Nicolai Hartmann

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Paul Nicolai Hartmann (* 7 February . Jul / 19th February  1882 greg. In Riga ; † 9. October 1950 in Goettingen ) was a German philosopher and professor of philosophy . He is considered a fundamental ontologist , an important exponent of critical realism and one of the most important innovators of metaphysics in the 20th century.


Hartmann was the son of the engineer Carl August Hartmann and his wife Helene, b. Haukmann. From 1897 he attended the German-language grammar school in Saint Petersburg . In 1902 and 1903 he studied medicine in Dorpat and from 1903 to 1905 classical philology and philosophy in Petersburg. He continued his studies from 1905 in Marburg , where he mainly heard the neo-Kantians Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp . This is where the lifelong friendship with Heinz Heimsoeth began . In 1907 he received his doctorate with the work The Problem of Being in Greek Philosophy before Plato . As a sequel, the book Plato's Logic of Being appeared in 1909 . In the same year he completed his habilitation on the subject of Des Proclus Diadochus Philosophical Beginnings of Mathematics .

In 1911 Hartmann married Alice Stepanitz, with whom he had their daughter Dagmar in 1912. In 1912 he published Philosophical Basic Questions in Biology . From 1914 to 1918 he did military service as an interpreter, letter censor and intelligence officer. After the war he got a position as a private lecturer in Marburg in 1919. During this time he got to know Martin Heidegger . In 1920 he became an associate professor, and in 1921 the work that marked his independent philosophical position, the basic features of a metaphysics of knowledge, appeared . The following year he was appointed full professor to succeed Natorp's chair. In 1925 he moved to Cologne , where he got in touch with Max Scheler . In 1926 he published the ethics as his second important work, in which, like Scheler , he advocated a material ethics of values . In the same year he was divorced from his wife.

In 1929 Hartmann married Frida Rosenfeld, with whom he had a son, Olaf (1930), and a daughter, Lise (1932). In 1931 he followed a call to Berlin for a professorship for theoretical philosophy. He held the chair until 1945. During this time he developed his ontology in several steps with The Problem of Spiritual Being (1933), On the Foundation of Ontology (1935), Possibility and Reality (1938) and The Structure of the Real World. Outline of the general theory of categories (1940).

After the death of Paul von Hindenburg , Nicolai Hartmann u. a. together with Martin Heidegger , Carl Schmitt and Erich Rudolf Jaensch in the Völkischer Beobachter for the “transfer of the powers of the Reich President to Hitler”.

Hartmann seems to have spent the time of National Socialism largely untouched by and against the rulers. However, documents in Gerhard Lehmann's habilitation procedure from December 1939 show that he did not oppose classifying the Jewish representatives of the Marburg School as “mere logicism” of “Jewish intellectual history”. He also paid tribute with the publication of an anthology Systematic Philosophy (1942) as part of a series of Nazi publications (“ Aktion Ritterbusch ”). Arnold Gehlen (“ Anthropology ”) and Erich Rothacker (“Cultural Anthropology”) first had their say as “representatives of National Socialism” . Hartmann follows with "New Paths of Ontology", a summarizing overview of the last three great ontological writings. The volume also contains overview articles by Otto Friedrich Bollnow (“ Existential Philosophy ”) and Heimsoeth (“ Historical Philosophy ”). Nevertheless, he was in 1942 by the Office Rosenberg , "viewed with concern," the cultural policy Surveillance Authority and the reasons for its rejection as follows: "connected to the Catholicism, is quoted by ideological opponents." Within the SD dossiers on professors of philosophy of the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS , In terms of the ideological classification of philosophers, Nicolai Hartmann received the following assessment from the SS perspective: “Always national. Loyal also to the NS, without pol. Activity, but quite socially minded. (See allowance for the NSV, admission of holiday children, etc.) ".

From 1945 to 1950 Hartmann taught at the Georg-August University in Göttingen . In the year of his death (after a stroke), the philosophy of nature appeared as a special category theory . The works Teleological Thinking (1951) and Aesthetics (1953) were published posthumously.

Despite all the sobriety, Hartmann was able to get enthusiastic and express himself in pictorial language:

“The tragedy of man is that of the starving man who sits at the table and does not stretch out his hand because he cannot see what is in front of him. Because the real world is inexhaustible in abundance, real life is soaked in value and overflowing, wherever we grasp it, it is full of wonder and glory. "

- Nicolai Hartmann


Metaphysics of Knowledge

In his early work up to and including his habilitation, Hartmann was largely based on neo-Kantianism and the idealism he represented with his doctrine of a constitutive setting of reality by the spirit. Even the text published in 1912 on the basic questions of the philosophy of biology , in which Hartmann took a positive stand on Darwinism , shows tendencies towards scientific materialism and atheism based on Ludwig Feuerbach . In 1921 he turned against the Marburg tradition in his work Basics of a Metaphysics of Knowledge (MdE), which suddenly made him famous, and now firmly took the view that reality existed independently of subjective perception. For Hartmann, who is attributed to critical realism because of this, knowledge was a process in which an object different from the knowing subject is depicted in consciousness.

Hartmann specifically chose the title "Metaphysics of Knowledge" to express that the basic assumption about the relation between the subject and the object of knowledge cannot be explained rationally. According to Hartmann, the unsolvable riddle of the relationship between knowledge and being necessarily leads to aporias . Contrary to Kant , Hartmann was of the opinion that one cannot set up an epistemology that is free from assumptions . Every epistemology has metaphysical presuppositions.

While for Cohen knowledge was a “mental creation” or “setting” of an object, for Hartmann knowledge meant grasping something that was already there. Hartmann described this acquisition as a process in three phases.

  1. In the beginning, here Hartmann leaned on Husserl , there is a phenomenology of knowledge. This includes processes of perception as well as processes of consciousness, such as the formation of representations, and the progress of knowledge. In the phenomenological perspective one tries to achieve a “maximum of givenness” (MdE, 43). However, it turns out that there are limits to knowledge. Man can never fully grasp the essence of reality, of which he and his cognitive achievement are only a part. At best, he can push the boundaries and broaden his horizon of knowledge.
  2. In the second step, the given phenomena are analyzed. This analysis shows a basic aporia, which is the basis for all further problems of knowledge. On the one hand, the subject is trapped within the limits of its consciousness; on the other hand, it relates to a being outside of itself. Knowledge depends on the relationship to an object outside of itself. Hartmann did not seek a solution for this contradiction, but regarded it as given.
  3. The conception of existence is the result of phenomenological consideration. In the third step, Hartmann tried to justify this view. His main argument is that the assumption of realism, which reflects both the natural and scientific worldview, can only be deviated from for good reasons. "In reality, then, the burden of proof falls on idealism precisely because it is it that moves away from natural object consciousness and from the state of affairs of the cognitive phenomenon and makes an assertion that bears the stamp of unnaturalism from the start." (MdE 229)


In ethics , one of his central works, he designed a “material ethics of values” following Max Scheler . According to this, values , like the objects of mathematics or logic, have the mode of being of an “ideal being” and are grasped by feeling for value.

"[Values ​​are] the formation of an ethically ideal sphere of an empire with its own structures, its own laws, its own order."

- ethics, 29

Hartmann initially took a critical look at various alternative ethical systems. This includes, first of all, utilitarianism in its various variants (maximizing benefit) and, as a counterpart, Schopenhauer's ethic of compassion (minimizing damage). According to Hartmann, these concepts confuse usefulness and good . This leads to a “misunderstanding and impoverishment of the sense of value” and in the end to a “value ihilism” (Ethik, 87). Opposite the eudaimonism Hartmann objected, happiness is not the highest value. There would be worthless and even worthless happiness, at least happiness without a moral basis (Ethics 87).

Hartmann criticized Kant for the purely subjectivist (in the subject) justification of values. The moral in the mind and the autonomy of the will of an individual alone are not enough to justify values. In addition, Kant's principles are only formal. According to Hartmann, a priori ethical principles must also be material in terms of content (Ethics 107). In addition, values ​​are not only rational, they also have a component of intuition .

“[...] there is a pure value a priori. That immediately, intuitively, emotionally pervades our practical consciousness, our whole view of life, and everything that falls within our field of vision that gives accents of value and disability. "

- ethics, 116
Structure of the values ​​according to Nicolai Hartmann
I. Moral values
1. Core values
the good - the noble - the abundance - the purity
2. Special values
a) ancient b) medieval c) modern
justice Charity Faraway love
wisdom truthfulness "Bestowal virtue"
bravery loyalty personality
Mastery humility love
II. Extra-moral values
personal values Goods values aesthetic values

In the second part of his ethics, Hartmann described the essential phenomena of ethical values ​​in a value review. "Philosophical ethics is a Maieutik of moral consciousness." (Ethik, 29) To the realm of values ​​he counted pleasure values, goods values, vital values ​​and moral values. Similar to his ontology (see below), Hartmann saw a layered structure between the value levels. In determining the material values, he relied heavily on Aristotle , but also on Nietzsche , whom he recognized as the discoverer of new values. He includes, for example, the “love of distant people”, which can be seen as an early concept of environmental ethics , as a description of the sustainability principle: “It may sound utopian to us today if we are asked to take an enlightened view of generations that are without our intervention Will be children of a different spirit and a different world situation. However, it remains true that this generation will be our historical heirs and will reap the fruits of our actions, and that we are responsible for what we give them to bear ”(Ethics 489).

In the third part of ethics, Hartmann dealt with the question of freedom as a prerequisite for all ethics and the justification for rejecting the relativity of values.

With regard to human free will, Hartmann took the view that within a deterministic system, the intention or the will acts as a "transforming" factor and thus constitutes freedom of choice. Like Kant, he emphasized that free will is based on the possibility of rational decisions, but is also severely impaired by external and internal conditions. It is only out of this dichotomy that one can ascribe responsibility to someone , since he could also decide otherwise. However, like reality and the existence of values, self-determination cannot be proven rationally, but must be accepted as a well-founded fact.

Hartmann pursued the justification against the relativity of values ​​with ontological arguments. The ought associated with a value is not an “ought to do”, but a “ought to be”. An ideal ought to be is independent of the subject. The individual, on the other hand, is confronted with an actual ought to be and is responsible for ensuring that the possibility of a value becomes reality. In man a transition from ideal to real takes place through his actions. Against constructivism Hartmann emphasized: “It is not the person who constitutes the values, but the values ​​constitute the person.” (Ethics, 134) However, not all people are determined by the same, unchangeable values ​​in the same way. Rather, there is a constantly changing awareness of values.

“The values ​​themselves do not shift in the ethos revolution. Their essence is timeless, superhistorical. But the awareness of values ​​is shifting. "

- ethics, 49


After the abandonment of traditional metaphysics by Kant and German idealism, and in their successor also by Neo-Kantianism, a return to Aristotle emerged in the middle of the 19th century , primarily initiated by Trendelenburg , Brentano and Meinong . In addition, Husserl's phenomenology was used as an instrument for analyzing formal ontology with the categories of beings in general and material ontology with the categories of special areas such as nature, history or anthropology.

From this tradition, Heidegger's existential ontology developed as well as the “New Ontology”, of which Hartmann is considered the most prominent representative. “The old doctrine of being was attached to the thesis that the general, in the essentia condensed into formal substance and comprehensible in the term, is the determining and shaping interior of things. Next to the world of things, in which man is also included, comes the world of beings, which timelessly and materially forms a realm of perfection of the higher being. ”Hartmann, on the other hand, clung to the question of“ being in oneself ”, the special one Metaphysics, and limited its ontology to the investigation of beings as beings, to the world of reality. The categories of this new ontology are "gradually eavesdropping on reality." Due to the limits of human knowledge, Hartmann understood his entire ontology as a hypothesis, as a concept to be further developed.

For the foundation of the ontology

In the phenomenological investigation of the categories of beings, Hartmann distinguished the "intentio recta" as an investigation of the natural and scientific attitudes towards an object. With this approach - in contrast to Kant or Neo-Kantianism - no results can be obtained a priori . The opposite pole is the “intentia obliqua”, which deals a priori-deductively and reflexively with the act of knowledge in logic, psychology or epistemology.

For Hartmann, reality is in all that is. “The being of beings is one thing, however varied this may be. All further differentiations of being are only peculiarities of the mode of being. ”(GdO, 38)“ Being is an ultimate thing that can be asked about. The last one is never definable. One can only define on the basis of something else that stands behind what is sought. ”(GdO, 43). For Hartmann, this indefinability meant that one cannot form the opposite of the concept of being. Therefore, he also rejected a dialectical comparison of “being” and “nothing” (against Hegel and Heidegger). He also considered Heidegger's question about the “meaning of being” to be just as wrong. The investigation of beings as being is based on reality and not on concepts (GdO, 42). Being is not to be equated with objects, because an object is determined by its relationship to a subject. Being, on the other hand, is independent of the subject.

The phenomenological analysis led Hartmann to different distinctions:

  • Moments of being are being and being
  • Ways of being are reality and ideality
  • Modes of being are possibility, reality and necessity

Every being has both being and being. Both aspects are inextricably linked (GdO, 86). Dasein and Suchein have both real and ideal entities like mathematical objects. Every existence has a being. And every so-being is always a so-being of a being.

Reality and ideality, however, are mutually exclusive. An existing is either real or ideal. The ideal is not something that is only thought, but something that is non-objective. Hartmann included mathematics, entities, logic and values. Ideal being is timeless, general and unchangeable. Real being, on the other hand, is temporal, concrete and transient. Reality is intrusive. You experience it in an experience of resistance. The ideal is contained in the real as a structure or law. A geometric sphere is an ideal structure that describes the structure of a material sphere. Empirical judgments always relate to real entities, mathematical judgments to ideal beings. Both kinds of judgments are a grasping of something that is in itself.

Hartmann thus took a realistic position with regard to the problem of universals . The being and its properties are independent of the subject. The ideal is contained in the real (“universalia in rebus”). “The general does not exist beyond the cases (ante res) for itself, but also by no means in ments as abstracted from them (post rem), but rather in rebus.” (GdO, 259) The in-itself being of the ideal established Hartmann said that it would not be possible to explain that nature is mathematically formed if there were no ideal relationships. (GdO, 265) This view corresponds to the Aristotelian universal realism. Logical propositions are valid because they agree with structures of being (GdO, 302). Real being is accordingly the higher being, which builds on the ideal being contained in it (GdO 291).

Possibility and reality

In his second ontological work, Hartmann developed a modal theory. He differentiated the modes of being possibility, reality and necessity as well as randomness, impossibility and unreality. What is special about Hartmann's modal analysis is his assertion that reality presupposes possibility and necessity. It is easy to see that something has to be possible in order for it to really be. Hartmann justifies the necessity as follows: A thing or an event can only become real when all the factors that constitute this thing or event are together. If only one factor is missing, this thing / event will not become reality, but another. But if all the factors come together, it cannot fail that this thing / happening really becomes. It really becomes necessary. The confusing consequence of this is that what once became reality (i.e. from the past to the now) could not have come otherwise. Because if it could have turned out differently, it would have turned out differently and not as it has now. The real is one. What did not become real was not possible either (which contradicts our sentence from everyday language: It would have been possible if only I ...) Reality is determined by reasons (not necessarily causes) (WuM, 44). Actions can, for example, be determined by motives. Ideal possibility and reality are without contradiction. An (ideal) geometric figure can be constructed and thus ideally exists. (MuW, 295)

Building the real world

Based on the general analysis of being and modal theory, Hartmann developed a general theory of categories based on the layered structure of beings.

He divided real being into the ascending layers of inorganic, life, soul and spirit. In the sphere of the spirit, Hartmann also made a distinction between the personal, the objective and the objectified spirit .

  • Personal mind encompasses all individual acts of consciousness.
  • Objective spirit is the consolidation of the personal spirit in historically effective structures such as in narratives, customs, law or science.
  • Objectified spirit means that a spiritual content is bound to a real structure, for example to a concrete work of art.

Each layer builds on the next level. Fundamental and specific categories apply to each layer. The fundamental categories consist of pairs of opposites (AdrW, 230). They are elementary and cannot be traced back to others.

Structure of being according to Nicolai Hartmann
Ideal being
timeless / general
Real being in
time / individual
Mathematical structures,
ethical values,
aesthetic values
spatial non-spatial
Inorganic Life soul ghost

List of fundamental categories

  • Principle and Concretum
  • Structure and mode
  • Form and matter
  • Inside and outside
  • Determination and Dependency
  • Unity and Diversity
  • Unanimity and conflict
  • Opposition and dimension
  • Discretion and continuity
  • Substrate and relation
  • Element and structure

Hartmann emphasized that his categories - unlike Aristotle and Kant - are not determined according to a uniform principle. However, they have the fundamental property that from each pair the other pairs can be derived gradually. As a result, the categories each depict one aspect of a uniform context (AdrW, 255). The pairs of categories are internally related and externally related to one another. The content of the categories is different in the individual layers. Determination is to be interpreted as physical causality on the level of the inorganic, on the level of life as drive, in the soul as motive and in the spiritual as reason.

In the third part of "Structure of the Real World" Hartmann established categorical laws:

  1. Categories are firmly connected with the concrete.
  2. Categories are conditioned within a category layer.
  3. Categories from the higher tier contain many of the categories from the lower tier, but in a modified form.
  4. Higher strata depend on the lower, but not vice versa.

If one looks at the connection between strata and categories, Hartmann believes that many worldviews contain the fundamental error of fundamental one-sidedness.

  • The materialism attempts to derive organic, emotional and mental phenomena of physical processes and provides for the more complex structures on top of each higher level.
  • Similarly, biologism tries to establish the soul and spirit from the principles of life and overlooks the laws of novelty and freedom (AdrW, 498)
  • The vitalism tries to explain the principle of finality , although this is a category of mind.
  • In idealism , the world is explained on the basis of the principle of the subject , although the subject is to be assigned to the level of the spirit.

Hartmann directly criticized Hegel and Marx's monistic worldview .

“Both seek to understand the whole of historical being from a single group of phenomena. If one designates the spiritual being within the whole as the higher stratum, the economic being as the lower, one can say in a formula: Hegel seeks to understand the whole "from above", Marx "from below". Hegel leaves no room for, in addition to the spirit and its self-realization, economic things can also intervene independently in historical development; Marx, on the other hand, does not envisage any scope for originally intellectual tendencies alongside the effects of production . "


Shortly after Hartmann's death, Joseph Maria Bocheński assessed Hartmann's philosophical achievement as follows:

“Nicolai Hartmann is without a doubt one of the most important figures in contemporary philosophy. Along with Whitehead and Maritain , he is considered to be one of the pioneers of metaphysics of the 20th century. Less systematic than this, his strength lies in the delicacy of the analysis and the gift, which is not too common among Germans, of presenting his ideas in a clear form, while captivating through content-related clairvoyance and depth. His works are truly models of sober exactness and scientific thoroughness. "

- Joseph Maria Bocheński

In the following years, however, Hartmann's works faded more and more into the background, as analytical philosophy flourished and existential philosophy also attracted greater attention. In the field of ontology , Hartmann's works have always retained a high priority.

His general theory of categories influenced a number of well-known scientists such as the psychologist Robert Heiß , the neurologist Richard Jung , the ethologist Konrad Lorenz and the physiologist Karl Eduard Rothschuh . Hartmann's category analyzes are topical when, for example, in the neurosciences a reduction of psychological processes to neuronal processes ( reductionism ) and ultimately to categories of physics is postulated. Such attempts at a “naturalization of the psychic” challenge us to recognize the independent (the categorical novelty) of the phenomena of consciousness compared to neurophysiology and the careless transgressions of boundaries ( category errors) in Hartmann's sense.

In March 2009, on the initiative of the Italian philosophers Roberto Poli and Carlo Scognamiglio and the Canadian philosopher Frederic Tremblay, a Nicolai Hartmann Society was founded, the first international conference of which took place in Rome in the summer of 2010.

In February 2013, the German Literature Archive in Marbach announced that it had acquired the philosopher's estate. These are manuscripts, printing templates and speech manuscripts, which are an important addition to the collection on the philosophy of the twentieth century.

The so-called “Cirkel Protocols” were found in the Hartmann estate in Marbach. From 1920 to 1950, NH held disputation circles with selected students on a topic at its respective university locations (Marburg, Cologne, Berlin, Göttingen) almost every semester and had the individual meetings recorded as dialogues. These "circle protocols" are being prepared for an online edition by Joachim Fischer and Gerald Hartung as part of a DFG project (2016–2019).


His most important works include Plato's Logic of Being , the Ethics (1925), New Paths of Ontology (1942) and Aesthetics (1953) , published in 1909 .


  • Proclus Diadochus' philosophical beginnings of mathematics , Töpelmann, Giessen 1909.
  • Plato's logic of being , Töpelmann, Giessen 1909.
  • Basic features of a metaphysics of knowledge . Association of Scientific Publishers, Berlin 1921.
  • The Philosophy of German Idealism - (1) Fichte, Schelling and Romanticism . de Gruyter, Berlin 1923.
  • The philosophy of German idealism - (2) Hegel . de Gruyter, Berlin 1929.
  • Ethics . de Gruyter, Berlin-Leipzig 1925 (3rd edition 1949).
  • Aristotle and Hegel . Stenger, Erfurt 1925.
  • On the problem of reality, philosophical lectures . Pan Verlag, Berlin 1931.
  • The problem of the spiritual being: Investigations into the foundation of the philosophy of history and the humanities . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1933; Berlin again in 1946.
  • Ontology. 4 volumes. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1935–1950.
    • 1. On the foundation of ontology.
    • 2. Possibility and Reality.
    • 3. The structure of the real world: outline of the general theory of categories.
    • 4. Philosophy of nature: outline of the special theory of categories .
  • New ways of ontology . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1942, 2014, new edition of the 5th edition from 1969; ISBN 978-3-17-025361-2 ; P. 120.
  • Systematic philosophy . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1942.
  • Leibniz as a metaphysician . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1946.
  • Teleological thinking . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1951.
  • Aesthetics . Walter de Gruyter. Berlin 1953.
  • Philosophical Conversations . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1954.
  • The philosophical thought and its history, temporality and substantiality, meaning and fulfillment of meaning . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1955.
  • Smaller writings - Vol. 1: Treatises on systematic philosophy , Vol. 2: Treatises on the history of philosophy , Vol. 3: From neo-Kantianism to ontology . Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1955–1958.

Selection of individual contributions

  • Basic philosophical questions in biology . In: Paths to Philosophy . Number 6, 1912.
  • This side of idealism and realism: A contribution to the distinction between the historical and the superhistorical in Kantian philosophy . In: Reprints of the Kantian studies . Pan Verlag R. Heise, Berlin 1924, pp. 160-206.
  • Systematic self-presentation . In: German systematic philosophy according to its designers . Junker & Dünnhaupt , Berlin 1933, pp. 283-340.
  • The problem of apriorism in Platonic philosophy . In: Meeting reports of the Prussian Academy of Sciences , Phil.-hist. Class , 15th Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1935.
  • The philosophical thought and its history . In: Dep. The Prussian. Academy of Sciences, Phil.-hist. Kl. , 5th Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1936.
  • The Megarian and Aristotelian Concepts of Possibility: A Contribution to the History of the Ontological Problem of Modality . In: session area. the Prussian. Academy of Sciences, Phil.-hist. Kl. , 10. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1937.
  • Heinrich Maier's contribution to the problem of categories . In: session area. d. Prussia. Academy of Sciences, Phil.-hist. Kl. , 10. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1938.
  • Aristotle and the problem of the concept . In: Dep. D. Prussia. Academy of Sciences, Ph.-hist. Kl. , 5th Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1939.
  • On the doctrine of the Eidos in Plato and Aristotle . In: Dep. D. Prussia. Academy of Sciences, Phil.-hist. Kl. , 8. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1941.
  • New ways of ontology . In: Systematic Philosophy . Published by Nicolai Hartmann, Stuttgart 1942.
  • The beginnings of the concept of stratification in ancient philosophy . In: Dep. The Prussian. Academy of Sciences, Phil.-hist. Kl. , 3rd Walter de Gruyter, Berlin 1943.
  • Autobiography . In: Werner Ziegenfuß : Philosophen-Lexicon , 1949.


  • Heinz Heimsoeth, Robert Heiß (Hrsg.): Nicolai Hartmann, the thinker and his work. Fifteen papers with a bibliography. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1952.
  • Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka: Essence et existence: Etude à propos de la philosophie de Roman Ingarden et Nicolaï Hartmann (= philosophy de l'esprit ). Aubier, Paris 1957, OCLC 602219670 (dissertation (Thèse lettres) Université de Friborg 1957, 251 pages, French).
  • H. Hulsmann: The method in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann . 1959.
  • K. Kanthack: Nicolai Hartmann and the end of ontology . 1962.
  • I. Wirth: Realism and a priorism in Nicolai Hartmann's epistemology. 1965.
  • JB Forsche: On the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann . 1965.
  • Werner Schneider:  Hartmann, Paul Nicolai. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 8, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1969, ISBN 3-428-00189-3 , pp. 2-4 ( digitized version ).
  • E. Hammerkraft: Freedom and Dependency in Nicolai Hartmann's layered thinking . 1971.
  • R. Gamp: The inter-category relation and the dialectical method in the philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann . 1973.
  • Alois Joh. Buch : Value - Value Consciousness - Valuation, Basics and Basic Problems of Nicolai Hartmann's Ethics . Bouvier, Bonn 1982.
  • Alois Joh. Book: Nicolai Hartmann - 1882–1982 . Bouvier, Bonn 1987.
  • Grötz Arnd: Nicolai Hartmann's doctrine of people . Lang, Frankfurt 1989.
  • William H. Werkmeister, Nicolai Hartmann's new ontology . Florida State University Press, Tallahassee 1990.
  • Roland H. Feucht: The neoontology of Nicolai Hartmann in the light of evolutionary epistemology . Roderer, Regensburg 1992.
  • Sakersadeh Abolghassem: Immanence and transcendence as unsolved problems in Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy . Lit, Münster 1994.
  • Reinhold Breil: Criticism and System. The basic problematics of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology from a transcendental philosophical point of view . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1996.
  • Martin Morgenstern: Nicolai Hartmann for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1997.
  • Karl-Heinz Brodbeck : Nicolai Hartmann . In: Julian Nida-Rümelin , Monika Betzler (ed.): Aesthetics and philosophy of art. From antiquity to the present in individual representations (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 375). Kröner, Stuttgart 1998, ISBN 3-520-37501-X , pp. 359-363 ( online. ).
  • Wolfgang Harich : Nicolai Hartmann - size and limits . Königshausen & Neumann , Würzburg 2000.
  • Rafael Hüntelmann : "Only what is real is possible". Nicolai Hartmann's Modalontology of Real Being . Dettelbach 2000.
  • Nebil Reyhani: Hermann Wein's examination of Nicolai Hartmann as his path from ontology to a philosophical cosmology . 2001.
  • Gerhard Ehrl: Nicolai Hartmann's philosophical anthropology from a systematic perspective . Junghans, Cuxhaven 2003.
  • Alessandro Gamba: In principio era il fine. Ontologia e teleologia in Nicolai Hartmann . Vita e Pensiero, Milano 2004, ISBN 88-343-1970-2 .
  • Alicja Pietras: W stronę ontologii. Nicolaia Hartmanna i Martina Heideggera postneokantowskie projekty filozofii . Universitas, Kraków 2012.
  • Jochen Fahrenberg: On the theory of categories in psychology. Complementarity principle. Perspectives and change of perspective. Pabst Science Publishers, Lengerich 2013, ISBN 978-3-89967-891-8 . [2] (PDF; 5.5 MB).
  • Frank-Peter Hansen : Nicolai Hartmann - thought through again . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2008, ISBN 978-3-8260-3910-2 .
  • Roberto Poli, Carlo Scognamiglio, Frederic Tremblay (eds.): The Philosophy of Nicolai Hartmann. de Gruyter, Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-11-025418-1 .
  • Gerald Hartung, Matthias Wunsch, Claudius Claudius (eds.): From system philosophy to systematic philosophy - Nicolai Hartmann. de Gruyter, Berlin 2012, ISBN 978-3-11-026990-1 .
  • Gerald Hartung, Matthias Wunsch (Ed.): Studies on New Ontology and Anthropology. de Gruyter, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-11-029120-9 .
  • Wolf Kettering: Nicolai Hartmann's Metaphysics of Knowledge (= Boethiana: Research Results on Philosophy, Vol. 110). Publishing house Dr. Kovac, Hamburg 2015, ISBN 978-3-8300-8272-9 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. Entry in the baptismal register of St. Peter's Church in Riga (Latvian: Rīgas sv. Pētera baznīca)
  2. Georg Leaman, Gerd Simon : Heidegger in context: general overview of the Nazi engagement of university philosophers (= Ideological powers in German fascism , vol. 5). Argument Verlag, Hamburg 1993, ISBN 3-88619-205-9 , p. 100.
  3. Reinhard Mehring : Tradition and Revolution in Berlin University Philosophy . In: Rüdiger vom Bruch (ed.): The Berlin University in the Nazi era . Steiner, Stuttgart 2005. Volume II, pp. 199-214
  4. ^ Christian Tilitzki : The German University Philosophy in the Weimar Republic and in the Third Reich . Akademie, Berlin 2002, 708, especially FN 481
  5. ^ Quotation from Ernst Klee : Das Personenlexikon zum Third Reich. Who was what before and after 1945 . Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, Second updated edition, Frankfurt am Main 2005, p. 229.
  6. Leaman, Georg / Simon, Gerd: German Philosophers from the View of the Security Service of the Reichsführer SS . Yearbook for Sociological History 1992, pp. 261–292.
  7. ^ Nicolai Hartmann: Ethics . 4th edition, de Gruyter, Berlin 1962, 11
  8. Wolfgang Harich: Nicolai Hartmann - size and limits. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2000, p. 4
  9. Martin Morgenstern: Nicolai Hartmann for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1997, 31
  10. ^ Wolfgang Röd: Section Nicolai Hartmann . In: History of Philosophy, Volume XII . Beck, Munich 2004
  11. Martin Morgenstern: Nicolai Hartmann for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1997, 32
  12. Martin Morgenstern: Nicolai Hartmann for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1997, 136
  13. Martin Morgenstern: Nicolai Hartmann for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1997, 134
  14. ^ Nicolai Hartmann: Systematic Philosophy . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart-Berlin 1942, 240
  15. Hartmann: Systematic Philosophy . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1942, p. 209
  16. Nicolai Hartmann: The problem of the spiritual being (1933) . 3rd edition Berlin 1962, 13.
  17. Joseph M. Bochenski: European philosophy of the present . 2nd edition Lehnen, Bern / Munich 1951, 218
  18. Jochen Fahrenberg: On the theory of categories in psychology, 2013 [1] .
  19. ^ Website of the Nicolai-Hartmann-Society with references to conferences, etc. a. in March 2011 in Wuppertal and in May 2011 in Katowice
  20. ^ Nicolai Hartmann, The Cirkel Protocols (1920 to 1950) Edition from the estate, German Literature Archive Marbach . In: . Retrieved July 23, 2019.
  21. Excerpt in: Martin Morgenstern , Robert Zimmer Ed .: Meeting Point Philosophy. Vol. 5 Realities and worldviews. BSV , Munich 2002 ISBN 3-7627-0326-4 & Patmos, Düsseldorf 2002 ISBN 3-491-75642-1 , p. 130 f.