Wilhelm Dilthey

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Wilhelm Dilthey around 1910

Wilhelm Dilthey (born November 19, 1833 in Biebrich ; † October 1, 1911 in Seis am Schlern , South Tyrol ) was a German theologian , high school teacher and philosopher .

Contrary to the naturalism , which was widespread at the time , Dilthey developed a life-philosophical foundation that no longer explained human life and the forms of its expression according to natural laws, but rather sought to understand the inherent laws of human spiritual life. Dilthey built this approach scientific theory and put it in contrast to the natural sciences a theory of Humanities , as its founder he is. As their method, he developed hermeneutics and understanding psychology in an essential way.

Dilthey brought his methods to empirical application in the doctrine of worldview , an interpretation scheme for what, in his opinion, failed systems of metaphysics . In it Dilthey tried to show how all different and contradicting metaphysical systems have their common origin in the context of human life, at the same time he categorized the historical approaches according to different “types of worldview”.


Dilthey House in Wiesbaden-Biebrich

Wilhelm Dilthey was born in 1833 into a Calvinist family of preachers. His father was Maximilian Dilthey (1804–1867), a Nassau court preacher in Biebrich, his mother Maria Laura Heuschkel (1810–1887), daughter of the ducal conductor Johann Peter Heuschkel in Hildburghausen . His brother Karl (1839–1907) became a professor of archeology, his sister Caroline was married to the philologist Hermann Usener .

He attended grammar school in Wiesbaden and gave a lecture on the subject of the influence of ancient Greece on young people for his Abitur in 1852 . In Berlin (1853) and Heidelberg (1852) he studied theology, history and philosophy a. a. with August Boeckh , Kuno Fischer , Leopold von Ranke and Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg .

In 1856 he passed his first state examination in theology. After completing the state school examinations, he became a teacher at the French and Joachimsthal Gymnasium in Berlin. In 1864 he received his doctorate with a thesis written in Latin on the ethics of Schleiermacher , habilitated in the same year on moral consciousness and became a private lecturer at the Friedrich Wilhelms University in Berlin . In 1867 he was offered a professorship in philosophy in Basel . Employment in Kiel (1868–1871) and Breslau (1871–1883) followed. In 1870 the first volume of Schleiermacher's Life was published , which established Dilthey's reputation as a historical scholar in the humanities. During his time in Breslau, Dilthey's friendship began with Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg , with whom he continued a lively correspondence, which significantly stimulated his discussion of philosophical and humanities topics.

Dilthey at the time of his engagement

In 1874 he married Katharina Püttmann (1854–1932), whom he met on a trip to Bad Elster . They had three children together, Helene, Clara (1877–1967) and Maximilian. Clara later married Dilthey's student Georg Misch . She edited and published part of her father's estate. In 1882 Dilthey received an offer to Berlin to succeed the suddenly deceased Rudolf Hermann Lotze , where he taught from 1883 to 1908. In 1883 the first volume of the Introduction to the Humanities , which Dilthey dedicated to Count Yorck, was published. In 1894 Dilthey published the ideas on a descriptive and dissecting psychology . Due to sharp criticism Hermann Ebbinghauses to the ideas Dilthey dropped his plans for a second volume of discharges fall.

Dilthey got involved in the women's movement around 1900. He belonged to the association founded by Helene Lange in 1893 for the organization of high school courses for women , which campaigned for the right of women to study at university. He also specifically promoted female students. One of his students was Helene Stocker , whom he brought in to support him in Berlin with his studies on Schleiermacher . Wilhelm Dilthey was one of the most important teachers for Gertrud Bäumer , and when she was doing her doctorate at Berlin University in 1904, he was a member of the doctoral committee.

In 1900 the first volume of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations appeared . Dilthey dealt intensively with them and made some corrections to his own work, which prompted him to continue the "Introduction" systematically . In 1905 Husserl came to Berlin to visit Dilthey. In 1906, with the appearance of The Experience and Poetry , Dilthey also became known beyond the circle of specialist colleagues. A Dilthey school was established in 1911 with the publication of the anthology Weltanschauung, Philosophie und Religion , to which Husserl responded in a clear way with his essay Philosophy as a strict science . There followed an exchange of letters between the two, but this did not help to clarify the differences. In 1911 Dilthey died in Seis after suffering from dysentery .



Detachment from naturalism

The naturalism has led as flow since the 17th century to the fact that a mechanical-causal understanding of nature was also transferred to the inner life of man, so his mind and ability to feel the same causal laws were subject to how she found in the physical description of nature . Kant tried to solve this problem by conceiving of physical nature as a description of nature through pure reason . This distinction presupposes a separation of thing-in-itself and appearances . According to Kant, it is only the appearances that the intellect can grasp and that can be ascribed causality. However , it remains uncertain whether the causality also applies to the thing-in-itself that lies behind the appearance .

However, this explanation did not lead to natural science using its results as a means of construction and hypothetical knowledge. Rather, the view that the natural sciences could explain their subject matter directly found its first climax in the positivism and naturalism of Comte and Mill . Here, for Dilthey, the obvious problem arose that if all rational processes are causally determined, then the positivistic and naturalistic conception of the human being is also determined. This, however, nullifies the claim to certainty under various alternative views.

Dilthey's solution consists in the distinction between the natural sciences and the humanities, which at the same time aims to restore the autonomy and freedom of the human rational being: Instead of being in the natural context, Dilthey tied the human being into the historical and cultural context, within which his spiritual spontaneity manifests and develops . Just as Kant tried to explain the epistemological basis of the natural sciences with his Critique of Pure Reason , Dilthey endeavored in his lifelong project of a Critique of Historical Reason to lay the foundation for what he called the humanities . The title of a historical reason already shows Dilthey's criticism of Kant. In Dilthey's case, reason is not a timeless and unchangeable quantity of an individual subject, but has experienced its expression in the course of history and is thereby established. The historically evolved actions and practices of human culture flow into it. Dilthey's fundamentally historical orientation was based on JG Droysen's ideas of historicism in terms of the philosophy of history . The Critique of Historical Reason, however, does not refer only to Kant, but claims to consider the entire history of metaphysics. Based on Hegel's phenomenology of the mind , Dilthey also called his program the phenomenology of metaphysics . In contrast to Hegel's work, he did not combine the historical process into a metaphysical system of absolute knowledge, which should ultimately offer absolute certainty. Rather, his consideration takes the opposite path, namely to show how a world view is only shaped by the many small certainties that are rooted in the immediate certainty of experience and life itself . This then also serves him as a foundation for establishing the humanities. Your goal is an "understanding of life and history".

Philosophy of life

After this early personal detachment from naturalism and positivism, Dilthey sought a new foundation from which human life can be understood in all its breadth. Essential approaches to this can be found in his elaborations for a planned but never published second volume of the Introduction to the Humanities (1883), the so-called Breslau elaboration , which was largely formulated as early as 1880. With a view to the German idealistic tradition, Dilthey developed his greatly expanded concept of consciousness as the central instance of experience :

“My consciousness is the place that encloses this whole, apparently so immeasurable outer world, the material from which all objects that come into contact with each other are woven. As far as these objects that appear to me extend, so far does the connection between my ideas extend. What is found in them, the hardness which shatters, the glowing heat which melts, everything down to the core of the objects is a fact of my consciousness, and the thing is, so to speak, a combination of such spiritual facts. "

However, awareness for Dilthey is not a perceptual “box” in which the experiences take place. For Dilthey, this conception of consciousness goes back to an incorrect orientation towards linguistic structures: Only the substantiated "consciousness" is understood as a thing and then demands a predicate. For Dilthey, the concept of consciousness is indicative and not descriptive. For Dilthey, in this demonstration of consciousness as a whole fact of life, lies the overcoming of a philosophy that starts only from the theoretical understanding and is therefore never able to overcome the opposition between body-soul and inner-outer world. Both mind and body, inside and outside, are always connected through the consciousness in which all this is only given. Although the processes of the external world run independently of those of the consciousness (as independent physical processes), they are only there for one consciousness: "In this relationship to an outside world that is independent of me my life runs ." So Dilthey makes our experience valid in all its breadth and understands the life process as a unit in which recognition, imagining, evaluating, feeling, acting and willing are always related to an outside world. The purely knowing subject is thus overcome:

“In the veins of the knowing subject, which Locke , Hume and Kant construct, it is not real blood that runs, but the diluted juice of reason as a mere thought activity. But historical as well as psychological preoccupation with the whole person led me to base the explanation of knowledge [...] on this being, in the diversity of his forces, who represent this wanting and feeling . "

By Descartes arisen idea of a subject that insure only the outside world would be Dilthey has by referring to the experience back from reality as the basic structure. This means that there is no longer a self-sufficient subject who is only occasionally affected by external experiences , but everything that happens is integrated into an overall context, i.e. i.e., is experienced . The Cartesian separation of subject and outside world, on the other hand, can only be carried out theoretically; it cannot be experienced.

"The indissoluble experience may in its generality [sc the simplest way to consciousness. Understanding] that I imagine the assertion that nullifies it: possibly nothing exists at all; then reality comes before me with irresistible power, which is connected with the awareness that something is there for me. ” (emphasis added)

This demonstrates the general validity of the experience : it is the basis of all reality. It is the experience and the whole context of life from which "pure reason" arises. Dilthey's departure from Hegel and Kant consists in the fact that it is no longer the logical laws of thought that rule our conception of reality and so “the evidence of thought floating in the air does not form the basis of science, but reality, full, closest to us and most important reality. ”And the prospect arises“ from this direct knowledge of reality, the achievements of thinking [sc. Logic] to make understandable. "

The immediate existence of contents of consciousness for oneself and the always present in every biography of the person relating this content called Dilthey life . The contents are never individual, but always interwoven, because nothing new can come into this context without being related to it in some way. With his conception of consciousness as life and experience, he overcame three weaknesses of older theories of consciousness: There is for him

  1. no isolated elements of consciousness (a theory about their connection becomes superfluous)
  2. no separation of consciousness and outside world, so no self-contained consciousness and
  3. no mind-body dualism .

In terms of awareness Dilthey called then a limited area of this life and experience . Reality is then precisely this life as a connection between experiences. If it is to be understood, understanding is only possible as a movement from life to life. Understanding does not only include understanding, but the totality of the human mind. Dilthey was thus the central figure of the so-called philosophy of life in Germany around 1900 .

Justification of the humanities

Understand and explain

After Dilthey had identified a common origin for all human experiences and processes of understanding (including the sciences) with life and consciousness , he was able to concentrate on working out the differences between the natural sciences and the historically oriented humanities. The main factor behind this distinction is Dilthey's assumption that the natural sciences explain processes in nature , while the humanities try to understand historical-cultural events . Understanding is based on reliving a foreign existence, as expressed in writing, language, gestures, facial expressions, art, etc. However, this process does not simply passively receive the symbols available to it, but requires active reliving.

The following comparison outlines some of the differences between the natural sciences and the humanities. It should be noted, however, that Dilthey was never concerned with a perfectly sharp or even absolute separation of the two sciences. (See also the section on criticism .) The late Dilthey then also chose a different scheme for explaining the humanities (experience, expression, understanding) in The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities (1910), which was less of a demarcation from the natural sciences is motivated as from the subject of all humanities themselves.

Science - Explain Humanities - Understanding
The subject is nature. It can only be examined and observed. Assumptions are made about the causes of natural processes; reliving is not possible. Its object is the products of the human mind. These can be understood because they are created by man himself.
Processes in nature are understood as a special case of an abstract general law. Objects of research in the humanities are understood in their concrete context.
Scientific understanding is neutral towards the object of investigation and of less importance for personal development. Understanding foreign existence, past cultures and personalities leads to a reshaping of the self. Foreign spiritual content is lively included in your own.


In general, hermeneutics is understood to be the interpretation or interpretation of the reality of life in time (past-present-future). The grasp of the reality of life is conveyed through experience, expression and understanding (according to Dilthey). In the philosophical tradition, hermeneutics (since the 19th century) has three functions:

  • Foundation of a specifically humanities method (in contrast to the natural sciences)
  • Emphasis on the historicity of people in their world
  • Analysis of the conditions of (life) expressions of people (such as art) in the whole of their (world) horizon (worldview!)

As a method of Humanities formulated Dilthey in the tradition of Schleiermacher the hermeneutics . Schleiermacher was the first to liberate hermeneutics from the mere method of text interpretation and generally open it to the field of understanding. Not only does each word get its meaning in connection with the text, but also the train of thought, the literary genre, the division into chapters, etc. must be taken into account. Dilthey orientates himself on this, but extends the hermeneutical considerations to all human expressions of life. Meaning is therefore always context-dependent and never absolute. Human gestures, works of art, architectural style, laws, orders, religious ideas can only be understood in context.

According to Dilthey, the following problem arises for hermeneutics: in the attempt to understand the individual through its connection with the whole, it is assumed that this whole is already known. On the other hand, it is precisely through the understanding of individual aspects that the context of the whole should be made accessible. The result is a circle: the individual is revealed from the whole, the whole from the individual. This problem - the so-called hermeneutic circle - had already been formulated by Friedrich Ast in the field of philology , and it also plays an important role in Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. Dilthey is now also taking it up. That circle does not signify a defect that is inherent in the method, but rather the essential trait of understanding in general. The formulation of that circle theorem takes into account the fact that the individual elements of a complex of meaning only get their meaning through their relation to the whole. That means that elements of meaning can only be understood by referring to the whole of the meaning. Conversely, however, the latter can only be obtained through the passage of the individual elements. Herein lies the real reason for the need for the circular method.

Hermeneutics thus indicates that every fact, insight or statement is always bound to a previous understanding. According to Dilthey, this also applies to the natural sciences. In this sense, as the empirical theorists of science of his time believed, there is no such thing as “raw data” that is completely free of any interpretation. Every scientific observation is based on an implicit or explicit theory, or more generally: a pre-understanding of the matter.

At first, Dilthey saw experience as the basis of hermeneutics and understanding as psychological empathy for the intellectual processes of an author, but later he deviated from this psychological point of view and moved the concepts of expression and understanding of expression to the focus of the humanities methodology : the humanities would have the task of clarifying the connection between experience , expression and understanding . The expression is more the objectification of the general spirit of an age than the manifestation of the individual life impulses of an author or artist.

In the 20th century, Martin Heidegger , Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricœur in particular followed up on Dilthey's formulation of hermeneutics .


Since the objects of hermeneutics are not natural processes and things, but intellectual products, psychology became the basis of hermeneutics for Dilthey. However, Dilthey was not referring to the explanatory psychology developed from natural science. This seemed unsuitable to him because it dissolved the unity of consciousness and thus missed the hermeneutic approach to understand human utterances in context . For Dilthey it was simply impossible to subsequently reconstruct the connection between the whole thing from individual psychological facts and behavioral patterns.

An understanding psychology, on the other hand, has to do with phenomena that can be experienced. It does not try to understand a single experience as the case of a general psychological pattern, but rather to understand it as an individual experience as something in which the processes of the whole mind work together. This form of psychology is largely descriptive .

Objective mind

Dilthey later opened his approach of the individual psychological approach to the consideration of objective aspects that influence the individual. This happened mainly due to his examination of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations I (1901) and his work on Hegel's concept of the objective mind ( "Hegel's Youth History" , 1901–1906). His considerations are reflected in the work The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities (1910) and thus complement the program of a foundation of the humanities.

Since the individual cannot dispose of the external cultural, social, religious and societal conditions, but these influence his thinking and behavior spiritually, Dilthey speaks of the "objective spirit" in relation to them. The objective spirit consists of "creations of common life" as they are reflected in rules, modes of action, values ​​and purposes. For example, in order to understand a political decision in the Middle Ages, it is not enough to put yourself in the shoes of the decision-makers concerned; you also have to know the usual procedures, know which values ​​determined the purposes and which means were traditionally considered adequate.

In all of this, of course, the objective mind is not something that exists in itself, but always needs a subjective manifestation. In spite of this subjectivity , the mind has a super-subjective character; for something that has grown in the historical process is not in the control of the individual subject. (No human being alone produces the language that he speaks, but takes it over and it only has meaning as a common practice.) An essential means of understanding is again a historical consideration. With this approach, Dilthey also turned against Hegel, from whom he had adopted the concept of objective spirit:

“[T] he assumptions on which Hegel placed this concept can no longer be recorded today. He constructed the communities out of the common rational will. We have to start from the reality of life today; in life the totality of the spiritual context is at work. Hegel constructs metaphysically; we analyze the given. "

In contrast to Hegel's orientation towards the manifestation of an objective reason, Dilthey's orientation towards the historical context allows all aspects of human life - including the irrational ones. The realm of the objective spirit is not to be equated with eternal truths. The creations that emerged from communal life are historically contingent and therefore always only relative to the context in which they are embedded:

"The relativity of every kind of human conception is the last word of the historical view of thought, everything flowing in the process, nothing lasting."

Experience, expression, understanding

In the “structure” , Dilthey specified the form of knowledge in the humanities using the terms experience , expression , and understanding .

“Humanity, understood in perception and knowledge, would be a physical fact for us, and as such it would only be accessible to scientific knowledge. But when the subject of the humanities it arises only if human conditions experienced , if they have in life expressions to express pass and if these expressions meant to be. " (Emphasis added.)

The humanities investigate the relationship between experience, expression and understanding. Dilthey, however, failed to provide a theoretical explanation of these three terms and their connection. However, this can also be seen as an advantage if one considers at the same time that Dilthey emphasized the self-reflection of the humanities scholar: "The work itself, which is carried out in the workshop of the humanities should be raised to reflection."

This liquefies the theory of the humanities and gives them the opportunity to dynamically adapt to their subject by reflecting on methods - just like the natural sciences do, because:

“This [sc. the natural sciences] have their object not in the impressions as they appear in the experiences, but in the objects which knowledge creates in order to make these impressions constructible. Here as there the object is created from the law of the facts themselves. Both groups of sciences agree on this. "

- Wilhelm Dilthey

This also means that there is no hard distinction (such as that proposed by Neo-Kantianism ) between historical-descriptive and systematic-explanatory methods. The historical humanities do not only focus on the singular (e.g. Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Bremen), but also capture general structures (e.g. the city in the Middle Ages). Dilthey explained this using Bismarck's example . In order to understand him as a person, there is an abundance of material: letters, files, stories, reports, etc., although it is not enough just to combine them, because "to recognize people, events, conditions as belonging to this causal context, does he need [sc. the humanities scholar] of general propositions. They are then also the basis of his understanding of Bismarck. ”The humanities scholar then examines not only the person of Bismarck, but also the situation and conditions of a Prussian state, the current political events at the time and how this affects Bismarck's attitude and actions.

In order to ultimately understand Bismarck, it is not enough to “feel into” him, but the objective conditions must also be taken into account. From this relationship, new general statements arise about Bismarck's person, with which the humanities scholar can continue to work. In order to record the objective historical conditions, it is not the historical humanities that come into play, but the systematic economic, cultural, legal, social and political sciences and the general knowledge that they make available.

Thus Dilthey rejected the of Ranke in historicism erected Ideal from a pure description as impossible demand. In spite of everything, a paradox remains: Dilthey won his theory of knowledge of the humanities only with regard to its subject. But just how this is to be understood (namely the “structure of the historical world” ), spiritual science should clarify beforehand. Now, however, Dilthey strengthened the proper law and the individuality of history at the same time when he understood this as a causal context. Here history is understood as "a causal context that is centered in itself, in which every single causal context contained in it has its center in itself through the setting of values ​​and the realization of purposes, but all are structurally connected to a whole." This means that there is no longer a sharp distinction between historical facts, personal purposes and general norms, but that they are all and are only in context. This objective orientation in Dilthey's late work leads to some unresolved defects. For example, one cannot see how prescriptive norms can be derived from the historian's descriptive sentences. Thus, the relativity of every historically existing opinion and worldview is opposed to the general validity of historical consciousness aimed at by Dilthey. The latter gains its right only as the emancipation of people from religion and metaphysics, who then can sovereignly "win the content of every experience, surrender to it completely, as if there were no system of philosophy or belief that could bind people."


After the end of metaphysics

In 1887, Dilthey saw himself faced with the “ruins of philosophy”: The “systems of metaphysics have fallen,” he said in his inaugural address at the Academy of Sciences. The German idealism had with spruce , Schelling and Hegel represented the "last great test of the human spirit," however, proved to be untenable.

Despite everything, Dilthey was of the opinion that these efforts could not simply be ignored. He wanted to gain an understanding of the way of thinking and the motives that led to the developments in the history of philosophy. However, Dilthey did not develop this understanding from abstract laws of thought or metaphysical assumptions, but through hermeneutic access to history. The various religious, metaphysical and scientific systems can then be understood as world views that have their common origin in the context of human life.

Returning philosophy to its unity was a passion that determined Dilthey's whole pursuit. Once he told of a dream in which the great philosophers appeared to him in a hall; they formed three groups: the positivists and materialists d'Alembert, Comte, Archimedes gathered at one end of the room; they mocked the group of idealists in which Fichte, Schiller, and Plato were. A third group stood aside; she talked about the divine harmony of the universe; Spinoza, Leibniz, Hegel were in this group.

“[T] he distance that separated these groups grew with every second - now the ground itself disappeared between them - a terrible hostile mood seemed to separate them - I was overcome by a strange fear that philosophy would be there three or perhaps more times seemed to be - the unity of my own being seemed to be torn apart, since I was longingly drawn, now to this group, now to that group, and I strove to maintain it. "

This dream of Dilthey, of which he recounted in old age, looking back on his life's work, shows how much his heart and soul was attached to leading philosophy back to unity and thus to asserting philosophy as philosophy in general . What man is, according to Dilthey, only history tells him. It is the "passion of historical consciousness" that drove Dilthey and which he wanted to convey to his students.

Philosophy of philosophy

What role has philosophy played in its history, and what role does it play today? - According to Dilthey, an answer to this question can only be found through a historical consideration in combination with an inventory of the current world age. Dilthey saw the 19th and the coming 20th centuries characterized by a "sense of reality" emerging from the positive sciences, the awareness of the changeability of social structures and an ideological and ethical relativism that was in stark contradiction to the general validity of the sciences .

In this context, Dilthey programmatically defined three tasks for a new philosophy:

  • The positive sciences also have unexplained prerequisites that need to be investigated and secured.
  • Philosophy has the task of clarifying the relationship between the individual sciences. This cannot happen through them themselves, because then at most a hierarchical conception would result, which Dilthey rejected.
  • Philosophy must become a philosophy of life if it rejects failed metaphysics. Dilthey saw the beginnings of this in the work of Nietzsche , Richard Wagner , Tolstois and Schopenhauer . Just as "as the scholastic thinker develops the ability to survey long series of inferences, [...] the ability to represent the secret passages in which the soul pursues happiness [...] is formed in them." the authors mentioned only single out individual moments and insights and absolutized them, making them “comrades of metaphysics” again. Her philosophy of life may be right within its limits, but it becomes completely wrong as soon as it "holds its corner for the world". Dilthey therefore did not understand his form of philosophy of life as one which makes concrete statements, but rather extracts the universally valid from the relative through comparison and historical consideration of the manifold designs.

So Dilthey did not develop a new philosophical system, but a "philosophy of philosophy". It is the task of this to understand the world views which first led to the metaphysical systems. In terms of Dilthey's use of the term psychology, this program could also be understood as the “psychology of metaphysics”. It can then no longer be a question of dealing with metaphysical arguments, but of understanding the systems as an expression of a basic ideological attitude. In this sense, it can be said that metaphysical concepts are the same as with artistic style: it cannot be said whether this is “true” or “false”.

From this point of view of metaphilosophy , in retrospect it becomes clear that the task of philosophy can no longer be defined in terms of a content that belongs to it, for example as epistemology or ethics . Philosophy cannot be defined on the basis of its method either, since it had to be oriented towards the matter at hand. Three properties that have persisted throughout the history of philosophy can nevertheless be determined:

  1. Philosophy is characterized by self-reflection, prudence and reflection. She tries to give account of thinking.
  2. The philosophy tends to focus on an overall context of the whole. The philosophical spirit does not leave knowledge to isolation, but integrates it into its overall view.
  3. The philosophy aims at general validity. This is what distinguishes them primarily from religion and art.

On the basis of this definition, independent of content and method, the social function of the metaphysical systems developed by philosophy can now be determined. In this way, the historical worldview behind it always reveals itself first by examining the metaphysical concepts. So philosophy always tried to classify the totality of knowledge in such a system and, according to this knowledge, to provide an answer to the question "How should I act?" An attempt that, according to Dilthey, must of course fail, because as soon as the world view is pressed into metaphysical systems, it loses its connection to the concrete context of life and the abstractions that have become independent lead to indissoluble antinomies . By giving an account of its approach at the same time, philosophy tries to raise the system it has developed to generality. The reflection of their own actions, however, has an inner regularity which, although it cannot be predicted, the context of which is revealed to be necessary in historical retrospect; so the desire for general validity will eventually lead to the attempt to justify one's own statements; this in turn leads to the question of how epistemological knowledge is possible, etc.

The "Philosophy of Philosophy" now examines these regularities. She looks at the individual philosophical systems and recognizes that their structure is determined by the social function of philosophy.

Types of worldview

Dilthey saw the breeding ground for skepticism in historical awareness and the historical overview of the large number of philosophical drafts . This concludes from the "anarchy of systems" and their contradictions with one another that any objective knowledge is impossible for humans. Dilthey did not try to evaluate the metaphysical systems in detail, but instead emphasized their common origin in the context of human life. As a sensual and physical being, the human being is always integrated into a concrete world from which he draws his life experiences. “The last root of worldview is life.” This rootedness in life is central to Dilthey's philosophy of worldview. The “main principle of the doctrine of world view” is therefore: “World views are not products of thought. They do not arise from the mere will of knowledge. […] They emerge from life behavior, life experience, the structure of our psychic totality. ”Only from the life's realization can the metaphysical designs be understood as perspectives of one and the same thing, namely life:“ The pure light of truth is only to see for us in differently refracted rays. "

Only when these experiences are to be recorded in purely abstract principles and thus detached from their origin, the context of life, does metaphysics arise. Metaphysics is therefore the assumption of an objective reality that exists independently of the human context. When skepticism concludes from the multitude of philosophical systems that objective knowledge is not possible, then it remains caught up in the metaphysical presuppositions which it criticized. He overlooks the concrete life contexts from which the abstract systems developed.

But the systems cannot only be understood through their return to the context of life; for once they have become independent, there is an inner movement of the spirit within them, the “inner form of thought”, which determines them. With regard to this, the inner necessity of the movement of thought is shown. On the one hand, Dilthey wanted to follow Kant , whose achievement he saw in having shown how much thinking is determined by categories, concepts and schemata. On the other hand, Dilthey followed up on Fichte, whose merit he located in the emphasis on the movement of the mind. For Dilthey, this resulted in the point of view that although categories and schemata determine thinking, these are no longer inscribed in the timeless subject, as in Kant, but result themselves in the movement of the spirit. When metaphysical systems develop, this does not happen according to fixed laws, although the internal structure of the systems follows certain rules. A “philosophy of philosophy” such as that which Dilthey strived for will not, for its part, be indulged in dogmatic statements, but will remain tied to what is reported to it from history: “We do not know the law of education, according to which of life Differentiation of metaphysical systems emerges. If we want to approach the conception of the types of worldview, we must turn to history. "

In addition to the internal structure of thought and the rules inherent in it, Dilthey also drew attention to the basic mood that accompanies every person in their relationship to the world. Only on the basis of this attunement does a person make his life experiences, which he gradually tries to organize into a meaningful whole. This basic mood can also be found in the philosophical systems. Dilthey even saw in it the one that essentially "keeps the systems alive": "[E] in system is a kind of living being, an organism, nourished by the heart and soul of a philosopher, viable through it, fighting with others." Hence, classifications work such as idealism , materialism , monism , dualism are always too short for Dilthey, since they only single out one moment of this “living organism”. Only by virtue of this basic mood do the systems, which are ragged by logical contradictions, carry themselves through history at all.

In line with this philosophy of life, Dilthey saw the metaphysical designs of the modern age, for example, as an attempt to save a world view and view of life, as developed by Goethe and Schiller , into the realm of thought and to secure it there: “And now the systems of Schelling, Hegel and Schleiermacher only logically and metaphysically justified implementation of these views of life and the world developed by Lessing, Schiller and Goethe. "

So in order to understand the philosophical system designs as an expression of a world view and basic mood, Dilthey tried to determine various classifications of the main forms of philosophy, these are:

  • Naturalism : He prefers sensualism as epistemology , materialism as metaphysics . In his basic mood (his "heart and soul") he is carried by the struggle against religious and spiritualistic metaphysics.
  • Idealism of freedom : carried in the mood as a counter-movement to (deterministic) materialism and its denial of the freedom of the spirit and its values, the idealism of freedom is formed. Starting from the free acting person, a system is formed which sees the spirit as independent of the mechanical laws of nature in its laws. Examples are Kant and Schiller .
  • Objective idealism : it is entirely different from the two above in that it emphasizes the universal harmony of the world as a whole. The synopsis of the whole shows how this whole gives the individual parts their space and meaning. Representatives of this worldview are Goethe , Hegel and the Stoa .

Dilthey knew about the provisional nature of this classification and emphasizes that he is more concerned with the method of how to arrive at it: the three main types are determined solely through historical comparison . Its historical occurrence cannot be predicted paradigmatically, but determined retrospectively. However, such a comparison also requires certain standards. These cannot be determined in advance, but result from intuition from many years of work with the individual systems. So it was not a fixed division that was important to Dilthey, but understanding as a process. (Dilthey later added another type, that of the naturalistic-positivistic worldview.)

According to Dilthey, every worldview is formed according to the same principles and so all worldviews have a common structure. The starting point for every worldview is the worldview . This arises from fundamental and rudimentary knowledge of the human being, who forms an image of it in his relation to the world. However, the contexts of meaning in this world still remain roughly and loosely linked. Only when a person begins to order the things they have recognized around them and to determine their value based on their usefulness for the pursuit of life do the first extensive structures of meaning arise. These then rise to his world view through further abstraction; in this it is determined what the highest values ​​and principles are, e.g. B. the good , and so an ideal of life and action is set up that is directed towards it. Since this process can take several generations, the worldview is a product of history.


Dilthey's doctrine of ideology found expression in the consistent relativism of Oswald Spengler and his work The Downfall of the Occident . Following the example of the types of worldview, Spengler differentiates between different forms of life (theoretical, economic, aesthetic, social and religious).

Dilthey's conception of hermeneutics as an understanding theory and methodology of the humanities had a great influence on all further epistemological discussions, in which it was about the demarcation between the natural and human sciences. As immediate successors of Dilthey are u. a. Hans Lipps , Herman Nohl , Theodor Litt , Eduard Spranger , Georg Misch and Erich Rothacker . Dilthey's philosophy also influenced the religious philosopher Martin Buber .

In Germany, Hans-Georg Gadamer in particular dealt with his work with critical intent. In many respects, Theodor W. Adorno , Ernst Cassirer , Emilio Betti , Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas also received suggestions from Dilthey. Leo Baeck received his doctorate in 1895 from Dilthey on Spinoza on the subject of Spinoza's first influences on Germany .

Martin Heidegger takes up Dilthey's central theme of historicity in Being and Time . According to Heidegger, his work “grew out of the appropriation of Dilthey's work”. Heidegger quotes Dilthey's philosophical interlocutor and long-time pen friend, Count von Yorck : “A self-reflection, which is not directed towards an abstract self, but towards the fullness of my self, will find me historically determined, just as physics will find me cosmic definitely recognizes. Just like nature, I am history. ”Heidegger also takes up the concept of the basic mood. So it is the basic mood of fear in being and time , which tears man out of life in inauthenticity and in the face of death, i.e. his finitude, leads him to an actual life. Heidegger even takes the basic mood so seriously that philosophizing is only possible for him from the basic mood. The late Heidegger will determine shyness as the basic mood for the event .

An important student from the school around Dilthey was the Franco-German historian and philosopher Bernhard Groethuysen , who also collaborated on the publication of Dilthey's complete works.


Dilthey's conception of metaphysics can be criticized for the fact that it is based on the tacit assumption that metaphysical propositions have no cognitive meaning. Likewise, one can doubt whether metaphysical systems actually “only” express the context of one of the three worldview types.

While Wolfgang Stegmüller has criticized Dilthey's attempt to differentiate natural sciences and humanities, he did not go far enough for Hans-Georg Gadamer . Gadamer complains that Dilthey is still too much oriented towards the natural sciences in his formulation of the humanities. Gadamer, on the other hand, would have preferred to bring the humanities closer to art.

Since all understanding and comprehension for Dilthey could never be completely brought to an end (the hermeneutic circle does not lead to an end point of complete certainty ), he ran the risk of abandoning all objectivity . Because even if one understands understanding as the comprehension of the objective spirit, it was only actually present as a subjective manifestation. Edmund Husserl reactivated the program of an exact science, contrary to Dilthey's theory of worldview. In his work Philosophy as a Strict Science of 1911 he tries to differentiate the concept of worldview from that of strict science and to establish a timeless science based on the phenomenological method . On the one hand, he emphasizes the achievements of ideology, but limits its scope and application to the education and personality development of the individual, while strict science, on the other hand, makes timeless and supra-individual claims to truth. Dilthey himself rejected the charge that he represented historical relativism in a letter to Husserl, in which he also rejected the skeptical consequences of his philosophy.

However, Dilthey continued to be accused of the relativistic tendency of the hermeneutic approach. This is above all with regard to his conception of metaphysics as “symbols of different sides of vitality”, with which Dilthey ties every statement with a claim to objective validity to pre-rational structures.


  • Collected Writings , Volumes I to XXVI. Volumes I to XII edited by Dilthey's students. From volume XV provided by Karlfried Gründer , from volume XVIII together with Frithjof Rodi, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2006, ISBN 978-3-525-30330-6
  1. Volume: Introduction to the humanities. Attempt to Lay the Groundwork for the Study of Society and History, ed. Bernhard Groethuysen, 1922
  2. Volume: Weltanschauung and analysis of man since the Renaissance and Reformation, ed. Georg Misch, 1914
  3. Volume: Studies on the History of the German Spirit. Leibniz and his age. Frederick the Great and the German Enlightenment. The Eighteenth Century and the Historical World, ed. Paul Ritter, 1927
  4. Volume: The youth history of Hegel and other treatises on the history of German idealism, ed. Herman Nohl, 1921
  5. Volume: The Spiritual World. Introduction to the philosophy of life. First half: Treatises on the foundation of the humanities, ed. Georg Misch, 1924
  6. Volume: The Spiritual World. Introduction to the philosophy of life. Second half: Essays on Poetics, Ethics and Pedagogy, ed. Georg Misch 1924
  7. Volume: The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities, ed. Bernhard Groethuysen, 1927
  8. Volume: Weltanschauung. Treatises on the Philosophy of Philosophy, ed. Bernhard Groethuysen, 1931
  9. Volume: Pedagogy. History and basics of the system, ed. Otto Friedrich Bollnow, 1934
  10. Volume: System of Ethics, ed. Herman Nohl, 1958
  11. Volume: On the rise of historical consciousness. Youth essays and memories, ed. Erich Less, 1936
  12. Volume: On Prussian History. Schleiermacher's political convictions and effectiveness. The reorganization of the Prussian state. The general land law, ed. Erich Less, 1936
  13. Volume: Schleiermacher's Life. First volume. Part I: 1768-1802; Part II: 1803-1807, ed. Martin Redeker, 1970
  14. Volume: Schleiermacher's Life. Second volume: Schleiermacher's system as philosophy and theology. Part I: Schleiermacher's System as Philosophy; Volume II: Schleiermacher's System as Theology, ed. Martin Redeker, 1966
  15. Volume: On the intellectual history of the 19th century. Portraits and biographical sketches. Source studies and literature reports on theology and philosophy in the 19th century, ed. Ulrich Herrmann, 1970
  16. Volume: On the intellectual history of the 19th century. Articles and reviews from newspapers and magazines 1859–1874, ed. Ulrich Herrmann, 1972
  17. Volume: On the intellectual history of the 19th century. From "Westermanns monthly books": literary letters, reports on art history, scattered reviews 1867–1884, ed. Ulrich Herrmann, 1974
  18. Volume: The Sciences of Man, Society and History. Preparatory work for the introduction to the humanities (1865–1880), ed. Helmut Johach; Frithjof Rodi, 1977
  19. Volume: Fundamentals of the human sciences, society and history. Elaborations and drafts for the second volume of the Introduction to the Humanities (approx. 1870–1895), ed. Helmut Johach; Frithjof Rodi, 1982
  20. Volume: Logic and System of the Philosophical Sciences. Lectures on epistemological logic and methodology (1864–1903), ed. Hans-Ulrich Lessing; Frithjof Rodi, 1990
  21. Volume: Psychology as empirical science, first part: Lectures on psychology and anthropology (approx. 1875–1894), ed. Guy van Kerckhoven; Hans-Ulrich Lessing, 1997
  22. Volume: Psychology as empirical science, Part two: Manuscripts on the genesis of descriptive psychology (approx. 1860–1895), ed. Guy van Kerckhoven; Hans-Ulrich Lessing, 2005
  23. Volume: General History of Philosophy. Lectures 1900–1905 , ed. Gabriele Gebhardt; Hans-Ulrich Lessing, 2000
  24. Volume: Logic and Value. Late lectures, drafts and fragments on structural psychology, logic and theory of values ​​(approx. 1904–1911), ed. Gudrun Kühne-Bertram, 2004
  25. Volume: "Poets as seers of humanity". The planned collection of literary-historical essays from 1895 , ed. Gabriele Malsch, 2006
  26. Volume: The Experience and the Poetry. Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin , ed. Gabriele Malsch, 2005

Important individual works


  • Kant's works ("Academy edition"), Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900ff.


  • Correspondence between Wilhelm Dilthey and Count Paul Yorck von Wartenburg 1877–1897. Edited by Sigrid von der Schulenburg . Niemeyer, Halle 1923; Reprint: Olms, Hildesheim 1995.
  • Letters from Wilhelm Dilthey to Bernhard and Luise Scholz 1859–1864. Communicated by Sigrid von der Schulenburg . In: Meeting reports of the Prussian Academy of Sciences. Philosophical-historical class, 1933, No. 10, pp. 416–471.
  • Correspondence. Edited by Gudrun Kühne-Bertram and Hans-Ulrich Lessing. 4 volumes planned. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2011ff.
    • Volume 1: 1852-1882. 2011.
    • Volume 2: 1882-1895. 2015.
    • Volume 3: 1896-1905. 2018.


  • Friedrich Wilhelm BautzDilthey, Wilhelm. In: Biographisch-Bibliographisches Kirchenlexikon (BBKL). Volume 1, Bautz, Hamm 1975. 2nd, unchanged edition Hamm 1990, ISBN 3-88309-013-1 , Sp. 1307-1310.
  • Otto Friedrich Bollnow : Dilthey: An introduction to his philosophy. Teubner, Leipzig 1936; 4th edition: Novalis, Schaffhausen 1980.
  • Otto Friedrich Bollnow:  Dilthey, Wilhelm Christian Ludwig. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 3, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1957, ISBN 3-428-00184-2 , pp. 723-726 ( digitized version ).
  • Giuseppe D'Anna, Helmut Johach, Eric S. Nelson (eds.): Anthropology and history. Studies on Wilhelm Dilthey on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of his death. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2013, ISBN 978-3-8260-5111-1 .
  • Ulrich Herrmann : Bibliography Wilhelm Dilthey: Sources and literature. Beltz, Weinheim 1969.
  • Ulrich Herrmann: Dilthey, Wilhelm. In: Theological Real Encyclopedia . 8: 752-763 (1981).
  • Erwin Hufnagel: Wilhelm Dilthey. Hermeneutics as the foundation of the humanities. In: Ulrich Nassen (Ed.): Classics of Hermeneutics. Paderborn 1982.
  • Matthias Jung: Dilthey as an introduction. Junius, Hamburg 1996 (2nd revised edition 2014), ISBN 978-3-88506-088-8 .
  • Guy van Kerckhoven, Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Axel Ossenkop: Wilhelm Dilthey. Life and work in pictures. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2008, ISBN 978-3-495-48305-3 .
  • Hans-Ulrich Lessing: The idea of ​​a critique of historical reason. Wilhelm Dilthey's epistemological-logical-methodological foundation of the humanities. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1984, ISBN 3-495-47549-4 .
  • Hans-Ulrich Lessing: Wilhelm Diltheys "Introduction to the humanities". Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2001, ISBN 3-534-10393-9 .
  • Hans-Ulrich Lessing: The contemporary reviews of Wilhelm Diltheys "Introduction to the humanities" (1883 to 1885). In: Dilthey yearbook for philosophy and history of the humanities. Edited by Frithjof Rodi. Volume I /, 1983, ISBN 3-525-30355-6 , pp. 91-181.
  • Hans-Ulrich Lessing, Rudolf A. Makkreel and Riccardo Pozzo (eds.): Recent Contributions to Dilthey's Philosophy of the Human Sciences. (= Problemata. Vol. 153). Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 2011, ISBN 978-3-7728-2604-7 .
  • Rudolf A. Makkreel: Dilthey. Philosopher of the humanities. (Translated from American English.), Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 978-3-518-58088-2 .
  • Georg Misch : From the circle of life and thoughts of Wilhelm Diltheys. Schulte-Bulmke, Frankfurt a. M. 1947.
  • Eric S. Nelson (Ed.): Interpreting Dilthey: Critical Essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2019, ISBN 1-107-13299-1 .
  • Frithjof Rodi : The structured whole. Studies on the work of Wilhelm Dilthey. Velbrück Wissenschaft, Weilerswist 2003, ISBN 978-3-934730-62-5 .
  • Frithjof Rodi, Gudrun Kühne-Bertram (eds.): Dilthey and the hermeneutic turn in philosophy. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-525-30367-2 .
  • Frithjof Rodi: Dilthey's philosophy of the context of life. Structural theory - hermeneutics - anthropology. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2016, ISBN 978-3-495-48837-9 .
  • Gustav Schmidt: Wilhelm Dilthey. In: Hans-Ulrich Wehler (ed.): German historians. Volume 4, Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, Göttingen 1973, pp. 540–558.
  • Gunter Scholtz (Ed.): Dilthey's work and the sciences. New aspects. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2013, ISBN 978-3-8470-0232-1 .
  • Dilthey yearbook for philosophy and history of the humanities. Edited by Frithjof Rodi. Göttingen 1983–2000 (with a bibliography from 1969–1998).

Web links

Wikisource: Wilhelm Dilthey  - Sources and full texts
Commons : Wilhelm Dilthey  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

Individual evidence

  1. a b H.-U. Lessing: Art. Dilthey, Wilhelm , in: RGG4, vol. 2, p. 853 f.
  2. Clara Misch: The young Dilthey. A picture of life in letters and diaries 1852–1870. Leipzig 1933; Stuttgart / Göttingen 1960.
  3. Angelika Schaser: Helene Lange and Gertrud Bäumer. A political community. Cologne: Böhlau, 2010, p. 72.
  4. Helene Stöcker: Memoirs , ed. by Reinhold Lütgemeier-Davin u. Kerstin Wolff. Cologne: Böhlau, 2015, p. 54 f.
  5. Angelika Schaser: Helene Lange and Gertrud Bäumer. A political community. Cologne: Böhlau, 2010, p. 105 f.
  6. Husserliana
  7. Cf. Manfred Riedel (ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities . Frankfurt am Main 1970, introduction by the editor, p. 13 below.
  8. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Wroclaw drafting. In: Collected Writings. Volume 19, pp. 1f.
  9. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Wroclaw drafting. In: Collected Writings . Volume 19, pp. 2f.
  10. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Wroclaw drafting. In: Collected Writings . Volume 19, p. 58. emphasis added.
  11. As we read from our own biography: "As far as I try to revive my earliest memories backwards: they are objects [...] that were there for me at all times." Collected writings . Volume 19, p. 58.
  12. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities . I, S. XVIII.
  13. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Wroclaw drafting . Collected Writings Volume 19, p. 43.
  14. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Wroclaw drafting . Collected Writings Volume 19, p. 41.
  15. This goes back to a generally accepted interpretation by L. Landgrebe: Wilhelm Dilthey's theory of the humanities . in: Yearbook for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research . Halle 1928, and OF Bollnow: Dilthey. An introduction to his philosophy. 1. Aufl., Leipzig 1936. Manfred Riedel (ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey takes a different view: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Frankfurt am Main 1970, introduction by the editor, p. 53ff. Riedel sees in the inclusion of the objective spirit a decline of Dilthey to his original epistemological conception. In this context, too, Riedel sees Dilthey's efforts to subject hermeneutics to an epistemological investigation, i.e. That is, to establish them oneself and not to accept the hermeneutic circle as a specific feature of all understanding. (Cf. Manfred Riedel (Ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: The Structure of the Historical World in the Humanities. Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 51.)
  16. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings. Volume 7, p. 150.
  17. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings. Volume 8, p. 76.
  18. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume 7, p. 87.
  19. Cf. Manfred Riedel (ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 66.
  20. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume 7, p. 305.
  21. Collected Writings . Volume 7, pp. 85 f.
  22. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume 7, p. 142.
  23. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume 7, p. 138.
  24. Cf. on this Manfred Riedel (ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Frankfurt am Main 1970, p. 76.
  25. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume 7, pp. 290f.
  26. a b Quoted from B. Groethuysen (Ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften . Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, SV
  27. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ) Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 223.
  28. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ), Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 197.
  29. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ), Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 198.
  30. Quoted from B. Groethuysen (Ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften . Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, SX
  31. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ) Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 86
  32. Quoted from B. Groethuysen (Ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften . Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. XI.
  33. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ) Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 99
  34. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . ( Weltanschauungslehre ) Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 35
  35. Quoted from B. Groethuysen (Ed.), Wilhelm Dilthey: Gesammelte Schriften . Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. VI.
  36. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings. (Weltanschauung). Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 100ff.
  37. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings. (Weltanschauung). Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 107ff.
  38. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings. (Weltanschauung) . Volume VIII, Stuttgart 1960, p. 112ff.
  39. Martin Buber
  40. Martin Buber (1878–1965)
  41. Martin Heidegger: Being and time . ( GA 2), Tübingen 2006, p. 397.
  42. Martin Heidegger: Being and time . ( GA 2), Tübingen 2006, p. 401.
  43. See Martin Heidegger: GA 29/30, p. 87.
  44. ^ Heinrich Schmidinger, Wolfgang Röd, Rainer Thurnher: History of Philosophy , Volume XII, CH Beck Verlag, 2002, p. 126f.
  45. See Wolfgang Stegmüller: Walther von der Vogelweide's Song of Dream Love and Quasar 3 C 273 . In other words: Rational reconstruction of science and its change. Stuttgart 1979 (Universal-Bibliothek 9938), pp. 27-86.
  46. See Hans-Georg Gadamer: Truth and Method , Tübingen 1965, p. 225.
  47. ^ Letter of June 29, 1911 in: Fr. Rodi and H.-U. Lessing (ed.): Materials on the philosophy of Wilhelm Diltheys. Suhrkamp TB, Frankfurt am Main 1984, p. 103.
  48. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Collected writings . Volume VIII, p. 8.
  49. Overview of the collected writings of the Dilthey Research Center at the Ruhr University Bochum