principles. ("But the law is the objective principle, valid for every rational being, and the principle according to which it should act, i.e. an imperative.")

With Kant there are other imperatives that are not categorical , the so-called hypothetical imperatives. These work according to the principle: "if you want the end, you also want the associated means to achieve this end". In his opinion, however, hypothetical imperatives cannot serve as the basis of a moral act. The hypothetical imperative pursues a specific purpose and establishes a means-end relationship. A hypothetical imperative is therefore only a rule in which a goal and the necessary means are determined. That is why it only applies in relation to the specific goal, not always and everywhere and for everyone (“Learn so that you can get a job later!”), Ie not categorically. Thus the hypothetical imperative cannot be accepted as a general law, since with these imperatives the will does not impose an obligation on itself, but pursues means to an end in relation to external factors. Because one cannot know whether one has set oneself the desired ends or whether they have been imposed from outside, the will, which is determined according to hypothetical imperatives, cannot be free. Because he cannot be free, no moral value can arise from it.

In contrast, the categorical imperative formally subjects action to a generally applicable law, regardless of a specific external purpose. According to Kant, there is only one single categorical imperative, according to which one should act, the well-known imperative: "Act only according to the maxim that you can want it to become a general law!" “You should learn!” Is not a categorical imperative because the possible intention (what is to be achieved through learning) cannot be assumed in every person and because one has not imposed the duty of learning on oneself (but the structures that convey that you won't get a job without learning). So “You should learn!” Is only a hypothetical imperative, even if it looks like a categorical one in terms of its external form - it has no moral value and the subsequent action is morally neutral.

Finite reason

The content of the categorical imperative (as the basic principle of morality) can, according to Kant, be derived solely from reason. Man is indeed gifted with reason, but is not motivated by reason alone. This possibility of contravening reason makes the objective moral principle a categorical imperative, that is, a generally valid principle of morality.

Reason is not tied to physical or mental differences that exist between humans (or any other rational beings). Although Kant does not claim that there are other rational beings besides human beings, purely rationally guided beings can be imagined (whereby human beings are precisely not because they are also guided by inclinations and the like).

Since the content of the categorical imperative (the objective moral principle ) results from reason, purely rational beings would, so to speak, automatically act accordingly, which is why the principle of the categorical imperative could not be a rule, i.e. an imperative, for such beings .

"All imperatives are expressed by an ought and thereby indicate the relationship between an objective law of reason and a will which, according to its subjective nature, is not necessarily determined by it (a compulsion)."

- Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 413

Through his reason man is autonomous, so here: self-legislating, whereby he submits to the “compulsion” (see above) of the categorical imperative out of reason. Through this autonomy man has dignity and is an end in itself .

Human will

According to Kant, the human being is a reasonable being and accordingly is always subject to a general law. The question, however, is why people do not behave in accordance with the requirements of the law, but rather contrary to duty and irrational.

The answer to this arises from the specific constitution of the human will. This is defined by Kant as “the ability to act according to the idea of ​​laws, that is, according to principles” ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 412 ). If reason had the ability to determine the will completely, that is, if it were the sole origin of the principles according to which the will is determined, as is true for pure rational beings, then that of reason would be objective (necessary for all rational beings) for Morally good Also recognized that which every rational being subjectively recognizes as morally good and would also want. The human being, however, does not derive the determining principles of his will from reason alone; he is not a purely rational being, but a partially rational being, a partial rational being equipped with a sensually affected will. According to Kant, what determines his will apart from reason are the inclinations, components of our sensual disposition, which are based on the “feeling of pleasure and displeasure” ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 427 ).

Out of this discrepancy between subjective will and the objective law of reason, man becomes the addressee of a coercion through which the recognition and observance of the absolute bindingness of objective principles of reason and their priority over all inclination-dependent determinations is demanded from the subject. That in which the coercion is expressed, quasi its means of transport, is the imperative. Imperatives always express an ought and express appellatively “that something would be good to do or not to do” ( Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 413 ). The categorical imperative demands that it always be treated as such, cf. the 'purpose-in-itself formula'.

Interpretation and application

According to Kant , the categorical imperative is not a substantive norm that says what should be done, but a criterion for examining actions and norms according to their ethical value. Anyone who wants to know whether an action that is intended, is to be carried out or has already taken place is morally correct must generalize the description of the action concerned . By abstraction from the individuality of the people involved, a general rule emerges. An action can only be understood as morally valuable ("out of duty") if this rule does not result in an internal contradiction or for the determination of good will or a categorical imperative (i.e. an unconditional instruction to one's own will and what is assumed therein basic possibility of following this).

The exact form of the contradiction that Kant meant is controversial. Christoph Horn , Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano present the following five interpretations in a commentary on the foundation of the metaphysics of morals

Logical interpretation
  • The strictly logical or conceptual-analytical interpretation: A maxim is forbidden if and only if it leads to a contradiction in itself. For example, a promise must not be made with the intention of breaking it because the concept of a promise already implies the intention to keep it.
  • The general logical interpretation: A maxim is forbidden if and only if it would no longer serve its purpose in a world in which the maxim would be generally followed. A false promise would be forbidden because no one would believe a promise anymore if everyone made false promises, so it would then no longer make sense to make a promise at all.
Transcendentally pragmatic interpretation
A maxim is forbidden precisely when it or its generalization is inconsistent with the necessary prerequisites for its establishment. It would be forbidden, for example, to steal in order to obtain property, because the general recognition and respect of my property is a prerequisite for the establishment of the maxim. In general, if everyone were to act like this, precisely this requirement would no longer apply.
Consequentialist interpretation
A maxim is forbidden precisely when I cannot want the empirical consequences that it would have as general practice. A ban on false promises would therefore exist because I could no longer trust anyone in a world where this would be common practice.
Teleological interpretation
A maxim is forbidden precisely when it is inconsistent with the purposes contained in nature (man). For example, one must not kill oneself out of self-love in the sense of avoiding suffering, since self-love also commands me to preserve my life.
The rational agency interpretation
According to this approach, the rational ability to act or the good, i.e. H. determined by reason, will is the highest and only moral good of the Kantian ethics. Maxims that contradict this good are immoral. According to this approach, it would be forbidden, for example, not to help a person in need, since “in need” means nothing other than having no sensible alternative (= improving the situation) on one's own. It is therefore imperative to help those in need in order to ensure their reasonable ability to act.

Each of these interpretations is not without problems, since they are not readily compatible with Kant's examples of the application of the categorical imperative. It is also controversial whether and how the categorical imperative can be used to derive not only prohibitions (instructions to refrain from) but also positive commandments. The mere avoidance of contradicting the categorical imperative also seems to apply to morally indifferent actions. Usually it is suggested (in analogy to Kant's determination of transcendental truth) that an action or maxim is required when its opposite is contradictory. How exactly the opposite of the maxim is to be determined, whether a contrary or a complementary negation is meant (see also logical square ), is also controversial.

Relationship to the Golden Rule

The categorical imperative is often confused with "What you don't want someone to do to you, don't do that to anyone else". This so-called golden rule is not to be equated with Kant's philosophical construction of the categorical imperative. The Golden Rule is a hypothetical imperative because it has one purpose: avoiding things "you don't want". Likewise, the criterion of generalizability would only apply to actions, but not to the maxims as in the case of the categorical imperative. Kant therefore turned against a general validity of the golden rule:

“You don't think that the trivial: quod tibi non vis fieri [what you don't want to happen to you ...] etc. can serve as a guideline or principle. For it is derived only from the former, although with various restrictions; It cannot be a general law, because it does not contain the basis of duties towards oneself, not of duties of love towards others (because many would like to accept that others should not do him good if he could only be relieved to do them good show), finally not of the guilty duties towards each other, because the criminal would argue against his punishing judge for this reason, etc. "

- Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 430

Reception and criticism

Hegel and Schopenhauer

The long classic criticism of Kant's use of the categorical imperative as an ethical principle came from Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel . Hegel accused Kant that the categorical imperative is a purely formal principle of action assessment, so that any material norms can be justified with it. Because reason with the categorical imperative can only make its self-certainty the criterion of morality, any determinations of will can be judged as moral as long as they appear compatible with reason itself. Applied to practice, the categorical imperative only produces “ tautologies ”. The test with the categorical imperative does not go far “for this reason; just as the standard is the tautology and indifferent to the content, it just as easily accepts this as the opposite ”.

So z. B. both the existence and the non-existence of private property can be justified with the categorical imperative without contradiction; this depends on the interests of the individual:

“Property, if there is property, must be property. But if the opposite determinateness, negation of property, is posited, then the legislation of the same practical reason results in the tautology: non-property is non-property; if there is no property, what will be property must be abolished. But it is precisely the interest to show that property must be. "

- Hegel : Articles from the Critical Journal of Philosophy

However, the question “should it be law in and of itself that property is” cannot be answered with the categorical imperative: “Property in and of itself does not contradict itself; it is an isolated determinateness or only equated with itself. Non-ownership, lack of ownership of things or community of property are just as little contradicting each other ”.

In his criticism, Hegel goes even further in the basic lines of the philosophy of law and sees in the “formal subjectivity” of reason that is expressed in the categorical imperative the danger of “ turning into evil ; both morality and evil have their common root in the self-being, self-knowing and resolving certainty of oneself ”.

Arthur Schopenhauer formulated another sharp criticism of the categorical imperative in his work On the Basis of Morals . Schopenhauer accuses Kant of not sufficiently justifying the necessity of moral laws and thus placing his ethics on a foundation that is not itself sufficiently justified. He sees in the Kantian formulation “you shall” the remnant of a theological morality (above all of the Decalogue ) which appeals to a highest moral authority. Since such an instance is not presupposed by the categorical imperative, it lacks a basis. In Schopenhauer's view, Kant fails to make a sufficient distinction between the form of an ethic and its justification. He also criticizes the fact that the categorical imperative does not result from empirical experience, but only from reason and concepts; Terms that lack an empirical basis, however, are not suitable for the formulation of a generally applicable law that seeks to exclude selfish endeavors.

Karl Marx

Karl Marx reinterprets the categorical imperative from an individual maxim for action to a revolutionary principle. For him, the criticism of religion ends “with the doctrine that man is the highest being for man, that is, with the categorical imperative to overturn all relationships in which man is a humiliated, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible being is ". He supplements this negative version with the positive demand to stand up for conditions "in which the free development of everyone is the condition for the free development of all".

Theodor W. Adorno

Theodor W. Adorno has formulated a new categorical imperative in his “Negative Dialectic”. In contrast to z. B. on Kant or Marx, Adorno refers to a specific event, namely the Holocaust, which must not be repeated:

"Hitler imposed a new categorical imperative on people in the state of their lack of freedom: to arrange their thinking and acting in such a way that Auschwitz does not repeat itself, nothing similar happens."

- Theodor W. Adorno : Negative Dialectic

Jürgen Habermas

In Jürgen Habermas' ethics of discourse , the “moral point of view” is the point of view from which moral questions can be judged impartially. This is taken up in the practical and domination-free discourse as a “cooperative search for truth” by “free and equal participants”, in which only the “compulsion of the better argument may come into play”. The practical discourse serves the "consensual settlement of trade conflicts". It does not determine itself in terms of content and does not create norms, but "is a procedure [...] for checking the validity of proposed and hypothetically considered norms." He follows the principle of universalization, the test of which can be carried out with a reformulated categorical imperative that is not structured monologically:

“The categorical imperative needs to be reformulated in the proposed sense: instead of prescribing a maxim that I want to be a general law to be valid for everyone else, I have to present my maxim to all others for the purpose of discursive examination of its universality. The weight shifts from what each (individual) can want as a general law without contradiction to what everyone wants to recognize in agreement as a universal norm. "

- Jürgen Habermas : Moral awareness and communicative action

Hans Jonas

In his principle of responsibility , in which he attempts an ethic for technological civilization , Hans Jonas formulates a categorical imperative with regard to responsibility for future generations:

“'Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of real human life on earth'; or put in negative terms: 'Act in such a way that the effects of your action are not destructive to the future possibility of such life'; or simply: 'Do not endanger the conditions for the indefinite continued existence of humanity on earth'; or again positively: 'Include in your current choice the future integrity of the human being as a co-object of your will.' "

- Hans Jonas : The principle of responsibility

Jonas differentiates himself from Kant, because his categorical imperative aims at the consequences of the action, so it is thought of as consequential. Nevertheless, it also serves the purpose of universalization:

"The new imperative invokes a different unanimity: not that of the act with itself, but that of its ultimate effects with the continuation of human activities in the future."

- Hans Jonas : The principle of responsibility

Marcus G. Singer

In Generalization in Ethics , Marcus George Singer criticizes the categorical imperative. He accepts Kant's distinction between moral norms and rules of prudence or skill. He admits to Kant that moral norms do not depend on the intentions of the acting person. They apply without any such condition and are therefore categorical.

For Singer, however, Kant goes beyond this definition when he describes moral norms as categorical imperatives. According to Kant, an imperative is “categorical” when it presents “an action as for itself, without relation to another purpose, as objectively necessary”. Categorical imperatives have an “unconditional, objective and therefore generally valid necessity”. They concern “not the matter of the action and what is to follow from it, but the form”.

With Kant one can understand this in such a way that the general moral norms such as “Lying is forbidden” or “One should pay back borrowed money” do not allow an exception under any condition. So, according to Kant, one shouldn't lie to a possible murderer even if that could save the lives of innocent people.

Kant justifies this with the fact that the concept of truth itself would be absurd if one allowed lying. If I pretend to tell the truth, but consciously (!) Not do it, then I take the concept of truth ad absurdum. It becomes difficult here when there is a conflict of duties : “I don't lie.” And “I save human lives” are both moral laws (that is, generalizable maxims, not categorical imperatives (!)), According to which one must act. Which one do you choose? Unfortunately, Kant has no answer.

This rigorism of Kant, which is also reflected in his attitude towards punishment and especially the death penalty, leads, according to Singer, to morally questionable decisions.

According to him, however, the misguided Kantian rigorism is not a necessary consequence of the categorical imperative. If my maxim is to lie, if necessary, if I can thereby prevent the murder of innocent people, then I can without problems want this maxim to be elevated to a general law. There is no danger here that through this permission to lie no one can trust that someone else will not lie to him.

Günther Patzig

Günther Patzig expressly agreed with Singer's non-rigorous interpretation of the categorical imperative and, in particular, with his resolution of the white lie problem. Patzig describes the principle of the categorical imperative as a "discovery" in the field of practical philosophy. The decisive factor is to free this "discovery" from all time-bound and subjective restrictions and in this way to give it the significance it deserves. Patzig describes Kant's moral rigorism as such a time-related element.

Norbert Hoerster

In his work Ethics and Interest, Norbert Hoerster formulates the following criticism of the categorical imperative, although he does grant it a "certain partial efficiency":

  • First of all, one could - without getting into contradiction - want to elevate the maxim of an individual to a general law, and this would nevertheless be unacceptable for the majority of people. As an example, he cites that someone is stealing because he generally considers private property to be harmful and wants to abolish it. The auxiliary assumption that private property is useful, which would disrupt this argument, cannot be derived from the categorical imperative.
  • Second, one can do moral acts, e.g. B. “Rich people should support poor”, also because one does not attach any importance to the general law that follows from it: “He who gets in need should be helped”. Ultimately, this leads to the remarkable conclusion that a general lack of altruism is less perceived by a person, the more secure his / her situation is in which he / she lives. Yes, the better off someone can live out their egoism the more unreservedly.

Hoerster also points out that it is not clear why anyone should accept the categorical imperative as a legitimate method for determining generally recognized moral norms. Kant evidently also saw this problem and stated that he could not show it. The procedural principle for finding universally accepted, objective moral norms according to the categorical imperative is therefore "in the air", according to Hoerster.

literature

Treatise of the categorical imperative in Kant

Secondary literature

Philosophy bibliography : Immanuel Kant - Additional references on the topic

  • D. Copp: The 'Possibility' of a Categorical Imperative: Kant's Groundwork, Part III. 1992.
  • A. Dymek: "Kant's Hypothetical and Categorical Imperatives". 2008. www.epubli.de (popular science, 28 pages, introduction).
  • RK Gupta: Notes on Kant's Derivation of the Various Formulas of the Categorical Imperative. In International Journal of Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 5 (1997), pp. 383-396.
  • Jonathan Harrison: Kant's Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative and The Categorical Imperative . In: Ethical Essays Vol. II. Aldershot 1993, pp. 87-99 and 100-104.
  • Christoph Horn , Corinna Mieth , Nico Scarano (eds.): Immanuel Kant: Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27002-8 (study library; vol. 2; annotated edition).
  • Ralf Ludwig: Kant for beginners. The categorical imperative. An introduction to reading . Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-423-30144-9 .
  • Herbert James Paton : The Categorical Imperative: An Inquiry into Kant's Moral Philosophy . Berlin 1962, ISBN 978-3-11-005040-0 .
  • Günther Patzig: The Categorical Imperative in the Ethics Discussion of the Present . In: Günther Patzig (Ed.): Ethics without metaphysics . 2nd Edition. Göttingen 1983, ISBN 978-3-525-33493-5 , pp. 148-171 .
  • A. Pieper: How is a categorical imperative possible? in: O. Höffe (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals.
  • TW Pogge: The Categorical Imperative, in: O. Höffe (Ed.): Basis for the Metaphysics of Morals; also in: Paul Guyer (Ed.): Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, pp. 189-214.
  • Christian Schnoor: Kant's categorical imperative as a criterion for the correctness of action. Tübingen: JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1989.
  • Dieter Schönecker and Allen W. Wood: Kant's "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". An introductory commentary, Paderborn: Schöningh (UTB), 2004.
  • Peter J. Steinberger: The Standard View of the Categorical Imperative. Kant Studies 90 (1999), pp. 91-99.
  • Ph. Stratton-Lake: Formulating Categorical Imperatives. Kant studies 84 (1993), pp. 317-340.
  • AW Wood: Kant's Ethical Thought. Cambridge University Press, 1999.
  • G. Yaffe: Freedom, Natural Necessity and the Categorical Imperative. Kant Studies 86 (1995), pp. 446–458.

Web links

Wikiquote: Categorical Imperative  - Quotations

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 420 .
  2. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 420 .
  3. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 421 .
  4. ↑ See e.g. B. Dieter Schönecker and Allen W. Wood : Kant's "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". An introductory commentary , Paderborn: Schöningh (UTB), 2004.
  5. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 421  / GMS, BA 52.
  6. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 436  / GMS, BA 81.
  7. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA V, 30  / KpV, A 54 (§ 7 Basic Law of pure practical reason ).
  8. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 434  / GMS, BA 76.
  9. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 429  / GMS, BA 66.
  10. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 433  / GMS, BA 74-75.
  11. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 421  / GMS, BA 52.
  12. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 437  / GMS, BA 81–82.
  13. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 438  / GMS, BA 83.
  14. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 444  / GMS.
  15. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 400 .
  16. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 413 .
  17. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 412 .
  18. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 427 .
  19. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 413 .
  20. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals / Commentary by Christoph Horn, Corinna Mieth and Nico Scarano . Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27002-8 , p. 231 ff.
  21. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 430 .
  22. ↑ Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit . Theory work edition by Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel Vol. 3, p. 317.
  23. ↑ Hegel: Articles from the Critical Journal of Philosophy . Vol. 2, p. 463.
  24. ↑ Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit . Vol. 3, p. 317.
  25. ↑ Hegel: Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, § 139 Vol. 7, p. 261.
  26. ↑ See Arthur Schopenhauer, On the basis of morality, in: All works (Vol. III), Stuttgart and Frankfurt am Main (1968).
  27. ↑ Cf. Giorgos Sagriotis: “categorical imperative”, in HKWM : Bd. 7 / I, Sp. 487–495.
  28. ^ Marx: On the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right . Introduction. MEW Vol. 1, p. 385.
  29. ^ Marx / Engels: Manifesto of the Communist Party . MEW Vol. 4, p. 482.
  30. ^ Theodor W. Adorno: Negative Dialektik , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 356
  31. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Frankfurt M. 1983, p. 77.
  32. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Discourse Ethics - Notes on a Justification Program. In: Moral awareness and communicative action. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 53-125, 113.
  33. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, p. 77 (sentence structure in the first sentence changed)
  34. ↑ Hans Jonas: The principle of responsibility. An attempt at ethics for technological civilization, Frankfurt M. 1984, p. 36.
  35. ↑ Hans Jonas: The principle of responsibility. Attempt at ethics for technological civilization, Frankfurt M. 1984, p. 37.
  36. ↑ Marcus G. Singer, Generalization in Ethics, New York 1971.
  37. ↑ Günther Patzig, The Categorical Imperative in the Ethics Discussion of the Present . In: Günther Patzig, Ethik ohne Metaphysik, 2nd ed., Göttingen 1983, pp. 148–171.
  38. ^ Norbert Hoerster: Ethics and Interest . Reclam, Stuttgart 2003, p. 105 ff.