Hermeneutic circle

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The expression of the hermeneutic circle (from ancient Greek ἑρμηνεύω hermēneúō "to interpret, explain, translate") is an initially visual objectification of the conflicting interpretation situation between author and recipient and the humanities' efforts to bridge it, u. a. in relation to texts of historical or psychological content or to works of art .

background

Understanding the meaning of cultural expressions (representations, works of art, texts, etc.) is tied to certain preconditions (prior knowledge and assumptions, value judgments , conceptual schemes , etc.) of interpreters, which are usually not congruent with those of the producers. The process of converging both “horizons of understanding” is progressive and never ends. The idea of ​​a circle (i.e. a circular movement) corresponds to the fact that there is no objective , linear, straightforward path to the meaning of a text or work of art that starts from a safe location, but first of all, the understanding person is and is already in an understanding movement of approach Second, if he is not just “turning in his own circle” anyway, at best he can approach the goal of understanding in a spiral movement without ever being able to achieve a complete “ understanding ” of the object of his interest.

The thesis of the hermeneutic circle as a prerequisite for the hermeneutic method was probably first proposed by the classical philologist Friedrich Ast (1778–1841) and published in 1808:

“But if we can now only recognize the spirit of ancient times through its revelations in the works of writers, but these themselves again presuppose the knowledge of the universal spirit, how is it possible, since we always only do one thing after the other, but not being able to grasp the whole at the same time, to know the individual, since this presupposes the knowledge of the whole? The circle that I can only recognize a, b, c etc. through A, but this A itself only through a, b, c, etc., is indissoluble if both A and a, b, c are thought of as opposites, which mutually condition and presuppose each other, but their unity is not recognized, so that A does not first emerge from a, b, c etc. and is formed by them, but precedes them, pervades them all in the same way, a, b, c are nothing more than individual representations of the one A. In A then there are already a, b, c in the original way; these links themselves are the individual unfolding of the one A, so there is already A in each in a special way, and I don't need to go through the entire infinite series of details in order to find their unity. "

- Friedrich Ast, basics of grammar, hermeneutics and criticism

The hermeneutic method

In epistemology , the approach presented by Martin Heidegger in Being and Time , which seeks to justify the hermeneutic circle “ontologically” , has become significant . According to this, the beginning of the hermeneutic circle lies in an original basic evidence of truth. Only because people “always” stand in the truth of their being can they ask the truth question about the meaning of their being human and expand it further. As a result, every statement made by an individual is a hermeneutical circle for the same, since the latter already has both the truth and the "knowledge" of the truth, or, to put it another way, cannot ask the question of the truth because it this already is. Hans-Georg Gadamer developed this view further in his hermeneutics .

The interpretation is based on the reader's emotion. Accordingly, usage texts are excluded from the hermeneutic method. Emil Staiger paraphrased this as follows: “That we understand what grasps us.” (Emotions must be explained rationally, fascination leads to analysis.) The actual process of understanding then consists of

  1. the formation of prejudices (i.e. anticipations or assumptions) in which guesses are made about the meaning of a text (or section of text);
  2. the subsequent development of the text (or text section).

This process leads to a change and further development of the original prior knowledge, provided the willingness to revise one's own prejudices (see openness, receptivity in Gadamer). There are three stages and a preliminary stage that can be peeled off:

  • Preliminary stage: Development of a pre-understanding, mastery of the language, idea of ​​the external conditions of a text
  • The hermeneutical draft (first stage): Horizons merging between the horizon of understanding and the horizon of meaning
  • The hermeneutic experience (second stage): pre-understanding is expanded and corrected
  • The improved draft (third stage): deeper understanding, maturation of the prior understanding

With this revised pre-understanding, the process of understanding can be started again so that the preceding stages are run through again. In principle, this circle can be repeated indefinitely.

The hermeneutic circle is often understood as a sui generis method in the humanities that distinguishes the humanities from the natural sciences. The analytical science philosopher Wolfgang Stegmüller , however, objected that the image of the hermeneutic circle firstly does not describe a circle (but a “hermeneutic spiral”), secondly it is not a method and thirdly does not represent a distinguishing feature between humanistic and scientific knowledge.

Significance in postmodernism

The hermeneutic circle is particularly problematic for postmodern philosophers . They believe not only that one can only know the world by the words that are used to describe it, but also that “whenever people try to pin down a particular interpretation of a text or phrase, they claim different interpretations as the reason for their interpretation ". In other words, “All systems of meaning are unfinished systems of signs that relate to signs that relate to signs. No term can therefore have a final, unambiguous meaning. "

See also

literature

  • Karl-Otto Apel : Transformation of Philosophy , 2 volumes, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1973 (Vol. I: Sprachanalytik, Semiotik, Hermeneutik; Vol. II: The a priori of the communication community)
  • Wolfgang Stegmüller : The so-called circle of understanding . In: ders .: The Problem of Induction: Hume's Challenge and Modern Answers . Darmstadt 1996 (Scientific Book Society)

Individual evidence

  1. Friedrich Ast: Basics of grammar, hermeneutics and criticism. Landshut 1808, p. 179 f.
  2. ^ Martin Heidegger: Being and Time , § 4 and § 63, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen 1926, 17th edition 1993, ISBN 3-484-70122-6 .
  3. Hans-Georg Gadamer : Truth and Method. Basic features of a philosophical hermeneutics. Collected works, JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1990; Vol. I , Hermeneutik I, ISBN 3-16-145616-5 (a) on the keyword “Openness for the opinion of the other”: Part II, 1, p. 273; (b1) on the keyword “hermeneutic circle”: pp. 179, 194, 270 ff., 296 ff .; Vol. II , Hermeneutics II, ISBN 3-16-146043-X (b2) = cont. From (b1), further on the keyword "hermeneutic circle": pp. 34, 57 ff., 224 f., 331, 335, 357 f., 406.
  4. ^ Adler, E. 1997. " Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics ", European Journal of International Relations 3: 321-322
  5. Wæver, Ole: The rise and fall of the inter-paradigm debate. In Steve Smith et al. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond . Cambridge 1996, p. 171.