Explication

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Explication (from the Latin explicatio , discussion, unraveling, explanation, unfolding, expressing) generally denotes the explanation , explanation, in particular the explanation of a term through the presentation of its characteristics , specifically after Carnap and following in philosophy, including the specification of a fuzzy term and logic in mathematical logic also the definition of symbols, conventional designations, etc. a. Explicit means 'explicitly, clearly, clearly'.

Explication as a technique of conceptual specification

The focus is on Carnap's doctrine of explication as a means of logical analysis.

It serves to specify an unclear (vague) or ambiguous term ( explicandum ) in the development of a scientific terminology by means of a more precise term ( explicate ) in the service of greater clarity and constancy of meaning.

According to Rudolf Carnap , the rational reconstruction of concepts is one of the most important tasks of philosophy.

The task of term explication is to replace a given, more or less inexact term with an exact one. The given term (and the term used for it) should be called the explicandum, while the exact term (and the term proposed for it), which is intended to replace the first, is called the explicate. The explicandum can be taken from everyday language or from an early stage of scientific language. The explicit must be given by explicit rules for its application. This can e.g. This can be done, for example, by a definition which classifies this concept into an existing system of logical-mathematical or empirical concepts. (Carnap (1959), p. 12)

The explication is partly included in the definition (in the broader sense). The explication does not just describe a usage of language, but has a prescriptive ( stipulative ) character. In the case of precision, traditional meanings are sometimes changed to make them useful for specific scientific tasks. Explications are judged on their convenience.

A single natural language word can be explicable multiple times, i. i.e., multiple explicates may be adequate. It must then be stated which explicit one is starting from.

Explication of natural language expressions is not always possible. This is used in political or scientific jargon .

On the transition from the explicandum to the explicate

The transition from the explicandum to the explicit takes place through an abstraction process .

Example:

A logical explicate of the “if-so-relationship” ( implication ) should be found. The explicandum occurs in statements of the form “If p, then q”. With the everyday use of the if-so relationship, a number of non-logical moments are linked in a highly unclear way. One assumes, for example, that p must be the cause of q in order for the statement “if p, then q” to be true.

With the corresponding test questions, it also emerges that most people consider the statement to be false if p is false but q is true . An explicate of this explicandum is, as an in-depth analysis shows, the subjunction . It is determined exclusively by the following truth table:

Truth table for the material implication
in two-valued classical logic
true true true
true not correct not correct
not correct true true
not correct not correct true

This term explication does not simply reject the explicandum as wrong , but rather preserves the scientifically valuable and correct moments, removes ambiguities and conceptual fuzziness and finally leads to what is considered by all psychological, causal-theoretical, etc. a. Explicit moments relieved.

Conditions of the adequacy of an explicate

Carnap names four adequacy conditions for explicates:

  1. Similarity to the Explicandum :

The explicate must be similar to the explicand, otherwise there is no explication.

  1. Accuracy :

The use of the explicit should be regulated explicitly, clearly and as precisely as possible.

  1. Fertility (Scientific Usefulness) :

The explicate must prove itself in scientific practice and, in particular, be able to take its place wherever the explicate has sufficiently met the requirements up to now. The explicate should be such that it can function as part of a self-contained theory if possible.

  1. Simplicity :

The explicate should satisfy the principle of simplicity. Wherever, from the point of view of a certain theory, several explicates can be constructed starting from the explicand, the one should be selected that gets by with a minimum of logical and general system-theoretical richness. It will therefore not be very useful to construct such explicates on the basis of a certain explicandum that at the same time require the modification of large parts or even entire scientific systems. This simplicity should meet two requirements: (a) The simplicity of the definition of the term and (b) the simplicity of the legal statements made possible by this term

Dieter Wunderlich emphasizes the theory-relatedness of an explication, demands the explication with regard to clear cases and compliance with the same language level

The theory-relatedness of the explication

Explication has similarities with defining and defining definitions, but differs from them in terms of their theory-relatedness:

"In essence, however, the meaning of explication is not dealing with a usage of language, but clarifying factual questions by explaining a fact in relation to the conceptual system of a scientific theory."

It is sometimes assumed that an explication tends to include the entire existing system of terms and therefore cannot be ended in principle.

The forms of the explicated term

The explicit term itself comes in three forms as:

  1. classificatory concept : division of things into two or more mutually exclusive classes, as in the division of plants and animals
  2. Quantitative term (also: metric term): Objects or their properties are characterized using numerical values: length, duration, temperature, income, export quota, etc. a.
  3. comparative concept (also: order concept, relation concept): thing A is warmer (more or equal, among other things) than thing B.

See also

literature

  • Rudolf Carnap: Inductive Logic and Probability , edited by Wolfgang Stegmüller, Springer, Vienna, 1959.
  • Georg Brun; Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn: Textanalyse in den Wissenschaften , vdf, Zurich, 2009 (UTB No. 3139), pp. 180-185.
  • Gottfried Gabriel : Explication , in: J. Mittelstraß (ed.), Enzyklopädie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie, 2nd edition 2005, p. 459.
  • Winfried Löffler : Introduction to logic. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2008, pp. 13-17.
  • Geo Siegwart: Explication. A methodological attempt , in: W. Löffler; E. Runggaldier (ed.), Dialogue and System. Otto Muck on his 65th birthday. Academia, Sankt Augustin, 1997, pp. 15-45.
  • Geo Siegwart: Preliminary questions about the truth. A treatise on cognitive languages. R. Oldenbourg, Munich, 1997, pp. 256-272.

Web links

Wiktionary: Explication  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
Wiktionary: explicit  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Pawłowski: Concept formation and definition. (1980), p. 183.
  2. ↑ W. Löffler: Introduction to logic. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2008, Rn. 17th
  3. ↑ W. Löffler: Introduction to logic. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2008, Rn. 18th
  4. ↑ cf. Pawłowski: Concept formation and definition. (1980), p. 166.
  5. ↑ Cf. Prechtl: Explication ; in: Prechtl: Basic Concepts of Analytical Philosophy , 2004.
  6. ↑ See Brun, Georg; Gertrude Hirsch Hadorn: Text analysis in the sciences. - Zurich: vdf (UTB No. 3139), p. 180 f.
  7. ↑ Rolf Wank: The legal concept formation. Munich, Beck 1985, p. 57.
  8. ^ So Wigand Siebel : Foundations of Logic. Munich, Verlag Documentation 1975 (UTB 515), pp. 35, 38.