Munchausen Trilemma

The Munchausen Trilemma is a philosophical problem formulated by Hans Albert . The question is whether it is possible to find a "final reason" (in the sense of a final cause or an inevitable first beginning) or to prove it scientifically.

Hans Albert claims that any attempts to establish a final justification must fail or lead to the Münchhausen Trilemma. The Munchausen Trilemma means that any attempt to prove a final reason leads to one of three possible outcomes:

to a circular argument , (the conclusion is supposed to prove the premise , but needs it to formulate the conclusion)
to an infinite regress (a new hypothesis is repeatedly formulated about the justifiability of a final reason, which however again proves to be inadequate or leads back into a circle)
to terminate the procedure at one point and to dogmatize the justification there

Apart from the fact that this assertion was misunderstood in many ways, it triggers philosophical discussions to this day, because the representatives of the biblical or theological schools need a final reason, a final cause in which they ultimately see God .

The name Münchhausen-Trilemma is an ironic reference to the legendary literary figure Baron Münchhausen , who claimed to have pulled his own hair out of a swamp. A philosophical use of the image can be found in Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil , who describes it as “a kind of logical discipline and unnatural” when someone tries “with more than Münchhausen's boldness to get himself out of the swamp of nothingness by the hair to draw into existence. ”The Münchhausen trilemma contains three of the five tropes of Agrippa and is therefore also compared with the Agrippa trilemma .

The trilemma situation

Münchhausen pulls out of the swamp , drawing by Theodor Hosemann

Assume that sentence p is to be justified. Three ways seem possible:

Infinite recourse: Every statement that justifies p has to be justified again. This leads to an "infinite recourse".
Circle: The reasoning runs in a circle. A statement that is supposed to justify p is identical to p or already occurs in the chain of reasons that is supposed to justify p . (Example based on a Molière comedy : Why is the girl mute? - The girl is mute because she has lost her ability to speak! - Why has she lost her ability to speak ? - Due to the inability to master the language! )
Termination of the procedure: Infinite regress and circular reasoning can be combined or repeated endlessly, which ultimately leads to the termination of the justification procedure.

In addition, and at the same time to be understood as a motivation for the formulation of this Münchhausen Trilemma, Albert adds (in a general sense): "If there were an ultimate justification (which fortunately is difficult to do), it would inevitably lead to a dogma ."

Since there are no infallible sources of knowledge, but at most sources whose infallibility is dogmatically asserted, according to the Munchausen Trilemma there is no privileged access to truth .

To the problem story

That these three alternatives exist in justification situations can already be found in ancient Greek philosophy, first in the Analytica posteriora of Aristotle (72b5 ff. After the Bekker count ). They play an important role in the Pyrrhonic skepticism . Allegedly, these figures of argument were used by the skeptics around Agrippa (first century AD).

A philosophy that sees itself as practical sometimes suspends the justification here and instead places a decision at the beginning of the system . For example, Fichte emphasizes in § 1 of his system of moral doctrine according to the principles of scientific theory that the beginning must not be justified, but founded: “not on the basis of a theoretical insight, but on the basis of a practical interest; I want to be independent, that's why I consider myself to be ”.

In modern philosophy, Jakob Friedrich Fries then rejected the demand to prove everything as contradicting, because it led to an infinite regress, and consequently rejected Kant's method (which means the Kantian assertion of the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori ). The attempted solution of Fries's theory that perceptual experiences could justify sentences because their evidence is immediately clear, was criticized in detail in the logic of research , in particular by Karl Popper , who called this position “psychologism” . At the same time, Popper has shown that empirical science will never be able to provide a final reason.

A further elaboration of the subject can be found in the epistemology that Georg Simmel explained in his Philosophy of Money (1900). Simmel started from the ontological category of interaction and connected this with a theory of the relativity of all beings . “That the earth's apparent rest is not just a complicated movement, but that its entire position in the universe exists only through an interrelationship to other masses of matter - that is a very simple, but very far-reaching case of the transition from the solidity and absoluteness of the world to their dissolution into movements and relations . ”Accordingly, for Simmel , knowledge does not have an absolute starting point, but has to look for its reference in axioms and determinations.

“It is only okay for our image of the world to" float in the air "in this way, since our world itself does it. This is not an accidental coincidence of the words, but an indication of the fundamental context. The necessity of our minds to recognize the truth by means of evidence either infinitely displaces its recognizability or turns it into a circle in that one sentence is only true in relation to another, but this other sentence is only true in relation to the first . The whole of knowledge would then be as little "true" as the whole of matter is difficult; only in the relationship of the parts to one another are the properties that cannot be said of the whole without contradiction. "

Another representation can be found in Paul Natorp . Following these representations, Leonard Nelson tried to prove that epistemology was impossible at all. However, the constant expansion of the justification space is part of the essence of science: Infinite regresses are definitely associated with epistemological as well as scientific knowledge expansions, especially if they are directed into the future. Each time a new hypothesis is set up, the infinite regress is expanded and thus, to a certain extent, leads to an increase in knowledge; because a hypothesis that ultimately turns out to be false , untrue or initially not verifiable is a possible finding.

The reasoned Popper critical rationalism argues with the trilemma against the conventional or "classical" rational understanding, the right manufacturing strategy , which aims to ensure that any attempt to unquestionable valid justification of a statement is this deductive , inductive , causal , transcendental or any other Wisely managed, fails because a reliable justification must in turn be reliably justified. Critical rationalism chooses a path outside of dogmatism and relativism, which is shaped by reasoning, in that it adheres to the existence of an absolute truth (absolutism), but assumes the fallibility of man and therefore the presumptive nature of knowledge ( fallibilism ), arguments always only one negative effect awards ( negativism ) and the impossibility of justifying epistemology asserts (knowledge skepticism ).

Last but not least, the following essential motivation is behind the debate: Can and should there be some kind of dogma ? Linked to this is, of course, the question of a final authority or instance that is incessantly in the right , or, to a lesser extent , an instance that is sometimes wrong, but which should always be followed for other reasons.

criticism

Nicholas Rescher referred to the distinction between theoretical logic ("logica docens") and a life-world practice of logic ("logica utens"), which was already known from Thomas Aquinas (Trin. 2, 2, 1c; cf. in IV met. 4) referenced, which has already been taken up again by Charles S. Peirce (CP 2, 186). The justification of a formal logical system presupposes that a logical apparatus for arguing is already informally available. Formal logic is the elaborated form of practical reasoning that cannot do without a presystematic understanding of the logical rules. In this sense, formal logic is also circular in that it depicts the content of the logica utens. According to Rescher, it depends on the basis of argumentation, the common prior understanding of whether a circularity of the argumentation is considered harmful. Within the system of formal logic, however, it is also undisputed for Rescher that a circle in an argument (in a proof, an explanation or a definition) is flawed. With regard to the infinite regress, Rescher points out that one must differentiate between a physical infinite chain of causes and an argumentative thought process. The physical chain of causes is a perfectly conceivable process that is not wrong for logical reasons. Only in the area of cognitive regress do the limits of pure reason in Kant's sense exist. Here the question of pragmatism arises as to whether the reasoning is sufficient for the intended purposes. “Since we can not achieve totality , we have to calm down on sufficiency , and that is in the end more of a practical than a purely theoretical matter. The ultimate doctrine of the unrealisability of an infinite regress in cognitive things is that the primacy of practical over theoretical reason is an inescapable aspect of the human condition . "

Immanuel Kant argued in the Critique of Pure Reason in the chapter on transcendental dialectics that there is no way of proving something unconditional to be true, be it the immortality of the soul, the infinity of the world or the existence of God. Kant dealt with the problem of infinite recourse in the antinomy of pure reason on the question of the infinity of the world. A final justification is then not possible. What remained for Kant were the postulates of pure reason.

For Friedrich Kambartel the trilemma is valid, but presupposes that "justifications only take place within the world of sentences and words [...]." However, such a restriction is always inappropriate if the statements refer to actions and their possibilities and terms refer to. The Münchhausen Trilemma "overlooks the fact that justifications can lead out of the realm of linguistic expressions and, if they are to do justice to their demands, must also lead out into the pragmatic, lifeworld context in which linguistic and thus scientific actions only gain meaning" .

Some criticism of the Münchhausen trilemma comes from the so-called school of transcendental pragmatists , which refers to Karl-Otto Apel , who believes a final justification is possible. Apel referred to the fundamental objection to the skeptical argument that every doubt that is represented with a claim to absoluteness leads to a “performative self-contradiction”. Also Vittorio Hösle refers to the absolute claim of Miinchhausen trilemma. If its statement is true, then it is itself an apodictic statement . To clarify, Hösle reformulates the statement of the Münchhausen Trilemma as: "It is ultimately justified that there is no ultimate justification." For Hösle, this claim is contradictory in itself.

With a view to his discourse theory , Jürgen Habermas commented on the Münchhausen trilemma: “This trilemma is of course problematic. It only arises on the assumption of a semantic concept of justification that is based on the deductive relationship between sentences and is based solely on the concept of logical inference. This deductivist concept of justification is obviously too selective for the presentation of the pragmatic relationships between argumentative speech acts: induction and universalization principles are only introduced as rules of argument in order to bridge the logical gap in non-deductive relationships. One cannot therefore expect a deductive justification for these bridging principles themselves, as is permitted in the Münchhausen Trilemma alone. ”In a similar way, Micha H. Werner pointed out that the Munchausen Trilemma is based on a justification as analytical truth and only applies because an analytical justification cannot do without preconditions. "But this does not answer the question of whether there are other reasons methods in addition to the deduction from given premises." When such an alternative Werner calls the irrefutable evidence, which as in the metaphysics in Aristotle finds (1005 ff.).

Marcus Willaschek objects to the Münchhausen trilemma that a fundamentally wrong rationality is used here . In the spirit of pragmatism , Willaschek recommends checking the chain of questions of a reasoning whether the expected answer to the next question is at all suitable to provide relevant information for solving the actual problem. In a pragmatic sense, further questions are no longer useful if the question is no longer relevant for the actual problem. This justification for stopping the questioning is not to be equated with breaking off the procedure according to Albert, but follows a pragmatic rationality that is aimed at solving problems.

Rupert Riedl offers the following solution in evolutionary epistemology : Epistemology is not at a dead end with the trilemma. “ On the contrary, the doctrine of knowledge, seen from our point of view, is itself a section of the biological process of knowledge and it has foreseen the screw structure of our model, albeit in pieces. [...] The cycle of expectation and experience would be a circle if the expectation were not changed with every experience and vice versa. And no less the tracing of the learning structures must be broken off in each case where they no longer contain their subject: for example the system of consciousness in the nervous system, that of stimulus conduction in the transport of substances, that of inheritance in chemical reactions. The end of the methodical reduction must always lie at those points where the fulguration led to new system laws. "

literature

Hans Albert: Treatise on Critical Reason. Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1968.

Web links

The "Münchhausen Trilemma" or: Is it possible to pull yourself out of the swamp by your own head?

Individual evidence

↑ Friedrich Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil. Critical Study Edition , Volume 5, No. 21, p. 35 ( online ).
↑ “There is neither a problem solution nor an authority responsible for the solution of certain problems, which would necessarily have to be withdrawn from criticism from the outset. One can even assume that authorities for whom such criticism immunity is claimed are not infrequently awarded in this way because their problem solutions would have little chance of withstanding any other possible criticism. The more such a claim is emphasized, the more likely it is that the suspicion that this claim is based on the fear of uncovering errors , that is to say: the fear of the truth, stands. ”(Hans Albert: treatise on critical Reason. 1968).
↑ Sextus Empiricus : Outline of the pyrrhonic Skepticism I, p. 164 ff.
^ Diogenes Laertios IX, p. 88.
↑ Jakob Friedrich Fries: New or anthropological criticism of reason. 1807, 2nd edition, 3 vol. 1828–31, reprint Berlin 1955, volume 1, §§ 70–73.
↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money [1900], second edition 1907, reprint in the Georg Simmel Complete Edition, Volume 6, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, Chapter 1, Section III, pp. 93–121.
^ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, p. 95.
^ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, p. 100
↑ Paul Natorp: The logical foundations of the exact sciences. Leipzig / Berlin 1910, pp. 31–32.
↑ Karl R. Popper: The two basic problems of the theory of knowledge. Second, improved edition, Tübingen 1994, p. 106 ff.
↑ Nicholas Rescher: On circularity and regress in the rational proof of validity , in: Rationality, Science and Practice , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 23–42, here 25.
↑ Nicholas Rescher: On circularity and regress in the rational proof of validity , in: Rationality, Science and Practice , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 23–42, here 39.
↑ KrV B 364; AA III 342 ff
↑ Friedrich Kambartel: Comments on the question “What is and should philosophy?” , In: Hermann Lübbe (Ed.): Why Philosophy? Opinions of a working group , De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1978, pp. 17–34, here p. 19 f.
↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Debates in the testing of the transcendental-pragmatic approach. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 166-179.
↑ Vittorio Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. Third edition, Beck, Munich 1997, pp. 153-155.
↑ Jürgen Habermas: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1983, 90.
↑ Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, p. 18.
↑ Marcus Willaschek: Conditional trust. On the way to a pragmatic transformation of metaphysics . In: Martin Hartmann, Jasper Liptow, Marcus Willaschek (eds.): The Presence of Pragmatism, Suhrkamp, Berlin 2013, 97–122
↑ Riedl, R. 1988. Biology of Knowledge: The phylogenetic foundations of reason . Munich: dtv. P. 232. By “screw structure of our model” it is meant that the circular reasoning does not just turn in a circle on one level, but rather leads to a higher level with each “turn”.

[1] Friedrich Nietzsche: Beyond Good and Evil. Critical Study Edition , Volume 5, No. 21, p. 35 ( online ).

[2] “There is neither a problem solution nor an authority responsible for the solution of certain problems, which would necessarily have to be withdrawn from criticism from the outset. One can even assume that authorities for whom such criticism immunity is claimed are not infrequently awarded in this way because their problem solutions would have little chance of withstanding any other possible criticism. The more such a claim is emphasized, the more likely it is that the suspicion that this claim is based on the fear of uncovering errors , that is to say: the fear of the truth, stands. ”(Hans Albert: treatise on critical Reason. 1968).

[3] Sextus Empiricus : Outline of the pyrrhonic Skepticism I, p. 164 ff.

[4] Diogenes Laertios IX, p. 88.

[5] Jakob Friedrich Fries: New or anthropological criticism of reason. 1807, 2nd edition, 3 vol. 1828–31, reprint Berlin 1955, volume 1, §§ 70–73.

[6] Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money [1900], second edition 1907, reprint in the Georg Simmel Complete Edition, Volume 6, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, Chapter 1, Section III, pp. 93–121.

[7] Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, p. 95.

[8] Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Money, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1989, p. 100

[9] Paul Natorp: The logical foundations of the exact sciences. Leipzig / Berlin 1910, pp. 31–32.

[10] Karl R. Popper: The two basic problems of the theory of knowledge. Second, improved edition, Tübingen 1994, p. 106 ff.

[11] Nicholas Rescher: On circularity and regress in the rational proof of validity , in: Rationality, Science and Practice , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 23–42, here 25.

[12] Nicholas Rescher: On circularity and regress in the rational proof of validity , in: Rationality, Science and Practice , Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2002, 23–42, here 39.

[13] KrV B 364; AA III 342 ff

[14] Friedrich Kambartel: Comments on the question “What is and should philosophy?” , In: Hermann Lübbe (Ed.): Why Philosophy? Opinions of a working group , De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 1978, pp. 17–34, here p. 19 f.

[15] Karl-Otto Apel: Debates in the testing of the transcendental-pragmatic approach. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1998, pp. 166-179.

[16] Vittorio Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. Third edition, Beck, Munich 1997, pp. 153-155.

[17] Jürgen Habermas: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action , Suhrkamp, Frankfurt 1983, 90.

[18] Micha H. Werner: Discourse ethics as maxim ethics. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2003, p. 18.

[19] Marcus Willaschek: Conditional trust. On the way to a pragmatic transformation of metaphysics . In: Martin Hartmann, Jasper Liptow, Marcus Willaschek (eds.): The Presence of Pragmatism, Suhrkamp, Berlin 2013, 97–122

[20] Riedl, R. 1988. Biology of Knowledge: The phylogenetic foundations of reason . Munich: dtv. P. 232. By “screw structure of our model” it is meant that the circular reasoning does not just turn in a circle on one level, but rather leads to a higher level with each “turn”.