Richard Rorty

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Richard McKay Rorty (born October 4, 1931 in New York City , † June 8, 2007 in Palo Alto , California ) was an American philosopher and comparativeist . Rorty is considered a representative of neo- pragmatism . He was also known for his left political positions.

family

Richard Rorty was the only child of James Rorty, son of an Irish immigrant, and of Winifred Raushenbush, daughter of German immigrants . Her father Walter Rauschenbusch was one of the spokesmen for the social gospel movement . Her grandfather August Rauschenbusch - consequently Richard Rorty's maternal great-grandfather - worked as a Baptist theologian in the USA and Germany. As a result of traumatic war experiences, the father experienced two nervous breakdowns at the end of his life. He experienced the worse of the two in the early 1960s. Among other things, he believed in having divine omniscience. Richard Rorty himself received psychiatric treatment in the early 1960s .

Father James Rorty was influenced by Thorstein Veblen in his youth , and mother Winifred Rorty did empirical social research as an assistant to Robert Ezra Park . The parents worked as freelance journalists and sympathized with communism. However, in 1932 they distanced themselves from the Communist Party USA , which was dominated by the CPSU . James Rorty was involved in the Moscow show trials on behalf of the Dewey Commission of Inquiry into the Trotsky affair. In the early 1940s, the parents supported the socialist presidential candidate Norman Thomas and worked for the Workers' Defense League , the League for the Defense of Workers . - In 1989, Richard Rorty dedicated the work Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity to his family. In the German translation the dedication reads:

In memory of six liberals: my parents and grandparents .

Richard Rorty's first marriage to Amélie Oksenberg, his fellow student at Yale University , has a son. After the divorce in 1972, Richard Rorty and Mary Varney married. In this marriage he became the father of two other children. Mary Varney Rorty had a PhD in philosophy from Johns Hopkins University ; she works at the Center for Biomedical Ethics at Stanford University. Mary Varney is a practicing Mormon , while Richard Rorty is known to be an outspoken atheist.

Life

The main and favorite occupation of young Richard Rorty was reading books; only observations of nature fascinated him throughout his life. He was shy and reserved. He could not find access to the activities of his classmates and it was part of his continuous school experience to be beaten up by "bullies". By the time he got into Hutchins College, he had changed schools about seven times.

He said it was lucky to be able to transfer to Hutchins College at the age of fifteen. At this school for the gifted at the University of Chicago , he achieved his bachelor's degree at the age of eighteen in 1949 and his master's degree three years later in 1952 with a thesis on " Whitehead 's Use of the Concept of Potentiality" in philosophy. His teachers included u. a. Rudolf Carnap , Charles Hartshorne and Richard McKeon. From 1952 to 1956 he studied at the Yale University , 1956 he was there with the work "The Concept of Potentiality" doctorate . His doctoral supervisor was Paul Weiss .

After he had done his two years of military service in the US Army (1957/8), he was from 1958 to 1961 Assistant Professor at Wellesley College . Subsequently - from 1981 as "Stuart Professor of Philosophy" - he was professor for analytical philosophy at Princeton University until 1982 . In 1967, in the introduction to “The Linguistic Turn ” - a collection of essays by representatives of analytical philosophy - he pleaded for a resumption of epistemological questions that have remained unanswered since ancient times. With the publication of the essay "World well lost" in 1972 he pointed further that truth, objective reality and conceptual framework should make each other philosophically superfluous like the old fetishes of God, reason and spirit. 1973-74 he received a Guggenheim scholarship . 1979 appeared "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" (Eng. "The mirror of nature", 1987). In it he presented the historically conditioned emergence of philosophical problems such as truth, objectivity and epistemology, showed in contemporary philosophy how unproductive further occupation with it might be, and proposed to pursue " educational " philosophy instead . For the years 1981–86 he received a MacArthur Fellowship.

In 1982 he gave up his work in university philosophy in view of his research results and left his chair at Princeton. In 1982 he became "Kenan Professor for Humanities" at the University of Virginia , which he held until 1998. He was u. a. Visiting Professor at University College London (1986) and Trinity College (Cambridge) (1987). In 1989 he published "Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity" (Eng. "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity", 1992) about possibilities of self-creation and solidarity in a contingent society. In 1997 he was visiting professor at Harvard and received an honorary doctorate from the University of Paris . Since 1998 Rorty has taught comparative literature at Stanford University .

In the same year “Achieving Our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America "(Eng." Proud of our country. The American Left and Patriotism, "1999) and" Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III "(Eng." Truth and Progress ", 2000) and he lectured at Trinity College Dublin . Further guest lectures followed at the universities of Frankfurt , Heidelberg , Berlin , Münster , Turin , Girona and Amsterdam . He was awarded Doctor Honoris Causa from Johannes Pannonius University , Pécs in Hungary (2000), Babeș-Bolyai University Cluj in Romania (2001) and the Free University of Brussels in Belgium (2001). Since 2005 he has been Professor Emeritus. Richard Rorty died of pancreatic cancer in 2007 in Palo Alto .

Act

Rorty discussed the question with others throughout his life: Is the world in which we live an objective or a constructed reality? Philosophers cannot decide this question, but they do advocate one or the other answer. That question was ...

" ... already in the game since Protagoras claimed:" Man is the measure of all things, "and Plato replied that the measure must instead be something inhuman, immutable and great - something like the good , the will of God or the intrinsic nature of physical reality . Scientists who [...] firmly adhere to the fact that reality has an eternal, unchangeable, intrinsic nature that science will ultimately reveal, are the heirs of Plato. Philosophers like Kuhn, Latour and Hacking, on the other hand, believe that Protagoras has gained an important insight and that the debate has not yet been decided. "

" These alternating intuitions have been in play ever since Protagoras said" Man is the measure of all things "and Plato rejoined that the measure must instead be something nonhuman, unchanging, and capitalized - something like The Good, or The Will of God, or The Intrinsic Nature of Physical Reality. Scientists who, like Steven Weinberg, have no doubt that reality has an eternal, unchanging, intrinsic structure which natural science will eventually discover are the heirs of Plato. Philosophers like Kuhn, Latour, and Hacking think that Protagoras had a point, and that the argument is not yet over. "

Rorty chose Protagoras' answer and left the question open for everyone else. He became one of the most widely read authors today.

In addition to philosophical questions, he commented on political theory, historiography, literary studies and less typically academic topics such as terrorism, human rights and evolutionary biology. Both his political and moral philosophies have been attacked by the political right and left. Some thought he was an academic leftist and others naive. The right accused him in particular of relativism and irresponsibility, the left both of a lack of foundation for a concept of social justice and, recently, too much partisanship for the foreign policy of the United States . The objection that Rorty contradicts himself is also widespread.

Together with Hilary Putnam, he is considered to be the main exponent of American neo- pragmatism . With his research results, Rorty asserted against analytical philosophy that it was shaped by traditional empirical and epistemological-fundamentalist concepts that prevent philosophizing in connection with contemporary problems. He advocated abandoning the concept of truth and objectivity . These terms are contingent, have not led to the prospective results and are therefore dispensable. He called for "a consistent historicization of epistemological problems". From the point of view of the philosophy of mind , Rorty advocated an eliminativism , which states that there are no mental phenomena.

Instead of designing further philosophical systems, his proposal was to take solidarity and action as the starting point for a society-wide, open, philosophical discourse. This “edifying philosophy” should enable people to develop new views. Solidarity between people who are shaped by Western culture arises from the shared experience of cruelty. It is located in the sphere of the public, of society, for which it is important to minimize or avoid cruelty and suffering. This shared feeling, the empathy, empathy of the people, can each individual z. B. develop further with the help of literature and poetry. Rorty is said to have explained this idea with the anecdote that Abraham Lincoln said in a conversation with Harriet Beecher-Stowe that the mass reading of her novel “ Onkel Toms Hütte ” actually made the civil war between southern and northern states possible in the first place. A moral advance for Rorty was the expansion of the "we", the community that has this empathy for one another.

His extensive criticism of analytical philosophy aroused sometimes violent collegial criticism of him personally. Rorty was repeatedly accused of being unable to "bury philosophy" and teach philosophy at the same time as his criticism. In 1982 Rorty left his chair in philosophy at Princeton University , the stronghold of analytical philosophy, and was Kenan Professor of Comparative Literature at Stanford University until his death . Extensive and coherent accounts of his analysis of contemporary philosophy and his idea of ​​“visual philosophy” can be found in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), Consequences of Pragmatism (1982), and Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1988).

A young project

When Rorty entered Hutchins College at the University of Chicago at age 15, he had a vague idea of ​​what he wanted to learn. “To grasp the present and justice in a single vision”, this phrase by the Irish poet William Butler Yeats was the name for a kind of project, as Rorty wrote in 1992 in “Trotsky and the Wild Orchids”, which he said of the adults in Chicago Suggestions awaited. Justice meant, following in the footsteps of one's parents, helping to increase justice in American society and thereby minimize suffering. “The present” stood for the inexplicable fascination for something or for someone with whom one feels to be touched by something unspeakable, as he had experienced in the forests of New Jersey and with wild orchids . He was unable to faithfully worship this ineffable, as he found out a few years later.

University of Chicago: Hutchinson Hall

Fascination with metaphysics and disillusionment

In Chicago, Rorty discovered philosophy as the right terrain for his project. In contrast to the pragmatic theories - which had replaced the Marxist theories and which his parents and intellectuals in New York now followed - in Chicago it was taught that “only if you have something eternal, absolute and good - like the God of the sacred Thomas or the “ nature of human beings ” described by Aristotle - it would approximate that the American decision in favor of a social democracy could be justified against any kind of fascism . His professors ' ridicule of Dewey's ' ridiculous pragmatism 'was combined with the adolescent need to distance themselves from parental role models, and Rorty followed their suggestion.

Besides his preoccupation with novel rationalist - metaphysical concepts like those of Alfred North Whitehead - whose student Charles Hartshorne was Rorty's mentor in Chicago - and later those of Paul Weiss at Yale, he read Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas and summed up that he if this should be possible - something similar to what Plato wanted to achieve as the absolute place of the good and the beautiful. In this way he believed that he was getting closer to the realization of his project “to capture the present and justice in a single vision”. "I didn't want to be anything more than a kind of Platonist and between the ages of 15 and 20 I gave my best."

But he did not succeed in the Platonic feat, reported Habermas : “... the youthful Rorty, who let himself be carried away by Plato, Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, increasingly found that the intention of touching the presence of the extraordinary in the form of a theory ... itself would not be realized with the help of philosophy. "

The Linguistic Turn (1967)

In contrast to Germany - where the rule of National Socialist fascism interrupted intellectual development for decades - a philosophical reorientation took place in the Anglophone- speaking area in the first half of the 20th century through analytical philosophy. In a further change within this, after the Second World War, the original terrain of logical-formal approaches and ideal linguistic designs were abandoned and everyday language began to be explored and philosophically evaluated. Gustav Bergmann called this turning point in the early 1950s as the "Linguistic Turn".

As part of the linguistic turn, Rorty seized the discursive possibilities of giving his philosophical-historical and epistemological research results space for technical-philosophical discussions with regard to the current state of discussion. For most American philosophers at the time, Rorty was considered a representative of analytical philosophy. In 1967 the anthology The Linguistic Turn appeared with an introduction by Rorty, which showed his clearly critical distance from analytical philosophy. He criticized the analytical philosophy of language , which, still clinging to epistemology , seeks to solve philosophical problems by either reforming language (constructing an ideal language) or understanding language better. Both could only serve to polish the “mirror”, which he regarded as questionable because, in his view, epistemological dead ends prevented this.

In the years that followed, Rorty repeatedly stated that he could not understand how the philosophy of language could solve traditional philosophical problems. The positive thing about the linguistic turn is the shift in the philosophical focus from empiricism to "linguistic behavior".

Nature's Mirror (1979)

When in 1979 in the USA “Der Spiegel der Natur. A Critique of Philosophy ”(in Germany 1981) appeared, the result and the conclusions of Rorty's historicization of epistemological questions were available. The focus was on the result of Rorty's attempt to examine philosophical problems for unchecked assumptions and to critically examine the answers. This resulted in a comprehensive and fundamental revision of the entire modern and modern philosophy. Many referred to the result as a "general settlement" with philosophy and called Rorty a "thinker of deconstruction".

Can we actually do that?

About the philosophy of the mental

The assumption that there are valid criteria for what is meant by mental is a mistake. Traditionally, philosophers have tended to infer something substantial from individual phenomena. In the case of “mental”, this has assumed the character of an immaterial entity . According to Rorty, there is no need to assume that apart from sensory impulses and the results of neurophysiological processing mechanisms there is something like the mental that mediates our perception . His alternative: We could possibly learn to speak differently about our intuitions than before, without being able to assume that the lack of conformity between our language and reality can be remedied.

Modern epistemology

All epistemological theories of the 16th and 17th centuries are implicit in the self-evident, socially valid idea that there are two entities, body and mind, and that the mind represents a true image of reality, i.e. H. Can "mirror". How this can be achieved in a reliable way so that philosophical and individual scientific truth claims can be substantiated was explicitly the subject of Lockes and Kant , who believed that they had reliably justified this 'mirroring' of reality in human consciousness in their own way .

Rorty presented the epistemological concepts of Locke and Kant as a form of “ concept formation ”. This “concept formation” was - as Rorty summarized - contaminated and worked through the justification of knowledge claims and through their causal explanation in connection with social practices and alleged psychological processes with the Cartesian division of res cogitans and res extensa, which has serious consequences and causes errors .

The views of representatives of analytical philosophy and psychological empiricism also document a predictable lack of results of any kind of epistemology. Only the implicit and unreflected assumption of "mirroring" makes philosophers believe that they can solve problems with it. Rorty recommended replacing the “recognition” associated with historically developed foundation claims by the current, social justification of the opinions of people in solidarity .

About the idea of ​​"philosophy without mirrors"

Rorty's alternative, the “philosophy without a mirror”, is the idea of ​​a framework to enable joint action through communication and looking at people and facts. He owes these suggestions for a hermeneutic approach to Ludwig Wittgenstein , Martin Heidegger and John Dewey , who, following Friedrich Nietzsche, claimed that 'knowledge' is part of a language game . A fundamental philosophy is therefore doomed to failure. Philosophers should refrain from continuing to search for ideal theories that must correspond with reality. After centuries of attempts, there is no evidence that this can be achieved. Traditional positions accused him of not having participated in the improvement of traditional philosophy or assumed he was poor in professionalism. Others rejected his research results and developed, contrary to Rorty, viable representative models from their point of view.

Rorty's “ visual philosophy” project focuses on the work of the philosophers together with others. They should take part in everyday-relevant discourses as intelligent, experienced interlocutors and prevent discussion groups from being misused as a "market for theories". This non-normal discourse should enable individuals and society to break away from traditions and find new perspectives. The openness of this approach ensured and continues to provide material for discussion throughout society.

A new idea of ​​philosophy inevitably encounters the contradiction of the old one, explained Rorty with regard to the traditionally valid image of man that is now up for discussion. Viewpoints of the traditional idea of ​​philosophy - " systematic philosophizing" - made it difficult to extract anything philosophically relevant from his other unusual views. He always contradicted those who thought his research results meant the end of philosophy. However, he considers epistemological philosophy to be an episode in European cultural history.

Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (1989)

After Rorty presented his critique of knowledge in his book Der Spiegel der Natur , he now says goodbye to all metaphysics , philosophy as a fundamental science which, with a view of the whole, claimed privileged access to truth.

Following on from Wittgenstein, for whom there is no recognizable world outside of language, Rorty writes: "Since truth is a property of sentences, since the existence of sentences depends on vocabularies and since vocabularies are made by people, the same applies to truths."

Language is contingent and a history of metaphors , and the metaphorical use of signs, unfamiliar with them, forces us to strive to develop new theories. Metaphors have a surprise effect: comparable to making a grimace in a conversation, Rorty said, referring to Donald Davidson . Metaphors have no meaning, but they can happen to fall on fertile ground.

In contrast to the traditional irony concept, in which irony is viewed as a means of getting closer to the truth, the ironist in Rorty (he uses the feminine form to distance himself from the traditional irony conception) has doubts and distance from her (ultimate) vocabulary . Ironics strive to constantly renew and question their vocabulary. In the private sphere, this serves to create the self and promotes autonomy. For Rorty, freedom is the insight into contingency .

"Benevolent" vs. "Critical" reading

Rorty's criticism became the greatest challenge to contemporary philosophy, causing it to be greatly troubled. He is seen by some as a consistent developer of the analytical philosophy after the pragmatic turn . This view is known as the “deflationist” interpretation. Or it is said that Rorty is trying to end philosophy at all. Both types of reading refer to his writings. Rorty is also considered a philosopher who wants to restore philosophy to its original meaning in life, in order to promote orientation and human progress. Rorty took a detailed position on these criticisms throughout his life.

Awards

In 2001 Rorty received the Meister Eckhart Prize, endowed with 50,000 euros, for his work, which was awarded for the first time this year . He has also been a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences since 1983 and of the American Philosophical Society since 2005 .

Works

  • Whitehead 's Use of the Concept of Potentiality . Master thesis. 1952.
  • The linguistic turn . 1967. Reprint: University of Chicago Press, 1992.
  • Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature . Princeton University Press, 1979.
    • German edition: The mirror of nature . Translated by Michael Gebauer. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1981, ISBN 3-518-06420-7 .
  • Consequences of Pragmatism . University of Minnesota Press, 1982.
  • Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity . Cambridge University Press, 1989.
    • German edition: Contingency, irony and solidarity . Translated by Christa Krüger. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1989, ISBN 3-518-58012-4 .
  • Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers I. 1991.
  • Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers II. 1991.
  • Hope instead of knowledge. An introduction to pragmatic philosophy. 2nd Edition. Passagen Verlag, Vienna 2013, ISBN 978-3-7092-0085-8 .
  • Achieving Our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth Century America. 1997. (German pride in our country. The American Left and Patriotism , Frankfurt 1999)
  • Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III. 1997. (German truth and progress , Frankfurt 2000)
  • The Communist Manifesto 150 Years Later. Failed prophecies, glorious hopes. Translated by Reinhard Kaiser . Reprint Edition Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1998, ISBN 3-518-06529-7 .
  • Philosophy and Social Hope. 2000.
  • with Gianni Vattimo : Il futuro della religione. 2005. (German The Future of Religion , Frankfurt 2006)
  • Philosophy as cultural politics. Philosophical Papers IV. 2007. (German philosophy as cultural policy , Frankfurt 2008)

literature

  • Dirk Auer: Politicized Democracy. Richard Rorty's political anti-essentialism . VS Verlag, Wiesbaden 2003, ISBN 3-8100-4170-X .
  • Robert Brandom (Ed.): Rorty and His Critics . Blackwell Publishing, Malden (MA) 2000, ISBN 0-631-20982-4 .
  • Matthias Buschmeier, Espen Hammer (Ed.): Pragmatism and Hermeneutics. Contributions to Richard Rorty's cultural policy. (= Special issue of the magazine for aesthetics and general art history ). Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 2011.
  • James Ferguson Conant : Freedom, Truth, and Cruelty: Rorty and Orwell . In: Rainer Born, Otto Neumaier (Hrsg.): Philosophy Science - Economy. Think together - learn from one another . öbv & hpt Verlagsgesellschaft, Vienna 2001, ISBN 3-209-03805-8 , pp. 75–94.
  • Alexander Gröschner, Mike Sandbothe (ed.): Pragmatism as cultural policy. Contributions to the work of Richard Rorty . Suhrkamp, ​​Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-518-29581-6 .
  • Neil Gross: Richard Rorty. The Making of an American Philosopher . UCP, 2008.
  • Detlef Horster : Richard Rorty for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 1991, ISBN 3-88506-868-0 .
  • Martin Mueller: Private Romanticism, Public Pragmatism? Richard Rorty's transformative re-description of liberalism. transcript Verlag, Bielefeld 2014, ISBN 978-3-8376-2041-2 .
  • Walter Reese-Schäfer : Richard Rorty for an introduction . Junius, Hamburg 2006, ISBN 3-88506-623-8 .
  • Mike Sandbothe (ed.): The renaissance of pragmatism. Current entanglements between analytical and continental philosophy . Velbrück, Weilerswist-Metternich 2000, ISBN 3-934730-24-8 .
  • Ulf Schulenberg: Romanticism and Pragmatism: Richard Rorty and the Idea of ​​a Poeticized Culture . New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015 ,.
  • Gadi Taub : Richard Rorty's American Faith . Dissertation. Rutgers University , 2003.

Web links

General

Contributions by Richard Rorty

Obituaries

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Neill Gross: Richard Rorty. Chicago 2008. pp. 16f.
  2. ↑ a b c Bruce Kuklick: Neil Gross, Richard Rorty: The Making of an American Philosopher. In: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society. 47.1 (2011), p. 36.
  3. ^ Richard Rorty: Contingency, Irony and Solidarity . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 8.
  4. ^ Neill Gross: Richard Rorty. Chicago 2008.
  5. ^ Rorty: Trotski and the Wild Orchids. Text also in Rorty: Philosophy and Social Hope. Penguin Books, 1999.
  6. ^ "World well lost", 1972 in Rorty, 1982: Consequences of Pragmatism. Minnesota University press.
  7. ^ Reference page by the Rorty family for Richard Rorty.
  8. ^ Richard Rorty (1999): Phony science wars. In: The Atlantic Monthly 284 (5), pp. 120-122. - Rorty called the "wars" over this question "mock battles".
  9. ^ Richard Rorty (1999): Phony science wars. In: The Atlantic Monthly 284 (5), pp. 120-122; Rorty called the “wars” over this question “mock battles”.
  10. ↑ cf. Charles B. Guignon, David R. Hiley: Richard Rorty. Cambridge Press, New York 2003, p. 1.
  11. ↑ Rorty left crumbs . In: Ian Bogost: We think public. May 2010.
  12. ↑ Richard Rorty: The mirror of nature. Frankfurt am Main 1987, pp. 221-224.
  13. ^ Schneider: Epistemology in the 20th Century. Stuttgart 1998, p. 159.
  14. ↑ Richard Rorty: The mirror of nature. Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 391 ff.
  15. ^ Lecture by Stephan Nehrkorn in the Humboldt Society.
  16. ^ Rorty: Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (1992). Reprinted in "Philosophy and Social Hope" (1999) .
  17. ↑ For both quotations: Rorty: Trotsky and the Wild Orchids (1992). Reprinted in Philosophy and Social Hope (1999).
  18. ^ Jürgen Habermas: Richard Rorty's Pragmatic Turn. In: Maeve Cooke (Ed.): On the Pragmatics of Communication. Institute for Technology, Massachusetts 1998, p. 343.
  19. ^ Richard Rorty: The linguistic turn. 1967, p. 9, note 10.
  20. ^ Walter Reese-Schäfer: Richard Rorty. Hamburg 2006, p. 13.
  21. ^ Richard Rorty: The Linguistic Turn. Chicago 1997, p. 39.
  22. ^ Richard Rorty: Philosophy as cultural politics. Cambridge Press, New York 2007, p. 160.
  23. ↑ Richard Rorty: The Mirror of Nature: A Critique of Philosophy. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1981. The following page numbers refer to this edition.
  24. ↑ See Walter Reese-Schäfer: Richard Rorty for an introduction. Junius, Hamburg 2006, p. 9 u. 17th
  25. ↑ Cf. Richard Rorty: Der Spiegel der Natur: A Critique of Philosophy. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1981, p. 48.
  26. ↑ World well lost 1972 in Consequences of Pragmatism. Minnesota University press, Minnesota 1982, p. 4.
  27. ↑ a b Cf. Der Spiegel der Natur. P. 20.
  28. ↑ See Richard Rorty: Reply to Geert Keil. In: Schäfer, Tietz, Zill (ed.): Behind the mirrors. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2001, pp. 73f.
  29. ↑ See the mirror of nature. P. 149 ff.
  30. ↑ See 5. u. 6. Chapter in the mirror of nature.
  31. ↑ See mirror of nature. P. 21.
  32. ↑ a b Cf. Der Spiegel der Natur. P. 183.
  33. ↑ See the mirror of nature. P. 322f.
  34. ^ John McDowell 1996 in Mind and World (Harvard University Press).
  35. ↑ See the mirror of nature. P. 403.
  36. ↑ See the mirror of nature. P. 22.
  37. ↑ See the mirror of nature. Pp. 387-426.
  38. ↑ page 49 (German edition, Suhrkamp 1992)
  39. ↑ See Detlef Horster: Rorty now behind the mirror? ( Memento of the original from September 25, 2007 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. Society for Philosophy and Science. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.philosophie.de
  40. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Richard Rorty and the delight in the shock of deflation. In: Jürgen Habermas: Oh, Europe. Small political papers. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2008, p. 17f.
  41. ↑ For example in: Robert Brandom (Ed.): Rorty and his critics. Blackwell Pub., Carlton, Victoria 2000. or in: Schäfer, Tietz, Zill (Ed.): Behind the mirrors. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2001.
  42. ^ Member History: Richard Rorty. American Philosophical Society, accessed January 25, 2019 .
personal data
SURNAME Rorty, Richard
ALTERNATIVE NAMES Rorty, Richard McKay
BRIEF DESCRIPTION American philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH October 4, 1931
PLACE OF BIRTH New York City
DATE OF DEATH June 8, 2007
Place of death Palo Alto