Value judgment

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A value judgment expresses positive or negative distinction, which is contained in a person's opinion regarding a more or less precisely defined object. It often goes hand in hand with the more or less explicit expectation and / or request of third parties to accept the same valuation as being sufficiently justified.

Value judgment or value statement

Conceptions of logic differ in whether they are based on certain basic concepts such as “judgment” and / or “statement” (or “ normative statement ”). It depends, for example, on whether a value judgment is logically presented in the form of a sentence in a subject - predicate structure or as an act of evaluating which is taking place or as a logical structure as which a statement is often viewed, or in turn to another other, for example psychological or action-theoretical ways.

The explication of “value judgment” requires an explicit value theory or a different kind of precision as to what exactly is meant by value .

Concept history

Ignaz Pokorny

The Herbartian Ignaz Pokorny tied the concept of value judgment closely to the concept of feeling . Pokorny differentiates between theoretical judgments , which, according to him, are “judgments about being and its more detailed determinations”, and value judgments. which he also makes practical judgments. is called. According to Pokorny, value judgments are the starting point of aesthetics and occur in very different forms (e.g. approval, disapproval, approval, displeasure, preference, rejection). He observes that different people and societies make different value judgments and are thus conditioned. He demands that aesthetics should seek unconditional values. In his view, value judgments have objects as subject and feelings as predicate. If the value judgment is to be unconditional, then the feeling must also be unconditional, ie independent of other ideas.

Max Weber

Especially in the still ongoing debate about the value of freedom of judgment a little is often more explicit term use basis, the Max Weber follows believes or to follow.

“Under 'evaluations', 'practical' evaluations of a phenomenon that can be influenced by our actions should be understood as reprehensible or worthwhile."

And: "Value judgments are practical evaluations of social facts as, from an ethical or cultural point of view (or for other reasons), practically desirable or undesirable."

These formulations are inadequate as attempts at definition, because the same expressions appear in the defining as in the definiendum ( logical circle ). Exactly the same objection also applies to "value judgment" = (def.) " A judgment of what is desirable or worth while "

In order to get a clear picture of Max Weber's utterances on “value judgment”, in particular about his conception of logic and his theory of value, one can first clarify the scope of the debates that not only clarified Weber's theses, but in places rather obscured them.

Karl Popper had put Max Weber under the spell of essentialism because of his extensive use of explicit definitions . In the positivism dispute, however, representatives of critical rationalism such as Hans Albert , Wolfgang Schluchter and Herbert Keuth not only defended Popper but also Weber against the positivism and decisionism accusations, attacks such as those presented by Herbert Marcuse and Jürgen Habermas .

Only later did it become known that Max Weber had unmistakably attached himself to Baden Neo-Kantianism , particularly Heinrich Rickert , in science and value theory . Weber modified this preliminary work according to his particular purposes and ideas; Nevertheless, this relationship to the history of the problem must be taken into account if one wants to understand Weber's epistemological statements.

Victor Kraft

Victor Kraft considers the concept of value to be definable. He differentiates value carrier and value predicate:

“The object to which a value is assigned is the value carrier; the value that is ascribed to it is expressed by a value predicate. This is a concept of value, mostly in adjectival, but also in noun or verbal form: x is sinful, x is a sin, x sins. "

The various types of value differ according to their strength in their objective, descriptive content. Kraft denies the independent existence of values ​​and thus distinguishes itself from so-called value absolutism (see value realism ).

Hans Albert

Following on from strength, according to Hans Albert, a sentence is a value judgment precisely if it is

1. characterizes the respective target situation in a positive or negative way for the behavior (statement or action);
2. Assuming a normative principle (value standard or behavior maxim) that requires appropriate behavior; and
3. involves a prescriptive expectation that the addressees of the sentence identify with this principle and therefore behave accordingly.

Theodor Geiger

Theodor Geiger wins his position on value theory by examining the Uppsala School (cf. Axel Hägerström ). According to Geiger's view, a value judgment objectifies the subjective relationship of a person to an object, whereby the linguistic representation inadmissibly turns the subjective evaluation into an objective property of the evaluated object. Geiger considers this abuse of language to be illegitimate:

“The value judgment thus objectifies a subjective relationship of the speaker to an object and makes this pseudo-objective part of a statement in the form of theoretical factual statements. This is illegitimate. "

Value freedom

In the philosophy of science the requirement is often made that scientific statements should be free of normative (or at least moral) content. This property is known as value freedom.

Value judgment dispute

Value judgments are a central subject of the value judgment dispute in sociology and economics. This dispute is about the question of whether value judgments should be made in science about measures to be taken by politics or whether such value judgments can be scientifically justified.

Value judgments and freedom of expression

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The distinction between value judgments and factual judgments plays a major role in the question of what opinions are that fall under the freedom of expression (see freedom of expression ). In German law, factual judgments are better protected than value judgments by the constitutional right of freedom of expression.

In detail: freedom of expression

literature

  • Hans Albert , E. Topitsch (ed.): Value judgment dispute . Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 1979.
  • Samuel Alexander : The idea of ​​value . Mind (NS) 1 (1892), pp. 31-55.
  • Anna-Marie Cushan: Investigations into Facts and Values: Groundwork for a Theory of Moral Conflict Resolution . (1983/2014). Ondwelle, Melbourne. [1]
  • Stephen Finlay: The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgment. In: The Journal of Ethics. 8/3 (2004), pp. 205-223.
  • W. Haas: Value Judgments. In: Min. 62 (1953).
  • Karl-Heinz Hillmann : Freedom of Value Judgment. In: ders .: Dictionary of Sociology (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 410). 4th, revised and expanded edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1994, ISBN 3-520-41004-4 , p. 932.
  • Herbert Keuth: Science and value judgment: to discussion of value judgments and positivism dispute. Mohr Siebeck, 1989, ISBN 3-16-345452-6 .
  • Victor Kraft : Basics of a scientific theory of values. 2nd Edition. Vienna 1951.
  • WD Lamont: The Value Judgment. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1955.
  • Richard Mervyn: The Language of Morals. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1952.
  • Annemarie Pieper , A. Hügli: Value judgment; Value judgment dispute. In: HWPh . Volume 12, pp. 614-621.
  • Ian T. Ramsey: Value Judgment. In: RGG . 3. Edition. Volume 6, p. 1652 f.
  • Armin G. Wildfeuer: Worth. In: Petra Kolmer, Armin G. Wildfeuer (Hrsg.): New manual of philosophical basic concepts. Volume 3 Verlag Karl Alber, Freiburg i. Br. 2011, pp. 2484-2504.

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ "The award, which is awarded by a concept of value predicate to a subject, is based on and refers to the fact that it is characterized in its relationship to our opinion." (Viktor force: . Value concepts and value judgments from: ibid .: The basics of a . scientific theory of value 2nd edition Springer, Vienna 1951. In:. Hans Albert, Ernst Topitsch, (ed.) . value judgment controversy . scientific Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt 1971, ISBN 3-534-04161-5 , page 50.)
  2. ↑ a b c Ignaz Pokorny: The main points of the doctrine of the feelings in Herbart and his school. In: Program of the KK Gymnasium in Znojmo at the end of the school year 1867. Znojmo 1867, p. 14.
  3. ↑ Ignaz Pokorny: The main points of the doctrine of the feelings in Herbart and his school. In: Program of the KK Gymnasium in Znojmo at the end of the school year 1867. Znojmo 1867, p. 14 f.
  4. ↑ a b Ignaz Pokorny: The main points of the doctrine of the feelings in Herbart and his school. In: Program of the KK Gymnasium in Znojmo at the end of the school year 1867. Znojmo 1867, p. 15.
  5. ↑ Max Weber, quoted in after Herbert Keuth: Science and Value Judgment. On discussion of value judgments and the argument about positivism. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck): Tübingen 1989, ISBN 3-16-345453-4 , p. 23 f. / Max Weber: The sense of 'freedom from values' in sociological and economic sciences. 1917. In: Collected essays on science. Mohr, 1988, ISBN 3-8252-1492-3 , p. 489.
  6. ↑ Value judgment. In: Wolfgang J. Koschnik: Standard dictionary for the social sciences. Volume 2, Munich / London / New York / Paris 1993, ISBN 3-598-11080-4 .
  7. ↑ Karl R. Popper: The open society and its enemies. Volume 1: The Magic of Plato. 7th edition. Tübingen 1992 (first: 1944), p. 262, note 41:30.
  8. ^ Wolfgang Schluchter: Freedom of values ​​and ethics of responsibility. On the relationship between science and politics in Max Weber. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1971, ISBN 3-16-532621-5 .
  9. ↑ Herbert Keuth: Science and Value Judgment. On discussion of value judgments and the argument about positivism. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1989, ISBN 3-16-345453-4 .
  10. ^ Hans Albert : Science and responsibility. Max Weber's Idea of ​​Rational Practice and the Total Reason of Political Theology. In: Ders .: Critical Rationalism. Four chapters on the critique of illusory thinking (UTB; 2138). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2000, ISBN 3-8252-2138-5 (replica to Herbert Marcuse: Industrialization and Capitalism. In: Otto Stammer (Ed.): Max Weber and the Sociology Today. Negotiations of the 15th German Sociological Conference . Mohr, Tübingen 1965)
  11. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Technology and science as ideology. 2nd Edition. Frankfurt 1969, p. 120 ff.
  12. ↑ Max Weber: Collected essays on the science of science. 7th edition. Tübingen 1988 (first: 1922)
  13. ↑ Wolfgang Schluchter: The Development of Occidental Rationalism. An analysis of Max Weber's social history. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1979, ISBN 3-16-541532-3 , p. 26.
  14. ^ Peter-Ulrich Merz-Benz : Max Weber and Heinrich Rickert. The epistemological foundations of understanding sociology . VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden 2008.
  15. ↑ a b Viktor Kraft: Value Concepts and Value Judgments. (From: The basics of a scientific theory of values. 2nd edition. Springer, Vienna 1951). In: Hans Albert, Ernst Topitsch, (Ed.): Value judgment dispute. Scientific Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1971, ISBN 3-534-04161-5 , p. 44.
  16. ↑ Viktor Kraft: Value Concepts and Value Judgments. (From: The basics of a scientific theory of values. 2nd edition. Springer, Vienna 1951). In: Hans Albert, Ernst Topitsch, (Ed.): Value judgment dispute. Scientific Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt 1971, ISBN 3-534-04161-5 , p. 47.
  17. ↑ Hans Albert: Theory and Practice. Max Weber and the problem of value freedom and rationality. In: Hans Albert, Ernst Topitsch, (Ed.): Value judgment dispute. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1971, ISBN 3-534-04161-5 , pp. 200–236 (from: Die Philosophie und die Wissenschaften. Simon Moser on his 65th birthday. Anton Hain, Meisenheim 1966, pp. 246–272).
  18. ↑ Theodor Geiger: Ideology and Truth. A Sociological Critique of Thought. Luchterhand: Neuwied and Berlin 2nd ed. 1968, p. 51.
  19. ↑ Oliver Stegmann: Assertion of facts and value judgment in the German and French press. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2004, 11 ff.