Nicholas Rescher

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Nicholas Rescher

Nicholas Rescher (born July 15, 1928 in Hagen ) is an American philosopher of German descent. His main focus is on theoretical philosophy , moral and social philosophy . Rescher is also currently the most prominent representative of the coherence theory of truth and process philosophy .

In his work, Rescher tries to link the methodology of analytical philosophy with traditional philosophical problems. His work is characterized by a great systematic and historical breadth and combines in itself coherence theoretical, pragmatic and idealistic components. The main impetus was his work on the coherence theory of truth .

Life

Rescher's father practiced as a lawyer in Hagen since 1922. After he had spoken out publicly against the National Socialism system, the National Socialists closed his office in the early 1930s, after which the family emigrated to the USA in 1938 .

After graduating from school, Rescher studied mathematics and philosophy at Queens College in Flushing , New York and at Princeton University from 1946 to 1951 . His teachers there included Herbert G. Bohnert, a student of Rudolf Carnap , Donald Davidson , Carl Hempel and Alonzo Church . In 1949 he obtained a Bachelor of Science degree in mathematics, and in 1952 he received a Ph.D. in philosophy from Princeton . From 1954 to 1956 he worked in the math division of RAND Corporation in Santa Monica .

1957 Rescher was appointed to a professorship in philosophy at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania . It was there that the foundations of his first known publication on the history of Arabic logic emerged. He also met Adolf Grünbaum , who helped him to a professorship at the University of Pittsburgh in 1961 , where he stayed until his retirement. Grünbaum and Rescher formed the core of Pittsburgh's Philosophy Department , which soon became known worldwide and to which Kurt Baier , Alan R. Anderson, Nuel Belnap and Wilfrid Sellars belonged.

In 1964 Rescher founded the well-known philosophical journal American Philosophical Quarterly , as its editor he was active until 1993. He also directed the world-famous Center for Philosophy of Science, founded in 1960, for many years .

Rescher was President of the American Philosophical Association , a permanent visiting professor at Oxford and taught regularly at other universities. In 1977 Rescher was made a permanent member of Corpus Christi College , Oxford .

In Germany, Rescher was awarded the Alexander von Humboldt Prize in 1984 and an honorary doctorate from the University of Konstanz (philosophy), in 2002 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the Department of Education, Social Sciences and Humanities at the Fernuniversität Hagen and in 2011 the Federal Cross of Merit, 1st class. In 1998 he was accepted as an external member of the Academia Europaea . He has been a member of the Royal Society of Canada since 2006 and of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 2009 . In 2016 he was awarded the Helmholtz Medal of the Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences.

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Rescher's systematic thinking combines idealistic positions with pragmatic-realistic considerations, making use of the methodical standards of analytical philosophy. In his over 100 book publications and more than 1000 essays, he often relies on various classical positions in philosophy, which he tries to combine and integrate into his philosophical system.

Rescher had initially dealt mainly with special topics such as logic in Arabic philosophy . In the course of his scientific development, his field of activity expanded to include a wide variety of philosophical and philosophical-historical areas. Unlike most current philosophers, Rescher intends to conceive a comprehensive system that gives answers to the "big questions" of philosophy such as "about the position of man in nature, free will, according to duty and obligation, knowledge and ignorance" .

Systematic and philosophical-historical work

Like hardly any other contemporary philosopher, Rescher covered almost all disciplines of philosophy through his publications. A special feature of his work is that he has also dealt with the philosophical-historical development of the respective disciplines. Basically, his work on systematic philosophy and the history of philosophy are closely linked. Rescher starts from a dialectical development of concepts according to which concepts differentiate in the course of the history of philosophy. Associated with this is a further development of the philosophical questions and problems.

In Rescher's Practical Philosophy there are studies on ethics , contributions to applied ethics , political philosophy , social philosophy and anthropology . In the theoretical area, he wrote studies on epistemology and philosophy of science , ontology , metaphysics , logic , the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language . Furthermore, Rescher has worked in the areas of philosophy of religion , philosophy of technology and metaphilosophy . He also presented a large number of monographs in which individual terms are extensively examined or particular sub-topics of individual philosophical disciplines are discussed in detail. Rescher's interests in the history of philosophy are also broad. In his works he deals intensively with ancient philosophy , Leibniz , Kant , pragmatism ( Peirce ) and the philosophy of common sense . Debates with important contemporary philosophers (e.g. Putnam , Davidson or Wittgenstein ) can also be found in his work.

Philosophy-historical influences

In addition to his academic teachers, who are part of the analytical philosophy, Rescher was influenced by Kant, Hegel and Peirce to varying degrees, both in terms of content and method.

Kant

The theoretical philosophy of Kant developed in the Critique of Pure Reason , which Rescher understands as a forerunner of pragmatism, exerted a great influence on Rescher . Kant's preferred means of problem-solving are conceptual distinctions, which he repeatedly introduces into the framework of a systematic approach. For Rescher, Kant's conceptual formations do not have an ontological but a pragmatic function: they are intellectual tools with the help of which one can grasp the world as it is accessible to us humans.

Fundamental to Kant's epistemology is the systematic nature of knowing, without which understanding is not possible. Individual phenomena would only be understandable if they could be brought under general laws, which in turn were fitted into a coherent framework.

pragmatism

According to Rescher, it is the characteristic of pragmatism that in it theories or procedures are not adopted for their own sake, but in order to successfully pursue certain goals. For Rescher, pragmatism is divided into two strongly divergent sub-currents: a “left pragmatism” ( pragmatism of the left ) and a “right pragmatism” ( pragmatism of the right ).

According to "left pragmatism" ( W. James , FCS Schiller and R. Rorty ) truths are humanly created and undiscovered constructs. He accentuates social consensus and conventions and is critical of the assumption of rational, general and objective standards. In the case of epistemic and moral standards, he emphasizes their dependence on human and social conventions.

The “right pragmatism” ( Ch.S. Peirce and CI Lewis ), on the other hand, to which Rescher himself is close, sees the sciences as being shaped by the search for truth and accepts the existence of rational, generally binding norms and objective standards. These are fallible and can generally be validated on the basis of their effectiveness in terms of achieving the desired goals.

Following on from Peirce, Rescher tries to work out standards and principles with the help of which ideas, theories and procedures can be pragmatically and objectively evaluated. In deviation from Peirce, however, Rescher does not assume that the scientific process approaches an ultimate truth.

It is of great importance for Rescher that a reality independent of the spirit is to be postulated in order to be able to adequately grasp the epistemological and scientific activities. This is justified in the fact that ontological realism has pragmatically proven itself. It is only with his help that a distinction between truth and falsehood, reality and appearance is possible. It creates the basis for intersubjective communication about something that can be explored and experienced together.

Hegel

Rescher's idea of ​​the historical development of philosophical theories is strongly influenced by the dialectical thinking of GWF Hegel . Rescher understands the dialectical method as a general procedure for gaining knowledge. It begins at a starting point ("input") - e.g. B. in the form of a plausible assumption - which is opposed to a response ("response"). This ensures a transformation or revision of the original assumptions, which - in an iterable process - can then serve as the starting point for further investigations.

For Rescher, the dialectical approach can be characterized as “creative innovation, the result of which is not predictable”. Correspondingly, the previous philosophical-historical development can be described as dialectical, but no reliable prognosis of the future philosophical development can be given. In contrast to Hegel, for Rescher the dialectical process is fundamentally inconclusive and its future development is indefinite in terms of content. In Dialectics , Rescher differentiates between a number of fields of application of dialectics, each of which he dedicates its own chapter ("Disputational Dialectic", "Cognitive Dialectic", "Methodological Dialectic", "Ontological Dialectic", "Philosophical Dialectic"). What these different dialectics have in common is their form or structure, which is only different in the various areas of application.

Analytical philosophy

Rescher's thinking was influenced primarily in formal terms by analytical philosophy; In his opinion, it has left behind a “toolbox” with methodological and conceptual aids and a number of important conceptual distinctions. In terms of content, Rescher complains about the analytical philosophy, in addition to various reductionisms, above all, its tendency to concentrate only on clarifying questions of detail. It lacks a systematic approach to the “big questions” of philosophy.

Philosophical system

Basic features of the philosophical system

Systems thinking

With his comprehensive philosophical system design, Rescher approaches the solution of the traditional problems of philosophy. In contemporary philosophy he sees the problem in the advanced specialization of the philosophical subjects, in which the view of the whole that is essential for philosophy is lost. Rescher, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of holistic, systematic philosophizing, which can be found especially in idealistic conceptions.

Rescher names “simplicity, regularity, uniformity, comprehensiveness, cohesiveness, unity, harmony, economy” as well as “wholeness”, “self-sufficiency”, “consonance” and “mutual supportiveness” as important parameters for a philosophical system. These parameters are not only regulative principles, but also express an internal systematicity of the world itself.

In addition, Rescher wants to combine the disciplines of theoretical and practical philosophy, as these cannot be viewed as completely isolated from one another. For example, taking certain epistemological positions has an impact on the possible moral-philosophical options.

Theory of the history of philosophy

The many positions represented in the course of the history of philosophy are based, according to Rescher, on contradicting assumptions, which he calls "aporetic clusters". According to his understanding, an aporia is a group of assertions that are plausible in themselves, but incoherent with others ("An apory is a group of contentions that are individually plausible but collectively inconsistent").

According to Rescher, the philosophical positions continue to change in their development through the “mutual interaction” of the philosophers. In this process, the original starting theses are defined more and more closely and conceptually differentiated in order to dissolve the aporetic clusters. Rescher compares this scheme with Hegel's ascent in dialectics.

Processes of differentiation continue the history of philosophy, but only contribute to short-term conflict solutions. A development towards a stable, consistent theory is not to be expected, because in the further course new aporias emerge again and again, which in turn require their own resolution. The course of this process is not predictable; it remains open which future aporias will arise and how they will be solved.

Metaphilosophy

For Rescher, philosophy is an indispensable undertaking for people in order to be able to orientate themselves adequately in the world. Your goal is the development of a comprehensive, consistent and coherent overall theory ("what we want is a coherent story that makes sense overall, a global narrative") that addresses the big philosophical questions, especially the "why" questions aimed at reasons, have to answer.

Since philosophy is always linked to existing, fallible data or considerations, there are no self-evident bases from which a system could be created. Rescher therefore rejects any epistemological fundamentalism ("foundationalism"). The only alternative truth criterion that remains is coherence - especially since philosophy, despite the division into several disciplines, makes up a coherent whole. In this respect, Rescher pleads in the context of his metaphilosophy for a holistic theoretical model that does not need any supposedly self-evident bases, but only initial plausible basic assumptions or data. These receive their justification in retrospect exactly when their acceptance in the cognitive process proves useful or proves pragmatically.    

Guidelines of philosophizing

In order to be able to obtain philosophical knowledge, according to Rescher, in addition to the top metaprinciples of consistency and coherence, a number of guidelines must be followed:

  • not methodically closing any paths of explanation
  • to make clear what is being asserted and what is excluded
  • Identify topics ("topics")
  • justify all assumptions
  • to focus on the weakest link in a chain
  • to choose the least unacceptable assumption
  • The unclear cannot be explained by the unclear
  • not to introduce unnecessary entities

In addition to these rules there are general rules of scientific work such as clarity, avoidance of equivocations, honesty, carefulness, openness of the mind, the search for the general.

For Rescher, a theory T 1 then proves to be preferable to a theory T 2 under the following conditions :

  • T 1 has a wider range of questions than T 2 on
  • T 1 is more coherent and less anomalous than T 2
  • Compared to T 2, T 1 has a lower complexity
  • the principles of T 1 are better secured with reasons than those of T 2
  • T 1 fits better with pre-theoretical knowledge than T 2
  • T 1 is more compatible with social life than T 2 .
Data of philosophical knowledge

According to Rescher, important sources or data of philosophical knowledge are beliefs of common sense, scientific results, traditions and lessons from history. They have the initial status of plausible data, but - due to their internal inconsistencies - cannot all be accepted at the same time and can only partially find their way into a consistent philosophical system.

The pre-assumptions ( presumptions , “presumptions”) arising from these sources play a major role for pragmatic reasons, especially in philosophy of language, epistemology and philosophy of science. Rescher regards them as initial plausible truth candidates in the course of an attempt to gain knowledge. Presumptions may only be accepted provisionally; if something speaks against them later, they must be given up. Rescher compares them with defendants who have not been convicted: they are considered innocent until they are found guilty. Analogously, presumptions are considered to be true, as long as nothing to the contrary has been established.

Dealing with the philosophical tradition

Appropriate handling of theories and texts from the philosophical tradition is of great importance to Rescher. When working out solutions to philosophical problems, earlier approaches to solutions and the terminology used in them can be used, as was very often practiced in the history of philosophy. In Rescher's view, different interpretations of a text are not equally acceptable per se, even if there could be several valid interpretations of a text (such as the Bible or Plato's dialogues).

For Rescher, a benevolent interpretation of the text according to the "principle of interpretative charity" is indispensable: an attempt should be made to maximize the coherence in the work of an author and to move from the many conceivable interpretations to the most plausible one. Under certain circumstances, not only the text itself but the entire text corpus of a philosopher should be taken into account.

At the same time, the benevolent interpretation of texts can also reach its limits if they do not meet the philosophical standards. This is the case with logical and conceptual inconsistencies, inconsistencies with other statements by the author, contradictions to scientific knowledge or unfounded violations of common sense.    

The best way to clear up inconsistencies is to modify or differentiate theses. However, this leads to a growing "sophistication in conceptual machinery" and a constant shift in problems. Despite the desired simplicity, according to Rescher, philosophical theories are therefore becoming increasingly complex.

Theory of Rationality and Objectivity

For Rescher, rationality is basically defined by the ability to solve problems (“using one's own intelligence to find out what is best to do in the respective circumstances”). He differentiates between three forms of reason, each of which has to do with different decision-making contexts:

  • the cognitive reason that accepts or rejects theses
  • practical reason that decides to act
  • the evaluative reason that makes judgments.

Reason is characterized by a hierarchy of levels that descends from the general to concrete decisions.

For Rescher, the fact that we should behave rationally can be justified pragmatically by the fact that rational problem solutions have the best chance of success. Rescher also emphasizes that it does not make sense to demand extra-rational reasons for rationality: "The only reasons to be rational that make sense to ask are rational reasons". In this respect, rationality represents a circular process: “The justification of rationality must all in all be reflexive and self-referential”.

For Rescher, rational acceptability implies an inherent claim to universality. There are certain principles that are not relative to certain cultures - except in the sense that individual cultures may not have developed them.

From an anthropological point of view, for Rescher, rationality is a component of humanity and the core of human self-definition. Rational behavior is such a duty for people and promotes "reflexive happiness" or the satisfaction of the mind.

For Rescher, the concept of objectivity is closely related to the concept of rationality . Only the existence of a common sense and generally binding standards open up the possibility of objective knowledge.

Rescher criticizes current relativistic tendencies because they destroy the concepts of truth and the morally correct. Objectivity relates on the one hand to an object side, on the other hand to a subject who has to decide "impersonally" if it wants to be "objective". It must avoid subjective factors (prejudices, passions, loyalty, ties, feelings, ideological or political preconceptions) and instead strive for impersonal standards and standardized results.

These standards of objective knowledge are initially “our” standards of rationality, which, according to Rescher, does not mean that one can simply use foreign standards (e.g. from other cultures or ways of life). The validity of our concepts of objectivity is not restricted by the fact that they come from a culture, since genesis and validity must be strictly distinguished. Other human populations may have different habits and decision-making processes, but, according to Rescher, they have no different concepts of reason or objectivity. If we did not stick to our standards of rationality and objectivity and exchange them for others, we would in turn make them ours.

Philosophical anthropology

General purpose of man

For Rescher, the task of philosophical anthropology is to find out how a person should ideally lead his life. According to Rescher, humans are natural and spiritual beings who have to find their way in nature and the world. For this reason he is forced to make decisions ("Homo optans") and make evaluations (as "Homo aestimans" or "Homo valuens"). In view of the often complex decision-making situations, perfect solutions are hardly achievable. Despite the causality in nature, man is in principle free; but if he decides rationally, his actions can be predicted in principle.

According to Rescher, humans are not only residents of the real world, but also of the world of fantasy and fiction ("Homo imaginans"). He could think about the existing world, but also speculate about unrealized possibilities. In this respect he is a citizen of two worlds: the real world and the world of thoughts. Nevertheless, humans are limited in their abilities, which is why they inevitably make mistakes and errors - both in the theoretical and in the practical area. But humans are also able to recognize mistakes and errors, to learn from them and to make progress in knowledge.

According to Rescher, various goals are objectively given to people. First of all, he has an interest in survival and the necessary goods (air, food, shelter, etc.). In addition, people strive for a satisfactory life. According to Rescher, important goods for this are, among other things, self-respect, community with other people and self-determination over the most important personal affairs.

Personhood

In the context of his anthropological considerations, Rescher names seven characteristics that are to be assumed as necessary and sufficient conditions of personhood :

  • intelligence
  • the ability to have judgmental affects
  • Capacity to act
  • Rationality or reason
  • Self-image
  • Self-esteem
  • the ability to recognize and recognize other people as human beings

For Rescher, the basis of these conditions is the freedom of the person: people are “free” in the sense that they could have acted differently in each case - and would have acted differently if the circumstances changed. According to Rescher, human persons are not controlled by instincts and free from external control. Their actions are determined internally by their own motives and mental states and should also be treated accordingly. For Rescher, being a person is not a naturalistic but a social or cultural term. Part of being a person is to commit yourself, to make your own assessments and to have a picture of yourself.

According to Rescher, one of the most important tasks of every person is to develop their abilities and skills, which is essential to be rational. Rescher speaks of an "ontological imperative" for self-realization ("self-realization"). It is not primarily a matter of pursuing one's happiness, but rather "making something of yourself" and choosing the right, appropriate life. However, it is an essential factor of being human to have to cope with different boundaries and limitations, since the available resources are insufficient to satisfy people. Nevertheless, there is a need to overcome these limits, which we as humans cannot give up.

Luck and misfortune

As humans, according to Rescher, we have to come to terms with the fact that there is such a thing as “fate”, “luck” and “unhappiness” in our lives. Fateful events happen to people by chance and result in benefits or losses. They are beyond the range that a person can control, but challenge them to adopt certain risk avoidance strategies. In the face of impending strokes of fate, people can be optimistic or pessimistic to different degrees. Rescher pleads for optimism, because this is part of human life. One should maintain a certain amount of hope for oneself and one's successors, otherwise life threatens to become inhuman (“inhumane”).

Man and evolution

Rescher sees humans as part of an evolution in two ways. From a genetic point of view, humans are initially a product of biological evolution . As such, it occupies an " ecological niche ", the niche of intelligent living beings. One result of this evolution is the emergence of the human mind and will. In this respect, humans can be viewed as the result of causal, non-targeted developments. In addition, he also initiated developments of a cultural nature, which, in contrast to biological evolution, proceed in a targeted manner.

Philosophy of mind

In the field of philosophy of mind , Rescher has worked intensively on the subject of "free will ". According to Rescher, free will can be characterized by the fact that one can choose and make decisions. For him, it is about showing that people are fundamentally to be regarded as free and that they are at least in principle responsible for their actions.

According to Rescher, three conditions must be met in order to be able to speak of a free act:

  1. the actor makes his own decisions through deliberation (“deliberation”)
  2. until the decision is made in favor of an action or its omission, the agent remains the decisive authority
  3. the agent controls his actions and the result of his actions by means of his thoughts.

Rescher makes a fundamental distinction between metaphysical ("metaphysical freedom") and moral freedom. For Rescher, metaphysical freedom means that human actions are not completely determined due to external causal structures. It is the prerequisite for moral freedom, which also enables people to be free from internal factors (motivations).

Causality and free will

Rescher sees no contradiction between the causality prevailing in nature and human free will. In order to reconcile both concepts, Rescher makes a distinction between two types of predetermination: "pre-determination" and "precedence determination". A “pre-determination” would exist if all actions and decisions were already fixed in advance through causal structures (“causally predeterminated”). In contrast to the “precedence determination” advocated by Rescher, this type of predetermination would no longer be compatible with free will. According to the concept of “precedence determination”, a human action is only determined by previous decisions at the point in time when the decision about it is made; beforehand man can freely think about it.

decisions

For Rescher, decisions are more or less punctual events ("temporally punctform, instantaneous occurences"), which he describes as "eventuations" in order to distinguish them from extended events ("events"). They are products of our construction of nature ("descriptive mind-constructs") and mark the beginning or end of our decision-making processes.

Decisions are not extended over time and are therefore not subject to the conditions of extended time events that are causally determined: "Natural causality relates to events not eventuations". They are outside of causal relationships, which means that the assumptions of natural causality and human free will can be reconciled. Decisions are made on the basis of motivations. However, these do not represent external influencing factors, but rather internal factors without a mandatory character.

Motivation and Free Will

For Rescher, free will is not to be confused with complete indeterminacy. Rather, a person's decisions are always determined by motives - Rescher speaks in this context of motivational determination (“motivational determinism”). Motives help ensure that a decision can be attributed to an actor in the first place. However, this does not exclude the freedom of the actor in forming a will, since at the moment of the decision he can determine himself which motives he is guided by. However, a distinction should be made between influencing factors that do not exclude free will (upbringing, customs, other social influences) and those that have this effect (hypnosis, brainwashing, etc.).

Epistemology

Criticism of skepticism

Rescher's epistemology is an integral part of his overall philosophical system. A central point is his examination of skepticism . From Rescher's point of view, the skeptical position has pragmatically unacceptable consequences. Nevertheless, skepticism is justified in showing the limits of our knowledge . From Rescher's point of view, however, this does not mean that knowledge is generally inaccessible.

Rescher distinguishes between factual statements and those that - on a meta-level - relate to our truth standards. Statements that relate to our standards of truth can no longer be reasonably doubted by the skeptic, since otherwise his position would be self-destructive.

Fact-related statements are generally rightly exposed to skeptical doubts, but a generalization would not make sense in this case for pragmatic reasons either. Statements do not have to be immune to every conceivable, but only to every realistic objection. According to Rescher, what speakers or cognitive subjects aim at are practical certainties that are beyond reasonable doubt, but not categorical certainties beyond all possible doubt. For the doubt - Rescher follows on from Peirce - only real possibilities of error are relevant, which arise from actual situations of research or knowledge gain.

Rescher rejects what from his point of view is excessive demands of skepticism with regard to the “exactness” and “uncorrectability” of our knowledge. For the justification of a claim to knowledge, the non-existence of opposing evidence is necessary; Justifications of knowledge are to be distinguished from strict evidence ("demonstrations") and are not needed in everyday life.

A sentence can generally be considered certain if everything imaginable has been done to test it and no further tests seem to make sense - although a distinction must be made between the subjective “consider something certain” and the non-subjective “be certain”. Sentences that express knowledge today may well turn out to be wrong in the future.

Concept of knowledge

According to Rescher, presumptive knowledge is at the beginning of gaining knowledge . As a rule, its principles ensure sufficient reliability. Examples of this are trust in sensory perception and in the statements of other people and authorities. Presumptive knowledge cannot initially be justified discursively or otherwise. It receives its justification in retrospect as "retrovalidation", i. H. it is retrospectively rated positively because of its usefulness and thus justified. Presumptive knowledge can thus do without an infallible foundation.,

Rescher considers the standard concept of knowledge as “justified true opinion” to be sufficient for everyday use. In principle, however, the general statements often associated with the concept of knowledge cannot claim validity without exception, but only validity for the fact that it generally and under normal circumstances behave as the sentence claims. Accordingly, Rescher speaks of a “limited rather than strict universality”. In fact, universal universal statements are difficult to find in view of the complexity of the data - even if they exist.

Rescher rejects any form of epistemological fundamentalism ("foundationalism") that wants to deductively derive all knowledge from infallible, self-evident principles. On the other hand, he prefers a coherentism based on fallible sentences (data) that may be revised later. These sentences are to be connected to one another in a "network" to form knowledge. According to Rescher, knowledge is not justified when - as in epistemological fundamentalism - it is “derived from basic knowledge”, but when it is “appropriately connected to the rest of the body of knowledge”.

Coherence theory of truth

Rescher's theory of coherence is a theory for determining the criteria of truth. In defining truth, he subscribes to the correspondence theory : Truth means the agreement of a proposition with a fact: "To assert that 'P is true' means to assert that P is the case."

Rescher distinguishes between two kinds of truth criteria: guaranteeing ( Guaranteeing ) and legitimizing ( authorizing ) criteria. The former give complete certainty as to the existence of truth, while the latter merely have a supportive character. In Rescher's view, it is sufficient if such a criterion makes the existence of truth more likely. Rescher then restricts the validity of the concept of coherence to the explication of factual statements - Rescher speaks of "data" - while, in his opinion, pragmatic criteria must be used for the truth of logical-mathematical statements. Data are conceived from the outset as linguistic entities and not as mere facts. The acceptability of data is also justified according to pragmatic criteria. According to Rescher, a theory or system of statements can be described as coherent if it fulfills the following three aspects:

  • Comprehensiveness : all relevant sentences are taken into account; the theory is logically closed.
  • Consistency : the theory does not contain any logical-contradicting propositions.
  • Cohesiveness : the propositions of the theory are explicated in their relationships or contexts to the other propositions; the relationships between the sentences are logically sound.

Philosophy of science

In the context of his diverse considerations on the theory of science , Rescher is concerned with issues that have to do with scientific methods , knowledge possibilities, the growth of scientific knowledge and possible limits of scientific knowledge.

Method pragmatism

Rescher favors a method pragmatism that ties in with Peirce. Methods are pragmatically justified by their success in application, the successful acquisition of knowledge. The aim of the methodological approach in science is to justify special knowledge claims. The methods used must be generally successful. They are tested through the iterable interaction of theory and practice. If sufficient results are available after repeated applications, one can evaluate the methods according to Rescher and try to introduce improvements based on the evaluation. Methods in science are interpersonal and public, which avoids a person or group-relative truth. The knowledge obtained by science is therefore objective, but remains - like the other knowledge of the world - fallible.

Scientific progress

According to Rescher, scientific progress develops “mainly not through addition, but through elimination and replacement”. The doctrine of the constant, converging accumulation of knowledge must be abandoned.

Rescher rejects a realistic model of scientific progress. This cannot be defined as an ever closer approach to reality, since we would then assume an already existing theory-independent access to reality that we do not have. When it comes to the question of scientific progress, not only nature should be considered, but also the perspective of the researcher. For Rescher, a scientific approach is an iterative process of asking questions and finding answers that have to be continuously integrated into the system of scientific knowledge. If scientific questions are based on prerequisites that no longer fit coherently into the current body of knowledge, they can be discarded. The range of meaningful questions changes with the level of knowledge; Individual questions that were considered "scientific" at one point in time can later be excluded as unscientific.

Questions can be considered resolved when they are either answered or rejected. Scientific progress has a process character: new questions develop from answers already given, which in turn determine the search for new answers, which in turn lead to new questions. For Rescher, scientific progress can be achieved in three ways:

  • new answers to old questions are given
  • new questions are asked
  • old questions and their answers are rejected as unsuitable.

According to Rescher, theories can only be compared with one another using a yardstick that is external to the theory. The progress of a theory manifests itself “through its superiority in application […], ie through the increased power of its predictions and control options. The ultimate arbiter of a theory is practice ”.

Limits of scientific knowledge

In his study The Limits of Science, Rescher argues that the development of the natural sciences has no cognitive limits. Every scientific explanation is limited, but details that have remained open in principle can still be clarified. Rescher admits that the world can never be fully described, since an endless number of facts can be ascertained about every object in the world. However, this does not mean that not every single fact can become the subject of research. Since new terms or classifications can be introduced at any time and new laws can be formulated, natural science remains potentially limitless.

Furthermore, according to Rescher, the future results of the natural sciences cannot be foreseen. Your future questions were based on the results you had achieved up to that point, which speak for their fundamental infinity.

Rescher sees economic reasons for a possible slowdown in scientific development. Above all, the increased effort to discover new things in mature sciences, rapidly rising costs due to increasingly expensive technology and the additional effort involved in obtaining data in increasingly specialized sciences could bring scientific progress to a standstill.

metaphysics

Rescher's contributions to metaphysics contain reflections on fundamental categories of reality, natural laws and the topic of “possible worlds”. A process ontology forms the framework of his considerations , which he understands as an alternative to a substance ontology.

reality

For Rescher, the existence of a common reality for people is a pragmatic presumption and has an a priori status. It cannot be inferred by means of a deductive procedure; nevertheless, their assumption can be justified in retrospect on the basis of their successes and their benefits.

According to Rescher, real things are characterized by the fact that they are a "something" and have a certain unity. They are intersubjectively accessible and on the one hand exist independently of the mind, but on the other hand can be recognized by it. Rescher declares a very wide range of things to be existing, which he assigns to different categories. He differentiates, among other things, between physical objects of the space-time world, mathematical entities that belong to a realm of quantities and structures, objects and properties of perception and terms that he assigns to a realm of ideas.

Categories and conceptual schemes

According to Rescher, categories serve exclusively pragmatic purposes. They are used to grasp reality and to order its parts and together form the conceptual scheme of a certain culture at a certain time.

Rescher names the highest categories among other things substance , quantity , type ( quality ), property , relation , time and space , cause , purpose , position (subordination or classification), composition, process , cause and function.

When directed against Donald Davidson , Rescher argues that there can be a number of different conceptual schemes. Differences between them were to be assumed due to cultural differences, as fundamentally different explanations were used in different cultures from different times and in different places. The diverging conceptual schemes are not of the same quality for Rescher. You can identify and classify real areas in different ways. Formal errors (imprecise, ambiguous, incomplete categories) and content-related errors (inapplicable, trivial or pointless categories) can occur.

According to Rescher's view, the process of classifying and creating categories is not restricted. Various criteria can be used for this. Categories can be formed on different levels of abstraction and continuously improved. In this respect, according to Rescher, things have an unlimited “cognitive depth”. Scientific research can therefore in principle go on indefinitely and our knowledge of the world can be endlessly expanded and improved.

Possibility and impossibility

According to Rescher, the concepts of possibility and impossibility are among the core concepts of metaphysics. For Rescher, something is “possible” when it is logically consistent and conceptually coherent. The term “merely possible objects” (“possibilia”) makes sense for Rescher. They can be characterized as hypothetical variants of existing "features".

As an example of “possibilia”, Rescher examines the ontological status of fictional persons in more detail . In his opinion, it is questionable here whether this - like z. B. Peter van Inwagen - should award a "quasi-existential" status as a non-existent inhabitant of a possible world. Rescher decidedly against this position: Hamlet, the Easter Bunny and the current King of France were not real, but mere objects of thought or discussion. If fictitious objects were to become part of an ontology, this would be “uncomfortably large”. Rescher therefore recommends for pragmatic considerations the use of " Occam's razor " and the talk of existence in the sense of a quasi-existence in a possible world.

Rescher fundamentally rejects the idea of ​​self-contradicting "impossibilia" (such as "childless parents"), as they are based on logically inconsistent conceptual structures and therefore remain incomprehensible.

Process ontology

Rescher takes the view that the fundamental components of the world are not individual things, but processes. According to Rescher, there are basically two different versions of the process ontology. In the stronger, causal version, which Rescher himself advocates, it is asserted that processes are ontologically fundamental and produce things causally, whereby things are to be understood as appearances of processes. The weaker, explanatory version, on the other hand, sees processes as explanatory prior to things, so that in order to explain a thing, one is dependent on including procedural occurrences of the thing.

Rescher voted for a process-based and against a dingontological understanding of reality, since the latter is able to adequately clarify the processes of the creation and change of substances. In addition, from his point of view, thing ontologies offer no advantage, since things could also be grasped in the terminology of process ontology - as processes that have positions and duration.

Processes and individual things

Processes can create things or change states. They can be hierarchized, i. H. classify in subordinate or superordinate processes. The spectrum ranges from processes on the micro level to cosmic processes. Small changes contribute to large processes; the next lower level could itself be seen as a bundle of again smaller processes.

Rescher classifies individual things according to their procedural change and current stability. They are part of continuous, open processes in which flowing processes are possible and receive their unity through the role they play in change processes. While processes cannot be further explained by anything else, this does not seem to apply to (material) things, because “to be a substance is to act as a substance”.

Process ontological interpretation of classical ontological problems

According to Rescher, a number of classic ontological problems can be adequately explained with the help of the process ontological model.

The process-ontological solution of the problem of universals consists in the fact that different things appear as the same (e.g. as a certain color or as a natural species) because they are the result of different processes that have at least one similarity.

The nature let itself be interpreted as a number of hierarchically ordered of different physical processes. These have a space-time place, are viewed as causal and thus appear to be connected with one another. The laws of nature in turn are understood by Rescher as procedurally; they only have a transitional stability ("merely transitory stability") and can change in the course of cosmological development.

According to Rescher, both biological and cultural evolution can easily be integrated into this process-oriented ontology . While Rescher tends to view biological evolution as undirected, he sees cultural evolution as purposeful due to its shaping by the cognitive influences of humans.

According to Rescher, a significant advantage of process ontology over thing ontology is that the concept of person becomes more understandable with the category of process . According to Rescher, the term “person” - like the terms “ I ” and “ self ” - cannot be adequately grasped as substance or thing. Rather, the person is the center of experience in a system of processes. Its unity can be understood as a narrative unit and cannot - as in thing ontology - be understood as a thing beyond activities and experiences. The spirit ( "mind") is a functional unit for Rescher. Mental processes depend on the body; But they have a dimension of meaning that they cannot reduce to physical processes.

ethics

In addition to his contributions to theoretical philosophy, Rescher has also written comprehensive studies on practical philosophy, especially ethics. Rescher primarily develops a normative moral concept, which he supplements with considerations on moral values and ideals . It is strongly oriented towards the concept of coherence and turns against skepticism, relativism and nihilism .

The ontological imperative as the basis of Rescher's moral conception

Rescher's ethics has an ontological basis. For people there is an “ontological imperative” not to let their potential wither away, to make the best of themselves and to generate certain values. Those who do not act in this way reject the ontological values ​​that are appropriate to them and ultimately damage their own character. The one who refuses to accept this imperative of self-realization is, according to Rescher's view, a “sociopath” and can no longer be counted under the category “person”, since being a person is a constitutive part of being moral.

From the ontological imperative, it follows that people are first of all obliged to use their own intelligence and develop their abilities. The interests of others should also be duly taken into account, since those who see value in their own rationality are obliged to also see value in the other's rationality. Rescher also emphasizes that it is also in one's own interest to consider the interests of others, since human life is a social one and the general best is also part of one's own best.

Concept and content of morality

Rescher regards the foundations of morality as infallible and invariant in time; only that which does not belong to the basis is subject to changes over time. Our concept of morality already defines this fundamentally in terms of content. For Rescher, for conceptual reasons, a completely different morality is not possible at all. If the norms followed in a strange society deviated too far from ours, we would no longer speak of a different morality in it, but none at all.

Rescher develops normative ethics with a 5-level hierarchy of rules that range from abstract, universal norms to specific instructions. The highest moral principle is the consideration of the interests of others ("Act with due heed of the interests of others"). It is just as universal as the basic principles and values ​​on the second level, including, for example, the principle of not unnecessarily restricting the life, freedom and development opportunities of others (“Do not unjustly deprive others of life, liberty or opportunity of self-development "). Level three includes so-called “governing rules” such as the prohibition of lying. Only the fourth level approaches the concrete implementation and contains the formulation of general framework conditions under which an action is required; these are specified in more detail on the fifth and last level for the specific individual case.

Social Philosophy and Political Philosophy

In the context of social and political philosophy, Rescher has dealt with questions of justice , egalitarianism and fairness as well as with the topics of democracy and its decision-making procedures. In terms of methodology, Rescher's writings contain empirical studies as well as conceptual analyzes, supplemented with pragmatic aspects.

justice

Rescher regards the concept of justice primarily from the perspective of distributive justice . Basically, it is important to avoid “monistic” theories of justice and to consider a variety of criteria for the distribution of goods.

Rescher criticizes classical utilitarianism , since it uses total utility as the central justice criterion without taking the aspect of equality into account. But other singular distribution criteria are also problematic in his view. If one advocates distribution according to personal needs , it should be clarified what “needs” are and whether these are real or just felt needs. Distribution based solely on personal abilities is unjust, since these gifts are nature's and undeserved. Allocation according to performance is also questionable , since a specific performance would be ineffective or even be provided for morally bad purposes. If one employed mere effort instead of performance, one faced the difficulty that such ineffective or incompetent persons could be entitled to special property allocation. Thus the productivity of the individual remains as the distribution criterion, but this too should only be one distribution criterion among several.

To the extent that inequalities serve the relative advantage of all, according to Rescher they can nevertheless - in a broader sense - be called fair. Such a constellation would exist if, in an affluent society, some more, but all in all, benefited from the increase in the goods to be distributed. In the event that goods cannot be shared, equal opportunities should be provided as a “substitute” for equal distribution. Indivisible goods would have to be distributed in such a way that all those entitled have an equal chance of obtaining them. Even in the case of extreme scarcity, where survival is only possible through unequal distribution, the idea of ​​fair equality could be deviated from in favor of equal opportunities.

Welfare

Rescher assumes that there is a widespread common sense that the creation of general social welfare is one of the most important tasks of the state and society. He gives details on this in his early work Welfare. Social Issue in Philosophical Perspective (1972), which primarily focuses on the state of the USA at the time.

Basically, it is to Rescher's view not the role of government and society, just luck ( "happiness") to produce, but only to provide those resources that are necessary for a broad consensus of obtaining happiness.

Rescher assumes the following as basic criteria or characteristics of the term "welfare":

  • physical health (life expectancy, physical condition, absence of pain and disability)
  • Mental health (self-determination, mental well-being, satisfaction with oneself and the environment, social skills)
  • material well-being (income, property, material security)
  • personal wealth (intellectual and social)
  • Environment resources (goods, services, intact environment)

In addition to these basic criteria, Rescher also counts legal interests such as equal rights and political and personal freedoms among the prerequisites for welfare.

According to Rescher, whether the state of welfare is fulfilled is a question of objective conditions and not of subjective preference. The distribution of resources must therefore be left to informed decision-makers who use objective criteria. Rescher sees the state as having an obligation to produce general welfare, but this should not undermine personal responsibility. State support must be realistic, effective, legally unobjectionable and sensitive to the rights of individuals.

Democracy and Democratic Process

For Rescher, democracy offers particularly favorable conditions for the establishment of a welfare state, but it still harbors some problems, especially with regard to its voting procedures: minorities can be disadvantaged by the majority or vice versa, minorities block meaningful measures and assert special interests against the general interest.

In order to solve these democracy problems, Rescher prefers - following John Dewey - to make the citizens “more trustworthy” through increasing participation . Therefore their political influence should be expanded by strengthening initiatives and referendums. According to Rescher, there is no reason to assume that if the direct will of the citizen were observed more strongly, the quality of the decisions would decrease compared to that of the establishment. Rather, it is to be expected that existing blockades could be resolved.

As a democratic model of decision-making, Rescher rejects the concept of consensus - against John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas , among others . In his view, consensus sometimes leads to problematic results (such as under National Socialism ) and fundamentally involves the risk of uniformity of thinking. In a plural world, divergent knowledge and divergent evaluations inevitably lead to dissent . These could not reasonably be avoided and could lead to competition for ideas and better results for everyone. Dissentes should not escalate, however, as this could lead to a waste of resources and a division of the community.

Ultimately, the dissent requires submission to political authorities. However, this is not a problem for Rescher, since on the basis of a cost-benefit calculation, consent from the individual can be expected. In the event of abuse of power by the political authorities, citizens would have the option of ending their docility (as happened in Eastern Europe at the end of the century).

Selected Works

  • The Development of Arabic Logic , Pittsburgh 1964
  • Essays in Philosophical Analysis , Pittsburgh 1969
  • Many-Valued Logic , New York 1969
  • Scientific Explanation , New York 1970
  • Temporal Logic (with Alasdair Urquhart), New York 1971
  • Conceptual Idealism , Oxford 1973
  • The Coherence Theory of Truth , Oxford 1973
  • Methodological Pragmatism , Oxford 1977
  • Peirce's Philosophy of Science , Notre Dame, Ind. 1978
  • Scientific Progress: A Philosophical Essay on the Economics of Research in Natural Science , Oxford 1978 (German Berlin 1981)
  • Cognitive Systematization , Oxford 1979
  • Induction , Pittsburgh 1980 (German Munich 1987)
  • Empirical Inquiry , Totowa 1982
  • The Limits of Science , Berkeley 1984 (German Stuttgart 1985)
  • The Strife of Systems , Pittsburgh 1985
  • Scientific Realism , Dordrecht 1987
  • Ethical Idealism , Berkeley, Cal. 1987
  • Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Rationale of Reason , Oxford 1988 (German Würzburg 1993)
  • A Useful Inheritance: Evolutionary Epistemology in Philosophical Perspective , Lanham, Md. 1989
  • Moral Absolutes , New York 1989
  • Human Interests - Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology , Stanford 1990
  • GW Leibniz's Monadology - An Edition for Students , Pittsburgh 1991
  • A System of Pragmatic Idealism , 3 Vols. Princeton, NJ 1992-94
  • Pluralism: Against the Demand for Consensus , Oxford 1993
  • Philosophical Standardism , Pittsburgh 1994
  • Luck: The Brilliant Randomness of Everyday Life , New York 1995 (German Berlin 1996)
  • Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy , Albany, NY 1996
  • Instructive Journey , Lanham 1996
  • Objectivity , Notre Dame 1997
  • Complexity , New Brunswick 1998
  • The Limits of Science , Pittsburgh 1999 (new edition from 1984)
  • Kant and the Reach of Reason , Cambridge 1999
  • Process Philosophy: A Survey of Basic Issues , Pittsburg 2000
  • Realistic Pragmatism , Albany, NY 2000
  • Nature and Understanding - The Metaphysics and Method of Science , Oxford 2000
  • Cognitive Pragmatism , Pittsburg 2001
  • Philosophical Reasoning , Malden / Oxford 2001
  • Epistemology: On the Scope and Limits of Knowledge , Albany, NY, 2003
  • Reason and Reality , Lanham 2005
  • Realism and Pragmatic Epistemology , Pittsburg 2005
  • Cognitive Harmony , Pittsburg 2005
  • Metaphysics - The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective , New York 2006
  • Presumption and the Practices of Tentative Cognition , Cambridge 2006
  • Dialectics , Frankfurt 2007
  • Error , Pittsburg 2007
  • Free Will , 2nd ed., New Brunswick 2009
  • Unknowability , Lanham 2009
  • Finitude , Heusenstamm 2010
  • Reality and Its Appearance , London / New York 2010
  • On Leibniz , expanded edition, Pittsburg 2013
  • A Journey through Philosophy in 101 Anecdotes , Pittsburg 2015
  • Concept Audits: A Philosophical Method , Lanham 2016
  • Pragmatism in Philosophical Inquiry , Dordrecht 2016

literature

  • Dale Jacquette: Reason, Method, and Value: A Reader on the Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher . Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-11-032905-6
  • Wulf Kellerwessel: Nicholas Rescher - the philosophical system. Introduction - overview - discussions . Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-1-61451-800-6
  • Michele Marsonet: Idealism and Praxis: The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher . Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-11-032911-7 .
  • Michele Marsonet: Rescher, Nicholas (1928–) , in: John R. Shook (Ed.): The Dictionary Of Modern American Philosophers . Thoemmes Continuum Bristol 2005, Vol. 4, pp. 2038-2044
  • Ernest Sosa (Ed.): The Philosophy of Nicholas Rescher , D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Boston, London 1979, ISBN 9789027709622

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Philosopher Nicholas Rescher now an honorary doctorate from the distance university
  2. ^ Membership directory: Nicholas Rescher. Academia Europaea, accessed January 19, 2018 .
  3. ↑ For the characterization of Rescher's work see Wulf Kellerwessel: Nicholas Rescher - the philosophical system. Introduction - Overview - Discussions , Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2014, pp. 10–12
  4. ↑ Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 61
  5. ↑ For the following cf. especially Rescher: Kant and the Reach of Reason. Studies in Kant's Theory of Rational Systematization . Cambridge et al. a. 2000.
  6. ↑ Rescher: Is Philosophy Dispensable? And Other Philosophical Essays . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007, chap. 11
  7. ↑ For the following cf. Rescher: Realistic Pragmatism. An Introduction to Pragmatic Philosophy . Albany, New York 2000 and the “Studies in Pragmatism” in Rescher: Studies in Pragmatism. Collected Papers II . Frankfurt / Main 2005.
  8. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Dialectics. A Classical Approach . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007, p. 1
  9. ↑ Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 98
  10. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 127
  11. ^ Rescher: Dialectics. A Classical Approach . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007
  12. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Minding Matter And Other Essays in Philosophical Inquiry . Lanham, Maryland 2001, p. 35
  13. ↑ Cf. Rescher: A System of Pragmatic Idealism . Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries. Princeton, NJ 1994; A System of Pragmatic Idealism . Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries. Princeton, NJ 1994.
  14. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Epistemic Pragmatism. And Other Studies in the Theory of Knowledge . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2008, chap. 12; Is Philosophy Dispensable? And Other Philosophical Essays . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007, chap. 12
  15. ^ Rescher: Cognitive Harmony. The Role of Systematic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge . Pittsburgh 2005, pp. 17, 25f.
  16. ↑ See Rescher: Cognitive Harmony. The Role of Systematic Harmony in the Constitution of Knowledge . Pittsburgh 2005, p. 44
  17. ↑ Cf. Rescher: A System of Pragmatic Idealism . Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries. Princeton, NJ 1994, chap. 2
  18. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 38.
  19. ^ Rescher: Philosophical Dialectics. An Essay on Metaphilosophy . Albany 2006, p. 17
  20. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 53
  21. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 95; Philosophical reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, chap. 9
  22. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 97
  23. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 104
  24. ↑ Cf. Rescher: The dispute of the systems. An essay on the reasons and implications of philosophical diversity . Würzburg 1997, p. 127
  25. ^ Rescher: Philosophical Reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, p. 45
  26. ^ Rescher: Presumption and the Practice of Tentative Cognition . Cambridge 2006, p. 53 f.
  27. ↑ Listed by Wulf Kellerwessel: Nicholas Rescher - the philosophical system. Introduction - Overview - Discussions , Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2014, p. 40; see. also the even more extensive list in Rescher: Philosophical Dialectics. An Essay on Metaphilosophy . Albany 2006, pp. 3-10
  28. ↑ See Rescher: Productive Evolution. On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2011, p. 42
  29. ↑ See Rescher: Philosophical Reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, p. 31
  30. ↑ See Rescher: Philosophical Reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, 2001, p. 15
  31. ↑ Cf. Rescher: A System of Pragmatic Idealism . Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries . Princeton, NJ 1994, p. 38; Philosophical reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, p. 16
  32. ↑ See Rescher: Presumption and the Practice of Tentative Cognition . Cambridge 2006, p. 11
  33. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Philosophical Textuality. Studies on Issues of Discourse in Philosophy . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2010, p. 6; A System of Pragmatic Idealism. Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries. Princeton, NJ 1994 , pp. 84 ff.
  34. ↑ See Rescher: Interpreting Philosophy. The Elements of Philosophical Hermeneutics . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007, p. 67
  35. ↑ See Rescher: Interpreting Philosophy. The Elements of Philosophical Hermeneutics . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2007, p. 27
  36. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Philosophical Textuality. Studies on Issues of Discourse in Philosophy . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2010, p. 13
  37. ^ Rescher: Philosophical Reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, p. 127
  38. ↑ See Rescher: Philosophical Reasoning. A Study on the Methodology of Philosophizing . Oxford 2001, pp. 197f.
  39. ^ Rescher: Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Reason . Würzburg 1993, p. 1 f.
  40. ↑ Cf. on this Rescher: Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Reason . Würzburg 1993, p. 195 f.
  41. ^ Rescher: Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Reason . Würzburg 1993, p. 50
  42. ^ Rescher: Rationality. A Philosophical Inquiry into the Nature and Grounds of Reason . Würzburg 1993, p. 51
  43. ^ Cf. Rescher: Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany, New York 2003 , p. 154.
  44. ^ Cf. Rescher: Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany, New York 2003 , pp. 165 f.
  45. ↑ See Rescher: Objectivity. The Obligations of Impersonal Reason . Notre Dame 1997, p. 1 f.
  46. ↑ See Rescher: Objectivity. The Obligations of Impersonal Reason . Notre Dame 1997, p. 5
  47. ↑ See Rescher: Objectivity. The Obligations of Impersonal Reason . Notre Dame 1997, p. 26
  48. ↑ See Rescher: Objectivity. The Obligations of Impersonal Reason . Notre Dame 1997, p. 60
  49. ^ Rescher: Error. (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong) . Pittsburgh 2007, p. 10.
  50. ^ Rescher: What If? Thought Experimentation in Philosophy . New Brunswick, London 2005, p. 168
  51. ↑ Cf. Rescher: What If? Thought Experimentation in Philosophy . New Brunswick, London 2005, p. 161
  52. ↑ “Error is commonplace in human affairs because Homo sapiens are limited creatures whose needs and wants outrun their available capabilities” (Rescher: Error. (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong) . Pittsburgh 2007, p. 2)
  53. ↑ See Rescher: Error. (On Our Predicament When Things Go Wrong) . Pittsburgh 2007, pp. 8 and 18
  54. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Epistemic Pragmatism. And Other Studies in the Theory of Knowledge . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2008, p. 9
  55. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, pp. 6f.
  56. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, pp. 8f.
  57. ^ Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, p. 19
  58. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, p. 33
  59. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, chap. 8 "Limits and Limitations"
  60. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, p. 73
  61. ^ Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, chap. 9
  62. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, chap. 10, "Luck"
  63. ↑ See Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, chap. 12
  64. ^ "The extinction of hope is the ultimate evil" (Rescher: Human Interests. Reflections on Philosophical Anthropology . Stanford 1990, p. 137)
  65. ↑ See Rescher: Productive Evolution. On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2011, p. 13
  66. ↑ See Rescher: Productive Evolution. On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2011, chap. 2, 6, 4.3.4
  67. ↑ See Rescher: Productive Evolution. On Reconciling Evolution with Intelligent Design . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2011, chap. 1 and 4
  68. ^ Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 49 f.
  69. ^ Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, chap. 2
  70. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd ed. 2009, pp. 5–8
  71. ^ Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 61
  72. ^ "The outcome of a decision is never settled as fact until 'all returns are in' [,] that is, until the moment of decision itself" (Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [ ua], 2nd edition 2009, p. 63)
  73. ^ Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 65
  74. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 65
  75. ^ Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 65
  76. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 71
  77. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 131
  78. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 79
  79. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 131
  80. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Free Will. A Philosophical Reappraisal , Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ [et al. a.], 2nd edition 2009, p. 81
  81. ↑ cf. on this Rescher: Skepticism, a Critical Reappraisal , Rowman and Littlefield 1980, introduction
  82. ^ Cf. Rescher: Skepticism, a Critical Reappraisal , Rowman and Littlefield 1980, p. 40
  83. ↑ See Rescher: On Certainty. And Other Essays on Cognition . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2011, p. 1 ff.
  84. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Cognitive Pragmatism. The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatic Perspective . Pittsburgh 2001, p. 29 f .; Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . Albany, New York 2003, p. 99; Presumption and the Practice of Tentative Cognition . Cambridge 2006, p. 31; Aporetics. Rational Deliberation in the Face of Inconsistency . Pittsburgh 2009, p. 17
  85. ^ Cf. Rescher: Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . Albany, New York 2003, p. 96
  86. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Philosophical Standardism. An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology . Pittsburgh, London 1994, chap. 3.1
  87. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Philosophical Standardism. An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology . Pittsburgh, London 1994, p. 3 f.
  88. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Philosophical Standardism. An Empiricist Approach to Philosophical Methodology . Pittsburgh, London 1994, p. 76 ff.
  89. ^ Cf. Rescher: Epistemology. An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge . Albany, New York 2003, p. 129
  90. ^ Rescher: The Coherence Theory of Truth (Oxford 1973), p. 262; Translated to Lorenz Bruno Puntel : Truth theories in modern philosophy . 3rd edition, Darmstadt 1993, p. 183
  91. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Methodological Pragmatism. A System-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge . New York 1977, p. 1 f.
  92. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Methodological Pragmatism. A System-Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Knowledge . New York 1977, p. 6
  93. ↑ Rescher: Studies on scientific epistemology . Würzburg 1996, p. 146 f.
  94. ↑ Cf. Wulf Kellerwessel: Nicholas Rescher - the philosophical system. Introduction - overview - discussions , Walter de Gruyter, Boston / Berlin 2014, p. 104
  95. ↑ See Rescher 1985: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The limits of science. Stuttgart 1985), pp. 75, 77
  96. ↑ See Rescher 1985: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The Limits of Science. Stuttgart 1985), p. 81
  97. ↑ See Rescher 1985: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The Limits of Science. Stuttgart 1985), p. 87
  98. ↑ See Rescher 1985: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The limits of science. Stuttgart 1985), p. 111
  99. ^ On the following, see Rescher: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The Limits of Science. Stuttgart 1985), Chap. 1
  100. ↑ See also Rescher: Ignorance. On the Wider Implications of Deficient Knowledge . Pittsburgh 2009, p. 74
  101. ↑ See Rescher: The Limits of Science. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1984 (German: The Limits of Science. Stuttgart 1985), Chap. 7th
  102. ↑ See Rescher: Scientific Progress . Oxford 1978 (German: Scientific progress. A study on the economics of research . Berlin, New York 1982)
  103. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, pp. 33, 161 f.
  104. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 176 ff.
  105. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 35
  106. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 17
  107. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Cognitive Pragmatism. The Theory of Knowledge in Pragmatic Perspective . Pittsburgh 2001, pp. 47, 50; Rescher: Being and Value. And Other Philosophical Essays . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2008, p. 153
  108. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 59 ff .; A System of Pragmatic Idealism . Volume III: Metaphysical Inquiries . Princeton, NJ 1994, chap. 4th
  109. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, pp. 90-92
  110. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 202 f.
  111. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Metaphysics. The Key Issues from a Realistic Perspective . New York 2006, p. 200
  112. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 57 f.
  113. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 66
  114. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 41
  115. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 54 f.
  116. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 52 f.
  117. ^ Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 56 f.
  118. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, chap. 4th
  119. ^ Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 91
  120. ^ Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, pp. 100-102
  121. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 108
  122. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Process Metaphysics. An Introduction to Process Philosophy . Albany 1996, p. 114 f.
  123. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. X
  124. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. 94
  125. ↑ "We should be moral not because it (somehow) pays, but because we ought to be so as part and parcel of our ontological obligation towards self-realization" (Rescher: Rationality and Moral Obligation . In: Synthesis 72, 1987, p . 29–43 (here p. 37))
  126. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Replies to Commentators . In: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 1994, pp. 441–457 (here p. 448)
  127. ↑ See Rescher: A System of Pragmatic Idealism , Volume II: The Validity of Values . Princeton, NJ 1993, pp. 113 f.
  128. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. 95
  129. ↑ See Rescher: Rationality and Moral Obligation . In: Synthesis 72, 1987, pp. 29-43 (here p. 30 f.)
  130. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. 38
  131. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. 40 ff.
  132. ↑ See Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, p. 48; A System of Pragmatic Idealism , Volume II: The Validity of Values . Princeton, NJ 1993, p. 189
  133. ↑ Cf. on this and the following Rescher: Moral Absolutes. An Essay on the Nature and Rationale of Morality . New York 1989, pp. 50 ff., A System of Pragmatic Idealism , Volume II: The Validity of Values . Princeton, NJ 1993, pp. 191 ff .; Objectivity. The Obligations of Impersonal Reason . Notre Dame 1997, pp. 137 ff .; On Rules and Principles. A Philosophical Study of their Nature and Function . Frankfurt / Main u. a. 2010, p. 33 ff.
  134. ↑ Especially in Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972
  135. ↑ See Rescher: Distributive Justice. A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution . Minneapolis, New York 1966, chap. 4.9
  136. ↑ See Rescher: Distributive Justice. A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution . Minneapolis, New York 1966, chap. 2.3
  137. ↑ See Rescher: Distributive Justice. A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution . Minneapolis, New York 1966, chap. 5.3.1
  138. ↑ See Rescher: Distributive Justice. A Constructive Critique of the Utilitarian Theory of Distribution . Minneapolis, New York 1966, chap. 5.5
  139. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 62 ff.
  140. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 12 f.
  141. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 72
  142. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 15 ff.
  143. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 125
  144. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 118 f.
  145. ↑ See Rescher: Welfare. The Social Issues in Philosophical Perspective . Pittsburgh 1972, p. 142
  146. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Studies in Philosophical Anthropology . Collected Papers VII. Frankfurt / Main 2006, chap. 2: Risking Democracy
  147. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Studies in Philosophical Anthropology . Collected Papers VII. Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 27 f.
  148. ↑ See Rescher: Pluralism. Against the Demand for Consensus . Oxford 1993, pp. 156-162 f .; Studies in Social Philosophy . Collected Papers VI. Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 31 f.
  149. ↑ Cf. Rescher: Studies in Social Philosophy . Collected Papers VI. Frankfurt / Main 2006, p. 37
personal data
SURNAME Rescher, Nicholas
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH July 15, 1928
PLACE OF BIRTH Hagen , Germany