Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling

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Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling, painting by Joseph Karl Stieler , 1835
Signature Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling.JPG

Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling , from 1812 Knight von Schelling (born January 27, 1775 in Leonberg , Duchy of Württemberg ; † August 20, 1854 in Ragaz , Canton of St. Gallen ), was a German philosopher , anthropologist , theorist of so-called romantic medicine and a the main representative of German idealism . Schelling was the main founder of speculative natural philosophy , which shaped almost all areas of the natural sciences in Germany from around 1800 to 1830. His philosophy of the unconscious influenced the training of psychoanalysis. Schelling's philosophy forms the decisive link between the Kantian and Hegelian philosophy as well as between the idealistic and post-idealistic philosophy. In it speculation of reason and motives going beyond idealism merge.


Origin and school time

Inscription plaque at the Nürtingen Latin School with a quote from Eduard Mörike

Schelling came from a long-established Swabian pastor's family. The father Joseph Friedrich Schelling , first pastor and deacon in Leonberg, from 1777 teacher at the higher seminary of the monastery Bebenhausen , was a respected orientalist . The intellectual milieu in Schelling's parents' house was shaped by the Protestant mysticism and pietistic inwardness of the Swabian fathers Johann Albrecht Bengel and Friedrich Christoph Oetinger and should not remain without influence on Schelling's later philosophy.

Schelling first attended the Latin school in Nürtingen , then the Protestant monastery school in Bebenhausen . Schelling, who is considered to be mentally precocious, learned Greek and Latin as well as Hebrew, Arabic and newer languages ​​with the older students. Among other things, Schelling was influenced by his uncle and teacher Nathanael Köstlin .


With a special permit Schelling was in 1790 at the age of just sixteen years in the the Eberhard Karls University belonging Tubingen Protestant pin be included. There he studied Protestant theology - together with Friedrich Hölderlin and Georg WF Hegel . A spiritually very fruitful friendship developed between these students, which is why they were called the "Tübingen Three". The ideas of the three were mainly shaped by the spiritual world of the theological enlightenment and the enthusiasm of the French Revolution . Its revolutionary spirit is reflected in the so-called oldest system program of German idealism (1796/97), in which, in addition to thoughts on freedom and criticism of the state, the idea of ​​a new mythology is represented. In addition to studying Kant's philosophy , it was above all the work On the Doctrine of Spinoza in Letters to Mr. Moses Mendelssohn by Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi that had a great influence on the thinking of the three. It was through this text and the subsequent pantheism controversy that Spinoza's philosophy first became known in the German-speaking world, albeit as a scandal . Schelling's discussion of Kant can already be seen in his master's dissertation in 1792, a treatise on the origin of evil. The philosophy of Spinoza had a particularly strong influence on Schelling's early philosophy and identity . Schelling also repeatedly dealt with Jacobi's teachings up to 1812.

In his philosophical beginnings, Schelling was also strongly influenced by the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte , who was teaching in Jena at the time and who represented a subjective idealism based on Kant. The closeness to Fichte's thoughts is expressed in his early writing Vom I als Principle of Philosophy or About the Unconditional in Human Knowledge (1795) and intensified after their time together in Jena. In 1801/02, however, there was a break with the philosophical mentor Fichte, who is documented in their correspondence. After completing his theology studies in 1795, Schelling first went to Stuttgart as a private tutor.

From 1796 to 1798 Schelling studied mathematics, natural sciences and medicine at the University of Leipzig , thereby laying the foundations for his natural philosophy. During this time he visited his compatriot Schiller in Jena, made the acquaintance of Goethe there (1796) and published his first natural-philosophical work with the programmatic title Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature (1797).

In August 1798 Schelling traveled to Dresden to study the art collection there . It was here that the first contact with the group of early romantics around the brothers August Wilhelm and Friedrich Schlegel , Novalis , Friedrich Tieck and Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher .

Professorship in Jena

Portrait after an oil painting by Christian Friedrich Tieck , around 1800

In 1798, Schelling, who was only twenty-three years old, was appointed associate professor in Jena with the support of Goethe . He taught at the University of Jena alongside Fichte, who, however , lost his chair in 1799 because of the charge of atheism (see Fichte ). In 1799 Schelling published his first draft of a system of natural philosophy and the system of transcendental idealism (1800) was created, in which Schelling presented natural philosophy and transcendental philosophy as equal basic sciences. He also published a journal for speculative physics (1800/01) in which the presentation of my system of philosophy (1801) appeared - the fundamental work of his philosophy of identity, a philosophy of the absolute strongly influenced by Spinoza.

After Fichte's departure from Jena, an exchange of letters between Schelling and Fichte began, but from 1801 there was a philosophical alienation and the correspondence ended in 1802. The dispute relates to the concept of nature, the concept of intellectual perception and the relationship between transcendental and natural philosophy . Fichte, who as a subject only knows the self, criticizes Schelling's idea of ​​a subject nature, a natura naturans . For him there can also be no natural philosophy with equal rights as a basic science of philosophy alongside transcendental philosophy.

From 1802 Schelling worked with Hegel, both published the journal Kritisches Journal der Philosophie (1802–1803). In 1802 the Socratic Dialogue Bruno or on the Natural and Divine Principle of Things (1802) appeared. In the same year Schelling held his lectures on the method of academic study , which appeared in 1803, with the aim of placing the individual branches of research on a uniform philosophical basis.

Würzburg, Munich, Erlangen

Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling

In 1803 the Protestant Schelling (like his friend Paulus ) was appointed to the University of Würzburg , which was shaped by Catholicism, in the course of the reorganization required by the secularization . In the winter semester of 1803/04 he began his work as a professor of philosophy where the physiologist and natural philosopher Johann Joseph Dömling was his pioneer. In addition to the writing Philosophy and Religion (1804), the system of philosophy as a whole and natural philosophy in particular (Würzburg lectures), one of the main works of identity philosophy , was created there . As a result of various private and professional adversities, his time in Würzburg only lasted three years.

In the spring of 1806 Schelling went to Munich , where he entered the Bavarian civil service, became a member of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and stayed until 1820. During this time Schelling did not have any academic teaching activities. In Munich there was a collaboration with Franz Xaver von Baader and Johann Wilhelm Ritter . The exchange with Baader, the then best connoisseur of Jacob Boehme's theosophical philosophy , proved to be very fruitful for Schelling's philosophy of freedom and the age of the world, which was now following. In Munich, the so-called Freiheitsschrift, Philosophical Investigations into the Nature of Human Freedom and the Objects related to it, was written (1809). From February to July 1810 Schelling held lectures in Stuttgart in the house of Eberhard Friedrich Georgii in front of a small group of private listeners, the Stuttgart private lectures . From 1810 he worked for years on Philosophy of the Ages , which was to become a great philosophy and theology of history, but was never completed.

From 1820 to 1826, Schelling lectured as an honorary professor with no fixed teaching commitment in Erlangen . This is where the Initia philosophiae universae (Erlangen lectures) arose , in which Schelling outlined a philosophy of mythology for the first time and thus the distinction between negative and positive philosophy .

In 1827 he was appointed full professor at the newly established University of Munich , where he held lectures until 1841 (his second time in Munich). From 1827 to 1842 he was President of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences . He was also the first general curator of the newly reformed natural science collections of the academy (later the SNSB ). From 1826 he was in Munich with Georg Friedrich Creuzer , August Neander , Christian August Brandis and Victor Cousin . From 1835 to 1840 Schelling was the philosophy teacher of the Crown Prince and later King Maximilian II Joseph of Bavaria . The period of Schelling's late philosophy began in Munich.


Friedrich Schelling, daguerreotype by Hermann Biow , Berlin, 1848

In 1841 Schelling was appointed to Hegel's vacant chair in Berlin . There he mainly taught the philosophy of religion (published as Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation ). His appearance in the then capital of Hegelianism was Karl Jaspers as the "last great university event". On November 15 he gave his inaugural lecture there and read “Philosophy of Revelation” in the winter semester. In addition to high-ranking state officials, military and university professors, the audience included Michail Alexandrowitsch Bakunin , Søren Kierkegaard , Friedrich Engels , Jacob Burckhardt , Savigny, Steffens, Trendelenburg, Leopold von Ranke , Alexander von Humboldt and other influential intellectuals of the 19th century. For different reasons, the Right and Left Hegelians were equally excited about his lectures. But disappointment soon spread and interest in Schelling's lectures waned. For example, Kierkegaard, who was initially happy about Schelling's speech on “Reality”, wrote disappointed: “I'm too old to hear lectures, just as Schelling is too old to give them.”

The transcript of some lectures on the philosophy of revelation was published without Schelling's consent, combined with severe criticism by his enemy Heinrich Eberhard Gottlob Paulus . It is noteworthy that the Paulus Postscript is an edition of Schelling's philosophy of revelation that is still popular and often used today . Schelling then withdrew from teaching, but stayed and continued to work in Berlin, where he was awarded the order Pour le Mérite for science and the arts on May 31, 1842 .


Schelling spent the summer of 1854 on a cure in Bad Ragaz in Switzerland. He died there on August 20, 1854.

His tomb (1855) by Georg Friedrich Ziebland is also in Bad Ragaz . The inscription under a bas-relief that Schelling shows in the midst of his students reads: "The first thinker in Germany". Maximilian II of Bavaria “set this monument to his beloved teacher”.


Caroline Schelling (née Michaelis, used Böhmer, married Schlegel), painting by Tischbein

Friedrich had a younger brother named Karl Eberhard Schelling (1783-1854), who studied medicine, became a doctor and senior medical advisor in Stuttgart from 1806 and tried to transfer his brother's natural philosophical concepts to medicine and the theory of life.

After being called to Jena in 1798, Friedrich Schelling stayed at the house of August Wilhelm Schlegel and his wife Caroline. Caroline (1763–1809) was an unusual and emancipated woman who did not correspond in the least to the then extremely conservative image of women. She was the daughter of the orientalist Johann David Michaelis , the former teacher of Schelling's father. Caroline was a writer, was considered a muse of early romanticism and her house was also a meeting place for the early romantic movement. A great love developed between Schelling and Caroline, who was twelve years her senior, which led to Caroline divorcing August Wilhelm Schlegel in 1803 with the support of Goethe and marrying Schelling on June 26 of the same year in Murrhardt (Württemberg). Schelling's father celebrated the wedding.

For Schelling, Caroline was muse, wife, helper and conversation partner at the same time. When she died of typhus on September 7, 1809 , Schelling fell into deep mourning. On the right-hand side of the obelisk of her tomb he had the words: “ God gave it to me, death cannot steal it from me”. The mourning manifests itself philosophically in the dialogical writing Clara. Or on the connection between the world of nature and the world of spirits (1810), with which Schelling wrote his meditatio mortis and consolation of philosophy.

After Caroline's death, the daughter of her best friend, Pauline Gotter (1786–1854), began an exchange of letters with the lonely Schelling. This brought the two people closer together and on June 11, 1812 Schelling and Pauline Gotter married in Gotha . The marriage had six children: Paul Heinrich Joseph (1813–1889), who studied law and was later a professor in Erlangen, Karl Friedrich August (1815–1863), who studied theology, became a vicar and was the editor of his father's complete works , Clara (1818–1857), who married the historian Georg Waitz , Julie Friederike Wilhelmine (1821–1885), who married the Prussian government official Hermann v. Eichhorn d. Ä. married, and Ludwig Hermann (1824–1908), who later became Prussian Minister of State.

Pauline Schelling died in 1854 in the house at Siebleber Strasse 8 in Gotha.

Philosophical work

Schelling's work has a wide thematic range. It includes writings on epistemology, metaphysics, natural and art philosophy, legal and religious philosophy.

Suggestions for periodization

The periodization of Schelling's work is controversial. The classification of Walter Schulz and Horst Fuhrmans into four periods and that of Nicolai Hartmann into five periods have become classic. The following sections of the chapter, however, are based on the division into seven periods proposed by Christian Iber.

Schulz distinguishes (1) the early philosophy under the influence of Fichte, which he regards as a preparation for (2) the identity system, the following (3) theosophically shaped phase and (4) the system of late philosophy, which consists of the negative and the positive philosophy.

Schelling statue in Munich

Horst Fuhrmans divides Schelling's work as follows:

  • philosophy before 1800,
  • the philosophy of identity (1800–1806),
  • middle philosophy (1806-1827) as the most important phase and
  • the late philosophy (from 1827).

Nicolai Hartmann distinguishes five periods:

  • natural philosophy (until 1799),
  • transcendental idealism (around 1800),
  • the philosophy of identity (1801–1804),
  • the philosophy of freedom (around 1809) and
  • the philosophy of religion and mythology of the late Schelling (from around 1815 on).

Christian Iber distinguishes seven periods in his Schelling monograph, which argues in terms of development history:

  • Schelling's early writings (1794–1795 / 96),
  • the writings on natural and transcendental philosophy (1796–1799),
  • the system of transcendental idealism (1800),
  • Philosophy of Identity (1801–1809),
  • Philosophy of freedom and the age of the world (1809-1820),
  • Erlanger lecture (1821/22) and
  • Late philosophy (1822 ff).

The fundamental questions that accompanied Schelling over all these periods were, according to Iber, how the absolute, as something beyond reason, can be established by means of reason, and how a reasonable explication of the absolute can take place without this being surrendered again to the immanence of reason.

Early writings

The inevitable starting point of Schelling's early philosophy is the critical philosophy of Kant, especially the Critique of Pure Reason . Although this attempted to justify the methodical structure of philosophy (the "form of all philosophy"), it did not provide a principle through which the basic structure of consciousness of human knowledge (the "original form") and from this the connection with all "subordinate forms" , the categories, could be derived. Schelling's early philosophy tries to solve this problem in different approaches, which, according to Christian Iber, can be divided into a principle-theoretical, an ontological and a practical-aesthetic phase.

Reflection of principles

In his first philosophical treatise from 1794, On the Possibility of a Form of Philosophy in General ( Formschrift ), Schelling is concerned with a principle- theoretical ultimate foundation of philosophy, which should thereby become science. The ultimate justification is not an end in itself, but pursues the goal of establishing the “unity of knowledge, belief and will - the ultimate legacy of humanity” (SW I, 112) through the concept of the unconditional.

Like Fichte, Schelling assumes that science is only possible through a “principle” (SW I, 90) and that this sentence can be “only one” (SW I, 91). For Schelling, all knowledge can only be systematically developed using arguments based on a top principle. The highest principle is supposed to guarantee the unity and system character of reason and, as a condition of conditional sentences, the unity of science in general.

Schelling emphasizes that the highest principle of philosophy in itself must be “absolutely unconditional” (SW I, 91), since it must not be deducible from any higher proposition if an infinite regress is to be avoided. Through “mere development of the concept of a supreme principle” (SW I, 94) it follows that the supreme principle must be unconditional. It follows from the concept of the unconditionality of the principle that its content and its form must also be unconditional, which in turn only applies if they mutually justify one another.

The determination of the content of the highest principle results from the further analysis of the unconditional. An absolutely unconditional sentence must also have an unconditional content that is not determined by anything outside of it, but is "absolutely posited", "posits itself (through absolute causality)" (SW I, 96). That which posits itself is nothing other than the I. The highest principle is thus: “I am I” (SW I, 97), whose content, the I, and its (inner) form, the absolute causality of self-positing, mutually establish one another.

Ontologization of the transcendental philosophy

At the center of the 1795 publication Vom Ich als Princip der Philosophie or On the Unconditional in Human Knowledge ( Ichschrift ) from 1795 stands the idea of ​​the unconditioned, which Schelling tries to explain ontologically. He approaches this with the method of conceptual analysis by examining which conditions must be fulfilled in order to be able to speak meaningfully of an unconditional.

In his analysis of the unconditional, Schelling turns against the “dogmatism” associated with Spinoza as well as against the “ criticalism ” of Kant, Reinhold and Fichte. Contrary to the view of dogmatism, the unconditional cannot be thought of as an object without internal contradiction, since an object must necessarily be understood as conditioned (SW I, 166). The unconditional can therefore never become the object of discursive knowledge, but always lies ahead of any discourse of reason. Against criticism, Schelling states that the unconditioned, on the other hand, cannot be understood as a subject either, since a subject does not necessarily have to be thought of as conditioned, but always as conditional. The unconditioned can therefore only be understood as that which transcends every subject-object relation in general; Schelling also uses the term “absolute I” (SW I, 167) or simply “the absolute”.

For Schelling, the absolute I lies “beyond all sphere of objective provability” (SW I, 167). Its essence consists in the absolute causality of its self-positing, which is primarily being-positing. It is therefore expressed in “I am”, not in “I think”. The unconditional as the absolute ego precedes any discourse of reason.

As a direct relationship to itself, the absolute I has the form of absolute identity. In this way, for Schelling, finite things get their “constancy” and their “unchangeability” (SW I, 178). From the conceptual analysis of the unconditionality of the ego, the concept of absolute freedom emerges in a further step. This only applies to the absolute, that is, “I excluding everything not-I” (SW I, 179). The freedom of the absolute ego is opposed to the lack of freedom of the empirical ego.

The absolute I excludes all consciousness because it is itself a condition of all consciousness. It is therefore neither comprehensible nor demonstrable through terms. His being is an immediate, pure self-relationship and only reveals itself to an intellectual perception. On the one hand, this differs from sensory perception because of its non-spatio-temporal structure and, on the other hand, it differs from the concept, which only indirectly relates to what it understands (SW I, 181).

Practical and aesthetic approach

In the letters, Schelling starts from the insight that the derivation of the system of philosophy from the absolute, attempted in the first- person script , ends in a paradox: the absolute cannot be thematized philosophically without being made an object at the same time and thus as an absolute principle get lost. Schelling draws the conclusion that the absolute cannot be theoretically grasped, but can only be reached at the end of a practical process. This practice can only be adequately performed in art. Since philosophy can only interpret the finite world in terms of an absolute, the finite world can only be adequately understood at the end of an aesthetic practice.

The main subject of the letters is the controversy between the two philosophical systems of dogmatism and criticalism, with their representatives Spinoza or Holderlin and Kant or orthodox Kantianism. For Schelling, there is agreement between these philosophical positions about the definition of the absolute, since in the realm of the absolute “no other than merely analytical propositions” apply and therefore “no dispute is possible about the absolute itself” (SW I, 308). The controversy only breaks out with the transition from the absolute to the finite world. The decisive question is “how the absolute can emerge from itself and a world can oppose itself” (SW I, 310).

Every answer of theoretical philosophy to derive the finite from the infinite is circular, because it always presupposes "the existence of a world of experience itself" (SW I, 310). With the question of the derivation of the finite from the absolute, the separation of subject and object is always given, for which the absolute lies beyond reach. Because knowledge is tied to the distinction between subject and object, it cannot go back behind them into an “unimaginable unity”. In order to be able to answer the question about the existence of the world, we would have to have left the field of experience, which would, however, “remove the question itself” (SW I, 310). Consequently, this question, which Schelling also describes as “the problem of all philosophy”, necessarily “leads to a requirement that can only be met outside of all experience” (SW I, 311), that is, it cannot be met by any theoretical knowledge but only through aesthetic practice is.

The decisive aesthetic terms in the letters are the sublime and the beautiful. The sublime is represented by the subject's ability to “fight against the immeasurable” (SW I, 284), while the beautiful shows itself through the downfall, the “silent surrender of myself to the absolute object” (SW I, 284). Both elements combine to form an excellent unity, especially in tragedy, where the objective power of absolute causality and the freedom of the subject are conveyed together in a vivid way.

Writings on natural and transcendental philosophy

The second phase of Schelling's philosophy begins with the treatises ( treatises explaining the idealism of the theory of science ) 1796/97 and ends with the text On the true concept of natural philosophy and the correct way to solve its problems (1801). In essence, Schelling is concerned with a new philosophical approach to his philosophy of the absolute.

The starting point is the self-conscious I, which Schelling understands as a transcendental presupposition of the absolute, but is no longer equated with the absolute, as was still the case in the early writings. For Schelling, the absolute as such is “spirit”. Like self-consciousness, it has a subject-object structure that can be recognized in the act of intellectual contemplation. The mind establishes its own development process through the process of its unconscious self-perception, in which it becomes conscious of itself and thus finite. In the course of its developmental history, the spirit is objectified in nature and in the act of abstraction from the nature it produces, it attains pure self-awareness.

For Schelling, self-confidence and the absolute stand in a circular relationship to one another. On the one hand, self-confidence presupposes the absolute in natural history: it is the result of its genesis. On the other hand, the absolute as spirit has its transcendental presupposition in self-consciousness. Corresponding to both sides of the circle, Schelling develops two basic philosophical types in this phase: the epistemic foundation of the absolute in self-consciousness establishes the transcendental philosophy , the genetic derivation of which leads to the natural philosophy .

Transcendental philosophy

In the essays Schelling assumes that the original experience of self-consciousness does not lie in the separation, but in the correspondence between subject and object (SW I, 365). For Schelling - as it was for Jacobi - the world and the ego consciousness are equally original. While for Jacobi this agreement is pre-reflective and therefore incomprehensible and only accessible to faith, for Schelling it comes to the fore in the self-consciousness of self-consciousness that rises above the immediate world of appearances (cf. SW I, 365 f).

Starting from the self-consciousness of subjectivity as the conscious ego, in a second step Schelling opens up the structure of an original self-perception as subject-object identity, which as an absolute precedes all consciousness, and which Schelling in contrast to the ego, which is necessarily confronted by a non-ego , Called "Spirit" (cf. SW I, 366f.). With the concept of the spirit, Schelling ties in with the absolute of the early writings, whereby this is no longer understood as the identical being that excludes all relationships from itself. Rather, it has a subject-object structure just like self-consciousness and only comes about as a relationship to itself, so it has a reflexive structure. According to Schelling, the absolute must not be understood as being at rest, but rather as "acting" (SW I, 367) or "eternal becoming" (SW I, 367).

Schelling derives the principle of spirit epistemically from the principle of the self-conscious ego, but he regards it as something preconscious. The mind is originally non-objective; but it is subject to the law of self-objectification. He “only becomes an object through himself, through his own actions” (SW I, 367). In the objectification of the way the mind acts, objects and ideas of these objects arise. The self-objectification of the mind unfolds in an infinite series of actions that Schelling understands as the “history of self-consciousness” (SW I, 382), the beginning of which is nature and the end of which is pure self-consciousness.

The self-consciousness of subjectivity, also called "pure self-consciousness" (SW I, 382) by Schelling, is not identical with the spirit; rather, this precedes that as original self-confidence. The spirit strives towards it in the course of its natural genesis, in order to finally reach it in the act of abstraction from nature and in it to come to consciousness of itself.

Natural philosophy

While natural philosophy was still conceived as an applied theoretical philosophy in the early writings and therefore represented an integrative part of transcendental philosophy, Schelling now makes a strict distinction between transcendental and natural philosophy. The natural philosophy is established as an independent science and contrasted with the transcendental philosophy.

In order to give natural philosophy its own epistemic foundation, Schelling, in his work On the true concept of natural philosophy (1801), forms the concept of an “intellectual perception of nature” (IV, 97), which is supposed to arise from the fact that the “viewer in the Intuition is abstracted ”(IV, 87f).

System of transcendental idealism

In his transcendental system ( system of transcendental idealism ) from 1800, Schelling shifts the emphasis of his philosophy from self-consciousness to the absolute, which he understands as absolute identity. In it he tries to overcome the aporia of his second philosophical phase, which on the one hand understood the absolute as the unconditional, from which ontologically the first thing to proceed, but derived it epistemically from the self-consciousness of the human subject.

Schelling now considers it to be the "main task of philosophy" (SW III, 342) to clarify how subject and object can match at all. For him, the traditional correspondence theory of truth is unable to provide this clarification, since it assumes a separation of subject and object. The fundamental identity of both is, however, a fact for Schelling, since subject and object cannot exist without the other. Their unity is shown in the fact that the subjective and the objective produce each other.

With this inevitable unity of subject and object, Schelling wants to distinguish himself from realistic dogmatism as well as from subjectivistic idealism. While realistic dogmatism lays the foundation of knowledge in a transcendent thing in itself, subjectivist idealism completely shifts the subject-object unity into the subject. Schelling, on the other hand, insists on the one hand that the limitation of the ego arises through the act of self-consciousness itself, but "the act by which the ego is objectively limited is an act different from that by which it is limited for itself" (SW III, 408).

Subjective and objective self-confidence

For Schelling, subjective self-confidence is characterized by its immediacy and inevitability. Due to its immediacy, it can be described as “looking”, which, however, cannot be a sensual but only “ intellectual intuition ” (SW III, 369) because it cannot be evaded . It has a non-sensual and at the same time a productive and receptive character (cf. SW III, 350f).

The task of philosophy is to make the subjective intellectual intuition "appear", to make it objectively, that is, intersubjectively communicable, whereby, according to Schelling, the entire system of knowledge can ultimately be justified. Schelling calls this the path from the subjective to the objective intuition, which is interpreted as an absolute, which is no longer characterized by a subject-object opposition, but by pure identity.

History of absolute self-confidence

Reason of its history and the abandonment of philosophy

In the Transcendental System of 1800, Schelling traces nature and history back to the "inner principle of spiritual activity" (III, 378) of absolute self-consciousness. Since the objective is to emerge from it, it must carry the law of objectification within itself (cf. SW III, 374), although it is itself something non-objective. In order to become aware of oneself as something real, the infinite (“real”, SW III, 386) activity of self-consciousness must oppose another restrictive activity. This limits the infinite activity, whereby the self-confidence is pushed back on itself. Schelling also calls this second activity the "ideal" (SW III, 386) because it helps self-confidence to become conscious. The infinite (“real”) activity is unconscious, it becomes conscious only through the ideal, limiting activity.

The task of philosophy is to prove the limitation of the actually found ego as a self-limitation from the infinite activity. Schelling calls the successive self-appropriation of limitation "epochs" on the way to the self-objectification of the mind. The aim of philosophy is to make people aware of the unity of the two opposing activities. The development proceeds from an unconscious unity of objective-real and subjective-ideal activity to a conscious one. Philosophy is supposed to help the initially anonymous absolute self-confidence to an increasingly thorough self-knowledge. This idea of ​​a history of self-consciousness was later taken up again by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).

Epochs of its history

The first epoch of self-awareness is represented by the two levels - Schelling also calls them potencies - sensation and matter . In the immediate, purely receptive sensation, there is an immediate unity of subject and object in which self-consciousness does not yet know that it is sentient. The “perception” of the sensation through the ego leads to the second stage. The ego distinguishes two moments in his perception: the "thing in itself" (SW III, 417), which triggers the sensation and is described by Schelling as a limiting ideal activity, and the "me in itself" (SW III, 423), Schelling also called limited or real activity. The two moments separated in perception are synthesized through the second power perception to a product that "floats" in the middle between the I in itself and the thing in itself. This visual product is “matter” as a synthesis of real and ideal activity (cf. III, 440ff).

As a second epoch, Schelling developed the forms of sensual perception, space and time, and the categories of causality, interaction and organism, based on the deduction of the Kantian cognitive structures in Fichte's theory of science . As the third epoch, he derives the development from intellectual reflection to will. The basic idea of ​​the third epoch is that the ego can only become aware of itself as producing when it breaks away from the entire sphere of production of nature in order to reach self-awareness in the sphere of reflection.

Identity philosophy

The basic writings of Schelling's philosophy of identity include the presentation of my system of philosophy (1801), Bruno or on the divine and natural principle of things (1802), philosophy and religion (1804), as well as the system of all philosophy and published from the estate der Naturphilosophie (1804), which is considered to be the most mature representation of the philosophy of identity. The time of identity philosophy is often regarded as the climax of Schelling's philosophical development. It is influenced by the philosophy of Hegel and signifies the final break with Fichte's philosophy of self-confidence.

The identity system is divided into three parts: The general fundamental part of a metaphysics of the absolute is followed by the development of inorganic nature and the organic in natural philosophy and the development of self-consciousness in transcendental philosophy. Central is the philosophy of the absolute, which is understood as the absolute identity of subjectivity and objectivity and is recognized in intellectual intuition, understood as "absolute knowledge". The representation of the absolute no longer takes place through art, but through speculative thinking. The intellectual intuition of self-consciousness is being replaced by the intellectual intuition of the absolute; the absolute is no longer what coincides with abstraction from subjectivity, but rather its basis.

Philosophy of freedom and world age

The starting point of the philosophy of freedom and world age is the open problem of the philosophy of identity, how the world is to be derived from the absolute. First, in his Freiheitsschrift ( Philosophical Investigations on the Essence of Human Freedom , 1809) , Schelling takes up the question of human freedom and the problem of the compatibility of evil with the divine system of reason. In the philosophy of the world ages , which emerged in several fragmentary drafts from 1811, new reflections on the nature and definition of the task of metaphysics were added, in which reason as the principle of philosophy loses its validity. Schelling increasingly sees reason as an irrational, inconsistent and delusional reason. The concept of ecstasy now comes to the fore , which in the Erlangen lecture (1821) finally completely replaces the concept of reason.

Erlangen lecture

The starting point of the Erlangen lecture (1821) is the question of the recognizability of the absolute. For Schelling, the various philosophical system conceptions of the modern age are shaped by contradicting paradigms (realism / materialism, subject / object). The reason for their contradiction lies in the contradicting structure of human knowledge. The conflict of philosophical systems cannot be resolved with the means of reason. The task of philosophy is therefore to find a principle of philosophy that goes beyond the dialectic and that enables a “coexistence” of the different forms of knowledge. This principle of philosophy can initially only be defined negatively as that which eludes all determination, which Schelling calls the “absolute subject” or simply “the absolute”. The absolute is neither God nor not God, neither a being nor a non-being. In positive terms, the absolute subject is absolute freedom. It is insubstantial and has no stipulations. Schelling expresses this indeterminacy with the phrase that the absolute is nothing and “nothing is not either, i. H. it's all".

Late Philosophy

Schelling's late philosophy is determined by the ultimate justification of philosophy. Schelling wants to identify an ultimate reason for thinking, which should provide the ultimate justification for reason. This last reason is defined as the God of Christianity who founds a "philosophical religion" which is the last goal of the history of philosophy. This double definition in the ultimate founding program of late philosophy is expressed in Schelling's distinction between negative and positive philosophy. Negative philosophy deals with the question of what reflection thinking must make in order to reach its justification authority. The positive philosophy assumes that this justification authority is God and examines the question of how God must be thought in order to be an “unthinkable” principle.

For Schelling, the ultimate justification of reason does not mean a reflexive self-justification, but to refer the foundation of thinking to a final instance that is precisely not thinking, namely God. Schelling's late philosophy can therefore be understood as a critique of the self-justification of autonomous reason, which ultimately aims at the "abolition of idealism", which actually begins with the change from an idealistic to a realistic philosophy in the middle of the 19th century.

Themes of Schelling's philosophy

The nature

Schelling dealt with questions of natural philosophy throughout his life. He developed a large number of natural-philosophical designs, all of which remained fragmentary. Schelling's natural philosophical work was always in tension with his transcendental philosophical approaches. In the beginning, the transcendental philosophical approach was in the foreground, but natural philosophy became increasingly important in the later phases of Schelling's work.

In opposition to the classical Newtonian mechanics that predominated in his time, Schelling describes nature with the metaphor of an organism. In connection with this, the traditional metaphysics of substance is replaced by a dynamic theory of nature, which he presents as being animated and changing itself. The basis of their constant movement is the productivity of nature, thought to be infinite. According to Schelling, it solidifies and finishes in its finite products. These only always represent a provisional and unstable state of equilibrium of the different natural forces, which can be canceled at any time and be incorporated into new designs.

For Schelling, the process of nature consists in a higher development from simple, uncomplicated to ever more complicated and complex forms. Schelling's basic development scheme is that of the triad, which he describes in different terms (matter, life (organicity), spirit (consciousness); mechanism, chemistry and organicity, etc.).

Schelling describes nature with the SpinozaCausa sui ” metaphor. It is the reason and consequence of itself, production as well as product, subject as well as object. The development of nature is ultimately the process of God's becoming self, which progresses from the imperfect, unconscious nature, to the more perfect, the self-conscious spirit.

The myth

Schelling got to know the problem of myth through his theological exegesis work. He first addressed it in his dissertation De malorum origine (1792) and the subsequent essay on myths, historical sagas and philosophems of the oldest world (1793).

For the young Schelling, the form of the myth is a form of consciousness. Imagination and sensuality are predominant in her. The lack of the myth lies in its lack of distance. He not only reports on the deeds of the past, but also visualises them in a spontaneous and sensual form. Schelling distinguishes between two types of myths: historical and philosophical (philosopheme). The purpose of historical myths is history, of philosophical myths the "presentation of a truth". Schelling emphasizes, however, that the two forms are difficult to separate: In historical myths, the deeds of the past are passed on with the intention of ethical instruction, while in the philosophers the truth is presented in historical or historical-like representation.

The late Schelling developed his conception of the myth further in his Munich and Berlin lectures. In it he works out a polytheistic belief in gods as a characteristic of the myth , which he divides into two forms: In relative polytheism “a larger or smaller number of gods [...] is subordinated to one and the same god as their highest and ruling one”. In the " successive " and actual polytheism be "adopted several gods [...], each of which is supreme and dominant in a certain time, and therefore can follow each other only." As an example, Schelling leads the gods Uranus , Cronus and Zeus in the Greek mythology, which are mutually exclusive and therefore follow one another in time.

Philosophy as a science of reason

In the first period he ties in with Fichte. Here Schelling appears, like Fichte, dominated by the endeavor to present philosophy as a science of reason . In the second period, in which, according to his own words, he returned to Kant, Schelling, on the other hand, sees philosophy as a “ positive science that transcends the mere knowledge of reason ”. Both periods have in common the endeavor to systematically derive the whole of science from a single principle , with the difference, however, that in the first period (philosophy = science of reason) this principle as being within reason itself (immanent, rational), its consequences necessary and are therefore achievable by mere reason, whereas in the second period (philosophy = positive science) it is viewed as being beyond and above reason (transcendent, supra-rational, "unthinkable"), the consequences of which are "free" (ie dependent on willing or not willing , take place just as well as can be absent) and are therefore only recognizable through “experience” (history and revelation).

The creative self

In Schelling's system of philosophy (in the first period) the creative ego is made the supreme principle, following Johann Gottlieb Fichte's original theory of science . After eliminating the Kantian thing in itself in Fichte's draft, the ego is the only real, through whose internally ambiguous, restlessly setting and canceling activity, the totality of knowledge comes about as the only real, hence its system is idealism. However, while Fichte understands the I as the individual basis of personal human consciousness, Schelling understands it as general or absolute, with an unconscious creative production (in the natural form) - real nature - and a (in the spiritual form) consciously creative production - the ideal spirit world. Both (the ideal and the real) are, however, as “sides” of the same (absolute) I in their roots identical. The deduction of the entire being of nature ( natura naturata ) from the absolute as (unconsciously) creating real principle ( natura naturans ) is the subject of natural philosophy (1797/99), through which Schelling wants to "have opened a new page in the history of philosophy". The universal perspective should also be mentioned here. B. reflected in the reception of Brownianism .

Incarnation as the development of nature to spirit

The deduction of the entire spiritual content of consciousness, as it is contained in the three successive areas of art, religion and philosophy (= science), from the absolute as (after the awakening of consciousness) the creative ideal principle makes the philosophy of the spirit or the system of the transcendental Idealism (1800), through which Schelling expands and shifts Fichte's weighting in the relation spirit-nature to nature as the cause. The conception of the essential identity of the real and ideal sphere as merely two different views of one and the same Absolute, fertilized by the study of Spinoza and Bruno, forms the content of the so-called. Identity philosophy . Schelling first developed this teaching in the magazine for speculative physics (1801), then - mixed with the Platonic theory of ideas - in the conversation with Bruno and in the lectures on the method of academic study (1802).

In order to explain the identity of subject and object, he - similar to Spinoza - completely classifies the spirit in nature and understands it as becoming self-conscious of nature: accordingly, nature is "unconscious" (= in natural form) creative spirit, the activities of the living elemental force of nature are therefore "unconscious" spiritual activities. Just as knowledge is not dead, nature is not a rigid being, but uninterrupted life. Each individual intellectual and natural product is created through the ever-active rhythmic play of opposing forces - on the one hand unrestricted setting (positive, material-giving) and on the other hand continuously restricting (negative, form-giving) - forces that are constantly developing to new levels. The most primordial forces of nature are the infinite expansion and the continually effective contraction, from whose mutual tension matter (as the first product of the principle of nature) arises. The first-named force is named by Schelling due to its space-penetrating property as light (in the figurative sense and not synonymous with optical light) and represents the positive, material-giving factor of matter. The second, the negative, form-giving factor, he calls weight because of its condensing property (again in a broader sense than earthly gravity). Both forces are compared with the analogous consciousness activities of (empty) looking and (specific) feeling, from whose mutual tension the first intellectual product, the perception, arises. Just as all higher products of the life of consciousness (concept, judgment, conclusion) emerge from perception through continued mental activity - as potentiations, so this happens accordingly with the potentiations of matter from the real life of the universal or absolute I (world-I): Through Continued natural activity develops all higher natural products (inorganic natural process, organic natural life, consciousness). The conclusion and conclusion of this process is the consciousness that awakens on the highest level of nature (in humans), in which the natural spirit (the world soul), which was previously unconscious but purposefully active (as in somnambulist slumber), turns itself, the only real, into its object Looking at (the ideal) makes. With this, however, a new mental process begins on the part of the absolute (as a human being in the universe), which is analogous to the natural process: while in the first, the absolute rises from level to level to the most perfect natural product (to humans), in the second, the in the Human beings embodied, that is to say, (refined) absolutes who have become part of nature themselves to become conscious of themselves as the absolute (their own infinity and freedom). Based on the natural spirit and the world soul, Schelling represents a panpsychistic worldview.


God as the end of the process in negative philosophy

Just as the course of the first process depicts the history of nature, the incarnation, so that of the second process depicts world history, the becoming God, at the end of which, as Schelling (1802) puts it, “God will be”. The phases of this development (analogous to the stages of the natural process: inorganic, organic, human stage) run in such a way that the absolute is initially (objectively) viewed in the form of visible nature (real; visible gods; paganism), then (subjectively) in the Form of the invisible spirit (ideal; invisible God; Christianity) is felt, finally as one with the knower (as subject-object) is known. This is intended to characterize the three forms of revelation of the absolute - art, religion and philosophy - and the three main periods of world history - ancient, medieval and modern times (which begins with Schelling's philosophy). This decidedly pantheistic form of his philosophy was just as decidedly denied by Schelling in the second period. While it was originally supposed to make up his entire philosophy, he now reduces it - not without violence - to an integrating but subordinate member of the overall organism of science: Since one thinks of God, who, according to early Schelling's saying, will only be "at the end." ", Although it can think as the end and result of our thinking, but not as the result of an objective process, it follows that the previous rational philosophy (including his) is in a misunderstanding about itself, in that it takes all that it has proven ( Becoming God) process is presented as a real one, while it is only an ideal one (taking place in mere thought). The result of the purely rational philosophy, which he now describes as negative, is therefore not a real, but a mere thought thing (not the real God, but only the God thought); the real world as it is, the understanding of which is the task of philosophy, cannot be grasped from a mere thought, but only from an objective principle (from the real God, not from the idea of ​​God). Schelling thus returns to the principle expressed by Kant in his critique of the ontological proof of the existence of God that existence cannot be “stolen” from pure thought.

Schelling memorial stone in Leonberg

God as the beginning of the process in positive philosophy

While the negative philosophy only deduces God as a principle “at the end”, the positive philosophy, for which the first only provides the means, places this beginning “as a principle”: God is the absolute prius , whose existence can neither be proven nor proven and which has no necessity, that is, nothing can be compelled to produce a world. The world is therefore to be understood (on the part of God) only as a result of a free act and as such (on the part of philosophy) only as an object of not rational, but empirical knowledge. Schelling sees the task of positive philosophy as being "in a free way of thinking in a documented sequence, to show what occurs in experience not as possible, like negative philosophy, but as real". The “documents” of Revelation - as that given by experience from God, the Prius of all experience - are given to it as a guideline for its deductions. Since none of all the facts of epistemic history, given by experience, seem to contradict the existence of a divine Creator of the actual world more than the existence of evil and evil in the world, it is understandable that the change in Schelling's philosophy begins with his studies on the nature of human freedom, published in 1809, which he claims to have been prompted by the writings of the Christian mystic and theosophist Jakob Böhme , which exerted a significant influence on him. In his investigations, which can be read as an attempt at a theodicy , Schelling tries to answer the question of the origin of evil and God's justification in the face of evil in the world: neither God nor a second being besides God comes into consideration as the cause of evil . Rather, the evil goes back to an act of man, the fall into sin . Before Schelling explains the doctrine of the fall of man, which he developed based on Kant's doctrine of radical evil, he explains how man can be given the ability to do evil: Man is independent of God because he becomes in what is in God is not God himself, d. H. in nature in God or in the ground. In man this will works as self-will, which is subordinate to the actual will of God, the will of love. Because man is not sufficient for his task to mediate creation with God, and in a perversion this order of will is reversed, evil becomes possible. The return of our world, characterized by illness and death, to its original unity with God begins in human consciousness first as an extra-divine theogonic process that generates ideas of gods in the mythologies of paganism, in Schelling's presentation of the philosophy of mythology. After overcoming the mythological process through the revelation, which arises from God's freest deed and which has come to mankind in Christianity, as the mediated restoration of man and all creation in God, the purpose of creation is achieved. In Schelling's philosophy of revelation, this forms the conclusion and crowning of the whole system in the creation of a philosophical, ie free and true, spiritual religion that differs from the so-called natural religion.


Among others, were by Schelling Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , Franz von Baader , Ernst von Lasaulx , Ludwig Schöberlein , Karoline von Günderrode , Ignaz Paul Vitalis Troxler , Henrich Steffens , Joseph Görres , Hanno Bernheim (1824–1862), Lorenz Oken , Johann Baptist von Spix , Karl Joseph Hieronymus Windischmann , Gotthilf Heinrich von Schubert , Søren Kierkegaard , Karl Wilhelm Ferdinand Solger , Victor Cousin , Nishida Kitaro and above all Martin Heidegger .

In England he also worked on the poet and literary critic Samuel Taylor Coleridge and the poet, literary and art critic Sir Herbert Read a . a.

Jürgen Habermas and Paul Tillich dealt with Schelling's philosophy in their dissertations. Tillich is mainly influenced by Schelling's late philosophy.

Schelling influenced Gotthard Günther (1900–1984), who developed a multi-valued "polycontextural logic" with a complex system network in order to model self-referential life processes. In his philosophy (Schelling's natural philosophy he addressed in his last lecture in Hamburg) he examines a. a. - based on cybernetics - the feedback processes between subject and object: "At this point it should be emphasized that it is actually not correct to speak of two causal chains - one originated in the inanimate object and the other in the living - and that is why, because all living systems originally emerged from the very environment from which they then shielded themselves. In fact, there is only one causal chain, springing out of and spreading through the environment and reflected back into that environment through the medium of the living system. "

Among the representatives of the so-called positive disciplines outside of natural science, the physicians Röschlaub , Adalbert Friedrich Marcus , Friedrich Joseph Haass , Carl August von Eschenmayer , among the lawyers, the legal philosopher Friedrich Julius Stahl and the Romance scholar Georg Friedrich Puchta received suggestions from him. The natural philosopher and anthropologist Schelling is considered to be the “pioneer of so-called romantic medicine ”. The first great economic theorist in Germany Friedrich List was influenced by him. His economic theory of productive forces, which differed from Adam Smith's theory of value, was inspired in particular by Schelling's natural philosophy.

Focus of Schelling research

After Schelling's death, his work went largely unnoticed for decades, but Heidegger's Schelling lectures resulted in a renaissance of Schelling research that continues to this day. The focus of current Schelling research is on the question of the unity of Schelling's philosophy, the position of his philosophy in German idealism, Schelling's natural philosophy and his definition of the “absolute”. Due to the changing source situation and the increased attention that Schelling's philosophy has received in Anglo-Saxon philosophical research since the 1990s, the discussion is still ongoing.

Unity of philosophical work

The question of the unity of Schelling's multifaceted work already preoccupied his contemporaries. While it was mostly affirmed during Schelling's lifetime, from the second half of the 19th century (e.g. Kuno Fischer and Wilhelm Windelband ) new approaches, crises and breaks in Schelling's work were assumed. The main reasons were Schelling's biographical blows of fate and his ability to be influenced by other philosophers.

It was not until the middle of the last century that some Schelling researchers (e.g. Walter Schulz ) turned their attention to the continuity in Schelling's philosophy, although the thesis of a break in Schelling's thinking (e.g. in Horst Fuhrmans ) and above all the division into an early and a late philosophy remained predominant.

In more recent Schelling research, the answer to the question of the unity of Schelling's philosophy falls in favor of the continuity thesis, which was promoted primarily by the work of Barbara Loer and WE Ehrhardt. In the mid-1970s, Barbara Loer attempted to interpret Schelling's philosophy as a whole as a “structural theory of the absolute”. WE Ehrhardt suggested the interpretation that Schelling's entire philosophical development is based on the central topos of freedom.

Position within German idealism

For a long time, the assessment of Schelling's position within German idealism was determined by Richard Kroner's interpretation . Schelling saw this only as an intermediate step in the development of German idealism from Kant to Hegel. He considered Schelling's late works to be non-idealistic and did not attach any importance to them.

In current Schelling research, both of Kroner's theses are no longer shared. Thus Schelling's natural philosophy and his concept of the absolute are currently receiving a great deal of interest. Above all, however, Schelling's later writings have met with particular interest since the middle of the 20th century and are classified as important for the further development of German idealism. Walter Schulz already regards Schelling's late philosophy as "completion", Michael Theunissen as "abolition", and Thomas Buchheim as "self-humiliation" of German idealism. Wolfgang Janke sees Schelling's late philosophy on an equal footing with Hegel's philosophy and Fichte's “unwritten teaching”. For Horst Fuhrmans, however, Schelling's late philosophy means a “factual” and at the same time “necessary break”, for Gotthard Günther the point in the development of German idealism “at which it begins to overcome itself from within”.

Natural philosophy

While the young Schelling's writings on natural philosophy were still largely unknown in the mid-1980s, an intensive occupation with Schelling's natural philosophy has taken place ever since. On the one hand it is used for a responsible understanding of nature, on the other hand it is brought into direct connection with current scientific theories. But their socio-critical potential has also recently been rediscovered.

In 1986, Marie-Luise Heuser-Keßler made a connection between Schelling's natural philosophy and the modern physics of self-organization. It showed that Schelling's natural philosophy was hardly received until the 1980s because it was rejected against the background of the outdated mechanistic conception of nature, but that it can be reread against the background of self-organization theories. It turned out that Schelling was striving for a physics of self-organization that makes an important heuristic contribution to the more recent theories of self-organization. Hans-Dieter Mutschler discovered in Schelling's natural philosophy a “corrective to our one-sided, rational and functional relationship to nature”. Rainer E. Zimmermann interpreted Schelling's natural philosophy as anticipating today's theoretical approaches in philosophical cosmology.

The absolute

Schelling's attempts to adequately define the absolute, as can be found above all in his philosophy of identity and in his later writings, are a central subject of recent Schelling research. An important point of contention is the question of the extent to which Schelling's determinations of the absolute can and must be stripped of their theologizing language.

Birgit Sandkaulen-Bock reconstructs Schelling's concept of the absolute as the beginning of his philosophical system. Wolfram Hogrebe interprets Schelling's age of the world as "fundamental heuristics", which could not only serve as an example of metaphysics under the auspices of language analysis, but also harbor critical potential in relation to the current "semantic idealism". Markus Gabriel focuses on Schelling's "Philosophy of Mythology", which has so far been neglected in research. Schelling understands the absolute as the “other of reason”, which at the same time represents the beginning of its development.

See also

Fonts (selection)

  • On the possibility of any form of philosophy in general (1794)
  • On the I as a principle of philosophy or on the unconditional in human knowledge (1795; full text online [PDF, 440 kB])
  • Treatise explaining the idealism of science (1796)
  • Ideas for a philosophy of nature (1797)
  • From the world soul (1798)
  • System of transcendental idealism (1800)
  • On the true concept of natural philosophy and the right way to solve its problems (1801)
  • Philosophy of Art (Lecture; 1802–1803)
  • Lectures on the method of academic study. (Tübingen 1803, digitized version and full text in the German text archive ; reprint: Meiner, Hamburg 1974)
  • System of the entire philosophy and natural philosophy in particular (Würzburg lectures; 1804, estate)
  • Philosophical investigations into the nature of human freedom (1809, full text online )
  • Clara - About the connection between nature and the spirit world. A conversation (fragment from the handwritten estate, probably between 1809 and 1812)
  • World Age (1811; later versions of this document exist)
  • Presentation of philosophical empiricism (1830, only known from the estate)
  • Philosophy of Revelation (Lecture; 1841–1842)
  • Philosophy of Mythology (Lecture; 1842)
  • Philosophy of Art (1859, digitized version and full text in the German Text Archive )


  • Journal for speculative physics (1800-1801), therein: Presentation of my system of philosophy (1801)
  • Critical Journal of Philosophy (1802–1803; with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel ), in it: Bruno or on the natural and divine principle of things (1802)

Issues (in selection)

  • Luigi Pareyson : Schellingiana rariora. Turin 1977 (= Philosophica varia inedita vel rariora. Volume 4).
  • The ages. Fragments . In the original versions from 1811 and 1813 edited by Manfred Schröter. CH Beck'sche Verlagshandlung, Munich 1966. Fourth, unchanged edition 1993. ISBN 3-406-02205-7 .
  • Historical-critical edition . 40 volumes (I: Works; II: Estate; III: Letters). Edited on behalf of the Schelling Commission of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences v. Thomas Buchheim, Christian Danz, Jochem Hennigfeld, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, Jörg Jantzen u. Siegbert Peetz. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1976 ff. ISBN 978-3-7728-0542-4 .
  • Philosophy of revelation. 1841/42 Ed. Manfred Frank. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977 (Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 181). ISBN 3-518-27781-2 .
  • Lectures on the method (type of teaching) of academic study. Edited by Walter E. Erhardt. Meiner, Hamburg 1990. ISBN 3-7873-0972-1 .
  • Das Tagebuch 1848. Philosophy of Mythology and Democratic Revolution Ed. Hans Jörg Sandkühler. Meiner, Hamburg 1990. ISBN 3-7873-0722-2 .
  • Philosophical drafts and diaries . Meiner, Hamburg 1994– […].
    • Volume 1: 1809-1813. Philosophy of freedom and the ages. Edited by Lothar Knatz, Hans Jörg Sandkühler and Martin Schraven. 1994. ISBN 3-7873-1162-9 .
    • Volume 2: 1814-1816. The World Ages II - About the deities of Samothrace. Edited by Lothar Knatz, Hans Jörg Sandkühler and Martin Schraven. 2002. ISBN 3-7873-1172-6 .
    • Volume 12: 1846. Philosophy of Mythology and Purely Rational Philosophy . Edited by Lothar Knatz, Hans Jörg Sandkühler and Martin Schraven. 1998. ISBN 3-7873-1171-8 .
    • Volume 14: 1849. Defeat of the revolution and elaboration of the purely rational philosophy . Edited by Martin Schraven. 2007. ISBN 3-7873-1827-5 .
  • System of transcendental idealism. Edited by Horst D. Brandt u. Peter Müller. Meiner, Hamburg 2000. ISBN 3-7873-1465-2 .
  • Philosophical investigations into the nature of human freedom and the objects connected with it. Edited by Thomas Buchheim. Meiner, Hamburg 2001. ISBN 3-7873-1590-X .
  • Journal of Speculative Physics. Edited by Manfred Durner, two volumes. Meiner, Hamburg 2002. ISBN 3-7873-1694-9 .
  • Bruno or about the divine and natural principle of things. A conversation. Edited by Manfred Durner. Meiner, Hamburg 2005. ISBN 3-7873-1719-8 .
  • Abyss of Freedom / The Ages of the World. An essay by Slavoj Žižek with the text by Friedrich Wilhelm J. von Schelling “Die Weltalter” . LAIKA , Hamburg 2013. ISBN 978-3-942281-57-7 (contains the text of the second version).
  • Stuttgart private lectures . Edited by Vicki Müller-Lüneschloß. Mine 2016. ISBN 978-3-7873-2871-0 .
  • System of philosophy as a whole and of natural philosophy in particular. Edited by Christoph Binkelmann, Andrea Dezi, Vicki Müller-Lüneschloß. Beatrix Editions, London 2017. ISBN 978-0-9933471-1-5 .
  • Aphorisms on natural philosophy . Edited by Fabian Mauch. Meiner, Hamburg 2018. ISBN 978-3-7873-3443-8 .


Philosophy bibliography: FWJ Schelling - Additional references on the topic

Introductions and biographical information

  • Hans Michael Baumgartner , Harald Korten: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling . Beck, Munich 1996, ISBN 3-406-38935-X .
  • Michaela Boenke (Ed.): Schelling . dtv, Munich 2001, ISBN 3-423-30695-5 (selection of the most important publications).
  • Walter E. Ehrhardt: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling . In: TRE Vol. 30 (1999), pp. 92-102.
  • Manfred Frank : An introduction to Schelling's philosophy . (Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft; 520). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 1985.
  • Werner E. Gerabek : Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and the medicine of romanticism. Studies on Schelling's Würzburg period , Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, New York, Paris and Vienna: Peter Lang. European publishing house of the sciences 1995 (= European university publications. Series 7, Dept. B, 7).
  • Arsenij V. Gulyga: Schelling. Life and work . Translated from the Russian by Elke Kirsten. Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, Stuttgart 1989, ISBN 3-421-06493-8 .
  • Reinhard Hiltscher, Stefan Klingner (eds.): Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2012.
  • Wilhelm G. Jacobs : Read Schelling (= legenda. Volume 3). Frommann-Holzboog publishing house, Stuttgart / Bad Cannstatt 2004, ISBN 3-7728-2240-1 .
  • Jochen Kirchhoff : Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling. With testimonials and photo documents. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1988, ISBN 3-499-50308-5 .
  • Gustav Leopold Plitt (ed.): From Schelling's life in letters , Leipzig: Hirzel 1869–1870 (digital copies: Volume 1 , Volume 2 ).
  • Xavier Tilliette : Schelling: Biography . From the French by S. Schaper. Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-608-94225-4 . ( Interview ; PDF; 75 kB)
  • Franz Josef Wetz : Friedrich WJ Schelling as an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1996, ISBN 3-88506-939-3 .


  • Guido Cusinato, person and self-transcendence. Ecstasy and epoché of the ego as individuation processes in Schelling and Scheler , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2012.
  • Christian Danz, Claus Dierksmeier , Christian Seysen (eds.): System as Reality: 200 Years of Schelling's “System of Transcendental Idealism” . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2001, ISBN 978-3-8260-2107-7 .
  • Horst Fuhrmans: Schelling's last philosophy. The negative u. positive philosophy in the use of late idealism (1940). Bibliographisches Institut & FA Brockhaus AG, 2005.
  • Stefan Gerlach: Action at Schelling. On the fundamental theory of practice, time and religion in the middle and late work (Philosophical Treatises; 117), Klostermann, Frankfurt / M. 2019, ISBN 978-3-465-04393-5 .
  • Thomas Glöckner: Aesthetic and intellectual outlook. The function of art in Schelling's transcendental idealism . AVM, Munich 2011, ISBN 978-3-86306-753-3 .
  • Martin Heidegger : Schelling. Of the essence of human freedom . 1936 (also in: Martin Heidegger Complete Edition ).
  • Marie-Luise Heuser-Keßler : The productivity of nature. Schelling's natural philosophy and the new paradigm of self-organization in the natural sciences , Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1986. ISBN 3-428-06079-2 .
  • Wolfram Hogrebe : Predication and Genesis . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 1989, ISBN 3-518-28372-3 .
  • Christian Iber: The other of reason as its principle: Fundamentals of the philosophical development of Schelling with an outlook on the post-idealistic philosophical conceptions of Heidegger and Adorno . De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1994, ISBN 3-11-014400-X .
  • J. Jantzen (Ed.): Schelling's philosophical anthropology. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2002.
  • Karl Jaspers : Schelling. Size and Doom , EA 1955 (most recently Piper, Munich et al. 1986). Vol. 42. Klostermann, Frankfurt a. M. 1988.
  • Heinz Paetzold , Helmut Schneider (ed.): Schelling's thinking of freedom . Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik on his 70th birthday, Kassel university press, Kassel 2010 ( online ; PDF; 1.1 MB)
  • Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling . (Metzler Collection; 311). Metzler, Stuttgart 1998, ISBN 3-476-10311-0 .
  • Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik : "Of the real, of the natural nature". Schelling's struggle for a natural philosophy dealing with Kant, Fichte and Hegel , (Schellingiana, vol. 8). frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996, ISBN 3-7728-1598-7 .
  • Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzik : Thinking Existence. Schelling's philosophy from its beginnings to its later work . Karl Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2015, ISBN 978-3-495-48751-8 .
  • Ulrich Schmitz : Is freedom really ours and the highest of God? - Reflections on memory and in connection with Schelling's Freiheitsschrift (1809) . Fölbach, Koblenz 2009, ISBN 978-3-934795-44-0 .
  • Walter Schulz : The completion of German idealism in Schelling's late philosophy . Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, Stuttgart 1954 (2nd edition: Neske, Pfullingen 1975), ISBN 3-7885-0048-4 .

Web links

Commons : Friedrich Wilhelm Schelling  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Primary texts

Secondary texts

Articles in encyclopedias

Forums and societies



AA Historical-critical Schelling

- Edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Eds. Hans Michael Baumgartner, Wilhelm G. Jacobs, Jörg Jantzen, Hermann Krings and Hermann Zeltner, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1976 ff.

SW Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling's complete works. Edited by KFA Schelling. 1st section: 10 volumes (= I-X); 2nd section: 4 vols. (= XI – XIV), Stuttgart / Augsburg 1856–1861. After the original edition in a new arrangement, ed. v. M. Schröter, 6 main volumes, 6 supplementary volumes, Munich 1927 ff., 2nd edition 1958 ff.

Individual evidence

  1. Cf. on this: Manfred Frank: Der kommende Gott. Lectures on New Mythology. 1st part, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 1982, 6th lecture.
  2. ^ Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Works . Complete edition, ed. v. Klaus Hammacher and Wolfgang Jaeschke, Hamburg, Meiner, Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog 1998 ff., Vol. 4, ISBN 3-7728-1366-6
  3. Antiquissimi de prima malorum humanorum origine philosophematis Genes. III. explicandi tentamen criticum et philosophicum (A critical and philosophical attempt to interpret the oldest philosopheme about the origin of human evils in Genesis III).
  4. See foundation and criticism. The correspondence between Schelling and Fichte (1794–1802), ed. v. J. Jantzen, Th. Kisser et al. H. Traub, Editions Rudopi BV, Amsterdam-New York, NY 2005 (= Fichte-Studien, Vol. 25).
  5. See foundation and criticism. The correspondence between Schelling and Fichte (1794–1802) . Edited by J. Jantzen, Th. Kisser et al. H. Traub. Editions Rudopi BV, Amsterdam and New York 2005 (=  Fichte-Studien , Vol. 25). See also Wilhelm G. Jacobs: Schelling in German Idealism. Interactions and controversies. In: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Edited by Hans Jörg Sandkühler. JB Metzler, Stuttgart and Weimar 1998, pp. 73-77; Hans Michael Baumgartner, Harald Korten: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Beck, Munich 1996 (Beck'sche Reihe; 536), pp. 84-88.
  6. See Jochen Kirchhoff: Friedrich Wilhelm Josef Schelling . Rowohlt, Reinbek near Hamburg 1982, p. 39.
  7. ^ The University of Würzburg. In: Heinrich Brück : History of the Catholic Church in the 19th Century. Volume 1. Mainz 1887, pp. 353–364 ( appointments around 1803 ).
  8. Werner E. Gerabek: The physiology professor and city doctor for the poor Johann Joseph Dömling (1771-1803) - an almost forgotten pioneer of romantic medicine. In: Würzburg medical history reports. Volume 22, 2003, pp. 21-29, here especially p. 26 f.
  9. ^ Werner E. Gerabek: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and the medicine of romanticism. Comments on the philosopher's time in Würzburg (1803–1806). In: Würzburg medical history reports. Bad 14, 1996, pp. 63-72.
  10. Werner E. Gerabek: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, "Madame Lucifer" and the Alma Julia. The living and living situation of the philosopher in Würzburg (1803–1806). In: Tempora mutantur et nos? Festschrift for Walter M. Brod on his 95th birthday. With contributions from friends, companions and contemporaries. Edited by Andreas Mettenleiter , Akamedon, Pfaffenhofen 2007, pp. 382–387
  11. See Siegbert Peetz: The Philosophy of Mythology. In: In: FWJ Schelling. Edited by Hans Jörg Sandkühler. JB Metzler, Stuttgart, Weimar 1998, p. 156.
  12. ^ A b Manfred Frank, Introduction, in: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Philosophy of Revelation. 1841/42 , Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977.
  13. ^ Hans Michael Baumgartner, Harald Korten: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling. Beck, Munich 1996 (Beck'sche Reihe; 536), p. 191.
  14. Schelling in the mirror of his contemporaries. Edited by Xavier Tilliette. Three volumes. Turin and Milan 1874-1983, Vol. I, pp. 444 and 452, respectively.
  15. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Philosophy of Revelation. 1841/42 Ed. And introduced by Manfred Frank. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977. - In the meantime, however, there is also an edition of the lecture manuscript: FWJ Schelling: Original version of the philosophy of revelation. Edited by Walter E. Ehrhardt. Meiner, Hamburg 1992.
  16. ^ Orden Pour le Mérite for sciences and arts (ed.): The members of the order . tape 1: 1842-1881 . Gebr. Mann Verlag, Berlin 1975, ISBN 3-7861-6189-5 ( [PDF; accessed on September 18, 2011]).
  17. Werner E. Gerabek: Schelling, Karl Eberhard. In: Encyclopedia of Medical History. 2005, p. 1293.
  18. ^ Hans Michael Baumgartner, Harald Korten: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling . (Beck series; 536). Beck, Munich 1996, p. 20, ISBN 3-406-38935-X . See on Schelling and Caroline: Xavier Tilliette: Schelling. Biography . From the Franz. S. Schaper, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-608-94225-4 .
  19. ^ Xavier Tilliette: Schelling. Biography . From the Franz. S. Schaper, Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-608-94225-4 , p. 571.
  20. ^ Gotha website , accessed on November 21, 2016
  21. See Walter Schulz: The completion of German idealism in the late philosophy of Schelling , Pfullingen 1975, p. 13
  22. Horst Fuhrmans: The Philosophy of the World Ages , in: Studia Philosophica 14 (1954), pp. 2-17
  23. Cf. Nicolai Hartmann: The Philosophy of German Idealism. Berlin / New York 3rd edition 1974, p. 112.
  24. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle: Fundamentals of Schelling's Philosophical Development with an outlook on the post-idealistic philosophical conceptions of Heidegger and Adorno . De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1994, p. 6f.
  25. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle: Fundamentals of Schelling's Philosophical Development with an outlook on the post-idealistic philosophical conceptions of Heidegger and Adorno . De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1994, p. 17f.
  26. On the philosophical interpretation of Schelling's early writings, cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, pp. 13–69
  27. Cf. W. Wieland: The beginnings of the philosophy of Schelling and the question of nature , in: M. Frank, G. Kurz (ed.): Materials for Schelling's philosophical beginnings , Frankfurt a. M. 1975, pp. 237-279 (here pp. 246f.); B. Sandkaulen-Bock: Exit from the unconditional. About the beginning in the philosophy of Schelling , Göttingen 1990, p. 40f.
  28. Schelling's letters appeared anonymously in the journal Philosophical Journal of a Society of Teutscher Scholars published by Friedrich Immanuel Niethammer in November 1795–1796.
  29. Cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, pp. 65f.
  30. Cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, p. 112f .; Manfred Frank: An introduction to Schelling's philosophy , Frankfurt a. M. 1985, p. 73.
  31. On the transcendental system see: Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, pp. 95–132; X. Tilliette: Schelling. Une philosophie en devenir , Vol. 1: Le système vivant 1794–1821, pp. 185–213; D. Korsch: The reason for freedom. An investigation into the history of problems in positive philosophy and the systemic function of Christianity in the late work of FWJ Schelling , Munich 1980, pp. 72-100.
  32. See in more detail Werner Marx : Schelling - Geschichte, System, Freiheit , Freiburg / Munich 1977, pp. 77-101
  33. Cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, p. 112
  34. Cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, p. 112f .; Manfred Frank: An introduction to Schelling's philosophy , Frankfurt a. M. 1985, p. 112f.
  35. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle: Fundamentals of Schelling's Philosophical Development with an outlook on the post-idealistic philosophical conceptions of Heidegger and Adorno . De Gruyter, Berlin, New York 1994, p. 6f.
  36. FWJSchelling: Initia philosophiae universae. Erlangen lecture WS 1820/21 , ed. u. come over. v. H. Fuhrmans, Bonn 1969, p. 13
  37. FWJSchelling: Initia philosophiae universae. Erlangen lecture WS 1820/21 , ed. u. come over. v. H. Fuhrmans, Bonn 1969, p. 17
  38. On the philosophical program of late philosophy cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, pp. 13–69, pp. 277–324; Klaus Brinkmann: Schelling's Hegel Critique , in: Klaus Hartmann (Ed.): Die ontologische Option , Berlin 1976, pp. 121-208
  39. Cf. Christian Iber: The Other of Reason as their Principle , Berlin, New York 1994, p. 278, Michael Theunissen : The Abolition of Idealism in the Spätphilosophie Schelling , in: Philosophisches Jahrbuch (1976), pp. 1–30.
  40. For the current discussion of Schelling's natural philosophy, cf. Karen Gloy : Schellings Naturphilosophie , in: Reinhard Hiltscher, Stefan Klingner (Eds.): Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2012, pp. 85-102
  41. ^ Marie-Luise Heuser-Keßler: The productivity of nature. Schelling's natural philosophy and the new paradigm of self-organization in the natural sciences , Berlin 1986
  42. For a first introduction to the problem of myth in Schelling cf. Wilhelm G. Jacobs: Read Schelling , pp. 52–61, 109–128.
  43. See About Myths. AA I, 1, 206f. (SW I, 53.)
  44. About myths. AA I, 1, 212. (SW I, 57.)
  45. See About Myths. AA I, 1, 219f. (SW I, 64.)
  46. Philosophy of Mythology SW XI, 120.
  47. See Philosophy of Mythology SW XI, 120.
  48. ^ Dörner, Klaus : Citizens and Irre . On the social history and sociology of science in psychiatry. [1969] Fischer Taschenbuch, Bücher des Wissens, Frankfurt / M 1975, ISBN 3-436-02101-6 ; P. 225 f.
  49. Gotthard Günther : Recognize and Want. An abridged version of Cognition and Volition. First published in: Cybernetics Technique in Brain Research and the Educational Process. 1971 Fall Conference of American Society for Cybernetics, Washington DC Dt. Translation by the PKL Group. Complete version in The consciousness of machines, AGIS, Baden Baden ³2002.
  50. Werner E. Gerabek: The physiology professor and city doctor for the poor Johann Joseph Dömling (1771-1803) - an almost forgotten pioneer of romantic medicine. In: Würzburg medical history reports. Volume 22, 2003, pp. 21-29, cited here: p. 21.
  51. ^ Werner E. Gerabek: Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling and the medicine of romanticism. Comments on the philosopher's time in Würzburg (1803–1806). In: Würzburg medical history reports. Bad 14, 1996, pp. 63-72.
  52. Werner E. Gerabek: Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von. In: Werner E. Gerabek, Bernhard D. Haage, Gundolf Keil , Wolfgang Wegner (eds.): Enzyklopädie Medizingeschichte. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2005, ISBN 3-11-015714-4 , pp. 1291-1293.
  53. ^ Marie-Luise Heuser: Romance and Society. The economic theory of productive forces. In: Myriam Gerhard (ed.), Oldenburger Jahrbuch für Philosophie 2007. Oldenburg 2008, pp. 253–277.
  54. Martin Heidegger: Schelling: From the essence of human freedom (1809) (WS 1935/36). Complete edition vol. 42, ed. by I. Schüßler. Frankfurt / M. 1988
  55. Cf. Stefan Klingner: Priorities of Schelling Research . In: Reinhard Hiltscher, Stefan Klingner (Eds.): Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2012.
  56. ^ Z. BEA Beach: The Potencies of the God (s): Schelling's Philosophy of Mythology . Albany 1994; A. Bowie: Schelling and Modern European Philosophy . London 1993; DE Snow: Schelling and the End of Idealism . Albany 1996; J. Norman, A. Welchman (Eds.): The New Schelling . London 2004; JM Wirth (Ed.): Schelling Now. Contemporary Readings . Bloomington 2005.
  57. ^ Walter Schulz: The completion of German idealism in the late philosophy of Schelling , Stuttgart / Cologne 1955
  58. Horst Fuhrmans: Schelling's last philosophy. The negative and the positive philosophy in the use of late idealism , Berlin 1940
  59. Barbara Loer: The Absolute and Reality in Schelling's Philosophy , Berlin / New York 1974.
  60. ^ WE Ehrhardt: Just a Schelling. In: Studi Urbinati 51 B (1977), 111 - 121; “Freedom is ours and the highest of the gods” - a way back to the freedom script? In: Schelling's way to freedom writing. Legends and Reality . Files from the symposium of the International Schelling Society in 1992. Ed. Hans Michael Baumgartner a. Wilhelm G. Jacobs. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1996, pp. 240–241, here 246.
  61. ^ Richard Kroner: From Kant to Hegel . 2 vol. Tübingen 2nd edition 1961 (1st edition 1921/24).
  62. Cf. the report by Markus Gabriel : Being, human and consciousness. Trends in more recent Schelling research. In: Philosophische Rundschau 52 (2005), pp. 271–301.
  63. ^ Walter Schulz: The completion of German idealism in the late philosophy of Schelling , Stuttgart / Cologne 1955
  64. Michael Theunissen: The abolition of idealism in the late philosophy of Schelling . In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 83 (1976), 1 - 30
  65. Thomas Buchheim: One of all. The self-restraint of idealism in Schelling's late philosophy , Hamburg 1992
  66. Wolfgang Janke: The threefold completion of German idealism. Schelling, Hegel and Fichte's unwritten teaching , Amsterdam / New York 2009
  67. Horst Fuhrmans: Schelling's last philosophy. The negative and the positive philosophy in the use of late idealism , Berlin 1940, p. 45
  68. Gotthard Günther, in: Reinhard Hiltscher, Stefan Klingner (Eds.): Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling , Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2012, p. 103
  69. ^ Matthias Mayer: Object-Subject. FWJ Schelling's natural philosophy as a contribution to a criticism of reification , Bielefeld 2014.
  70. ^ Marie-Luise Heuser-Keßler: The productivity of nature. Schelling's natural philosophy and the new paradigm of self-organization in the natural sciences , Berlin 1986. This work was written in 1981 and handed over to the Heinrich Heine University in 1982. See also Marie-Luise Heuser-Keßler / Wilhelm G. Jacobs (eds.), Schelling and self-organization, Berlin 1995.
  71. Hans-Dieter Mutschler: Speculative and empirical physics. Topicality and limits of Schelling's natural philosophy. Stuttgart et al. 1990, p. 7
  72. Rainer E. Zimmermanns: The reconstruction of space, time and matter. Modern implications of Schelling's natural philosophy , Berlin et al. 1998
  73. Birgit Sandkaulen-Bock: Exit from the unconditional. About the beginning in Schelling's philosophy. Goettingen 1990.
  74. Wolfram Hogrebe: Predication and Genesis. Frankfurt / M. 1989, p. 130.
  75. Markus Gabriel: Man in Myth. Studies on ontotheology, anthropology and the history of self-awareness in Schelling's "Philosophy of Mythology". Berlin / New York 2006, p. 465 f.
  76. Lotte Burkhardt: Directory of eponymous plant names - Extended Edition. Part I and II. Botanic Garden and Botanical Museum Berlin , Freie Universität Berlin , Berlin 2018, ISBN 978-3-946292-26-5 doi: 10.3372 / epolist2018 .
predecessor Office successor
unoccupied President of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences from
1827 to 1842
Maximilian von Freyberg-Eisenberg