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The concept of truth is used in different contexts and understood differently. Generally speaking, the correspondence of statements or judgments with a state of affairs , a fact or reality in the sense of a correct representation is called truth . In the following, “truth” is also understood to mean the correspondence of an utterance with an intention or a certain meaning or a conception that is normatively recognized as correct (“ truism ” or commonplace ) or with one's own knowledge, experience and convictions (also called “truthfulness”) . More in-depth considerations see truth as the result of a revealing, exposing or discovering process of recognizing original connections or essential features.

The underlying adjective “true” can also describe the genuineness , correctness , purity or authenticity of a thing, an action or a person, measured against a certain term (“a true friend”). In everyday language one can distinguish the "truth" from the lie as the deliberate expression of the untruth and the error as the wrongly held to be true.

The question of truth is one of the central problems of philosophy and logic and is answered differently by different theories. The questions about a definition of truth and a criterion for whether something is rightly called “true” can be roughly distinguished. In certain formal semantics , sentences are assigned truth values that describe the fulfillment in certain contexts. The concept of provability , which is important for the fundamentals of mathematics , can sometimes be associated with such semantic concepts of truth, and a proof then demonstrates the truth.

In science and technology, the truth (true value) is generally strived for by measuring. True values cannot be measured directly, but they are successfully limited by value intervals (of the complete measurement result ).

Word origin

Truth is formed as an abstraction to the adjective “true”, which has developed from the Indo-European root noun (ig.) * Wēr- “trust, loyalty, consent”.

Truth in philosophy

Ancient Greek ἀλήθεια - aletheia and Latin veritas correspond to the concept of truth in ancient philosophy . In modern theoretical approaches, “truth” usually describes a property of beliefs, opinions or expressions that can relate to any possible area of ​​knowledge (everyday objects, physics, morality , metaphysics, etc.).

A limitation of the relation of truthful propositions to certain subject areas, e.g. B. on the area of ​​those objects that are accessible to experience is controversial, as is the exact determination of the objects to which this property is ascribed (the "truth carrier": judgments, convictions, statements, contents etc.). But the nature of truth as a property of the truth bearers is also the subject of debates (e.g. correspondence with “ truth makers ”, ie objects, facts etc. or “coherence” as agreement with other truth bearers). It is also controversial how we get knowledge of this property: only through empirical knowledge acquisition or at least for certain objects in advance, " a priori ".

Different elaborations of truth theories answer some or all of these questions in different ways.

Schematic overview

position Definition of truth Truth carrier Truth criterion
Ontological-metaphysical correspondence theory "Veritas est adaequatio intellectus et rei"
Truth is the correspondence of knowing mind and thing
Think Things in the world
Dialectical materialistic reflection theory Correspondence between consciousness and objective reality Consciousness (Orthodox Marxism)
or Statement (Modern Marxism)
Logical-empirical image theory Correspondence between the logical structure of the sentence and that of the facts it represents Sentence structure Structure of the facts
Semantic theory of truth "X is a true statement if and only if p" (for "p" any statement, for "x" any proper noun of this statement can be used.) Sentence (of the object language) Discourse universe (of object language)
Redundancy theory The concept of truth is only used for stylistic reasons or to emphasize one's own assertion. sentences -
Performative theory what you do when you say a statement is true Action / speech act / self-commitment own behavior
Coherence theory Consistency / derivative relationships of a statement to the system of accepted statements statement No contradiction between the statement and the already accepted statement system
Consensus theory Discursively redeemable validity claim that is connected with a constative speech act Statement / proposition reasoned consensus under the conditions of an ideal speaking situation

The correspondence theory of truth

The theory of truth that dominated the history of philosophy for a long time was the correspondence or adequation theory of truth . This theory assumes truth as the correspondence of conceptual ideas with reality. Their representatives understand truth fundamentally as a relation between two points of reference and refer to these as correspondence, correspondence, adequation , agreement etc. The relata are also determined differently: anima ( soul ) / ens , thinking / being , subject / object, consciousness / world, Knowledge / reality, language / world, assertion / fact etc.

The almost opposite view is that of ancient skepticism , which questions the possibility of a secure, verifiable knowledge of reality and truth.


Aristotle formulated the basic principle of the correspondence theory

Aristotle is often mentioned as the first correspondence theorist , who formulated in his metaphysics :

“To say that beings are not or that there are non-being is wrong, but to say that there is and that that which is not is not is true. So whoever predicts to be or not to be must pronounce truth or falsehood.
[…] Not because our opinion that you are white is true, you are white, but because you are white, we tell the truth by claiming this. "

Aristotle does not speak of correspondence or adequacy in this famous formulation. Therefore there is no scientific consensus on the assignment of Aristotle to the correspondence theory.

Thomas Aquinas

In medieval philosophy, Thomas Aquinas is one of the best-known representatives of a correspondence or adequation theory of truth. In the Quaestiones disputatae de veritate there is the classic formulation of the ontological correspondence theory of truth as "adaequatio rei et intellectus (correspondence of the thing with the understanding )":

“Respondeo dicendum quod veritas consistit in adaequatione intellectus et rei […]. Quando igitur res sunt mensura et regula intellectus, veritas consistit in hoc, quod intellectus adaequatur rei, ut in nobis accidit, ex eo enim quod res est vel non est, opinio nostra et oratio vera vel falsa est. Sed quando intellectus est regula vel mensura rerum, veritas consistit in hoc, quod res adaequantur intellectui, sicut dicitur artifex facere verum opus, quando concordat arti. "

“I answer that it should be said that truth consists in the correspondence of reason and matter […]. Therefore, if things are the measure and rule of the understanding, the truth is that the understanding conforms to the matter, as it is the case with us; namely, because of the fact that the thing is or is not, our opinion and our speech about it is true or false. But if understanding is the rule and measure of things, then truth consists in the conformity of things with understanding; it is said that the artist produces a true work of art if it corresponds to his artistic conception. "

The background to this definition of truth is a threefold understanding of truth:

  • from the side of agreement ( ontological truth );
  • from the side of the knowing subject, whose knowledge agrees with beings ( logical truth ) - expressed in the formula "adaequatio intellectus ad rem"
  • from the side of the known object, whose being corresponds to the knowledge of the knowing subject ( ontic truth ) - expressed in the formula "adaequatio rei ad intellectum"

Modern times, Kant

A correspondence theoretical concept of truth was very often represented up until the 19th century. So explains z. B. Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason : "The explanation of the name of truth, namely that it is the correspondence of knowledge with its object, is given here and presupposed" (A 58 / B 82). However, Kant himself advocates a more differentiated theory of truth that depends on the source of the respective knowledge. For example, he advocates verificationism (correspondence between experience and thinking) for individual judgments about objects of experience, but this can be restricted or even canceled by the conditions of the coherence of experiences. A moderate fallibilism for general empirical judgments and natural laws.


In modern philosophy, the correspondence theory is mainly defended by the Neuthomists ( Emerich Coreth , Karl Rahner , Johannes Baptist Lotz ). Truth generally designates a correspondence or approximation relationship between the knowledge of a knowing subject and a being to which this knowledge relates. Coreth defines truth in its typical formulation as "correspondence between knowledge and being". The background is the conception of a fundamental identity of being and knowing: "Being is originally and actually knowing oneself, knowing being-to-oneself in the spiritual fulfillment".

Dialectical materialistic reflection theory

With Dialectical Materialism, Marx formulates a reflection theory for the mapping of objective reality (reality) in people's consciousness. Truth is accordingly a correspondence of consciousness with objective reality. It is in the service of practice and is measured by it alone. Marx expresses this in his second thesis on Feuerbach:

“The question of whether objective truth belongs to human thinking is not a question of theory, but a practical question. In practice man has to prove the truth, ie reality and power, this-sidedness of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thought - which is isolated from practice - is a purely scholastic question. "

While in orthodox Marxism consciousness is assumed to be an "image" of the state of affairs, newer trends are shifting towards ascribing this function to linguistic structures such as statements:

"It [the truth] is defined as the property of the statements to agree with the reflected facts."

The truth always represents a relationship - namely the relationship between the depicted object in consciousness and the object itself. If the reflection is adequate, one speaks here of (relative) truth. The criterion for this is practice. Dialectical materialism distinguishes relative truth from absolute truth . Both are viewed as a dialectical unit: According to this, an absolute truth is e.g. B. the descent of humans from animals. The relativity of this truth results z. B. from the development of the knowledge of mankind, which comprehends the natural processes more and more perfectly and thus finds out "new", more precise, higher truths. Darwin's thesis is absolutely true, but it can be supplemented and determined more precisely. As a result, people attain higher and higher relative truth based on absolute truths. There is no final, eternal truth in dialectical materialism.

Logical-empirical image theory

There is also an image theory of truth within logical empiricism . Classically this is worked out in the work of the early Wittgenstein . In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , Wittgenstein initially assumes that we make images of reality. They are a “model of reality” (2.12). Images express themselves in thoughts, the shape of which represents "the meaningful sentence" (4).

Wittgenstein defines reality as “the totality of facts” (1.1). Facts are existing facts, which are to be distinguished from mere, non-existing facts (2.04–2.06). They consist of objects or things and the connection between them (2.01). The theorem is also a fact (3.14). A fact becomes an image through the “form of the image” which it has in common with what is depicted. Wittgenstein tries to make this clear with the following example:

"The gramophone record, the musical idea, the musical notation, the sound waves, all stand in the representational relationship that exists between language and the world."

- Ludwig Wittgenstein : Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus . 4.014.

Just as the musical notation is an image of the music it represents, the sentence represents "an image of reality" (4.021). A sentence consists of names and the relationships between them. It is true when the names contained in it refer to real objects and the relationship between the names corresponds to that between the referenced objects.

Problems of Correspondence Theory

In correspondence theory, truth is thought of as a two-digit relation of the form aRb . With all of these three structural elements, problems arise that were increasingly discussed at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, which led to the development of alternative theories of truth.

So there are difficulties in determining the truth carrier ( truth bearer ). What are the objects or entities that are supposed to agree with facts or reality, and which we call true in this sense ?

On the other hand, there is the question of the truth maker ( truthmaker ), namely of what type it is that statements must agree with in order to be true. Although there is broad agreement among correspondence theorists that the truth makers are facts , there is disagreement about what facts actually are. Günther Patzig expresses a view widespread in analytical philosophy that one can neither define the general concept of fact nor identify individual facts without referring to statements. Facts would therefore have to be seen as fulfilled truth conditions of sentences. For correspondence theory, this results in the dilemma that it ends up in a definitional circle, since the concept of fact already contains the concept of truth, which actually has to be defined:

“It is important to note that it is initially quite unclear whether what facts are to be explained about facts or whether facts are to be explained. Precisely for this reason a definition according to which is true what is in agreement with the facts is just as correct as it is empty: it is a tautology [...]. "

The third problem concerns the correspondence relation itself. This is already evident from the fact that a large number of expressions have been used to describe it in the various theories: correspondence , correspondence, agreement, adequation, mapping or reflection .

Against the concept of a real pictorial relationship there was the objection that it remains unclear how the correspondence relation of two so different "entities" as knowledge and object should be thought at all (e.g. between my knowledge that the concrete object in front of me is red and the object itself). In order to avoid these difficulties, representatives of language-analytically oriented correspondence theories tried to grasp the relation between statements and facts more abstractly than structural equality or isomorphism . However, this concept also proves to be problematic with simple examples, since in many cases a clear breakdown of a fact into its elements does not seem to be possible:

“Let's take the example that has long been notorious in the discussion of truth: the cat is on the mat. This statement can perhaps be broken down into its component parts in a reasonably plausible manner. But what about the relevant fact? Can one really say that this fact consists of such and such components, for example the cat, the mat and a certain spatial relation? "

One encounters even greater difficulties, for example, with negative statements and their counterparts on the side of the facts. What is the correspondence, for example, when I recognize that a certain object does not exist or that it does not have certain properties? How can one imagine a match with something that doesn't exist? It is even more difficult to interpret unreal conditional sentences like: "If I hadn't done this, that (maybe) wouldn't have happened."

Nevertheless, Karen Gloy has to agree: "The adaequatio-understanding of truth is undoubtedly the best known and most widespread, which dominates both our everyday, pre-scientific thinking as well as our scientific." In everyday life (vague) talk of the correspondence of a linguistic statement with one objective facts are often not a problem.

Language-analytically oriented truth theories

With the emergence of language- analytical philosophy , there was a renewed interest in the problem of truth in the 20th century. The concept of truth was partly developed within highly complex truth theories. The positions represented differ both with regard to the question of which “objects” the predicator “true” can be assigned to and with regard to the criteria for when truth can be spoken of.

In these theories, truth is no longer understood as a property of consciousness or thinking, as in correspondence theory, but as a property of linguistic structures such as sentences or propositions .

Semantic theory of truth

The most influential theory based on language analysis is the semantic truth theory of Alfred Tarski (also logical-semantic or formal-semantic truth theory ). Tarski's goal is a definition of truth following the use of colloquial language and in a more precise manner of the correspondence theory. In addition, it also specifies how and under what conditions a submitted expression can be proven to be true.

For Tarski, the concept of truth always refers to a specific language. To avoid antinomies , Tarski suggests reserving semantic predicates such as “true” or “false” for a particular metalanguage . In this metalanguage, “true” or “false” should be used to designate statements that are formulated in an object language that is separate from the metalanguage . Since for each language L the predicate “true in L ” is to be banned from L itself, the languages ​​are hierarchized, for which truth predicates can be defined without contradiction.

On the basis of the classical concept of truth, Tarski assumes that an adequate definition of truth should result in sentences of the type:

"The statement 'snow is white' is true precisely when snow is white."

Or generalized to a scheme:

" (T) X is true if and only if p."

According to Tarski, this " equivalence of the form ( T )" is not a definition of truth, since there is no statement here, only the scheme of a statement:

“We can only say that any equivalence of the form (T) that we obtain after replacing 'p' with a particular statement and 'X' with the name of that statement can be regarded as a partial definition of the truth which explains what the truth of this one individual statement is. The general definition must in a certain sense be the logical conjunction of all these partial definitions. "

For his formal definition, however, Tarski starts out from the concept of fulfillment . In logic, a subject fulfills a statement function if the function becomes true by inserting the name of the subject. So here the term “fulfillment” is defined using the term “true”. This definition can be turned around and for propositional functions with only one free variable say: A proposition is true if its subject fulfills the propositional function. To avoid a circle, the term “fulfillment” must now be defined without recourse to the term “true”. According to Tarski, this is again possible with the help of a scheme: A subject fulfills a statement function if it has the property expressed in the predicate, i.e.:

"For every a - a the proposition function x satisfies if and only if p"

Appropriate substitutions result in statements that clarify the concept of being fulfilled and can be used as partial definitions of this concept. For an example related to colloquial language, we can use the quotations "" x is white "" of the propositional function "x is white" for "x" and the propositional function "a is white" for "p", which can be replaced by "x" caused by "a", insert to get the following statement:

"For every a - a fulfills the statement function" x is white "if and only if a is white"

The specified scheme can be generalized for propositional functions with several free variables or without free variables and can be made more precise for a large class of formal languages ​​in such a way that a definition of the fulfillment and, based on this, one of the truth can be created.

According to Tarski, to prove the truth of a concrete proposition one starts from a list of fundamental statements which are assumed to be fulfilled. These fundamental statements are axioms or observational data that represent the connection to reality. If, with the help of logic, it is possible to derive the sentence in question from the fundamental statements, it is also fulfilled.

For Tarski, a general definition of truth is only possible in the context of formal languages. In normal language it can only be clarified “what is the truth of this one individual statement.” This is also the case in his famous example: “'It is snowing' is a true statement if and only when it is snowing”. However, he says:

“The results obtained for formalized languages ​​also have some validity in relation to colloquial language, thanks to the universalism of the latter: by translating any definition of a true statement [...] into colloquial language, we obtain a fragmentary definition of truth. "

Apparently, this definition relates to a correspondence between a statement (“it snows”) and a fact (“when it snows”), so that it is often assumed that Tarski's logical-semantic concept of truth is based on the thought of correspondence. Even if this corresponds to Tarski’s goal of making correspondence theory more precise, it was objected that Tarski’s theory is systematically based on the assumption that “the framework theory, the axiomatic set theory, is consistent, i.e. no contradiction, no formula of the form 'A and non- A 'is allowed to deduce according to the inference rules of classical logic . ”Therefore, the“ often so-called' correspondence theory 'of W. [ahrheit] of the Tarski succession is based on a pure theory of coherence ”. Still, Tarski's influence cannot be denied:

“Like hardly any other, this theory of truth has met with broad resonance in modern philosophy and has been incorporated into the philosophy of science and metamathematics without any problems, almost by itself . Today all modern theories of truth use the Tarskian concept of truth. "

Deflationist theories of truth

Redundancy theory

The redundancy theory of truth states that sentences containing the word “true” are usually redundant. This term can then be eliminated from the language without any loss of information; it is superfluous in a sense. Frank Plumpton Ramsey , Alfred Jules Ayer and Quine are usually named as the main proponents of redundancy theory. According to Dummett, this approach can be traced back to Gottlob Frege , who formulated the basic idea of ​​the redundancy theory in his work On Sense and Meaning in 1892:

“You can almost say: 'The thought that 5 is a prime number is true.' But if you look more closely, you notice that this actually doesn't mean anything more than the simple sentence '5 is a prime number'. [...] From this it can be inferred that the relation of the thought to the truth must not be compared with that of the subject to the predicate. "

Frege is already expressing the central idea of ​​the redundancy theory that the expression “true” basically does nothing to the meaning of the sentences in which it occurs and is therefore redundant in terms of content. This idea is formulated in its classic form in Ramsey's Facts and Propositions , where it says succinctly that “in reality there is no separate truth problem, but only a linguistic muddle ”. Truth or falsehood can primarily be attributed to propositions . When someone says “ p is true”, he is only affirming p , and when he says “ p is false” he is not asserting -p . But this would not extend the content of the proposition p . For example, the sentence “It is true that Caesar was murdered” does not mean any more than the sentence “Caesar was murdered”. A sentence like “it is true” is only used for stylistic reasons or to emphasize one's own assertion.

Frege himself, however, rejects a redundancy theory, for him truth is an indefinable logical basic concept and "the true" an abstract object.

The objection to redundancy theory was that the term “true” is neither explained nor defined. Thus, against the Caesar example of Ramsey, a sentence can be constructed in which the designation "true" occurs essential and cannot be omitted for understanding: "Everything that the Pope says is true."

Prosentential theory

Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp Jr. and Nuel D. Belnap Jr. worked out the prosentential truth theory based on an idea by Franz Brentano .

Minimal theory

Paul Horwich's minimal theory states that the property “true” defies any conceptual and scientific analysis.

Disquotation theory

The disquotation theory says: Truth is related to reality. The phrase “snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. No sentence is true in itself, reality makes it true.

Performative theory

Ramsey's redundancy theory had a great impact on the discussion of the concept of truth in language analytical philosophy. One of the most important attempts at critical elaboration was made by Peter Frederick Strawson in 1949 in his essay Truth , in which he developed a performative theory of truth. Strawson agrees with redundancy theory in that he claims that "if you say that a statement is true, you don't make a new statement." Nevertheless, the statement of the truth is not superfluous, since "you do something beyond the mere statement when you say that this statement is true".

For Strawson, the phrase "is true" is not a metalinguistic predicate that is used to speak about sentences. Rather, it represents an "utterance without meaning or purpose (pointless utterance)". The use of "is true" is a "linguistic act" with which one merely confirms a statement without stating anything new in terms of content. The expression "it is true that" is therefore only the mode of statement, a "performer who converts an initially only possible statement into a real (admittedly possibly false) statement."

Coherence theory

The coherence theory of truth emerged in the neo-Hegelianism of the Anglo-Saxon region at the end of the 19th century , for example with Francis Herbert Bradley and Brand Blanshard . It also played a role in the discussions of logical empiricism and the Vienna Circle , with Otto Neurath preferring a theory of coherence, while Moritz Schlick preferred a theory of correspondence. In its simplest form, the theory of coherence states that the truth or correctness of a statement consists in letting itself be inserted into a system of statements without contradiction. This is how Otto Neurath puts it:

“Science as a system of statements is always up for discussion. […] Each new statement is confronted with the entirety of the existing statements that have already been brought into line with one another. A statement is called correct if it can be incorporated. What cannot be incorporated is rejected as incorrect. Instead of rejecting the new statement, it is also possible, which is generally difficult to decide, to change the entire previous system of statements until the new statement can be incorporated [...]. "

Neurath's programmatic approach was developed into a comprehensive theory by Nicholas Rescher . However, Rescher uses the concept of coherence explicitly only as a criterion, but not to define truth. In defining “true” he subscribes to the correspondence theory: Truth means the agreement of a proposition with a fact.

Rescher distinguishes between two kinds of truth criteria: guaranteeing ( Guaranteeing ) and legitimizing ( authorizing ) criteria. The former give complete certainty as to the existence of truth, while the latter merely have a supportive character. In Rescher's view, it is sufficient if such a criterion makes the existence of truth more likely. Rescher further restricts the validity of the concept of coherence to the explication of factual statements - Rescher speaks of "data" - while, in his view, pragmatic criteria must be used for the truth of logical-mathematical statements. Data are conceived from the outset as linguistic entities and not as mere facts. The acceptability of data is also justified according to pragmatic criteria.

According to Rescher, a theory or a system of statements can be described as coherent if the following aspects are met:

  1. Comprehensiveness : All relevant sentences are taken into account; the theory is logically closed.
  2. Consistency : The theory does not contain any logical- contradicting propositions.
  3. Cohesiveness : the propositions of the theory are explicated in their relationships or contexts to the other propositions; the relationships between the sentences are logically sound.

Pragmatism and intersubjectivity theories

The idea of intersubjectivity was already strongly worked out in German idealism . However, it was only Charles S. Peirce who recognized the connection to the problem of truth . Peirce sees intersubjectivity as the result of an unlimited research community.

“On the other hand, all representatives of science are carried by the joyous hope that the processes of research, if only carried forward far enough, will yield a reliable solution to every question to which they are applied. […] You may get different results at first, but when everyone perfects their methods and processes, you will find that the results steadily move towards a predetermined center. [...] The opinion that all researchers fatefully end up agreeing to is what we mean by truth, and the object that is represented by this opinion is the real. "

- Charles S. Peirce

While Peirce here suggests both intersubjectivity and correspondence with facts as aspects of truth, elsewhere he advocates principles of a pragmatic theory of truth :

“For truth is neither more nor less than that character of a proposition which consists in this, that belief in the proposition would, with sufficient experience and reflection, lead us to such conduct as would tend to satisfy the desires we should then have. To say that truth means more than this is to say that it has no meaning at all. "

“Because the truth is neither more nor less than the character of a sentence, which consists in the fact that the conviction of this sentence, with sufficient experience and reflection, would lead us to behavior that would aim at the wishes that we would then have , to satisfy. If you say that truth means more than that, it means that it has no meaning at all. "

- Charles S. Peirce

William James and John Dewey , the main proponents of the truth theory of pragmatism , invoked Peirce . The sense of truth, then, is the practical difference between true and untrue ideas. According to James, "there is an internal connection between the question of what truth is and the question of how we achieve truth ." With regard to the verification process, one can say:

"[T] he definition of truth is related to the truth criterion ."

For the truth criterion of usefulness in practice , a possible connection to the truth theories of Hegel and Marx was pointed out.

Bertrand Russell criticized this mixture of definition and criterion of truth. Determining whether the effects of a belief are good (in the long run) can be even more difficult than other forms of verification. Other people may also consider those effects harmful that we consider positive. "Intersubjective truth therefore presupposes that all individual interests harmonize." For Herbert Keuth , the pragmatic theory of truth is basically a theory of holding-to-be-true; Nor, in order to be able to judge the success of a statement, can we avoid checking the correspondence with the facts.

Based on the considerations of pragmatism and Wittgenstein's philosophy of language, the intersubjectivity theory of truth developed in the German-speaking area primarily as a consensus theory ( Jürgen Habermas , Karl-Otto Apel ) and as a dialogical theory ( Erlanger school ).

Consensus theory of truth (Habermas)

For consensus theory (also discourse theory ), a statement is true if it deserves recognition from all sensible interlocutors and a - in principle unlimited - consensus can be established about it. In 1973 Jürgen Habermas presented the most precise draft of such a theory in his essay Truth Theories. He defines "truth" as follows:

“Truth is what we call the validity claim that we associate with constative speech acts. A statement is true if the validity claim of the speech acts with which we make that statement using sentences is justified. "

- Jürgen Habermas

The bearer of truth is the statement insofar as its content can be formulated in the standard form of asserting a fact (so-called constative speech act ). If such a formulation is possible as a factual statement, a validity claim is made with the statement, which may or may not be justified. According to Habermas, a validity claim is justified if it can be redeemed discursively .

Validity claims

Habermas distinguishes four types of validity claims that cannot be traced back to one another or to a common foundation. The speakers must assume their fulfillment in communicative action . As long as the understanding succeeds, the mutual claims remain unaffected; if it fails, the allegations must be checked to see which of them remained unfulfilled. There are different repair strategies depending on the validity claim:

  • Comprehensibility : The speaker assumes that the expressions used are understood. If there is a lack of understanding, the speaker is asked to explain it.
  • Truthfulness : The speakers mutually assume truthfulness. If this is doubted, the doubts can hardly be dispelled by the speaker himself who is suspected of being untruthful.
  • Truth : With regard to the propositional content of the speech acts, truth is assumed. If this is doubted, a discourse must clarify whether the speaker's claim is justified.
  • Correctness : The correctness of the norm asserted by the speech act must be recognized. This validity claim can only be redeemed discursively.


The claim to validity of the truth of a statement is redeemed in discourse . The redemption takes place in consensus , which does not have to be a coincidental but a reasoned consensus, so that "everyone else who could enter into a conversation with me would assign the same predicate to the same item". The prerequisite for such a well-founded consensus is an “ideal speaking situation”.

"The ideal speech situation is neither an empirical phenomenon nor a mere construct, but a reciprocal assumption that is inevitable in discourses ."

So that an ideal speech situation does not remain mere fiction, four conditions of equal opportunities for all participants in the discourse must be met, first two trivial, then two non-trivial:

  1. Equal opportunities with regard to the use of communicative speech acts , so that everyone can “open up discourses at any time and continue through speech and counter-speech, question and answer”;
  2. Equal opportunities with regard to the thematization and criticism of all pre-opinions , so that “no pre-opinion remains withdrawn from thematization and criticism in the long run” and can therefore be problematized, justified or refuted (“postulate of equality of speech”);
  3. Equal opportunities regarding the use of representative speech acts , so that it is possible for everyone to “express their attitudes, feelings and intentions” in order to guarantee the truthfulness of the speakers towards themselves and others (“truthfulness postulate”);
  4. Equal opportunities with regard to the use of regulative speech acts , so that everyone "has the same chance to command and oppose, to allow and forbid, [...] etc.", so that "privileges in the sense of unilaterally binding norms of action and evaluation" excluded are.

To distinguish between truth and falsehood according to consensus theory, it is important to identify reasonable consensus:

“In the final analysis, a sensible consensus can be distinguished from a deceptive consensus solely by reference to an ideal speech situation. […] The conditions of empirical speech are [however] very often not identical with those of an ideal speech situation even if we follow the declared intention to start a discourse. "

But in order not to have to give up “the reasonable character of speech”, we assume that a consensus reached is a reasonable consensus as long as “every consensus actually achieved can also be questioned and checked to see whether it is a sufficient indicator for one justified consensus is. "

Dialogic Theory of Truth (Erlanger School)

The basis of the dialogical theory of truth (also dialogue theory ) is the text Logische Propädeutik. Preschool of rational speech . Wilhelm Kamlah and Paul Lorenzen develop the basic terminology of the doctrine of rational speech, which also includes the words "true" and "false". They emphasize the importance of "homology", i.e. the consensus of the discussion participants:

“Since, when judging the truth of statements, we rely on the judgment of others who speak the same language with us, we can call this process interpersonal verification. In this way, through this 'method', we establish a correspondence between the speaker and his interlocutors, a correspondence that was called 'homology' in Socratic dialogue. "

For Kamlah and Lorenzen, “true” and “false” are assessment predicators. What these terms mean can be reconstructed in natural language. Based on an essay by Lorenzen's student Kuno Lorenz , Jürgen Habermas explains the difference between consensus theory and dialogical theory of truth: The definition of the "truth conditions of a statement with the rules of use of the linguistic expressions occurring in this statement" means a confusion of intelligibility and truth. Because of this "analytical theory of truth", the Erlangen approach "does not contribute significantly to the justification of a logic of discourse required by the consensus theory of truth [...]."

Truth in German idealism

The representatives of German idealism place the principle of subjectivity at the center of their philosophy. For them there is basically no objectivity outside the subject. Truth, therefore, cannot simply be determined in the sense of correspondence theory as the agreement of the judgment of a subject with an object outside the subject.

For these idealistic philosophers, the correspondence theory of truth is only relevant for the a posteriori truth of objects of experience. Without an external world existing independently of the knowing subjects, the question of truth has no great significance. Therefore, the primary interest of the German idealists is the question of the “conditions of the possibility” of truth.

The position of Friedrich Schlegel is indicative of the changed status of truth :

“There is no true statement, because a person's position is the uncertainty of floating. Truth is not found, but produced. It is relative. "


According to Johann Gottlieb Fichte , the truth must not be separated from the subject's experience of truth. Truth that is not experienced by a (general) subjectivity is a contradiction in terms. Nevertheless, a distinction must be made between the act of thinking and the content of thought, and the claim to the objective validity of truth must be maintained. Fichte rejects a psychological- solipsistic position like that of Berkeley as “dogmatic idealism”.

For Fichte, truth is present when there is a correspondence between what the ego experiences or suffers passively and the active ego activities. For Fichte, the object is identical to the passive and limited experiences of the subject. If these coincide with his active activities, Fichte speaks of truth.

Nevertheless, Fichte understands truth as something super-individual. There are not many truths understood psychologically, but only one indivisible truth. It does not depend on the individual will of the individual subjects, but on the general structures of a reasonable subject that has always been presupposed:

“[T] he essence of reason is one and the same in all rational beings. We do not know how others think, and we cannot assume that it is. How to think, if we want to think reasonably, we can find; and the way we should think should all rational beings think. All investigation must be done from within, not from without. I'm not supposed to think like others think; but how I should think, so, should I assume, others think too. - To be in agreement with those who are not with themselves, would that be a worthy goal for a reasonable being? "

- Johann Gottlieb Fichte

Truth has such an in-itself character: from the perspective of the individual subject, it appears to create itself; the transcendental , general subjectivity, on the other hand, knows of itself as the constitutional ground of the unified truth. Absolute truth consists in complete self-identity and proves itself to be an infinite task for the finite I, an ideal that can ultimately never be achieved .


For Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel , the “ordinary” concept of truth, which understands it as a correspondence between judgment and reality, denotes a mere correctness. Hegel transfers the concept of correspondence from the level of the relationship between thinking and the thing to the level of thinking and the thought grasping the thing. In this sense, truth is the agreement of an object with itself; H. with his term.

With Hegel, "truth" is an "immanent" process of "the thing itself". In this context, Hegel distinguishes between the "ordinary" and the "philosophical or speculative" sentence. The ordinary sentence takes the form of a judgment. Its components, subject and predicate, are first understood as separate from one another and, as such, placed in relation to one another. This is then true or false. In the positively rational or speculative proposition, on the other hand, the dialectical movement of the thing itself is recorded.

The “concept” in the Hegelian sense represents the substantial constitution of all “things” (things) and the “whole”. The concept of a thing in principle and necessarily surpasses this thing itself, because of the finite moment of the thing. The absolute truth is God as spirit. It alone represents the absolute correspondence of the concept and reality:

“God alone is the true correspondence of concept and reality; But all finite things have a falsehood about them, they have a concept and an existence that is inadequate to their concept [...]. "

For Hegel, the reason for a mismatch between concept and thing is that things have an “untruth” in them. This is based on the fact that they are finite, while the concept that encompasses them is itself infinite. “Therefore, they [finite things] must perish, thereby manifesting the inappropriateness of their conception and existence. The animal as an individual has its concept in its species, and the species frees itself from individuality through death ”. According to Hegel, the “ontological constitution” of a finite thing consists in the fact that it cancels itself ; the perishing is the result of the dialectic that sets in because the being of finite things is not appropriate to its own concept. The same applies to the “truth” of finite things: These “truths” are “finite truths” that must perish. In doing so, they are not destroyed, this cannot happen to the spiritual in contrast to the material, but together with the grasping of their development they form the result. Here truth shows itself in the real sense - as coming together, agreement (identity) of different in a common medium. Hegel means it literally when he says:

“The truth of being as well as of nothing is therefore the unity of both; this unity is becoming . "

Objections to the concept of truth

Logical objections

From the assumption or the principle that there is a single truth, a concept of truth usually follows, which implies an unconditional validity of what is called “true”. Such a concept of truth implies at the same time a complete independence or separation of what is called “true” from what is judging (see dualism ). Objections can be raised against such a rigid concept of truth.

The fundamental problem with all theories of truth is their circularity. The question arises in what sense they should themselves be true or right. A claim to truth in the self-defined sense would be arbitrary; to fall back on a norm lying ahead of its definition would already presuppose the concept of truth, which had to be determined first.

Nietzsche and the consequences

Strong criticism came for the first time from Friedrich Nietzsche , who pointed out the human interests, inclinations, the will and the instinctuality that stands behind all knowledge. Subsequently, Wilhelm Dilthey developed a typology of metaphysicians in which he tried to trace basic philosophical views back to different psychological types.

Together with the strong historical awareness and the increased knowledge of other peoples and cultures, there was a general phase of skepticism and doubt at the end of the 19th century as to whether every truth in general depends only on cultural views (see cultural relativism ). The point is not that laws of nature are being questioned, but rather the question of whether there cannot be many different points of view, and whether truths can be dependent on cultural developments, in other words, whether truths can be viewed as constructions within a culture.

On the cognitivistic level, Jakob Johann von Uexküll , for example, worked out the subjectivity of all perception by comparing the perceptual apparatus of different animals and insects.


Postmodern philosophers reject the idea of a single truth as a myth ( Gilles Deleuze : " The concepts of importance , necessity and interest are a thousand times more decisive than the concept of truth. ").


The radical constructivism (IGC) will lay claim to have solved the problem of truth, by coming out of this circularity. Since all perception is subjective, the view of the world or the view of things is also exclusively subjective. There are therefore only competing subjective truths. A comparison with the matter itself is not possible for systematic reasons. Ernst von Glasersfeld refers, among other things, to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis , which says that one learns the truths contained and expressed in the mother tongue. Different mother tongues therefore also represent different truths. The RK consequently gives up the concept of the one truth and thus the truth itself for systematic reasons.

Critical Rationalism

The critical rationalism holds the absolute truth as regulative idea firmly, referring to the devastating consequences that arise when giving up. He explains differences in opinions with their differing closeness to truth . Even if opinions are often errors and therefore wrong, they can still more or less agree with the truth. Critical rationalism solves the supposed circularity of the concept of truth by giving up reasoning-oriented thinking in favor of criticism that does not aim at justification. Critical rationalism therefore rejects the view that there are truth criteria. Truth is thus attainable, but it cannot be justified, proven or made probable that it has been reached ( fallibilism ), and just as it cannot be justified ( skepticism of knowledge ). Nonetheless, through critical judgment (including through perception) it is possible, without arbitrariness, to make assumptions about which existing theory for a given area of ​​application comes closest to the truth ( negativism ; mutual control of assumptions through assumptions; ' checks and balances ').

The objectivity of truth

All knowledge has an objective content. The truth of a knowledge is related to its objective content. What is true can only be determined from the point of view of the object; it does not depend on the subject of knowledge - on his wishes or peculiarities of his experience or thought. Since truth relates exclusively to the objective content of knowledge, it has an objective character. Truth is always objective truth. The prerequisite for this is the recognition of matter as objective reality. The objectivity of truth is based on objective reality.

Truth in science

Truth, science and reality are directly related. The goal of every knowledge (science) is the truth. Science as a form of social consciousness “reflects” (describes) objective reality. The concept of truth characterizes the accuracy of the reflection of reality. Absolute truth (accuracy) means a “perfect, exact” reproduction that is only possible for numerical facts, such as B. with the correct specification of the number of objects. In general, however, scientific statements, like any knowledge, are associated with a greater or lesser degree of uncertainty, so that one speaks of relative truth.

Truth in the natural and technical sciences

For the natural and technical sciences, practice (e.g. experiment) as practical evidence is the primary and sufficient criterion of truth. The natural and technical sciences, like truth, have an objective character (see above: materialistic reflection theory) - other theories of truth are not required. In the natural and technical sciences, the claim to validity of a result is usually associated with a claim to accuracy. Metrology makes clear how the dialectical relationship between absolute and relative truth is dealt with in science and technology . The measurement uncertainty, which hides the true value, is countered not only with more precise measurements, but also with statistical methods when evaluating repeated measurements ( DIN 1319 ). The truth in the form of true values cannot be directly measured, but it can be limited. A confirmation of natural laws succeeds within the scope of the measurement uncertainty . Metrology shows how the concept of truth in science and technology is more closely determined by measurements.

Truth in the social sciences and humanities

In the social sciences and humanities, the experiment can hardly be used as a criterion of truth. So O. Schwemmer: “A methodical construction of reality, as it is carried out in experiments, is not possible in the humanities and social sciences. And where there is talk of experiments, they differ fundamentally from experiments in the natural sciences. This is because we do not build isolated systems with people, because we cannot reduce the formative influences from the physical, social and semantic environments of people to an 'ideal' model situation. ”The secondary truth criteria remain (see above). But these are only of a necessary but not sufficient character. The subjective influence of the knower cannot be completely eliminated. The result is that the social sciences and humanities can only partially meet the demands of a science on objectivity and general validity.

Truth in religions

Judaism and Christianity

Old testament

The word Ausdruck (eh'-meth) corresponds to the expression “truth” in Hebrew . It is related to amen (אָמַן ('aman) ) and means something like reliability, the unbreakable sustainability of a thing or a word, the loyalty of people. This Hebrew term is thus more process and action-oriented than the Greek aletheia (object- and state- related , cf. Heidegger's German version of “Ent-Bergung”). In the interpersonal sphere, the concept of truth is closely related to law. In the religious sense, God himself is the source of all truth: " Yes, my Lord and God, you are the only God, and your words are true " ( 2 Sam 7:28  EU ). His words and his actions are the guarantee of unconditional reliability: "For the word of the Lord is true, all his actions are reliable" ( Ps 33.4  EU ). The divine commandments laid down in the Torah are also called “truth”: “Your righteousness remains righteousness forever, your instruction is truth” ( Ps 119,142  EU ). Man should stick to this truth - if only in the interest of his own life: " Because if you stick to the truth, you will be successful in everything you do " ( Tob 4, 6  EU ).

New Testament

Nikolai Nikolajewitsch Ge : What is Truth (1890); Pontius Pilate to Jesus ; Joh 18,38  EU

In the New Testament the concept of truth becomes theologically significant, especially in Paul and in the Gospel of John.

Paul appears with the claim to preach the truth ( 2 Cor 4,2  EU ). Truth and gospel are equated with him. The truth is "Jesus" ( Eph 4,21  EU ); it is important to obey her ( Gal 5,7  EU ). Love of truth means at the same time a rejection of injustice and wickedness ( 2. Thess 2.10 ff EU ). In the pastoral letters Paul also speaks of a “knowledge of the truth”. For him, truth becomes a synonym for orthodoxy, which must be defended against false “heresy”.

In John's Gospel , the concept of truth has a strong Christological connotation. Jesus speaks of himself as the "truth". He says: “I am the way, the truth and the life” ( Jn 14.6  EU ). All the words that Jesus spoke are also truth. The knowledge of this truth, the acceptance and staying in this truth leads to "freedom" and "life" ( Jn 8,31-32  EU ). This truth presupposes that people are receptive, but also requires that it prove itself in action ( 1 Joh 1.6  EU ; 2.4 EU ; 3.18 EU ). The spirit of truth (also called the Holy Spirit ) ( Joh 14,17  EU ; 1 Joh 5,7  EU ) continues the saving work of Christ ( Joh 16,13  EU ); he continues to work in the disciples and leads them to bear witness to Jesus Christ to the world ( Jn 15 : 26-27  EU ).

The Gospel of John ( John 18  EU ) reports how Jesus was interrogated by Pilate. Pilate: “Are you still a king?”, Jesus: “You say it, I am a king. I was born and came into the world that I should testify for the truth. Everyone who is of the truth listens to my voice. "Pilate waves this off:" What is truth? “- The quote is also interpreted as an indication of the limitations of human knowledge, which can only be overcome through faith or revelation.

Christian theology


In the history of Christian theology, the truth of the Christian faith has repeatedly been at the center of heated controversy. As early as the Middle Ages, attempts were made to settle the dispute in such a way that a theory of the “ double truth ” was drafted, according to which in subjective religious belief or in scientific theology what is wrong in philosophy can certainly be true. This view was condemned as heresy at the 5th Lateran Council in 1513. But the question of the unity and general validity of religious truth was taken up again in the Reformation and Enlightenment . The denominational schism, the emancipation of the individual sciences from the traditionally claimed factual priority of theology, the modern criticism of religion and the confrontation with the truth claims of other religions are the most important factors that have contributed to the emergence and maintenance of this crisis in modern times.

In modern religious philosophy , the concept of truth in Christian theologies has been attacked in various ways, including:

  • Are statements made with a genuine claim to truth in the Christian speech of faith? Or is it not rather about linguistic utterances that cannot claim to say something, which is the case, but rather reflect the speaker's feelings, attitudes and maxims? (so-called anti-realism , noncognitivism , emotivism , fictionalism or pragmatism )
  • If religious statements make a genuine claim to truth, can they be recognized or proven to be true in any form ( verification problem)?

The latter objection presupposes a verificationism, as it was partly popular in the first half of the 20th century, but is now rejected by many theorists of science. Both objections presuppose that religious truth can be understood according to the model of propositional truth. This assumption was criticized many times in the theology of the 20th century. With recourse to the Old Testament meaning of "truth" (אמת, emet ), religious truth was instead interpreted, for example, as a personal encounter or (mostly on the part of Lutheran or dialectical theology) understood as an event that happens when the word of God is conveyed to people in faith makes true. In the more recent philosophy of religion, the metaphilosophical debate about realistic interpretations of religious beliefs and statements is intense and controversial. (so-called theological realism or critical realism in the philosophy of religion)

Roman Catholic Church
Visualization of the truth allocation according to Lumen Gentium

For a long time the Roman Catholic Church made an absolute claim for its own religious truth and mediation of salvation. This position has v. a. In the fundamental theological discussion of the second half of the 20th century, various specifications and modifications were made. Since the Second Vatican Council , moderate inclusiveism has been officially represented. Especially in Nostra Aetate , the declaration on the attitude of the church to non-Christian religions, it is declared that only in Christ, "the way, truth and life" ( Jn 14.6  EU ), people can find the fullness of religious life . But other religions also have a share in the unsurpassable salvation mediated by Christ, because their ways of acting and living can "not infrequently reveal a ray of that truth that enlightens all people". The Church sees people as belonging to and assigned to the truth in different ways: First "the Catholic believers, the others who believe in Christ and finally all people in general who are called to healing by the grace of God."

The current Pope Francis and his predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI. , described truth as a relationship between people and God, which, however, no one has absolutely at their disposal, but which has to be opened up again and again within the framework of a path.


The Mahayana Buddhism has no concept of the dual truth ( satya-dvaya ). It was introduced by Nagarjuna to clarify the epistemological significance of the Buddha's teaching. Since Nagarjuna denies descriptive validity of every concept because of the logical aporias of conceptual thinking, the problem arises as to whether the Buddha's teaching is true. For Nagarjuna it is - understood as a correct description of reality - just as wrong as all other systems. What is true in the highest sense ( paramartha-satya ) cannot be conceptualized. But the Buddha's teaching is relatively true ( samvriti satya ), since it leads to the general knowledge of the highest truth, whereby it cancels itself. The conception of an accurate describability of reality is understood as a form of attachment to be overcome. The Buddhist doctrine, which initially makes use of "adherent", that is, conceptual thinking, is the suitable means for overcoming this.

According to the concept, a distinction must be made between “truth in the highest sense” ( paramartha satya ) and a “relative truth” or “concealment truth” ( samvriti satya ).

The "relative truth" denotes any form of conceptualized truth, but especially the Buddhist teaching, which is descriptively inaccurate, but "relatively" true because it leads to the knowledge of the highest truth. This, on the other hand, is neither conceptually comprehensible nor linguistically articulated. It is that salutary knowledge ( prajña ) that is granted in enlightenment , to which all linguistic, conceptual articulation seeks to lead.

In the Kalama Sutta -Kâlâma Sutta (Anguttara Nikâya III. 66) - Buddha Shakyamuni said the following about the determination of truth:

“Don't believe in anything just because you heard it. Don't just believe in traditions because generations have accepted them. Do not believe in anything just because of the spread of rumors. Never believe anything just because it is in the scriptures. Do not believe in anything just because of the authority of teachers or the elderly.

But when you yourself recognize that something is wholesome and that it benefits the individual and everyone and is beneficial, then you may accept it and always live according to it. "

- Kālāma Sutta Anguttara-Nikāya III, 66

In a discourse for his son Rahula, he also pointed out the importance of truth.


The theosophists , Koran exegetes and traditionarians have been discussing the definition and meaning of the ambiguous terms used in the Islamic world, Haqq ( Arabic , Al-Haqq الحق) and Haqqiqah ( Arabic , الحقيقه) for centuries . T very controversial and with hostility and apostasy accusations ( Takfīr , Arabic تكفير).

In the Koran, the term `` Al-Haqq '' occurs a total of 227. In four verses in the Koran the god (Allah) is referred to as Haqq (Al-Haqq), the truth (also in the traditions, Al-Haqq appears among the 99 names assigned to the god). In the Quran, the religion, teachings, and words of God are described as Al-Haqq. The Koran exegetes claim this definition of truth for Islam bzs. for the Koran. According to the definition of these Islamic theosophists, God and everything that comes from Him is the truth (Al-Haqq).

Truth in German literature from the Enlightenment to the modern age

The concept of establishing the truth is used for the first time in Enlightenment literature . In the Age of Enlightenment , when the old norms and values ​​of society and science are viewed as false, it is up to the writer and philosopher to seek the truth. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing sees this truth in the pursuit of tolerance and humanity, as he explains in the ring parable . Because it is precisely this striving alone that, according to Lessing, makes man: "For it is not through possession, but through researching the truth that his [man's] powers are expanded, in which alone his ever-increasing perfection consists." Another thinker, too Enlightenment, Lichtenberg, in his aphorisms thinks about the truth, or how people behave in relation to it: "The most dangerous untruths are truths moderately distorted". In the Enlightenment, the term truth relates above all to the human striving to find his goals in life and thus to achieve his personal freedom and maturity.

In the Weimar Classic , the concept of truth is rather ambiguous. On the one hand, he describes a human ideal, as in Goethe's example: "Humans are noble, helpful and good ...". He gives instructions, so to speak, how one should shape one's life in order to live virtuously. Faust is about the extent to which a person can reach absolute truth and whether the pursuit of truth justifies all means. Faust himself actually shows that man can only fail in this; the truth remains divine or "devilish". It is inaccessible to humans. He is marked by an "aspiring effort" but can never reach the truth.

The romantics have a very different view of the truth. For them this is a world that is veiled or difficult to access, which exists parallel to our reality. It is the poet's or the artist's task to reveal this world to other people; only he knows the “magic word” that makes the world “ring”. The romantic truth can be found in oneself or in harmony with nature. It is a quiet, lonely experience, and the longing for it is what defines the romantic. At a time when revolution and restoration follow one another very quickly, he seeks his own personal truth outside of society in nature.

The naturalists have a very different view of what the truth is. They see people as a product of their time, race and milieu (according to Hippolyte Taine), and thus reduce them to a scientifically explainable subject. Truth-finding is to uncover that determination. The naturalists reproduce reality as precisely as possible in seconds: for them, the absolute truth consists in showing reality.

Around 1900 , after the second wave of industrialization, the search for the truth became an essential question. The individual is restricted to a part of the great mass; the individual is lost. He wanders around aimless and disoriented. Some authors seek to rediscover these lost values ​​in God; Rilke describes someone “who holds this falling infinitely gently in his hands”. He trusts in a divine power. Nietzsche takes a different view: “God is dead”, and anyone who goes in search of the truth must be aware that there is no turning back. The road is lonely and difficult, and even its success is uncertain.

The authors of the modern age are becoming aware that people sink into consumption and anonymity. In the overstimulation he becomes visibly lonely. In “ Homo faber ” Max Frisch shows a rational person who follows the “American way of life” and believes that he is above all feelings. So he is actually the ideal person of his time; a conscientious technician who enjoys partying now and then and generally doesn't care too much about life. But its facade is already crumbling; According to Max Frisch there are more than the objective truth of the technology - the person has feelings and is not to deny them.

The position of radical constructivism has not yet been fathomed, since in it the 'objective truth of technology' turns out to be the truth of those who earn money from this technology. The 'truth of the haves' stands against the 'truth of the have-nots'.

Truth in narrative research

In narrative research , the question of the truthfulness of the traditional types of text, such as fairy tales , myths , sagas , jokes or jokes, which are called simple forms , was in the foreground. Modern narrative research also looks at everyday stories , anecdotes , family memories, experiences of illness and modern legends, etc. and examines the claim to truth with which a story is told rather than the question of the 'true core'. By examining variants of a narrative, it is possible to trace their distribution and to what extent it is based on the passing on of the story (and not on the recurrence of the experiences described).

Truth in Law

The case law decides legal disputes by applying legal norms to a specific issue . In addition to determining the content of the applicable standards ( interpretation ), every court must therefore also determine the facts ( taking evidence ); It is not uncommon for the litigation to focus on this because the parties are making contradicting claims.

How the court determines the truth depends on the respective procedural rules. For example, fixed rules of evidence or the principle of free assessment of evidence can apply , and certain pieces of evidence can be prescribed or excluded ( prohibition of evidence , e.g. torture ). A right to refuse to testify may be granted because certain conflict situations are resolved to the detriment of establishing the truth (medical confidentiality, relatives, pastoral care, etc.). Sometimes the truth of certain assertions does not matter because they are assumed ( fiction , irrefutable assumption , factual effect , etc.). The necessarily limited procedural time also sets limits to the establishment of truth; with the (material) legal force of the decision, it is fundamentally binding and to this extent withdrawn from any further determination of the truth. The possibility of resuming the proceedings is reserved for particularly blatant contradictions between the facts on which the decision is based and the truth that emerges later.

What all processes have in common is that only substantial allegations are examined for their truth; if it does not matter for the decision, because it must be the same in all cases, the question remains open and a corresponding request for evidence must be rejected. In German procedural law there is also a fundamental difference between the concept of truth in civil proceedings on the one hand and that in criminal and administrative proceedings on the other: In civil proceedings, which are based on the principle of presentation , the formal truth is determined. So it is only checked whether a contested allegation of the evidence burdened party is certain to convince the court. If the other side does not deny the allegation, it is undisputed and withdrawn from any further investigation and the decision is based on, even if it should not be correct. In criminal, administrative and voluntary jurisdiction proceedings, on the other hand, the principle of investigation applies so that the material truth must be determined. The accused can therefore also be acquitted, for example, if he confesses and the public prosecutor considers the offense to be proven, but the court is convinced that the accused was wrongly involved - for example to cover the real perpetrator.

If the truth remains open ( non liquet ), the decision will be based on the (objective) burden of proof (in voluntary jurisdiction: burden of determination ). In the criminal process, the accused is acquitted ( in dubio pro reo ), unless, because every conceivable truth is a criminal offense, an exceptional election is not possible. In civil proceedings, the burden of proof is based on substantive law; if the plaintiff cannot prove the factual prerequisites of the asserted claim, the claim will be dismissed; if he can prove that, but the defendant cannot prove the requirements of the substantial objections, it will be granted.

The parties in civil proceedings are subject to a duty of truth, as are witnesses and experts ; False statements can be punishable as fraud or testimony . The accused, on the other hand, is not only allowed to remain silent in the criminal proceedings , but also to lie ( Nemo tenetur se ipsum accusare ).


Truth in philosophy

Classics (in chronological order)

Introductions and text collections

  • Truth in times of knowledge. Announcements of the Institute for Science and Art , No. 1–2, Vienna 2007 (with contributions by Manfred Füllsack, Thomas Auinger, Andreas Balog, Karen Gloy, Herbert Hrachovec and Eva Laquièze-Waniek) focuses on the function, the value and the Intrinsic value of truth in the knowledge society, especially with regard to new philosophical and sociological concepts of truth: (PDF)
  • Markus Enders, Jan Szaif (ed.): The history of the philosophical concept of truth. Berlin 2006, ISBN 978-3-11-017754-1 . Focuses on the history of the concept of truth before the 20th century. The book is essentially an elaboration of the corresponding article in the Historical Dictionary of Philosophy .
  • Karen Gloy : Truth Theories. An introduction . Francke, Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-8252-2531-3 .
  • Richard Heinrich: Truth . Stuttgart: UTB 2009, ISBN 978-3-8252-3231-3
  • Peter Janich : What is truth? A philosophical introduction . 3rd edition, Beck, Munich 2005, ISBN 3-406-41052-9
  • Richard L. Kirkham: Theories of Truth - A Critical Introduction . MIT Press, Cambridge 1992.
  • Wolfgang Künne : Truth . In: Ekkehard Martens / Herbert Schnädelbach (ed.): Philosophy. A basic course . Vol. 1, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, ISBN 3-499-55457-7 , pp. 116-171.
  • the blue Rider. Journal of Philosophy . Special issue: Truth . No. 2, 1995. Verlag der Blaue Reiter, ISBN 978-3-9804005-1-0 .
  • Wolfgang Künne: Conceptions of Truth . Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003. Demanding, systematically oriented discussion of the different philosophical positions on the concept of truth.
  • Kurt Pritzl OP (Ed.): Truth : Studies of a Robust Presence, Catholic University of America Press 2010, ISBN 978-0-8132-1680-5 . Reader with current individual articles v. a. to historical positions. Review by Nicholaos Jones.
  • Lorenz Bruno Puntel : Theories of Truth in Modern Philosophy . 3rd edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 1993, ISBN 3-534-07258-8 . The German-language standard work on the subject. However, if it mainly deals with modern theories of truth, it naturally does not take into account the latest debates. Very detailed presentation of the coherence theory.
  • Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Theories of Truth. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, ISBN 3-518-27810-X . A selection of fundamental texts on modern theories of truth; some central theoretical approaches such as that of Habermas are missing, however, as they were intended for a later, unpublished volume.


  • William P. Alston: A Realist Conception of Truth . Cornell Press, Ithaca 1996.
  • Wolfgang Becker: Truth and linguistic action. Investigations on the philosophy of language truth theory. Publishing house Karl Alber, Freiburg i. Br. / Munich 1988, ISBN 3-495-47651-2 . How a truth claim can be redeemed intersubjectively is clarified by an integrative truth criterion.
  • Pascal Engel: Truth . McGill-Queen's, Montreal 2002.
  • Harry G. Frankfurt : About the truth . From the American by Martin Pfeiffer. Hanser, Munich 2007 (originally Knopf, New York 2006).
  • Winfried Franzen : The meaning of 'true' and 'truth'. Analyzes on the concept of truth and on some more recent theories of truth. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1982, ISBN 3-495-47480-3 . After a presentation of the problems associated with the correspondence theory and a critical review of the redundancy theory, a 'resentential' theory of truth is developed.
  • Ernesto Garzón Valdés and Ruth Zimmerling (eds.): Facets of Truth . Verlag Karl Alber Freiburg i. Br. / Munich 1995, ISBN 978-3-495-47820-2 Festschrift for Meinolf Wewel . Contributions from 25 scholars from eleven countries.
  • Petra Kolmer : Truth. Plea for a new hermeneutical approach in truth theory . Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2005, ISBN 978-3-495-48168-4 .
  • Josef Pieper : Truth of Things, An Investigation into the Anthropology of the High Middle Ages . Munich 1966, ISBN 3-466-40146-1 .
  • Richard Schantz (Ed.): What is truth? de Gruyter, Berlin 2002.
  • Scott Soames: Understanding Truth. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999.
  • Wolfgang Stegmüller : The truth problem and the idea of ​​semantics. An introduction to the theories of A. Tarski and R. Carnap . Springer, Vienna 1957.
  • Ernst Tugendhat / Ursula Wolf : Logical-semantic propaedeutics . Reclam, Stuttgart 1993, ISBN 3-15-008206-4 .

Truth in religions

  • Robert Cummings Neville (Ed.): Religious truth. A volume in the Comparative Religious Ideas project . Albany State University of New York Press, 2001, ISBN 0-7914-4777-4



  • Siddheswar Rameshwar Bhatt, Anu Mehrotra Dignāga: Buddhist Epistemology . Greenwood Publishing Group 2000, ISBN 0-313-31087-4
  • Horst Bürkle: "The truth mirror was spotted" (Gautama Buddha). Notes on the Buddhist understanding of truth . In: Markus Enders (Ed.): Yearbook for Philosophy of Religion , Volume 4. Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, ISBN 978-3-465-03393-6 .
  • Maximiliane Demmel: Truth and certainty of faith in Zen and Amida Buddhism , in: Gerhard Oberhammer, Marcus Schmücker (ed.): Certainty of faith and truth in religious tradition , working documentation of a symposium, contributions to the cultural and intellectual history of Asia 60, meeting reports of the phil. -hist. Class 775. 2008, ISBN 978-3-7001-3735-1 , 281-302
  • David J. Kalupahana: A History of Buddhist Philosophy: Continuities and Discontinuities . University of Hawaii Press, 1992, ISBN 0-8248-1402-9 , pp. 46 ff. And others.
  • Kulitassa Nanda Jayatilleka: Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge . New York 1963. Review by RH Robinson, in: Philosophy East and West , 19, pp. 69-81
  • Kulitassa Nanda Jayatilleka: The buddhist concept of truth . In: The Wheel Publication , No. 50, 1963, pp. 25-41.
  • Shoryu Katsura: Dharmakīrti's theory of truth . In: Journal of Indian Philosophy , 12/3, 1984, pp. 215-235.
  • B. Matilal: Indian theories of knowledge and truth . In: Philosophy East and West , 18, 1968, pp. 321-333.


  • Konrad Meisig: Truth in Hinduism . In: Markus Enders (Ed.): Yearbook for Philosophy of Religion , Volume 4. Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, pp. 35-53.


  • Daniel Kroglichnik : The Seal of God. The concept of truth in the Bible, Talmud, Kabbalah, Hasidism and Jewish religious philosophy . In: Markus Enders (Ed.): Yearbook for Philosophy of Religion , Volume 4. Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, Frankfurt a. M. 2005, ISBN 978-3-465-03393-6 .


  • Andrey Smirnov: Truth and Islamic Thought . In: E. Deutch / R. Bontekoe (Ed.): A Companion to World Philosophies . Blackwell publishers 1997, pp. 437-447.
  • Bernhard Uhde: "Because God is the truth" (Koran 22,62). Notes on understanding "truth" in the religious world of Islam . In: Jahrbuch für Religionsphilosophie 4, 2005, pp. 99–125.
  • Article Ḥaḳīḳa, Ḥaḳḳ, Ḥukm, Wud̲j̲ūd, s̲h̲ay . In: P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, CE Bosworth, E. van Donzel, WP Heinrichs (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam . Brill, suffering.

Truth in narrative research

  • Jürgen Beyer: Truth, in: Enzyklopädie des Märchen. Concise dictionary for historical and comparative narrative research, Vol. 14, Lfg. 1, Berlin a. New York: Walter de Gruyter 2011, col. 412-418.

Truth in the constitutional state

  • Peter Häberle : Truth Problems in the Constitutional State . Nomos, Baden-Baden 1995, ISBN 3-7890-3766-4 ; Translations into Japanese, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese.
  • Peter Häberle : "Truth problems in the constitutional state" - an interim balance . In: Festschrift for Alexander Hollerbach on his 70th birthday . 2001, pp. 15-23.

Web links

Wiktionary: Truth  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
Wikiquote: Truth  - Quotes

General information on the concept of truth

On the history of the concept of truth

Individual topics

Individual evidence

  1. a b Article "Truth". In: Georg Klaus, Manfred Buhr (Hrsg.): Philosophical dictionary. 11th edition, Leipzig 1975.
  2. Kosing, A .: Marxist dictionary of philosophy. Verlag am Park, Berlin. 2015
  3. ^ Entry "Truth" in the German dictionary by Wilhelm Jacob Grimm
  4. ^ Entry "true" in: Kluge. Etymological dictionary of the German language; 24th edition
  5. ^ A b Alfred Tarski: The concept of truth in formalized languages. In: Studia Philosophica Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum . Vol. I, Leopoli [Lemberg] 1935, p. 268 f. Reprinted in: K. Berka / L. Kreiser: logic texts. Annotated selection on the history of modern logic. 4th edition, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1986.
  6. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 249: "Only statements can be true or false."
  7. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 239.
  8. Aristotle: Metaphysics 1011b (trans H. Bonitz.).
  9. Aristotle: Metaphysics 1051b (trans H. Bonitz.).
  10. For an overview of some other positions, see e.g. B. Catarina Dutilh Novaes: Medieval Theories of Truth ( Memento from February 1, 2012 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 93 kB), to be published. in: H. Lagerlund (Ed.): Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy .
  11. See e.g. B. Marian David:  The Correspondence Theory of Truth. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy . . Compared to today's correspondence theories, however, there are also differences. For example, refer to: John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock: Truth in Aquinas , Routledge 2001, e.g. BS 6ff. A systematic elaboration of similarities and differences between the Thomasian adequacy theory of truth and today's correspondence theories of truth developed z. B. Tobias Davids: Truth as correspondence and adequation , reflections on Thomas Aquinas' concept of truth. In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch , 113/1, 2006, pp. 63–77. There is also further literature on the subject.
  12. Cf. Thomas Aquinas: Quaestiones disputatae de veritate q.1.a.1.
  13. Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiae I, q.21 a.2. (Latin original)
  14. Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiae I, q.21 a.2. (English translation)
  15. See e.g. B. De veritate I, 1.
  16. Cf. Emerich Coreth: Metaphysics: A methodical-systematic foundation. Tyrolia, Innsbruck / Vienna / Munich 1961, p. 350.
  17. Cf. Emerich Coreth: Metaphysics: A methodical-systematic foundation. Tyrolia, Innsbruck / Vienna / Munich 1961, p. 354.
  18. Karl Marx: Theses on Feuerbach. MEW Vol. 3, p. 5.
  19. a b c Article "Truth". In: Georg Klaus, Manfred Buhr (Hrsg.): Philosophical dictionary. 11th edition, Leipzig 1975.
  20. Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus .
  21. ^ Günther Patzig: Language and Logic . Göttingen 1970, pp. 39-76.
  22. Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer : Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1714.
  23. Winfried Franzen : On the more recent discussion of truth: redundancy theory versus correspondence theory of truth . In: Journal for Philosophical Research 35, 1981, Issue 1, p. 78.
  24. Alfred Tarski: The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics. (1944) . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 140–188, here p. 143.
  25. ^ A b c Alfred Tarski: The semantic conception of truth and the foundations of semantics. (1944) . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 140–188, here p. 145.
  26. ^ A b Alfred Tarski: The concept of truth in formalized languages. In: Studia Philosophica Commentarii Societatis philosophicae Polonorum . Vol. I, Leopoli [Lemberg] 1935, p. 308. Reprinted in: K. Berka / L. Kreiser: logic texts. Annotated selection on the history of modern logic. 4th edition, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1986.
  27. Detailed examples can be found in Wolfgang Künne: Truth . In: Ekkehard Martens / Herbert Schnädelbach (ed.): Philosophy. A basic course . Vol. 1, Rowohlt, Reinbek bei Hamburg 1994, ISBN 3-499-55457-7 , pp. 116-171; Wolfgang Stegmüller: The truth problem and the idea of ​​semantics. An introduction to the theories of A. Tarski and R. Carnap . Springer, Vienna 1957; and Ernst Tugendhat / Ursula Wolf: Logical-semantic propaedeutics . Reclam, Stuttgart 1993, ISBN 3-15-008206-4 .
  28. ^ Alfred Tarski: The concept of truth in the formalized languages . In: K. Berka / L. Kreiser: logic texts. Annotated selection on the history of modern logic . 4th edition, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 1986, §2 (note 10), p. 458.
  29. a b Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1714.
  30. Karen Gloy: Theories of Truth. An introduction . Tübingen 2004, ISBN 3-8252-2531-3 , p. 146.
  31. Gottlob Frege: About sense and meaning (1892). In: G. Patzig (Ed.): Frege. Function, concept, meaning . Göttingen 1980, p. 49.
  32. ^ Frank Plumpton Ramsey: Facts and Propositions . In: G. Pitcher: Truth . Englewood Cliffs 1964, p. 16.
  33. On the criticism of redundancy theory cf. u. a. Alan Richard White: Truth , London 1971, p. 92 ff.
  34. D. Grover, J. Camp, N. Belnap: A Prosentential Theory of Truth . In: Philosophical Studies , 27, 1975, pp. 73-125.
  35. See Paul Horwich: Truth . 2nd Edition. Oxford 1998.
  36. ^ Peter Frederick Strawson: Truth . In: Analysis 9, 1949; German: truth . In: R. Bubner (Ed.): Language and Analysis. Texts on contemporary English philosophy . Goettingen 1968
  37. Peter Frederick Strawson: Truth . In: R. Bubner (Ed.): Language and Analysis. Texts on contemporary English philosophy . Göttingen 1968, p. 97.
  38. Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1716.
  39. See Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1716.
  40. Cf. Gunnar Skirbekk: Introduction . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 8-34, here p. 16f.
  41. Otto Neurath: Sociology in Physicalism. In: Knowledge 2, 1931, p. 403.
  42. Cf. Nicholas Rescher: The Coherence Theory of Truth. Oxford 1973.
  43. See Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O-Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712-1722, here pp. 1716f.
  44. ^ Charles S. Peirce: Collected Papers . Vol. 5, section 407. See Charles Hartshorne / Paul Weiss / Arthur W. Burks (Eds.): Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce . Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism . 58th edition, Thoemmes et al. a., Bristol et al. a. 1998 [1931]. Translation by Lutz Hartmann.
  45. ^ Charles S. Peirce: Collected Papers . Vol. 5, Section 375, Note 2. See Charles Hartshorne / Paul Weiss / Arthur W. Burks (Eds.): Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce . Vol. 5: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism . 58th edition, Thoemmes et al. a., Bristol et al. a. 1998 [1931]. For the translation by Gert Wartenberg cf. Karl-Otto Apel (ed.): Writings on pragmatism and pragmatism . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1976, ISBN 3-518-06029-5 , p. 175.
  46. Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1717. Cf. William James: The concept of truth of pragmatism. (1907) . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 35-58; and John Dewey: Essays in Experimental Logic . Chicago 1916.
  47. a b Gunnar Skirbekk: Introduction . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 8–34, here p. 13.
  48. Lothar Kreiser, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer: Truth / Truth Theory . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 2: O – Z, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, pp. 1712–1722, here p. 1717.
  49. Gunnar Skirbekk: Introduction . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 8–34, here p. 14. Cf. Bertrand Russel: William James. (Excerpt –1946) . In: Gunnar Skirbekk (Ed.): Truth theories. A selection from the discussions about truth in the 20th century . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1977, pp. 59-62 (originally from Bertrand Russell's History of Western Philosophy ).
  50. Herbert Keuth: Science and Value Judgment. On discussion of value judgments and the argument about positivism. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck): Tübingen 1989. ISBN 3-16-345453-4 . P. 130ff.
  51. Cf. on this, especially with a view to a resulting criticism of the consensus theory of truth, Vittorio Hösle : The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. Transcendental pragmatics, ultimate justification, ethics . Beck, Munich 1990, p. 179ff.
  52. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, ISBN 3-7885-0037-9 , pp. 211-265.
  53. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 218.
  54. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211-265, here p. 236.
  55. See Jürgen Habermas: Truth Theories . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211-265, here p. 220f.
  56. a b Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 258.
  57. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211-265, here pp. 255f.
  58. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 257.
  59. ^ Wilhelm Kamlah / Paul Lorenzen: Logical Propaedeutic. Preschool of Sensible Speaking . Bibliographisches Institut, Mannheim 1967. 2nd edition 1973 ( BI-HTB 227 ). 3rd edition Metzler, Stuttgart 1996, ISBN 3-476-01371-5 , p. 120.
  60. Kuno Lorenz: The dialogical concept of truth . In: New Issues for Philosophy 1972, Issue 2/3, pp. 111–123.
  61. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 238.
  62. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211-265, here p. 231 and p. 238.
  63. Jürgen Habermas: Theories of Truth . In: Helmut Fahrenbach (Ed.): Reality and reflection. Walter Schulz on his 60th birthday . Neske, Pfullingen 1973, pp. 211–265, here p. 264, note 30.
  64. ^ According to Philosophische Lehrjahre (Vol. 18 of the Critical Schlegel Edition), No. 1149, formulated in: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Handbuch Deutscher Idealismus . Metzler, Stuttgart / Weimar 2005, ISBN 978-3-476-02118-2 , p. 350.
  65. Johann Gottlieb Fichte: About revitalization and heightening of the pure interest in truth . In: Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Works . Vol. 8, p. 351.
  66. Cf. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Science of Logic I. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 93ff.
  67. ^ A b Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia . § 24, addition 2.
  68. ^ Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Encyclopedia . § 88.
  69. See Albert Keller : General Epistemology , p. 110f.
  70. Article “Truth”. In: Georg Klaus, Manfred Buhr (Hrsg.): Philosophical dictionary. 11th edition, Leipzig 1975.
  71. "What is truth?" - Overview of current theories of truth. In: Enlightenment and Criticism (2002). Pp. 96-103
  72. Truth and Science by Oswald Schwemmer, download page. (DOC) Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, accessed on February 6, 2017 .
  73. O. Bollnow: The Objectivity of the Humanities and the Question of the Essence of Truth - Journal for Philosophical Research, 16th year - 1962 - pp. 3–25
  74. a b Dogmatic Constitution Lumen Gentium. Roman Catholic Church , November 21, 1964, retrieved on January 8, 2014 (No. 13 and No. 16): “All people are called to this Catholic unity of God's people, which denotes and promotes all-embracing peace. The Catholic believers, the others who believe in Christ and finally all people in general who are called to salvation by the grace of God belong to it or are assigned to it in various ways. "
  75. ^ Nostra Aetate. Declaration on the Church's Attitude to Non-Christian Religions. Roman Catholic Church , October 2, 1965, accessed January 8, 2014 (Chapter 2).
  76. ^ Pope Francis writes to “la Repubblica”. “Open dialogue with non-believers”. La Repubblica , September 12, 2013, retrieved January 7, 2014 : “You also ask me whether it is a mistake or a sin to believe that there is no absolute truth. At first I would not speak of 'absolute' truth even for a believer - for the Christian, the truth is God's love for us in Jesus Christ, i.e. a relationship! And each of us starts from himself when he takes in and expresses the truth: from his history, culture, his situation, etc. That does not mean that truth is subjective or changeable, on the contrary. But it only ever gives itself to us as a way and as a life. Didn't Jesus himself say: I am the way, the truth, the life? "
  77. ^ Sermon by Pope Benedict XVI. Holy Mass at the end of the encounter with the “ Ratzinger School Circle ”. Roman Catholic Church , September 2, 2012, accessed on January 7, 2014 : “Nobody can have the truth, the truth has us, it is something living! We are not its owners, we are moved by it; only if we let it lead and drift us do we stay in it; only if we are pilgrims of truth with it and in it, then it is there in us and through us. "
  78. Vol. 1, pp. 167-171 Aurum Ed.
  79. Ambalatthika-rahulovada Sutta Instructions to Rahula at Mango Stone Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu, (English)
  80. Koran, sura 22, verse 6; Sura 22, verse 62; Sura 24, verse 25; Sura 31, verse 30.
  81. ^ Bentley, David (September 1999). The 99 Beautiful Names for God for All the People of the Book . William Carey Library. ISBN 0-87808-299-9
  82. Quran, Sura 8, verse 8.
  83. Quran, Sura 28, Verse 48.
  84. Tabataba'i, Muhammad Husayn , Al-Mizan fi Tafsir al-Qur'an (Arabic: الميزان في تفسير القرآن, "The balance in interpretation of Quran"), exegesis of Sura 9, verse 33 (in Arabic and Persian).
  85. Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rassoul: Tafsīr Al-Qur'ān Al-Karīm . 41st edition. Islamic Library, 2008, ISBN 978-3-8217-0233-9 , pp. 39 .