Identity philosophy

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Identity philosophy is a z. B. Hegel 's polemical term for the conception of the mind -body problem formulated by Schelling between 1801 and 1806 , that nature and mind can be viewed as a unit and represent only two sides or poles of the same reality.

background

Schelling's remarks are to be seen above all in the context of the mind-body problem , which had become a general paradigm since René Descartes (1596–1650) . However, Hegel's criticism may also be related to the lack of scientific knowledge from his point of view. This problem had already become evident because of Descartes' assumption of the pineal gland as a mediating brain structure. Its acceptance seemed more and more unlikely, especially after a revision by the monadology of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716), in which the intervention of God (›concursus dei‹) was again emphasized. Schelling's conception, referring to the ideas of identity of Benedictus de Spinoza (1632–1677), should prove to have a promising future, since it was taken up again by Gustav Theodor Fechner (1801–1887), see Chap. Reception .

Schelling's statements

Schelling himself always referred to his conception of the identity of nature and spirit and thus of the real and the ideal as an ›absolute identity system‹. The term ›philosophy of identity‹, however, became a polemical term relatively quickly. The philosophy of identity can be understood as a › system ‹ insofar as scientific research results, which relate to psychologically subjective facts in humans, are to be brought methodically and factually to a point of unity. Schelling used the term ›point of indifference‹ for this unit point. Philosophy must arrive at this point, from which the absolute can be grasped as undivided identity. The goal for Schelling was the ' positive philosophy' . The unity of nature and spirit therefore also includes the unity of subjectivity and objectivity or the subject-object split . Everything real therefore does not exist for itself alone. With this view, Schelling represented thoughts that go back to his preoccupation with Spinoza , especially his 'ethics'. The method favored by Schelling is already contained in the book title of Spinoza's ›Ethik‹ in the reference ›ordine geometrico‹ (ordine geometrico = according to the geometric method). Schelling describes it as a priori . The task of philosophy is to construct and systematize the universe from the ideas recognizable in nature. Schelling writes about the relationship between spirit and nature:

Nature should be the visible spirit, the spirit the invisible nature. So here, in the absolute identity of spirit in us and nature outside of us, the problem of how a nature outside of us is possible must be resolved .

polemic

Schelling's views were initially largely accepted by Hegel, but then rejected polemically. Hegel criticizes Schelling's ›Absolute‹ as:

" Night [...] in which, as they say, all cows are black, [...] the naivety of the void of knowledge ".

In addition, Hegel exercised further criticism of Schelling's theory in his preface to the second edition of the encyclopedia in 1827. It points out the difference between human and divine creativity.

Further development

Schelling was in contact with one of his students, the Württemberg doctor Carl August von Eschenmayer (1768-1852). This had dealt with Schelling's thoughts of the absolute. In 1804, after moving from Jena to Würzburg, Schelling recognized the duality of philosophy with regard to knowledge . Compared to the perception of the soul in the absolute, the divine in man, knowledge is only the negative. According to Schelling, this negative evaluation of knowledge is caused by the corruption of man, his apostasy from God. The origin of this division, the apostasy from God, the alienation , also lies in the absolute. This falling away presupposes freedom, whereby the fallen man appears as a counter-absolute, an inverted God. Through the rule of matter, as an external principle, man has come into this state. Hence the un-being rules over the being, the negative over the positive, the relative non-being over beings and the external over the inner. Schelling drew conclusions from these views in 1809 when he applied them to illness . Illness is "the true counterpart of evil or sin" due to the abuse of freedom. Applied to the unreasonableness of insanity, Schelling concludes in 1810 that the soul, as an instance of the divine, cannot become ill in humans: "There are no diseases of the soul". Only the mind can become ill. “It is not the spirit that is infected by the body, but, conversely, the body is infected by the spirit.” Spirit is the ideal side, awareness, the personal, conscious desire , that is, the will , cf. a. the concept of mental illness . The will is at the point of indifference, in the middle position between self-will and understanding .

reception

Jürgen Mittelstraß considers identity philosophy to be an episode in the history of philosophy. Kant's positions critical of knowledge would be lost here through the purely constructive systematic thinking introduced by Fichte . Karl Marx seems to correspond to this critical point of view with his famous dictum: "It is not the consciousness of the people that determines their being, but, conversely, their social being that determines their consciousness." However, this must not overlook the formative influence of Schelling's constructive thinking was based on romantic medicine and the natural sciences on the one hand, but on the other hand also for the delay in scientific medicine and psychiatry in Germany, e.g. B. access to learning theory . Klaus Dörner sees the natural and theological philosophy of Schelling u. a. for the German definition of the endogeneity of psychoses as essential. Under Wilhelm Wundt and Gustav Theodor Fechner , German psychology came to dominate on the basis of this approach. Basically, two forms of monism (on each side of the “indifference point”) appear possible: the spiritualistic and the materialistic . Gotthard Günther brings both opposing poles together in his texts "Recognize and Will" and "Metaphysics of the Institution", the latter explicitly referring to Schelling.

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ^ A b c Eisler, Rudolf : Historical Dictionary of Philosophy ( HWPh ). Completely revised edition of the ›Dictionary of Philosophical Terms‹ by Rudolf Eisler. [1904], ed. by Joachim Ritter (†) and Karlfried Gründer , by Schwabe & Co, Basel, Stuttgart; © 1976; ISBN 3-7965-0115-X (for the complete works); Volume 4 (IK); Stw. "Philosophy of Identity" Column 151-152.
  2. a b c d Mittelstraß, Jürgen (Hrsg.): Encyclopedia Philosophy and Philosophy of Science . Bibliographisches Institut Mannheim / Vienna / Zurich, BI - Wissenschaftsverlag 1984, Volume 2 (HO), ISBN 3-411-01604-3 ; Stw. "Identity Philosophy" page 193.
  3. a b Hofstätter, Peter R. (Ed.): Psychology . The Fischer Lexicon, Fischer-Taschenbuch, Frankfurt a. M. 1972, ISBN 3-436-01159-2 , Stw. "Body-soul problem" page 207 f.
  4. a b Spinoza : Ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata (“Ethics, represented according to the geometrical method”, published posthumously in 1677 - ISBN 3-88851-193-3 ); Quote: “Una eademque res sed duobus modis expressa”, II, 7.
  5. Schelling , FWJ: Presentation of my system of philosophy. Journal of Speculative Physics II / 2 (1801). Works, ed. KFA SCHELLING (1856-1861) 4, 113 or III-XIV, 1-127, Complete Works III, 1-108.
  6. Stöckl, Albert : Textbook of the history of philosophy. Franz Kirchheim Verlag Mainz 1870; Page 728, para. 14.
  7. Schelling , FWJ: Ideas for a philosophy of nature . In: Works . Ed. Schröter, Munich 1927, Vol. I; Page 706.
  8. Hegel , GWF: Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's systems of philosophy . Jena 1801
  9. Hegel, GWF: Phenomenology of the Spirit . Bamberg / Würzburg 1807, s. Works II, 22
  10. Hegel, GWF: Encyclopedia of Philosophical Science in Outlines . Preface to the second edition 1827, pages IX-XVI, Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1999, Hauptwerke, vol. 6, ISBN 3-7873-1433-4 , pages 8–11.
  11. a b Schelling, FWJ: Philosophy and Religion . (1804), in: »Works«, Ed. Schröter, Munich 1927, Vol. IV, (a) to Stw. “Recognition of the duality of philosophy”: pages 13, 20 f., 28; (b) Re. “Origin of the split”: page 29
  12. Schelling, FWJ: Philosophical investigations into the essence of human freedom . (1809), in: »Works«, Ed. Schröter, Munich 1927 Vol. IV, pages 258, 263
  13. a b Schelling, FWJ: Stuttgart private lectures . (1810), in: "Works", Ed. Schröter, Munich 1927, Vol. IV, (a) on Stw. “Soul and Spirit”: Page 361 (concept of mental illness ); (b) Re. “ Psychophysical correlation ”: page 360.
  14. ^ Karl-Heinz Hillmann : Dictionary of Sociology (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 410). 4th, revised and expanded edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1994, ISBN 3-520-41004-4 , p. 99, Stw. Consciousness .
  15. a b c Dörner, Klaus : Citizens and Irre . On the social history and sociology of science in psychiatry. [1969] Fischer Taschenbuch, Bücher des Wissens, Frankfurt / M 1975, ISBN 3-436-02101-6 ; (a) Re. "Promoting influence on romantic medicine": page 225 f .; (b) Re. “Inhibiting influence on the development of scientific medicine”: pages 260, 262; (b) Re. "Endogeneity": page 260

literature

  • FWJ Schelling: Bruno or about the divine and natural principle of things . A conversation. Berlin 1802 (Complete Works III, 109-228)
  • FWJ Schelling: Further representations from the system of philosophy . New Z. f. speculative physics I. first and second piece (1802). 1-188, 1-180 (with additions from a personal copy in: Sämtl. Werke Erg.Bd. l, 385-562)
  • FWJ Schelling: Lectures on the method of academic study . Tübingen 1803 (Complete Works III, 229 374).
  • Düsing, Klaus : Speculation and reflection . About the collaboration between Schelling and Hegel in Jena. Hegel-Stud. 5: 95-128 (1969)
  • Folkers, Horst : Hegel's first philosophical position determination. The position of differential writing in the formation of the philosophy of identity. Diss. Presented by Horst Folkers [as typescript], Heidelberg, Univ., Diss., 1986.
  • Lauth, Reinhard : The emergence of Schelling's identity philosophy in dealing with Fichte's science: (1795 - 1801). Freiburg (Breisgau), Munich: Alber 1975, ISBN 3-495-47322-X
  • Karl Leonhard Reinhold : Instructions for knowing and assessing philosophy in all of its teaching buildings . (1805) 147-154: Of the absolute dogmatism, or the so-called identity system
  • Johann Eduard Erdmann : Attempt at a scientific presentation of the history of modern philosophy . (Neu-A. 1932) 3/2, 309-352
  • Nicolai Hartmann : The Philosophy of German Idealism l (1923) 153-162
  • Hermann Zeltner : Schelling's philosophical idea and the identity system (1931); in: Schelling (1954) 53-55. 286-295
  • Helmuth Plessner : The Identity System . Studia philos. 14 (Basel 1954) 68-84
  • Xavier Tilliette : Schelling . Une philosophie en devenir l (Paris 1971) 305-438.