Edmund Husserl

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Edmund Husserl (1900)

Edmund Gustav Albrecht Husserl [ˈhʊsɐl] (* April 8, 1859 in Proßnitz in Moravia , Austrian Empire ; † April 27, 1938 in Freiburg im Breisgau ) was an Austro-German philosopher and mathematician and founder of the philosophical trend in phenomenology . He is considered one of the most influential thinkers of the 20th century .

Husserl studied mathematics in Leipzig with Karl Weierstrass and Leo Koenigsberger and philosophy with Franz Brentano and Carl Stumpf . From 1887 he taught philosophy as a private lecturer in Halle . From 1901 he taught first in Göttingen , later as a professor in Freiburg . In 1928 he was retired , but this did not affect his philosophical work. In 1938 he fell ill and died in Freiburg that same year.

While his early writings aimed at a psychological foundation for mathematics, Husserl's Logical Investigations , which appeared in 1900 and 1901, presented a comprehensive critique of the psychologism prevailing at the time , which saw the laws of logic as the expression of mere psychological conditions. In addition, he presented far-reaching considerations on pure logic. Around 1907, Husserl presented the “phenomenological reduction” method he had developed. From then on, this would not only have a decisive influence on his further work, but also lead to the philosophical approach of a transcendental idealism in his subsequent works .

Husserl's thinking shaped the philosophy of the 20th century, especially in Germany and France, and is still very effective today. Husserl's students include Martin Heidegger , Oskar Becker , Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss , Eugen Fink , Edith Stein and Günther Anders . Max Scheler , Alfred Schütz , Jean-Paul Sartre , Maurice Merleau-Ponty , Emmanuel Levinas and many more were significantly influenced by his thinking.


Youth and education

Memorial plaque in Prostejov

The second son of a Jewish cloth merchant family belonging to the German-speaking middle class , Husserl was born in Prostejov (German Proßnitz), in Moravia, in 1859 - a town that was then part of Austria-Hungary and is now in the Czech Republic. Subsequently, he attended the grammar school in Olomouc, where he obtained the university entrance qualification in 1876. At the University of Leipzig (1876–1878) he studied mathematics and physics as well as astronomy and attended the lectures of the philosopher Wilhelm Wundt , one of the founders of modern, scientifically oriented psychology. Wundt represented a holistic scientific approach in which natural and human sciences perspectives were connected. At first, however, philosophy was only a sideline for Husserl. At the University of Leipzig he met Tomáš G. Masaryk , who also came from Moravia and earned his living as a private teacher. Masaryk later became a member of the Austrian Imperial Council, led the Czech independence movement during the First World War and became the first President of Czechoslovakia in 1918 (after the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy) . Even if both lost sight of each other after three semesters in Leipzig, the encounter had consequences for Husserl's further development. Masaryk not only supported Husserl's conversion to the Evangelical Lutheran faith, he also recommended his doctoral supervisor, the philosopher Franz Brentano, as a philosophical teacher and mentor.

First, Husserl moved to Berlin in 1878 to continue his mathematics studies under Leopold Kronecker and Karl Weierstrass at the Friedrich Wilhelm University (today: Humboldt University) . There he attended Friedrich Paulsen's philosophy lectures . In 1881 he moved to the University of Vienna to complete his mathematics studies under the direction of a former student of Karl Weierstrass, Leo Königsberger. In 1883 he received his doctorate with his mathematical work Contributions to the theory of the calculus of variations .

After completing his doctorate, he returned to Berlin to work as an assistant to Karl Weierstrass. When he fell ill, Husserl again moved to Vienna and did his military service there. In 1884 he attended Franz Brentano's lecture on philosophy and philosophical psychology at the University of Vienna. Brentano is considered the founder of nude psychology and taught psychology from the empirical point of view (1874), as the title of his main work is. He introduced Husserl to the works of Bernard Bolzano , Hermann Lotze , John Stuart Mill and David Hume . Husserl was so impressed by Brentano's work that he decided to devote his life to philosophy; Franz Brentano is often seen as the most important influencer of Husserl. Since Brentano was unable to do his habilitation as a private lecturer, Husserl followed Carl Stumpf, a former student of Brentano who - like Wundt - was a pioneer of modern psychology, to the University of Halle / Saale, where he worked under his direction in 1887 with the work Über habilitated on the concept of number . This treatise, located between psychology and mathematics, was later to serve as the basis for his first influential work, Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891).

In 1887, Husserl married Malvine Steinschneider and was baptized and married as a Protestant on this occasion. Their daughter Elizabeth was born in 1892, their son Gerhart in 1893 , and their son Wolfgang in 1894, who died in the First World War. Gerhart Husserl became a legal philosopher who did research on the subject of comparative law and first taught in the USA and after the war in Germany.

Academic research and teaching

Following his habilitation, Husserl began his university career in 1887 as an unpaid private lecturer at the University of Halle / Saale. With his book Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), which refers to his earlier work on mathematics and philosophy and proposes a psychological framework as a basis for mathematics, Husserl attracted the critical attention of the logician Gottlob Frege . In consideration of his criticism of psychologism , he carried out extensive logical investigations up to the turn of the century , which grew into his first major work and brought the forty-two- year-old in 1901 a call to Göttingen , where he taught for fourteen years, initially as an associate professor and from 1906 as a full professor. The first volume of the Logical Investigations contains reflections on a “pure logic” which represent a rejection of “psychologism”. The work was well received and, among other things, the subject of a seminar by Wilhelm Dilthey. He became personally known during his time in Göttingen with David Hilbert , Leonard Nelson , Wilhelm Dilthey , Max Scheler , Alexandre Koyré and Karl Jaspers as well as the poet Hugo von Hofmannsthal .

In 1908 Husserl visited his former teacher Franz Brentano in Italy. In 1910 he became co-editor of the magazine Logos . During this time he gave lectures on the inner time consciousness, which were edited for publication more than ten years later by his former student Martin Heidegger.

In 1912, Husserl founded the yearbook for philosophy and phenomenological research with the followers of his philosophy , which published articles of the new philosophical direction from 1913 to 1930 - for example in the first edition of the yearbook Husserl's influential work Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy .

Husserl's house in Freiburg from 1916 to 1937

In October 1914, both of Husserl's sons were drafted and had to fight on the western front of the First World War. The following year, Wolfgang Husserl was seriously wounded. He died on March 8, 1916 on the Verdun battlefield. The next year his other son Gerhart Husserl was also injured in battle, but survived. Husserl's mother Julia died that same year. In November 1917, Adolf Reinach , one of Husserl's most notable students and himself a legal philosopher, fell in Flanders.

In 1916, Husserl accepted a call to the Albert Ludwig University of Freiburg (i. Breisgau), where he took over the chair of the Neo-Kantian Heinrich Rickert as a full professor and advanced his philosophical research. At this time, despite the precarious situation in Germany after the lost First World War, Husserl had developed into one of the leading German-speaking philosophers who had a large group of students around him and was recognized both at home and abroad. Edith Stein worked as his personal assistant in these first years; Martin Heidegger took over this position from 1920 to 1923. In 1922, Husserl gave four lectures on the phenomenological method at University College London. The University of Berlin offered him a position in 1923, which he refused. He received honorary doctorates from the Universities of London, Paris, Prague and Boston and was elected a member of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences , the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and the British Academy . In 1927 Heidegger dedicated his book Being and Time to Husserl “in grateful admiration and friendship”. Husserl remained a professor in Freiburg until he asked to be allowed to retire; He held his last lecture on July 25, 1928. A commemorative publication was presented to him on April 8, 1929 as a present on his seventieth birthday. His students included Edith Stein and Martin Heidegger, who succeeded the Freiburg chair, the technology philosopher Günther Stern (Anders), the racial and ethnic psychologist Ludwig Ferdinand Clauss and the philosophers Eugen Fink, Dietrich von Hildebrand and Ludwig Landgrebe .

Last years

Husserl's grave in the cemetery in Freiburg Günterstal

Despite his retirement, Husserl held other important lectures: The Paris lectures from 1929 led to the Cartesian Meditations (Paris 1931). His lectures in Prague in 1935 and again in Vienna in 1936 culminated in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Belgrade 1936). The last writings bear the fruits of his academic life. After his resignation from the university, Husserl worked with great intensity and completed several larger projects.

In April 1933, Husserl - although already retired - was given leave of absence by a special decree of the state of Baden on the Reich Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service , which allowed both political opponents of the National Socialists and Jewish civil servants to be dismissed, which prohibited him from any teaching activity. Due to the absurdity of this decision and the fact that Husserl, because his son had died at the front, fell under the frontline fighter privilege , the decision was revised in July 1933. However, in 1936, after heightened racial persecution with the introduction of the Nuremberg Race Laws , his license to teach was revoked for good. His colleague Heidegger took over the post of rector at the University of Freiburg on April 21, 1933 and became a member of the NSDAP on May 1, 1933. Husserl, on the other hand, left the German Academy.

After a fall in autumn 1937, Husserl fell ill with pleurisy . He died in Freiburg on April 27, 1938, shortly after his 79th birthday. His wife Malvine survived him. Eugen Fink, his research assistant, gave his eulogy. Gerhard Ritter was the only representative of the University of Freiburg to attend the funeral.

During his lifetime, Husserl not only switched between different study locations and academic disciplines, but also his citizenship and denomination. He had changed the latter in 1887, shortly before his marriage in Vienna. He was baptized as an Evangelical Lutheran , so he did not join the Catholicism that dominated the area , but rather Protestantism, which is considered to be progressive. He belongs to a minority of Jewish citizens who converted to Christianity and gave up their traditional beliefs in return. Even if the transfer made his academic career easier, he converted not out of opportunism, but out of conviction. His death finally saved him from further persecution by the National Socialists. In 1896, after having lived in the German Empire for sixteen years, Husserl took on Prussian citizenship.

Foundations of Husserl's philosophy

Early Philosophy

In his early work, Husserl tried to combine mathematics, psychology and philosophy with the aim of working out a foundation for mathematics. He analyzes the psychological process that is necessary to form the concept of number; Following on from this, he tries to develop a systematic theory. In this way he draws on different methods and concepts of his teachers. For example, he takes over from Weierstraß the idea that we acquire the concept of number by counting a certain collection of objects.

He adopts the distinction between “concrete” and “inconcrete” ideas from Brentano and Stumpf. Husserl's example of this is: when you stand in front of a house, you have a “concrete”, “direct” idea of ​​this house, but if you look for it and ask for directions, then you provide the directions (e.g. the house at the Corner of this and that street) represents an “unspecific”, “indirect” idea. In other words, one has a “concrete” idea of ​​an object when it is directly present, and an “unspecific” (or “symbolic”, like Husserl it) also called) imagination, when the object is represented by signs, symbols, etc.

Logic is a formal theory of judgment that examines the formal a priori relations of judgments with the help of categories of meaning. Mathematics, in turn, is formal ontology. Thus the objects of investigation of a philosophy of logic and mathematics are not sensory objects, but the different formal categories of logic and mathematics. The problem with the psychological approach to math and logic is that it fails to take into account the fact that it is about formal categories and not simply about abstractions of sentience. The reason we don't just work with sensual things in mathematics is because of “categorical abstraction,” another level of understanding. At this level, we can leave aside the sensory components of judgment and focus on the formal categories themselves. Husserl criticizes the logicians of his time for disregarding this connection in their psychological foundations.

Criticism of psychologism

After receiving a PhD in mathematics, Husserl analyzed the basics of mathematics from a psychological point of view. In his habilitation thesis On the Concept of Number (1886) and in his Philosophy of Arithmetic (1891), using Brentano's descriptive psychology, he tries to define natural numbers in a way that is similar to the methods and techniques of Karl Weierstrass, Richard Dedekind, Georg Cantor, Gottlob Frege and others continue.

In the first part of his Logical Investigations , the Prolegomena of Pure Logic , Husserl then attacks the psychological point of view in logic and mathematics. Following the psychologism , it would, according to Husserl logic not an autonomous discipline, but a branch of psychology: either a prescriptive and practical "way" the right judgment (a position that Brentano and some of his more orthodox students represented) or a description of factual processes of human thought. Husserl sees the reason why the opponents of psychologism could not overcome psychologism in their failure to distinguish between the theoretical, fundamental side of logic and the applied, practical side of it. Pure logic does not deal at all with "thoughts" or "judgments" as spiritual episodes, rather it is concerned with laws and conditions a priori of any theory and any judgment. Psychologists have failed to show how we can ensure the certainty of logical principles, such as the principle of identity and excluded contradiction, from a psychological standpoint. It is therefore pointless to base logical laws and principles on uncertain processes of empirical consciousness.

This critique of psychologism, the distinction between psychic acts and intentional objects and the difference between the normative side of logic and its theoretical side, is derived from an ideal conception of logic. This means that logical and mathematical laws apply independently of empirical human consciousness.


Husserl adopts the concept of intentionality from Brentano . Intentionality means that consciousness is characterized by the fact that it is always related to something. Often simply summarized as “awareness of something” or the relationship between an act of consciousness and the external world, Brentano defines it as the main characteristic of mental phenomena, which distinguishes them from physical phenomena. Every psychic act has a content, relates to an object (the intentional object). Every belief, wish etc. has an object to which it relates: what is believed, what is desired. Husserl himself elaborated the term for the first time in his fifth Logical Investigation in a systematic way.

Knowledge ” is bound to psychological and physiological processes, but it is not identical with these. A logical norm can never be derived from an empirical psychological proposition. Empirical sentences are only probable and can be falsified . Logic, on the other hand, is not subject to causality like empiricism . Philosophy as a science can therefore not be bound by naturalism . Philosophy, epistemology, logic and pure mathematics are ideal sciences whose laws express ideal truths a priori . Phenomenology as the " essence of what is given" is supposed to be the basis of all knowledge without any preconditions.

Stumbling block for Edmund Husserl in front of the college building I of the University of Freiburg

Phenomenological reduction and epoché

A few years after the publication of the Logical Investigations in 1900–1901, Husserl developed some crucial conceptual differentiations. He had come to the view that in studying the structure of consciousness one had to distinguish between an "act of consciousness" and a "phenomenon to which it is directed" (the object to which one intentionally refers). Knowledge of the being would be possible through the "bracketing" of all prejudices about the existence of an outside world. Husserl calls the corresponding methodical procedure Epoché (ἐποχή). This new conception led to the publication of the ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy in 1913, as well as the plans for a second edition of the Logical Investigations .

Since the publication of his ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy , Husserl concentrated on the ideal, essential structures of consciousness. The metaphysical problem of the reality of objects independent of the perceiving subject was of no particular interest to him, although he advocated a transcendental idealism. He called the way in which we, as "people of natural life" perceive the natural world and the things around us, as a natural attitude . Let this be characterized by the assumption that objects exist outside the perceiving subject and have properties that we perceive:

“As my counterpart, I always find the one spatial-temporal reality to which I belong, like all other people found in it and related to it in the same way. The 'reality', which suggests the word, I think as existent before and take them as they are to me, as existent back. Any doubt and rejection of the facts of the natural world does not change anything in the general thesis of the natural attitude . "

Compared to the natural attitude, phenomenology now makes a change: it switches off the natural attitude by exercising “a certain abstinence from judgment” and bracketing the natural world. The gaze is directed towards the transcendental ego - and its contents of consciousness - which in many ways is intentionally directed towards the objects and thereby "constitutes" them. From the phenomenological point of view, the object does not simply exist “outside” and does not itself provide indications of what it is, but becomes a bundle of perceptible and functional aspects that mutually imply under the idea of ​​a certain object or “type” . The reality of objects is not rejected by phenomenology, but "bracketed" - as a way in which we view objects rather than a property inherent in the nature of the object. In order to better understand the world of appearances and things, phenomenology aims to identify the invariant structures of our modes of perception and thus provides knowledge about the consciousness and the structures of these services.

Philosophy as a strict science

Husserl responded to Dilthey's philosophy of world view , published in 1911, in the same year with the essay Philosophy as Strict Science . There Husserl initially rejects naturalism, since it cannot clarify its epistemological presuppositions for itself. This can only be achieved by a "scientific knowledge of the essence of consciousness" and this is phenomenology. It determines what is common to all individual acts of consciousness , namely awareness of ... being, i. that is, they mean something concrete . In disregarding what is meant by ... the essence of the acts of consciousness results ; it can be "fixed as an objective unit".

The establishment of objectively valid facts is possible because, even if these have become historical, they can still be absolutely valid - Genesis does not affect the validity. As an example of a system of necessary propositions, Husserl cites mathematics, which cannot at all orientate itself on history to judge the truth of its theories. "The 'idea' of science [...] is timeless, [...] not limited by any relation to the spirit of a time." Husserl therefore proclaims the "will to strict science" against the philosophy of worldview.

The late work: Crisis of the Sciences

Husserl's house in Freiburg from July 1937 until his death on April 27, 1938

In his late work, Husserl criticized the fact that the modern sciences, with their claim to grasp the world objectivistically, no longer answer people's questions about the meaning of life . He therefore called on the sciences, to reflect the fact that they own their origin of human life world owe. The lifeworld, as a central concept, is for Husserl the pre-theoretical and as yet unquestioned world of the natural attitude: the world in which we live, think, work and create . Husserl's transcendental phenomenology seeks to reduce the alienation that has arisen between people and the world.

Ontology and metaphysics

Husserl's phenomenology sees itself as a rejection of “ metaphysical [r] adventures ”, but by no means as a rejection of any metaphysics in general. Husserl's engagement with ontology and metaphysics can be divided into three phases.

  1. In the Logical Investigations there is initially a neutrality with regard to the metaphysical question, which Husserl here as "[the] question of the existence and nature of the 'outside world'". understands. In this work he concentrates solely on “epistemology, as a general enlightenment about the ideal being and about the valid meaning of knowing thought”. That epistemology , which he also understands as the a priori theory of objects as such, is later referred to by Husserl in retrospect with the “old expression ontology”.
  2. The second phase can be found in Ideas I. At the start of the epoch, Husserl now strives for phenomenology as an eidetic and transcendental science. It comprises a universal formal ontology as well as regional, material ontologies. As essential sciences, these form the basis of all empirical and factual sciences and represent an "indispensable precondition [...] for every metaphysics and other philosophy - 'which can appear as a science'". Husserl primarily deepens this new understanding of ontology and metaphysics In the lecture First Philosophy : “First Philosophy” precedes “a science of the totality of the pure (a priori) principles of all possible cognitions and the totality of the a priori truths determined systematically in them, that is, purely deductible from them,” their “application” "The totality of the 'real', that is to say the rationally 'explanatory' factual sciences" lead to a "'Second Philosophy'", which Husserl also calls a "'metaphysical' interpretation of the 'universe [s]'" (the latter as "the universal theme of positive sciences ”) understands.
  3. The third phase contains a reversal of the relationship between ontological possibility and metaphysical reality: "[T] as Eidos transcendental ego is unthinkable without the transcendental ego as factual". "All essential necessities are moments of his fact". And more generally: "We come to the ultimate 'facts' - basic facts, ultimate necessities, the basic necessities". A metaphysics of the original facts is now the basis of a phenomenological science of essence and ontology, which in turn supplies the a priori determinations for the science of facts.

In the course of the return to Aristotle from Trendelenburg, Brentano and Meinong, as well as in the circle of those early pupils of Husserl who were critical of his turn to idealism, approaches to ontology and metaphysics with realistic and in any case anti-idealistic traits developed early on. This applies to Adolf Reinach , Hedwig Conrad-Martius , Moritz Geiger , Roman Ingarden , but also to Nicolai Hartmann . Husserl's assistants Ludwig Landgrebe and Eugen Fink each worked in their own way on dealing with metaphysical questions arising from Husserl's phenomenology. In contemporary phenomenology, continuations can be found in László Tengelyi , Alexander Schnell , Jocelyn Benoist , Jean-François Lavigne and Dominique Pradelle .


Volumes 13–15 of the Husserliana give the best information about Husserl's phenomenology of intersubjectivity . These editions are formally characterized by the fact that, with a few exceptions, they are based on the so-called “research manuscripts” which Husserl wrote monologically only for himself, and in which he does not present problem solutions to an audience, but searches for them. The first volume includes main texts on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity from 1905 to 1920, the second from 1921 to 1928, and the third from 1929 to 1935. The division into three different volumes corresponds to three different major phases of Husserl's struggle for conception and presentation his phenomenological philosophy.


The earliest text that could be found in the estate on the problem of intersubjectivity comes from the summer of 1905, bears the title "Individuality of I and Experiences" from Husserl and is dedicated to the difference between the experiencing individuals. It comes from the beginning of the time when Husserl developed the idea of ​​phenomenological reduction as the “most fundamental of all methods”, and which reached a climax in 1910/11 with the lectures “Basic Problems of Phenomenology”. The main point of these lectures consisted in overcoming the phenomenological solipsism, in which Husserl with his conception of phenomenological reduction in his lectures "Introduction to Epistemology" from 1906/07 and in the introduction of his lecture "Principles from Phenomenology and Critique of Reason" from 1907 was still biased by the extension of the phenomenological reduction to intersubjectivity. To put it more concretely, it consisted in the fact that he included the other (foreign) intentional conscious subjects that were made present in empathy (foreign experience) into the phenomenological research field. Understandably, between 1905 and 1910/11, Husserl began to grapple with the best-known theories of the knowledge of the foreign ego at the time: Benno Erdmann's theory of the analogy inferring the foreign ego and Theodor Lipps' criticism of the same and his own theory of his Aesthetics-rooted teaching of the immediate empathy of experiences in perceived outer bodies. Husserl thought both theories were wrong. From Lipps, Husserl took over the word empathy for the foreign experience, although he always rejected his theory of empathy and was of the opinion that "empathy is a wrong expression" for the experience of foreign experiences, since this experience is aware of foreign experiences and is in her therefore not current her own felt (introjected).

But it was not until 1914/15 that Husserl dealt intensively with the analysis of empathy and designed this problem in a way that was also fundamental for his later exploration of it during the twenties and thirties. The corresponding text group does not deal exclusively with empathy (experience of strangers), but also with various other types (modes) of visualizations; empathy is a constant problem. The third of these six texts is entitled: “Studies on vivid visualizations, [i. H. about] memories, fantasies, visual representations with special regard to the question of the ego visualized in them and the possibility of imagining the ego ”, and Husserl remarks in a later footnote:“ The purpose of these studies was for the particular way of visualization , empathy means learning something. ”This context shows that Husserl approached the problem of the experience (empathy) of the other (ie of another self and its experiences) as a kind of visualization, such as the memory of one's own experiences, which as another kind of visualization also visualizes an I and its experiences that are not immediately present. But while the own experiences remembered in the memory are past and the remembered I is the same as the remembering, the experiences made present in empathy can be present in time, and there is no identity between empathic and felt self.

In the first text of this group, Husserl asks the question: "How does this interpretation [of a body other than myself as a stranger] take place?" And finally, after trying the approach, which was no longer satisfactory from 1920/21 onwards, answers the possibility of one to think foreign ego before his real experience, with the sentence that is now always valid for him: "If I had no body, if my body, my empirical ego [...] had not been given to me, then I could not have another body, no other person" see '[...] I can only grasp the foreign body in the interpretation of a body similar to mine as a body and thus as the carrier of an I (one similar to mine). ”This sentence is the basis of the“ pairing [between foreign body and own body ] as an associative constituent component of the experience of the foreign ”in § 51 in the fifth of the Cartesian Meditations of 1931. In the text group from 1914/15, Husserl thinks the other ego as an analog of his own I. ch in there, d. H. as a point of view on the world that I would have if I were not here but there.

In text no.14 from the period between 1914 and 1917, Husserl examines the relativism of the normality of experience, which is conditioned by psychophysical conditionality, and discusses the conditions of the possibility of intersubjective objectivity of nature up to logical-mathematical objectivity. In this context he expresses for the first time the idea of ​​the intersubjectivity of the phenomena ("aspects", sights), which in the first version of Ideas II he still considered as belonging to the individual subject - the individual monad. In text no. 15 from September 1918 he develops the distinction between “straight empathy”, in which the empathic person is directed to the environment that appears to the felt ego, and “oblique empathy”, in which the empathic person is directed to the intentional experiences of the felt self reflected. At the center of the last text by Hua XIII , written in the summer of 1920 , is the difference between “improper (non-illustrative) empathy”, that of scientific psychology, and “actual (vivid empathy)” as “absolutely empathic knowledge”, that of the humanities underlying.


From the numerous texts that were published in On the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, Part Two : 1921–1928, only four topics from texts or text groups are highlighted here.

  1. In the first of the texts from the context of the preparations for a “great systematic work” (1921/22), his phenomenological analyzes lead him for the first time to recognize the empathized self as a radical transcendence towards the self, although it belongs to the transcendental-phenomenological area : "Empathy creates the first true transcendence [...] Here a second stream of consciousness is set with it, not [like physical things] as the formation of the meaning of my stream, but as only indicated by its formation of meaning [constitution] and legislation [...]."
  2. Within the text group from 1921/22, the texts nos. 9 and 10 and their supplements, which Husserl placed under the title “Community Spirit”, deserve special attention. This term comes from the founder of German sociology, Ferdinand Tönnies (1855–1936), who understood it to mean the common spirit of a community. Husserl adopted this term in text no. 10, which he headed “Personal units of a higher order and their correlates of effects”; in text no. 9 he refers specifically to Tönnies and his work Community and Society . In text no. 10 it says: “So it is not a mere analogy, not a mere picture, when we speak of a common spirit […], just as little as when we speak correlatively of a structure such as language or custom, etc. A faculty has convictions, desires, decisions of will, it carries out actions, just like an association, a people, a state. And we can also speak of ability, character, disposition, etc. in a strict, but correspondingly higher-level sense. ”Just as important and fundamental for text no. 10 is text no. 9, to which Husserl also gave the title“ common spirit ”. This is about the "social acts" that Husserl distinguishes from mere empathy and understanding and which he in this text, only hinted at, in acts of turning to others, showing them something, of the I-Thou relationship with one another Speaking, wanting something together, doing something, loving one another in different ways (from sexual love to neighborly love) differentiated. In no other texts did Husserl speak so differently of such social acts and corresponding communities as in these two and their supplements.
  3. In text no. 19 (between 1925 and 1928) the concept of “originality”, which was already mentioned in text no. 11 (around 1921), is analyzed in more detail. Husserl first tries to define the experience of others as an original experience, but then rejects this approach and finally distinguishes three different terms of the original experience: 1. the sphere of “primordinal originality”, “the original experience that does not Empathy stocks, no stocks of the foreign subject [...] applies ”, 2. the sphere of“ secondary originality [first originality] ”,“ which includes everyone else's original sphere of experience ”, 3. my“ tertiary original experience [= second Originarity] ”, which gives me“ cultural objects which for their part originally owe their meaning to the cultivating [foreign] subjects ”. In this differentiation, the concept of "primordinal originality (primal originality)" appears for the first time, which Husserl takes over in his concept of the primordinal sphere or sphere of peculiarities in the fifth Cartesian meditation ( Hua I) and which is fundamental for his concept of the monad: the monad is, according to Husserl, identical with the sphere of primordinal originality or individuality.
  4. The texts (nos. 20–37) from the context of the second part of the lectures “Introduction to Phenomenology” of the winter semester 1926/27 contain the most precise reflections and phenomenological analyzes on the problem of the experience of foreigners, the “perception of a person”, since the text group from 1914/15 in Hua XIII. The greatest achievement of these reflections is their proof that the immediate perception, which is fundamental for empathy, of the correspondence between the moving (behaving) foreign body that appears to me in the outer space and the body that appears to me, despite the fundamental difference in their visual appearance, through the constitutive reference back of every spatial movement and change of location to one's own subjective “kinesthetic” movement and ability to move without analogization “without further ado” becomes understandable. This merely sensual, present seeing is indeed not yet a presenting "in the phantasy" transferring oneself to the point of view of this living being related to its spatial environment and thus not yet an understanding of another ego, but its necessary basis.

Hua XV

The third part of On the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity, Third Part: 1929–1935. comprises 670 pages. Text No. 35 and its supplement XLVIII from September 1933, compared to the two previous volumes, are devoted to a completely new and very rich topic caused by the problems of the lifeworld: the relationship between the home world and the foreign world, the appropriation of foreign worlds (“ Hiding from strangers "), understanding each other as people with a core of the world as an understood" core of the misunderstandings that make humanity and the world concrete in their natural relativity "The supplement ends with the sentences" We normally live [...] in an environment that is for us [...] a really familiar world [...]. In the indirect horizon are the strange humanities and cultures; they belong to it as strange and strange, but strangeness means accessibility in the actual inaccessibility in the mode of incomprehensibility. "

Phenomenology of space and movement ( Hua XVI)

Husserl has spent his life analyzing the perception of spatial objects. Of particular importance is a lecture given in the summer semester of 1907, which was published in 1973 under the title Thing and Space as Volume XVI of the Husserliana. In accordance with the basic idea of ​​phenomenological intentional analysis, Husserl's perception analyzes focus on the “ correlation of perception and perceived thingness”. It shows that in the consciousness of the perceiver the perceived thing is always given only one-sidedly. This “essential inadequacy of every isolated external perception” characterizes the “perception of spatial things”. Corresponding to it is the necessary reference to further possibilities of perception of the same thing connected with and with one another. Perceptual things can therefore not be grasped in isolated acts of perception, but only in perceptual processes that turn into “syntheses of identification”.

Husserl deepens his perception analyzes by addressing the dependence of the constitution of the object of perception on physical movement phenomena and examining the connection between the sensations of movement, the so-called kinaestheses, and the associated changes in appearance. The special achievement of the kinesthesia consists on the one hand in the constitution of identical, physically voluminous objects. On the other hand, according to Husserl (unlike for Kant), the space of our perceptual experience is constituted in and through the appearances of the perceived things. The space is therefore also ultimately constituted in the kinaesthetic systems of perception.

In detail, Husserl works out the various kinaesthetic achievements and experiences necessary for the constitution of the thing and space, by moving from one-eyed to two-eyed vision, from staring to eye, head and upper body movement and finally to free physical movement of the perceiver . In doing so, he expresses himself fluctuatingly with regard to the question of which kinestheses ultimately bring about the experience of the three-dimensional physical-spatial world. While he has considered in the context of thing and space that the transition from one-eyed to two-eyed vision is already connected with the experience of spatial depth. In later works he understood the constitution of spatial depth as the achievement of the current field. From a factual point of view, however, it would make little sense to play off the constitutive achievements of visual or tactical perception and the corresponding kinesthesia against each other. Rather, according to Husserl, the visual and the current field are closely intertwined.


Husserl's ethical considerations can be divided into three phases: the early phase of a cognitivistically oriented ethics of values , the middle phase of a rationalistic ethics of will and the late phase of an affective ethics of love. All these phases are pervaded by the phenomenological concepts of value and person . Husserl's goal in ethics is to use his phenomenological method to pave a middle path between emotional morality and intellectual morality.

The elaboration of a formal and material rationality of the emotional acts of valuing and willing is intended to reject the subjectivism and relativism of emotional morality. At the same time, against the rationalistic ignorance of the role of feelings, Husserl sticks to the thesis that ethics can ultimately only be found in emotional acts, i.e. H. is accessible in acts of valuing and willing and can only be based on them.

In the lectures on ethics and value theory of 1914, Husserl advocates a strict parallelism between logic and ethics and, according to his antipsychological view, assigns ethical issues a reality of their own. Although he takes into account the situation of the acting subject in his Brentano-based categorical imperative “Do the best under what is attainable!”, He does so under the premise that there is a formal and material a priori in every situation that would have to be determined eidetrically. This attitude that any subject could "recalculate" what would be correct eidetic for it to do is abandoned by Husserl in his later ethics. But it is not the case that he would reject his axiological theory and his considerations on preferential laws of volition as wrong. He just no longer considers it to be an approach that would be appropriate to ethical experience. Crucial for this is Moritz Geiger's objection that “it would be ridiculous to demand that a mother should first consider whether the support of her child is the best in her practical area” The effort, the objectivity of values ​​and the rationality of the Showing phenomenological feelings gives way to the insight that a purely theoretical or metaethical consideration of the ethical impact by a call does not do justice and leads to a focus on the personal and individualizing being called upon by “love values”. This characterizes the second and third phases of Husserl's ethics from 1918, whereby these phases partially intermesh. On the one hand, the “Five Essays on Renewal” from 1922–1924 show clear rationalistic and perfectionist traits: The answer to the call is a willful decision that extends over one's entire life to strive for the goal of ethical perfection and “true human incarnation” in constant renewal . On the other hand, in Husserl's estate there are the motives of an emphasis on the affectivity and passivity of being called in the “absolute ought” and the answer to this in active love (“love value” and “love community”), as well as darker motifs such as theological-teleological Fate, death, sacrifice and decision.

Psychology and psychiatry

The intersections of phenomenology with psychology and psychiatry are probably one of the most fruitful areas of application of the approach established by Husserl. This is especially true for psychopathology, which, in the modern form of Karl Jaspers, owes phenomenology to lasting impulses to this day. In the German and French-speaking areas, phenomenological-anthropological conceptions exerted a decisive, at times even dominant influence on psychiatry in the last century, which was linked in particular to the “analysis of existence” based on Heidegger's fundamental ontology. After the last comprehensive synopsis by Spiegelberg, however, phenomenological research directions faded into the background compared to the experimental-biological paradigms that have dominated until today. While academic psychology has only sporadically shown itself to be open to phenomenological approaches, a lively, also international renaissance of phenomenology can now be observed in psychopathology and psychiatry, which primarily falls back on the conceptions of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Despite his rejection of psychologism in the Logical Investigations, Husserl himself developed approaches to a phenomenological psychology, especially in the lectures of the same name from 1925, in which the conception of such a psychology is outlined as an "a priori science of the soul" and as a form “Regional ontology” is differentiated from transcendental phenomenology. While phenomenological psychology moves in the field of the direct experience of self and the experience of others, the structure and nature of which it is supposed to open up by means of phenomenological reduction and eidetic variation, transcendental phenomenology examines the constitution of everything given in subjective experience on the basis of transcendental subjectivity - a distinction that later also became important for psychopathology, since in certain forms of psychotic experience it is precisely these basic constitutional functions that are disturbed. However, the project was not carried out and the contribution of phenomenology to academic psychology was limited as a result.

In the period after the Second World War, a lively phenomenological movement developed in the Netherlands , represented in particular by Frederik Buytendijk, Johannes Linschoten and Jan van den Berg. Extensive research focused on the phenomenology of the human situation, for example in everyday experiences such as greeting, driving, sexual encounters or falling asleep.

Finally, we should like to point out the question of the phenomenological method , which is important for the future of the research direction, and which has to assert itself in psychology against the dominant empirical-experimental orientation. An elaborate methodology of descriptive phenomenology was developed by Giorgi, among others, at Duquesne University since the 1960s. Based on the phenomenological epoché and eidetic variation, the subjective experience should be captured in empathic intuition and used as a basis for further qualitative analyzes. Similar approaches to the practice of phenomenological introspection and experience analysis can be found today in French phenomenology.

As a systematic project of investigating the structures of subjective experience, phenomenology was naturally also suitable as a basic science for psychopathology. Karl Jaspers and Ludwig Binswanger, who went beyond this and developed a phenomenological-anthropological direction in psychiatry, should be mentioned here. Erwin Straus, Emil von Gebsattel, Eugen Minkowski, Jürg Zutt, Roland Kuhn, Hubertus Tellenbach, Wolfgang Blankenburg, Bin Kimura and Arthur Tatossian are among the main representatives of the phenomenological-anthropological psychiatry that originated in Binswanger.

Phenomenological approaches in psychology and psychiatry examine the phenomena, structures and structural elements of conscious experience, particularly with regard to corporeality, temporality, intentionality and intersubjectivity, in order to also capture their modifications in mental illness. Phenomenology provides a rich set of instruments for researching these layers of experience, ranging from phenomenological description and the recording of eidetic typologies to transcendental phenomenology, constitution and lifeworld analysis. The research opportunities that this offers are by no means exhausted. In the last two decades in particular, an international renaissance of phenomenological psychiatry, which is particularly oriented towards Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, can be observed, which emphasizes the importance of pre-reflective and affective experience, of "passive syntheses" in the constitution of experience and, last but not least, of transcendental intersubjectivity for the Understanding of mental illness.

Although methodologically it still brackets any assumptions about causal explanations, phenomenology thus provides a framework for the analysis of subjectivity and its disorders, which also lead to empirically testable hypotheses about underlying etiological processes. Phenomenological-anthropological psychiatry does not see itself as an uninvolved observation from outside. Her analyzes of intersubjectivity also include the relationship between patient and therapist, and she pays special attention to the phenomenology of the diagnostic and therapeutic process itself: for example, the phenomena of intuition, inter-corporeality, empathic understanding and existential encounters: this is not the last reason why it sustains also contributes to the philosophical foundation of psychotherapy. Above all in the concepts of humanistic and existential orientation such as gestalt therapy, talk therapy, existence and existential analysis, it is often in the foreground as a methodological tool. Last but not least, phenomenology can be seen today as the decisive direction in the sciences of the psyche, which defends the reality and significance of subjectivity and intersubjectivity against reductionist-naturalistic approaches.

Husserl's estate

Throughout his life, Husserl published little compared to what he actually put on paper. His book publications can be counted on one hand, and he has only published a few smaller texts and essays or reviews. Almost every day, Husserl wrote a kind of philosophical thinking diary, manuscripts written in shorthand in which he tried out ideas or pursued trains of thought, some of which he later rejected. In part, these texts resemble a pure stream of thoughts without a recognizable line or line of argument. Nevertheless, there are statements by Husserl, especially at an advanced age, that his manuscripts contain the essence of his philosophy, especially because his published writings are largely introductory, while the manuscripts contain many individual analyzes as well as drafts and approaches to a systematic work that he wanted to write from around 1922, but never completed it.

Since Husserl realized, especially from the beginning of National Socialism in 1933, that he would no longer come to a systematic conclusion of such a system of phenomenology (not to mention the publication ban for Jews issued by the National Socialists), he took precautions to systematically organize his estate in order to archive it as a tool for future generations of phenomenologists. The immediate reason for putting the order in order was the desire to offer it to the Brentano Archives in Prague, with which he could have applied for asylum for himself and his family. After the Nazis marched into Prague, this last hope was also destroyed.

Husserl carried out this order together with his assistants Eugen Fink and Ludwig Landgrebe. The various manuscripts were arranged in bundles and given an archive number. There were the main groups with the letters A to F, which in turn were partially arranged in sub-groups with Roman letters. The individual bundles in these subgroups were again grouped (especially in groups A, B and E) in Arabic letters. E.g. Konvolut BI 21 is Konvolut 21 in subgroup B I. Each sheet is numbered a (recto) and b (verso). The bundles range from manuscripts that only have a few pages to several hundred manuscript sheets, most of which are written on sheets in DIN A-5 format.

Of course, Husserl continued to write even after he had carried out these estate regulations - the texts that were viewed and archived after his death were assigned to group K by the archivists who followed. The systematic archiving was continued later, including Husserl's lecture notes from his student days, as well as his correspondence, his library (both books and offprints with and without annotations ), inserts in books or offprints, and finally print samples, fair copies for publications, and Works by his assistants (written or typographical copies), in which he sometimes added extensive annotations.

The story of Husserl's estate (approx. 40,000 pages in Gabelsberg shorthand) also includes his rescue by the Belgian Franciscan Father Hermann Leo Van Breda . Husserl died before he could bring his estate to safety. Van Breda, who came to Freiburg in 1938 hoping to ask Husserl about his future doctoral thesis on phenomenology and to read his unpublished texts, found Husserl's desperate widow and the archived manuscripts. In an exciting campaign, Van Breda managed to bring the estate via Diplomatic Bag via Berlin to Belgium, where he founded the Husserl Archive in 1939. There - at the Hoger Instituut voor Wijsbegeerte of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven - the estate is now in the order it was made by Husserl and his assistants.

Writings of Husserl


Husserl's writings are usually quoted from the Husserliana .

Husserliana: Edmund Husserl - Collected Works (Critical Edition) . Published on the basis of the estate by the Husserl archive in Leuven. Nijhoff, Den Haag, or Dordrecht / Boston / Lancaster, 1950 ff., Now: Springer, Berlin 2008: 42 volumes.

  • Hua I: Cartesian meditations and Parisian lectures. Edited and introduced by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd, verb. Edition. 1991, ISBN 90-247-0214-3 .
  • Hua II: The Idea of ​​Phenomenology. Five lectures. Edited and introduced by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd, extended edition. 1973, ISBN 90-247-5139-X .
  • Hua III / 1 and III / 2: Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. In: two volumes; 1st half volume: text of the 1st - 3rd edition. ; 2nd half volume: Supplementary texts (1912–1929). (Newly edited by Karl Schuhmann. Reprint 1976. 1st half volume: ISBN 90-247-1913-5 ; 2nd half volume: ISBN 90-247-1914-3 )
  • Hua IV: Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Second book: Phenomenological investigations into the constitution. Edited by Marly Biemel. Emphasis. 1991, ISBN 90-247-0218-6 .
  • Hua V: Ideas on a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. Third book: The phenomenology and the foundations of the sciences. Edited by Marly Biemel. Emphasis. ISBN 90-247-0219-4 .
  • Hua VI: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd, verb. Edition. ISBN 90-247-0221-6 .
  • Hua VII: First Philosophy (1923/24). First part: critical history of ideas. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1956, ISBN 90-247-0223-2 .
  • Hua VIII: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, ISBN 90-247-0225-9 .
  • Hua IX: Phenomenological Psychology. Lectures in the summer semester of 1925. Ed. By Walter Biemel. 2., verb. Edition. 1968, ISBN 90-247-0226-7 .
  • Hua X: On the Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness (1893–1917). Edited by Rudolf Boehm. Reprint of the 2nd, verb. Edition. 1969, ISBN 90-247-0227-5 .
  • Hua XI: Analysis of Passive Synthesis. From lecture and research manuscripts (1918–1926). Edited by Margot Fleischer. 1966, ISBN 90-247-0229-1 .
  • Hua XII: Philosophy of Arithmetic. With additional texts (1890–1901). Edited by Lothar Eley. ISBN 90-247-0230-5 .
  • Hua XIII: On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate. First part: 1905–1920. Edited by Iso Kern. 1973. ISBN 90-247-5028-8 .
  • Hua XIV: On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate. Second part: 1921–1928. Edited by Iso Kern. 1973, ISBN 90-247-5029-6 .
  • Hua XV: On the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. Texts from the estate. Third part: 1929–1935. Edited by Iso Kern. ISBN 90-247-5030-X .
  • Hua XVI: thing and space. Lectures 1907. Edited by Ulrich Claesges. 1973, ISBN 90-247-5049-0 .
  • Hua XVII: Formal and Transcendental Logic. Attempt a critique of logical reason. With additional texts. Edited by Paul Janssen. 1974, ISBN 90-247-5115-2 .
  • Hua XVIII: Logical Investigations. First volume: Prolegomena to pure logic. Text of the 1st and 2nd edition. Edited by Elmar Holenstein. 1975, ISBN 90-247-1722-1 .
  • Hua XIX / 1 and Hua XIX / 2: Logical Investigations. Second volume: Studies on the phenomenology and theory of knowledge. Edited by Ursula Panzer. 1984, ISBN 90-247-2517-8 .
  • Hua XX / 1: Logical Investigations. Supplementary volume. First part. Drafts for the revision of the VI. Investigation and preface for the new edition of Logical Investigations (summer 1913). Edited by Ullrich Melle. 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0084-7 .
  • Hua XX / 2: Logical Investigations. Supplementary volume. Second part. Texts for the new version of the VI. Investigation: On the phenomenology of expression and knowledge (1893/94 - 1921). Edited by Ullrich Melle, 2005, ISBN 1-4020-3573-X .
  • Hua XXI: Studies in Arithmetic and Geometry. Texts from the estate (1886–1901). Edited by Ingeborg Strohmeyer. 1983, ISBN 90-247-2497-X .
  • Hua XXII: Articles and Reviews (1890-1910). Edited by Bernhard Rang. 1979, ISBN 90-247-2035-4 .
  • Hua XXIII: imagination, image awareness, memory. On the phenomenology of vivid visualizations. Texts from the estate (1898–1925). Eduard Marbach. 1980, ISBN 90-247-2119-9 .
  • Hua XXIV: Introduction to Logic and Epistemology. Lectures 1906/07. Edited by Ullrich Melle. 1984, ISBN 90-247-2947-5 .
  • Hua XXV: Articles and Lectures (1911–1921). Edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. 1987, ISBN 90-247-3216-6 .
  • Hua XXVI: Lectures on the theory of meaning. Summer semester 1908. Edited by Ursula Panzer. 1987, ISBN 90-247-3383-9 .
  • Hua XXVII: Articles and Lectures (1922-1937). Edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp. 1989, ISBN 90-247-3620-X .
  • Hua XXVIII: Lectures on ethics and value theory (1908-1914). Edited by Ullrich Melle. 1988, ISBN 90-247-3708-7 .
  • Hua XXIX: The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Supplementary volume. Texts from the estate of 1934–1937. Edited by RN Smid. 1993, ISBN 0-7923-1307-0 .
  • Hua XXX: Logic and general philosophy of science. Lectures in winter semester 1917/18. With additional texts from the first version from 1910/11. Edited by Ursula Panzer. 1996, ISBN 0-7923-3731-X .
  • Hua XXXI: Active Syntheses. From the lecture “Transcendental Logic” 1920/21. Supplementary volume to "Analyzes of Passive Synthesis". Edited by Roland Breeur. 2000, ISBN 0-7923-6342-6 .
  • Hua XXXII: nature and spirit. Lectures in the summer semester of 1927. Edited by Michael Weiler, 2001, ISBN 0-7923-6714-6 .
  • Hua XXXIII: The Bernauer Manuscripts on Time Consciousness (1917/18). Edited by Rudolf Bernet and Dieter Lohmar. 2001, ISBN 0-7923-6956-4 .
  • Hua XXXIV: On the phenomenological reduction. Texts from the estate (1926–1935). Edited by Sebastian Luft, 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0744-2 .
  • Hua XXXV: Introduction to Philosophy. Lectures 1922/23. Edited by Berndt Goossens, 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0080-4 .
  • Hua XXXVI: Transcendental Idealism. Texts from the estate (1908–1921). Edited by Robin D. Rollinger in conjunction with Rochus Sowa, 2003, ISBN 1-4020-1816-9 .
  • Hua XXXVII: Introduction to Ethics. Lectures in the summer semester of 1920 and 1924. Edited by Henning Peucker. 2004, ISBN 1-4020-1994-7 .
  • Hua XXXVIII: Perception and Attention. Texts from the estate (1893–1912). Edited by Thomas Vongehr and Regula Giuliani. 2004, ISBN 1-4020-3117-3 .
  • Hua XXXIX: The lifeworld. Interpretations of the given world and its constitution. Texts from the estate (1916–1937). Edited by Rochus Sowa. 2008, ISBN 978-1-4020-6476-0 .
  • Hua XL: Studies on Judgment Theory. Texts from the estate (1893–1918). Edited by Robin D. Rollinger. 2009, ISBN 978-1-4020-6896-6 .
  • Hua XLI: On the doctrine of the essence and method of eidetic variation. Texts from the estate (1891–1935). Edited by Dirk Fonfara. 2012, xlv + 499 pp. HB. ISBN 978-94-007-2624-6 .
  • Hua XLII: Frontier Problems of Phenomenology. Analyzes of the unconscious and instincts. Metaphysics. Late ethics. Texts from the estate (1908–1937). Edited by Rochus Sowa and Thomas Vongehr. 2014, ISBN 978-94-007-5813-1 .

Husserliana: materials. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann, Michael Weiler and Dieter Lohmar, Dordrecht 2001 ff.

  • Hua Mat I: logic. Lecture 1896. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2001, ISBN 0-7923-6911-4 .
  • Hua Mat II: logic. Lecture 1902/03. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2001, ISBN 0-7923-6912-2 .
  • Hua Mat III: General Epistemology. Lecture 1902/03. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2001, ISBN 0-7923-6913-0 .
  • Hua Mat IV: Nature and Mind. Lectures in the summer semester of 1919. Edited by Michael Weiler. 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0404-4 .
  • Hua Mat V: Judgment Theory. Lecture 1905. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2002, ISBN 1-4020-0928-3 .
  • Hua Mat VI: Old and New Logic. Lecture 1908/09. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2003, ISBN 1-4020-1397-3 .
  • Hua Mat VII: Introduction to the Phenomenology of Knowledge. Lecture 1909. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. 2005, ISBN 1-4020-3306-0 .
  • Hua Mat VIII: Late Texts on the Constitution of Time (1929–1934): The C-Manuscripts. Edited by Dieter Lohmar. 2006, ISBN 1-4020-4121-7 .
  • Hua Mat IX: Introduction to Philosophy. Lectures 1916–1920. Edited by Hanne Jacobs. 2012, ISBN 978-94-007-4657-2 .

Husserliana: documents. The Hague / Dordrecht 1977 ff.

  • Hua Dok I: Karl Schuhmann: Husserl Chronicle. Edmund Husserl's thought and life path , 1977.
  • Eugen Fink: VI. Cartesian meditation. Set ISBN 90-247-3436-3 .
    • Hua Dok II / 1: Part I. The idea of ​​a transcendental methodology. Texts from the estate of Eugen Fink (1932) with notes and supplements from the estate of Edmund Husserl (1933/34). Edited by H. Ebeling, J. Holl and G. van Kerckhoven, 1988.
    • Hua Dok II / 2: Eugen Fink: Part II. Supplementary volume. Edited by G. van Kerckhoven, 1988.

Writings published during Husserl's lifetime

Further editions


To Husserl

  • Javier Yusef Álvarez-Vázquez: Early history of the phenomenological reduction: Investigations into the epistemological phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. FreiDok, Freiburg 2010, urn : nbn: de: bsz: 25-opus-74421 , 250 pp. ( e-book: PDF ).
  • Edmund Husserl and the phenomenological movement. Certificates in text and images. Published by Hans Rainer Sepp on behalf of the Husserl Archive Freiburg im Breisgau . Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1988, ISBN 3-495-47636-9 .
  • David Bell: Husserl. Routledge, London 1990, ISBN 0-415-03300-4 .
  • Rudolf Bernet, Iso Kern, Eduard Marbach: Edmund Husserl. Representation of his thinking . Felix Meiner, Hamburg 1989, ISBN 978-3-7873-1284-9
  • Christian Beyer et al. (Ed.): Husserl's Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity . Routledge, London (published).
  • Alwin Diemer : Edmund Husserl. Attempt to present his philosophy systematically. 2nd, improved edition. Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1965.
  • Eugen Fink : VI. Cartesian meditation. Part 1: The idea of ​​a transcendental methodology. Texts from the estate of Eugen Fink (1932) with notes and supplements from the estate of Edmund Husserl (1933/34). In: Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl and Guy van Kerckhoven (eds.): Husserliana, Documents Volume II / 1 (Dordrecht / Boston / London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988).
  • Christel Fricke u. a. (Ed.): Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl . Frankfurt, Paris, Lancaster, New Brunswick 2012.
  • Thomas Fuchs: Phenomenology and Psychopathology. In: S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking (Eds.): Handbook of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. Springer, Dordrecht 2010, pp. 547-573.
  • Thomas Fuchs: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Psychiatric Diagnosis. In: Psychopathology. 43, 2010, pp. 268-274.
  • Thomas Fuchs: Temporality and Psychopathology. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. 12, 2013, pp. 75-104.
  • Hans-Helmuth Gander (Ed.): Husserl Lexicon . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2009, ISBN 978-3-534-16493-6 .
  • Klaus Held (Ed.): Edmund Husserl. Selected texts.
  • Gisbert Hoffmann: Consciousness, reflection and I in Husserl. Karl Alber Verlag, Freiburg / Munich 2001, ISBN 3-495-48050-1 .
  • Husserl. (= Philosophy now! ). Selected and presented by Uwe C. Steiner. Ed .: Peter Sloterdijk . Diederichs, Munich 1997, ISBN 3-424-01290-4 .
  • Julia V. Iribarne: Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity . Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1994.
  • Paul Janssen: Edmund Husserl. Introduction to its phenomenology. Koleg philosophy. Karl Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1976, ISBN 3-495-47247-9 .
  • Edda Kapsch: Understanding the other. Understanding others following Husserl, Gadamer and Derrida. Parodos, Berlin 2007, ISBN 978-3-938880-11-1 .
  • Iso Kern: Foreign experience. In: Bernet, Kern, Marbach (ed.): Edmund Husserl. Representation of his thinking. 2nd Edition. Meiner, Hamburg, 1996, pp. 143-153.
  • Iso core: intersubjectivity. In: Lester Embree (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Phenomenolgy . Kluwer, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1997, pp. 355-359.
  • Matis Kronschläger: The unification of the lifeworld (s) according to Husserl. University of Vienna, 2012. (digitized version)
  • Jean-François Lavigne: Accéder au transcendantal? Réduction et Idéalisme transcendantal dans les Idées I de Husserl . Paris 2009.
  • Jean-François Lavigne: Husserl et la renaissance de la phenomenology . Paris 2005.
  • Sebastian Luft: The archiving of the Husserl estate 1933–1935. In: Husserl Studies. 20, 1-23.
  • Utz Maas : Persecution and emigration of German-speaking linguists 1933–1945. Entry on Edmund Husserl (accessed: April 13, 2018)
  • Verena Mayer: Edmund Husserl: Logical investigations. Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-05-004391-3 .
  • Verena Mayer: Edmund Husserl. CH Beck, Munich 2009, ISBN 978-3-406-58688-0 .
  • Karl Mertens : Between the final justification and skepticism. Critical investigations into the self-understanding of Edmund Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. (= Orbis Phenomenologicus. VI. 1). Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1996, ISBN 3-495-47818-3 .
  • James Morley: Phenomenological Psychology. In: S. Luft, S. Overgaard (Eds.) The Routledge Companion to Phenomenology . 2012, pp. 586-595.
  • Wolfgang Hermann Müller: The philosophy of Edmund Husserl according to the main features of its origin and its systematic content. Bouvier, Bonn 1956.
  • Dominique Pradelle: Généalogie de la raison. Essai sur l'historicité du sujet transcendantal de Kant à Heidegger . Paris 2013.
  • Dominique Pradelle: Par-delà la révolution copernicienne. Subject transcendantal et facultés chez Kant et Husserl . Paris 2012.
  • Peter Prechtl: Edmund Husserl for an introduction. 5th edition. Junius, Hamburg 2012, ISBN 978-3-88506-369-8 .
  • Bernhard Rang: Husserl's phenomenology of material nature. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1990, ISBN 3-465-02217-3 .
  • Adolf Reinach: What is phenomenology? Munich 1951.
  • RD Rollinger: Husserl's Position in the School of Brentano (Phaenomenologica 150). Kluwer, Dordrecht 1999, ISBN 0-7923-5684-5 .
  • Christian Rother: The place of meaning. On the metaphoricity of the relationship between consciousness and objectivity in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. Dr. Kovac, Hamburg 2005, ISBN 3-8300-1801-0 .
  • Leonardo Scarfò: Philosophy as a science of pure idealities. On the late philosophy of Husserl with special consideration of Appendix III to the Crisis Script. Herbert Utz, Munich 2006, ISBN 3-8316-0649-8 .
  • Alexander Schnell : Temps et phénomène. La phenoménologie husserlienne du temps. Olms, Braunschweig 2004.
  • Alexander Schnell: Husserl et les fondements de la phenoménologie constructive . Millon, 2007.
  • Karl Schuhmann: Husserl - Chronik (thought and life path Edmund Husserls) Number I in Husserliana documents . Nijhoff, The Hague 1977, ISBN 90-247-1972-0 .
  • Karl Schuhmann: Husserl and Masaryk. In: Josef Novak (ed.): On Masaryk. Texts in English and German . Amsterdam 1988, pp. 129-156.
  • Josef Seifert : The Significance of Husserl's Logical Investigations for Realistic Phenomenology - And Realistic Phenomenologists' Criticism of Some Husserl's Theses. In: AEMAET. 4, 2015, pp. 28–119. ISSN  2195-173X
  • Barry Smith, David Woodruff Smith: Introduction. In: Diess. (Ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Husserl . Cambridge / New York 1995, ISBN 0-521-43616-8 .
  • Barry Smith, David Woodruff Smith (Eds.): The Cambridge Companion to Husserl. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1995, ISBN 0-521-43616-8 .
  • David Woodruff Smith: Husserl . Abingdon / New York 2007.
  • Thorsten Streubel: The essence of time. Time and Consciousness in Augustine, Kant and Husserl. Würzburg 2006.
  • Elisabeth Ströker : Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1987, ISBN 3-465-01773-0 .
  • Hermann Leo van Breda: The rescue of Husserl's estate and the establishment of the Husserl archive. In: Husserl-Archiv Leuven (Ed.): History of the Husserl-Archives Leuven. Springer, Heidelberg 2007, ISBN 978-1-4020-5726-7 , pp. 1-37.
  • Dan Zahavi : Husserl and the transcendental intersubjectivity. Kluwer 1996.
  • Dan Zahavi: Husserl's phenomenology. UTB, Stuttgart 2009, ISBN 978-3-8252-3239-9 .
  • Philosophical thinking in Halle. Dept. 3, Philosophers of the 20th Century, Volume 2., Conveyor of Logic / Georg Cantor, Heinrich Behmann and Edmund Husserl arr. by Günter Schenk, 1st edition. 2002

Further information

  • Jocelyn Benoist: Elements of a realistic philosophy: reflecting on what you have. From the Franz. David Espinet. Suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-518-29700-1 .
  • Ludwig Binswanger : About flight of ideas. Orell Füssli, Zurich 1933.
  • Ludwig Binswanger: Daseinsanalytik and Psychiatrie. In: Selected lectures and essays. (Volume II). Francke, Bern 1955, pp. 279-302.
  • Ludwig Binswanger: Three forms of unsuccessful existence: extravagance, eccentricity, mannerism . de Gruyter, Berlin 1956.
  • Ludwig Binswanger: Schizophrenia . Neske, Pfullingen 1957.
  • Ludwig Binswanger: Melancholy and Mania . Neske, Pfullingen 1960.
  • Ludwig Binswanger: Wahn: Contributions to his phenomenological and existential analysis research . Neske, Pfullingen 1965.
  • Wolfgang Blankenburg : Approaches to a psychopathology of "common sense". In: Con-finia Psychiatrica. 12, 1969, pp. 144-163.
  • Wolfgang Blankenburg: The loss of the natural matter of course. A Contribution to the Psychopathology of Asymptomatic Schizophrenias . Enke, Stuttgart 1971.
  • Frederik JJ Buytendijk : About the pain . Huber, Bern 1948.
  • Frederik JJ Buytendijk: Phenomenology of Encounter. In: Eranos yearbook. 19, 1951, pp. 431-486.
  • Frederik JJ Buytendijk: The woman: nature, appearance, existence. Bachem, Cologne 1953.
  • Frederik JJ Buytendijk: General theory of human posture and movement . Springer, Berlin 1956.
  • Gary B. Cohen : Education and Middle-Class Society in Imperial Austria, 1848-1918 . West Lafayette IN 1996.
  • Hedwig Conrad-Martius : Foreword. In: Adolf Reinach (Ed.): What is phenomenology? Munich 1951, pp. 5-17.
  • Gerhard Dammann (Ed.): Phenomenology and psychotherapeutic psychiatry . Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2014.
  • Natalie Depraz et al. a. (Ed.): On becoming aware: A pragmatics of experiencing . John Benjamin Publishing, 2003.
  • Thomas Fuchs : Melancholia as a desynchronization. Towards a psychopathology of interpersonal time. In: Psychopathology. 34, 2001, pp. 179-186.
  • Thomas Fuchs: Psychotherapy of the lived space. A phenomenological and ecological concept . In .: American Journal of Psychotherapy. 61, 2007, pp. 432-439.
  • Thomas Fuchs: Pathologies of intersubjectivity in autism and schizophrenia. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies. 22, 2015, pp. 191-214.
  • Thomas Fuchs u. a. (Ed.): Karl Jaspers: Phenomenology and Psychopathology . Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 2013.
  • Moritz Geiger : The reality of science and metaphysics . Bonn 1930.
  • Amedeo Giorgi: Psychology as a Human Science . Harper & Row, New York 1970.
  • Amedeo Giorgi: The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology . Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh PA 2009.
  • Carl Friedrich Graumann : Phenomenological Psychology. In: R. Asanger, G. Wenninger (Hrsg.): Concise dictionary of psychology. 5th edition. Psychologie Verlags Union, Weinheim 1994.
  • Carl Friedrich Graumann: Basics of a phenomenology and psychology of perspectivity . de Gruyter, Berlin 1960.
  • Nicolai Hartmann : Basic features of a metaphysics of knowledge . Berlin / Leipzig 1921.
  • Nicolai Hartmann: New ways of ontology. 3. Edition. Stuttgart 1949.
  • Alice Holzhey-Kunz : Analysis of Daseins. In: A. Längle, A. Holzhey-Kunz (Ed.): Existential analysis and Daseinsanalyse. Facultas, Vienna 2008, pp. 181–348.
  • Roman Ingarden : The dispute about the existence of the world. I: Existential ontology . Tubingen 1964.
  • Karl Jaspers : General Psychopathology. 9th edition. Springer, Berlin / Heidelberg / New York 1913/1973.
  • David Katz : The structure of the color world . Barth, Leipzig 1930.
  • David Katz: Gestalt Psychology . Schwabe, Basel 1944.
  • Joseph J. Kockelmans (Ed.): Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch school . Kluwer, Dordrecht 1987.
  • Kurt Koffka : The Principles of Gestalt Psychology. Harcourt, New York 1935.
  • Wolfgang Köhler : Gestalt Psychology . Bell, London 1929.
  • Hans Köchler : The subject-object dialectic in transcendental phenomenology: the problem of being between idealism and realism . Anton Hain, Meisenheim a. G., 1974.
  • Hans Köchler : Phenomenological Realism . Peter Lang, Frankfurt a. M. / Bern / New York 1986.
  • Alfred Kraus: Social behavior and psychosis manic-depressive. Enke, Stuttgart 1977.
  • Lenelis Kruse et al. a. (Ed.): Ecological Psychology . Psychologie Verlagsunion, Munich 1990.
  • Roland Kuhn : Daseinsanalysis and psychiatry. In: HW Gruhle u. a. (Ed.): Psychiatry of the present. (I / 2), Springer, Berlin / Göttingen / Heidelberg 1963, pp. 833-902.
  • Ludwig Landgrebe : Facticity as the limit of reflection and the question of belief. In the S. (Ed.): Facticity and Individuation. Studies on the basic questions of phenomenology . Hamburg 1976, pp. 117-136.
  • Ludwig Landgrebe: Phenomenology and Metaphysics . Hamburg 1949.
  • Jan Huygen van Linschoten: About falling asleep. In: Psychological Contributions. 2, 1955, pp. 70–97 as well as Sleeping and Doing . Ibid., Pp. 266–298.
  • Jan Huygen van Linschoten: On the way to a phenomenological psychology. The Psychology of William James. de Gruyter, Berlin 1961.
  • Sebastian Luft: On the phenomenological method in Karl Jaspers' "General Psychopathology". In: S. Rinofner-Kreidl, HA Wiltsche (Ed.) Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology between Science, Philosophy and Practice. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2008, pp. 31–51.
  • Eric Matthews: Body-Subjects and Disordered Minds: Treating the 'whole' person in psychiatry. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007.
  • Maurice Merleau-Ponty : Phenomenology of Perception . de Gruyter, Berlin 1966.
  • Maurice Merleau-Ponty: The Structure of Behavior . de Gruyter, Berlin 1967.
  • Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Germs of Reason: Lectures at the Sorbonne, 1949–1952 . Fink, Munich 1994.
  • Daniel Nischk u. a .: From theory to clinical practice: A phenomenologically inspired intervention for patients with schizophrenia. In: Psychopathology. 48, 2015, pp. 127-136.
  • Josef Parnas u. a .: EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience. In: Psychopathology. 38, 2005, pp. 236-258.
  • Josef Parnas u. a .: Rediscovering psychopathology: the epistemology and phenomenology of the psychiatric object. In: Schizophrenia Bulletin. 39, 2012, pp. 270-277.
  • Claire Petitmengin-Peugeot: The intuitive experience. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6, 1999, pp. 43-77.
  • Claire Petitmengin: Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive sciences. 5, 2006, pp. 229-269.
  • Matthew Ratcliffe: Feelings of being. Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2008.
  • Louis A. Sass, Josef Parnas: Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. In: Schizophrenia Bulletin. 29, 2003, pp. 427-444.
  • Louis A. Sass, E. Pienkos, B. Skodlar, G. Stanghellini, T. Fuchs, J. Parnas, N. Jones: Examination of Anomalous World Experience. (= Psychopathology. 50). Karger, Basel / Freiburg 2017, ISBN 978-3-318-06020-1 .
  • Alexander Schnell : Out. Drafts for a phenomenological metaphysics and anthropology. Wuerzburg 2011.
  • Alexander Schnell: Images of Reality . Tübingen 2015.
  • Herbert Spiegelberg : Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry. A Historical Introduction. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1972.
  • Giovanni Stanghellini: Disembodied spirits and deanimatied bodies: The psychopathology of common sense. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004.
  • Giovanni Stanghellini, Thomas Fuchs (eds.): One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.
  • Erwin W. Straus : From the sense of the senses. 2nd Edition. Springer, Berlin 1956.
  • Erwin Straus: Psychology of the Human World . Springer, Berlin / Göttingen / Heidelberg 1960.
  • Hubertus Tellenbach : Melancholy. Problem history, endogeneity, typology, pathogenesis, clinic. 4th edition. Springer, Berlin 1983.
  • László Tengelyi : World and Infinity. On the problem of phenomenological metaphysics . Freiburg / Munich 2014.
  • Jan Hendrik van den Berg u. a .: situation. Contributions to phenomenological psychology and psychopathology. Spectrum, Utrecht / Antwerp 1954.
  • Kai Vogeley, Christian Kupke: Disturbances of time consciousness from a phenomenological and a neuroscientific perspective. In: Schizophrenia Bulletin. 33, 2007, pp. 157-165.
  • Dan Zahavi (Ed.): Exploring the self: Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience . John Benjamin, Amsterdam 2000.

Web links

Commons : Edmund Husserl  - collection of images, videos and audio files
Wikisource: Edmund Husserl  - Sources and full texts

Husserl Archives

Works online


Husserl pages

Individual evidence

  1. ^ David Woodruff Smith: Husserl . 2nd Edition. London 2013, ISBN 978-0-415-62257-8 .
  2. ^ Jonathan Kearns Cooper-Wiele: The totalizing act: key to Husserl's early philosophy . Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht 1989, ISBN 0-7923-0077-7 .
  3. Dissertation (last accessed on June 28, 2019)
  4. Habilitation thesis (last accessed on June 28, 2019).
  5. ^ Edmund Husserl: Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations, Vol. 1, 1891 (last accessed on July 13, 2017).
  6. ^ Paul Ricœur: Husserl. An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Northwestern University, 1967, pp. 29-30.
  7. Husserl, Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time Consciousness. 1928.
  8. Edmund Husserl: Ideas for a pure phenomenology and phenomenological philosophy. General introduction to pure phenomenology. In two volumes: 1st half volume: Text of the 1st – 3rd Edition. 2nd half volume: Supplementary texts (1912–1929). New ed. by Karl Schuhmann. Emphasis. 1976. In: Husserliana: Edmund Husserl - Collected Works. Volume III / 1 and III / 2. Nijhoff, Den Haag 1976. (In the following the Husserliana are cited as Hua, supplemented by the corresponding volume information)
  9. ^ Deceased Fellows. British Academy, accessed June 12, 2020 .
  10. Martin Heidegger: Being and time. Niemeyer, Tübingen 2006, SV
  11. ^ Edmund Husserl: Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures . Edited and introduced by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd, verb. Edition. In: Hua. I, 1991.
  12. Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd, verb. Edition. In: Hua. 6, 1976.
  13. Hua III / 1, p. 56.
  14. Hua III / 1, p. 57.
  15. Hua III / 1, p. 64.
  16. Not to be confused with the material production of objects and the idea that objects are only inventions of the imagination
  17. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science. In: Collected Writings. Volume VIII. Here he refers explicitly to Dilthey's The Types of Weltanschauung and their formation in the metaphysical systems , cf. ibid p. 50.
  18. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, pp. 19ff.
  19. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 21.
  20. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 37.
  21. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 38.
  22. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 51f.
  23. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 52.
  24. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science . Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 61.
  25. Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as a strict science. Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 11.
  26. Verena Mayer: Edmund Husserl. P. 46.
  27. Hua I, 166. Emphasis. in orig.
  28. Hua I, 182.
  29. Hua XIX / 1, 26.
  30. Ibid.
  31. Hua III / 1, 28, footnote.
  32. Hua III / 1, §§ 8 and 9.
  33. Ibid. 8th.
  34. Hua VII, 13f.
  35. Ibid. 14th
  36. Ibid.
  37. Ibid. 188, footnote.
  38. Hua XV, 385.
  39. Ibid., 386.
  40. Ibid., 385
  41. Hua XIII, XIV, XV.
  42. Hua XIII.
  43. Hua XIV.
  44. Hua XV.
  45. Hua XIII, Text No. 1.
  46. Ibid., Text No. 6.
  47. Hua XXIV
  48. Hua II
  49. Hua XIII, Text No. 2 (before 1909) and Appendix IX.
  50. Hua XIII, Text No. 13, p. 335.
  51. Hua XIII, Texts No. 8-13.
  52. Hua XIII, p. 288.
  53. Hua XIII, Text No. 8.
  54. Hua XIII, p. 250 f.
  55. Hua XIII, p. 267.
  56. Hua XIII, Appendix XXXVI to Text No. 8.
  57. Hua XIII, p. 377 ff .; see. Hua XIV, Text No. 13 from January / February 1922, p. 250 ff.
  58. Hua XIII, Text No. 16.
  59. Hua XIII, p. 455 ff.
  60. Hua XIV, p. 8 f.
  61. Hua XIV, p. 182.
  62. Hua XIV, p. 201.
  63. Hua XIV, p. 389.
  64. Hua XIV, p. 387.
  65. Hua XIV, p. 389.
  66. Hua XIV, p. 390.
  67. See above on Hua XIII, Text No. 13, p. 339.
  68. Hua XIV, Text No. 36.
  69. Hua XV.
  70. Hua XV, p. 625.
  71. Ibid.
  72. Hua XV, p. 631.
  73. Hua XVI, p. 8.
  74. Ibid., P. 52; see. ibid., p. 114 ff.
  75. Ibid., P. 60.
  76. ibid., P. 154.
  77. ibid., P. 172 ff., 228 f.
  78. Hua XIV, p. 534 ff.
  79. Hua XVI
  80. Hua XXVIII
  81. Hua XXVIII, 153.
  82. Hua XXVIII, XLVI.
  83. Hua XXVII.
  84. Published in Hua XLII.
  85. ^ H. Spiegelberg: Phenomenology in Psychology and Psychiatry. A Historical Introduction. Northwestern University Press, Evanston 1972.
  86. Hua XVIII.
  87. Hua IX, p. 41.
  88. J. Van den Berg, FJJ Buytendijk, MY Langeveld, J. Linschoten: Situation. Contributions to phenomenological psychology and psychopathology. Spectrum, Utrecht / Antwerp 1954.
  89. JJ Kockelmans (Ed.): Phenomenological Psychology: The Dutch school. Kluwer, Dordrecht 1987; J. Linschoten: About falling asleep. In: Psychological Contributions. 2, 1955, pp. 70–97 and J. Linschoten: Einlafen und Tun. In: ibid., Pp. 266–298.
  90. ^ A. Giorgi: Psychology as a Human Science. Harper & Row, New York 1970 and A. Giorgi: The Descriptive Phenomenological Method in Psychology. Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, PA 2009.
  91. C. Petitmengin: Describing one's subjective experience in the second person: An interview method for the science of consciousness. In: Phenomenology and the Cognitive sciences. 5, 2006, pp. 229-269; C. Petitmengin-Peugeot: The intuitive experience. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies. 6, 1999, pp. 43-77 and N. Depraz, FJ Varela, P. Vermersch (Eds.): On becoming aware: A pragmatics of experiencing. John Benjamin Publishing, Amsterdam 2003; T. Fuchs: Phenomenology and Psychopathology. In: S. Gallagher, D. Schmicking (Eds.): Handbook of phenomenology and the cognitive sciences. Springer, Dordrecht 2010, pp. 547-573.
  92. ^ D. Zahavi (Ed.): Exploring the self: Philosophical and psychopathological perspectives on self-experience. John Benjamin, Amsterdam 2000; LA Sass, J. Parnas: Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self. In: Schizophrenia Bulletin. 29, 2003, pp. 427-444; E. Matthews: Body-Subjects and Disordered Minds: Treating the 'whole' person in psychiatry. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007; M. Ratcliffe: Feelings of being. Phenomenology, psychiatry and the sense of reality. Oxford University Press, Oxford / New York 2008; T. Fuchs: Pathologies of intersubjectivity in autism and schizophrenia. In: Journal of Consciousness Studies. 22, 2015, pp. 191-214 and J. Parnas, LA Sass, D. Zahavi: Rediscovering psychopathology: the epistemology and phenomenology of the psychiatric object. In: Schizophrenia Bulletin. 39, 2012, pp. 270-277.
  93. ^ T. Fuchs: Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity in Psychiatric Diagnosis. In: Psychopathology. 43, 2010, pp. 268-274 and G. Stanghellini, T. Fuchs (Ed.): One Century of Karl Jaspers' General Psychopathology . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013.
  94. ^ T. Fuchs: Psychotherapy of the lived space. A phenomenological and ecological concept. In: American Journal of Psychotherapy. 61, 2007, pp. 432-439; G. Dammann (Ed.): Phenomenology and psychotherapeutic psychiatry. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2014 and D. Nischk, C. Dölker, J. Rusch, P. Merz: From theory to clinical practice: A phenomenologically inspired intervention for patients with schizophrenia. In: Psychopathology. 48, 2015, pp. 127-136.
  95. ^ Husserl Archives Leuven: History . Retrieved April 14, 2020.