Vittorio Hösle

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Vittorio Hösle (born June 25, 1960 in Milan ) is a German philosopher . He currently teaches at the University of Notre Dame in Indiana (USA).

Vittorio Hösle, Vatican, 2020

Hösle is the author of numerous books, including on German idealism , the history of philosophy , discourse ethics and practical philosophy . In his philosophy he combines an “ objective idealism ” with a theory of intersubjectivity , an approach that tries to harmonize the traditional idealistic philosophy of Plato and Hegel with the transcendental pragmatics established by Karl-Otto Apel .

Hösle is a member of the advisory board of the “Committee for a Democratic UN”.

Life

Career

Vittorio Hösle is the son of the Romance studies professor Johannes Hösle and his wife Carla Hösle, b. Gronda. He grew up in Milan until he was six, where his father ran the Goethe Institute there . In 1966 he came to Germany, where - after skipping two classes and spending a year at a German school abroad in Barcelona - he passed the Abitur in Regensburg at the age of 17. Hösle studied philosophy, general history of science, classical philology and Indology in Regensburg, Tübingen, Bochum and Freiburg. In 1982 he received his doctorate with the thesis “Truth and History. Studies on the structure of the history of philosophy with a paradigmatic analysis of the development from Parmenides to Plato ” in Tübingen summa cum laude. There he completed his habilitation in 1986 with “Subjectivity and Intersubjectivity. Investigations into Hegel's System ”. In June 1986 he became a private lecturer in philosophy at the University of Tübingen . In the same year he became Visiting Assistant Professor and 1988 Associate Professor at the New School for Social Research in New York. From 1989 to 1990 he was a visiting professor at the University of Ulm , from 1990 to 1991 he worked at the German Department of the Ohio State University and was again a visiting professor from 1992 to 1993 in the Department of Environmental Sciences at the ETH Zurich . In 1993 Hösle accepted a chair at the University of Essen . In 1997 he became director of the Research Institute for Philosophy in Hanover . Since 1999 he has been working as a professor at the University of Notre Dame / USA. Because of the high speed of his career, Hösle was known as the "Boris Becker of philosophy" in the 80s.

In addition to the publication of his own writings, Hösle translated works by Raimundus Lullus (Logica Nova) and Giambattista Vico (Sciencia Nuova), to which he also wrote extensive introductions. He became known to a wider audience through the book Cafe der toten Philosophen , in which he published his correspondence with Nora, an 11 to 13 year old girl, on general philosophical questions. Hösle has held a number of guest lectureships in the USA, Russia, Norway, Brazil and South Korea, among others.

Social Commitment

In addition to his academic work, Hösle was and is socially committed in a variety of ways. Since 1986 he has written several expert reports for the Federal Chancellery , in which he a. is critical of the state of contemporary philosophy. In autumn 1987 he worked in Rome for the Italian state television station RAI on the framework of a project under the auspices of the Council of Europe to present philosophical questions for television. Since 1989 he has also been holding seminars for business executives. In 1990 he was a member of the Hoechst commission for the ethical evaluation of the “ abortion pill ” RU 486. Since 1990 he has been a member of the DAAD commission for southern Europe. From 1993 to 1996 he was a member of the “Economy-Ecology” discussion group of the Baden-Württemberg Ministry of the Environment.

Hösle is currently a member of the Advisory Board on the “Committee for a Democratic UN” and is also one of the supporters of the “ Global Marshall Plan Initiative”. In September 2013 he was appointed by Pope Francis to the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

philosophy

overview

Vittorio Hösle is committed to the philosophical position of objective idealism and regards his position as an approach in the succession of Plato and Hegel. Hösle sees the history of philosophy as a cyclical structure with repetitive phases from realism through empiricism, skepticism and a finite transcendental philosophy to objective idealism as the last and highest stage of such a cycle. Hösle takes modern philosophy into account by replacing the absolute spirit in Hegel with the category of intersubjectivity, which he took up in his philosophical position in dealing with Karl-Otto Apel's transcendental pragmatics.

Hösle is very critical of contemporary philosophy because, in his view, it contributes significantly to the loss of values ​​and thus an orientation in society by dispensing with a final justification. According to Hösle, the lack of orientation leads to a dominance of purely economic rationality, which also dominates natural sciences and technology. For Hösle, however, ethical rationality has priority. For him the moral law is something that cannot be denied. Moral values ​​have reality and are not just human constructs. So he opposes “therapeutic cloning”, which for him is a homicide, and calls for the protection of unborn life. In his fundamental work " Morals and Politics ", he tries to give an orientation based on historical and metaethical considerations, how politics can incorporate ethical principles and should react to the problems of developing countries and the threat posed by the ecological crisis. In doing so, he calls for more influence from the United Nations, but also for the participation of business, which has the operational competence to implement changes, as well as the religions, whose task he sees in the specification of stable norms.

Criticism of contemporary philosophy

In his works, Hösle repeatedly criticizes contemporary philosophy , which in his eyes "no longer does justice to the idea of ​​philosophy". “It is true that hardly any more time should have been spent on philosophy than ours,” but this “cannot hide the fact that the former queen of the sciences is of little importance in today's sciences, and that the result of philosophical reflection is poor overall that there is a painful discrepancy between effort and result ”. Philosophy has - “despite the ever larger space it occupies in a leisure and entertainment culture”, “to say less and less to the life centers of society”. Hösle identifies four major shortcomings in contemporary philosophy:

  1. She lacks "a great synthesis, even attempts at one":
    Hösle concedes that the actual claim of philosophy to “put your time in thought” can no longer be fulfilled by individuals “with the progress of science and the differentiation of knowledge”. But there are also no institutions that can do this. At the universities there is an "outpouring of teaching and bureaucratic work at the expense of research", a "destruction of the community between students and professors", a "absence of any real competition between the universities" and an obligation to "specialize at an early stage", which makes them “no longer appear as a refuge of the spirit”.
  2. It contributes less and less to "overcoming sectoral thinking":
    The increasing specialization in the individual sciences, from which philosophy is not excluded, has, in Hösle's view, led to a “sectoral thinking” that absolutizes one's own “only limited valid point of view and unfairly expands it to everything”. The philosophy of the present does not oppose this reductionism, rather it even favors it, since fewer and fewer philosophers are able or willing to “communicate across school boundaries”.
  3. She is silent "more and more about the most pressing individual questions of the time":
    Due to the lack of knowledge of the whole of our culture, current philosophy understands the "rapid changes that are taking place in the modern world [...] less and less". Hösle is of the opinion that this is essentially connected with a split into a "systematic philosophy without knowledge of the history of philosophy (especially in the analytical camp) and a philosophy history for which truth is reduced to historical correctness". On the one hand, “philosophy cannot be fruitfully pursued without knowledge of its history”, and on the other hand, limiting philosophy to its history paralyzes any “productive further development”. Philosophy in its current form has therefore "gambled away its right to exist in relation to the individual sciences".
  4. She is responsible for the destruction of "reason and belief in moral values ​​and duties":
    This fourth deficiency in contemporary philosophy is, from Hösle's point of view, the “most serious reproach” that can be made against it. Since the end of German idealism, Hösle has seen a "process of the self-destruction of value-rational reason" in progress. Modern philosophy has corroded the belief in the “moral determination” of human existence, which “penetrated the souls of most people like an infectious disease” and “has now become a principle of public opinion in almost all countries of the First World” be. Hösle states a general relativism that differs from that of earlier times in its “moral banality”. According to Hösles, the modern representatives of philosophy are unable to “part with the privileges associated with a philosophy professorship” and have “lost that mental and emotional tension [...] that characterized their ancestors”. This relativism leads to the fact that “all signposts are 'deconstructed'”, which could show ways out of the dangers of modernity. In the long run this destroys the “mental and emotional immune system” and “every ability to react appropriately to the challenges of the time”.

Examination of the transcendental pragmatics of Karl-Otto Apels

The answer of transcendental pragmatics to the crisis of reason

For Hösle, every real philosophy has to do with ultimate justification, and thus also with the unconditional, absolute and ultimate , which is "the philosophical problem par excellence" and "ensures that philosophy is irretrievably independent from all attempts at absorption by the individual sciences". Only the resulting synthetic-a priori propositions could, in the strict sense, justify a categorical imperative, and only this in turn would make it possible to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate goals and needs.

The transcendental pragmatics of Apels oppose the destruction of value rationality in modernity that goes hand in hand with the renunciation of ultimate justification. Hösle sums up Apel's final argument as follows:

“Anyone who argues always presupposes that he can arrive at true results in the discourse, i. H. that there is truth. It also presupposes that the interlocutor with whom he is speaking is in principle capable of knowing the truth; he has recognized him as a person in an empathic sense. The argumentation situation is inevitable for every argumentator; an attempt to reflect out of this situation with a claim to truth is hopelessly inconsistent ” .

Hösle agrees with Apel's analysis of the structure of last-justified sentences: a sentence p has to be regarded as last-justified if it

  • (a) not contested without pragmatic contradiction and
  • (b) cannot be proven without its validity being assumed.

For Hösle, condition (a) is the only way to avoid the infinite recourse to justification of direct proof, while (b) might initially be strange, but only represents the other side of the same connection and not a petitio principii .

Criticism and further development of the transcendental pragmatics

The primacy of a material ethic

The metaethical concern of Hösle is a moral realism, "for which the fundamental propositions of ethics are categorical imperatives independent of human inclinations and historical developments, recognizable a priori, which in a certain way also determine nature and history".

Although being does not justify the ought, for Hösle being and ought are not completely separate spheres. For him, the ought is, at least in part, the foundation of being. The demonstration of the “irreducible transcendence of the normative” in relation to everything factual must take place reflexively for Hösle, which is why he adheres to the insights of transcendental pragmatics.

With the proof of the ultimate justification, Hösle primarily wants to reject that metaethical theory for which there are no categorical, but always only hypothetical imperatives, because for him every normative or evaluative sentence is synthetic a priori (although not every synthetic-a priori sentence is normative or evaluative) . The negation of the existence of such sentences “necessarily leads to the destruction of ethics”.

In spite of the argumentative rigor with which for Hösle transcendental pragmatics adheres to unconditional ethical obligations, it nevertheless suppresses entire disciplines for him. Natural philosophy hardly plays a role and considerations on the philosophy of mathematics as well as reflections on aesthetics and the philosophy of religion are sought in vain, just as a distinction between natural law and moral norms within practical ethics would be ignored. For Hösle, however, this is essential, because material content must also and especially for an ultimately founded ethics be specified.

Dealing with the consensus theory

Hösle wants to expand the formal justification approach of transcendental pragmatics to include material content. To this end, he ties in with the truth theory of transcendental pragmatics. The theory that truth is what the consensus is recognized ( consensus theory ) is, for Hösle either tautological or false - at least for the theoretical discourse. It is only correct that the truth is recognized in a trivial sense by all rational beings. This equivalence can only be meaningfully maintained if it is recognized at the same time that the truth of a statement does not itself depend on the recognition, but presupposes truth criteria that go beyond the mere factual agreement. This also applies to consensus for Hösle, because “ a consensus is only rational if it follows certain criteria that precede the consensus - namely those of evidence and coherence [...]. Consensus is never, not even in the conflict situation sought by Apel, a criterion for truth ” .

Nevertheless, in Hösle's eyes, transcendental pragmatics has the right intuition to see intersubjectivity as the highest form of ethical obligation. For Hösle, however, this can no longer be demonstrated transcendentally, but only speculatively. The insight that intersubjectivity represents a higher category than subjectivity can lead to the overcoming of “theoreticism” that characterized the tradition of objective idealism, since for this the solitary knowledge of the absolute represented the highest point of ethics.

Philosophy of the ecological crisis

The ontological status of nature

For objective idealism, which for Hösle can be derived from the proof of ultimate justification itself, nature is the basis of all finite subjectivity and intersubjectivity, because it precedes it as such. But since nature is constituted by the “ideal sphere”, it cannot be anything alien to the spirit at the same time. For him it is a “creation of the absolute, in which one cannot intervene without reason. Nature is something that precedes all making and in this respect must be considered a parable of the unconditional ”. Despite the “principle” by the absolute, nature is not an end in itself for Hösle, although as the world of the real it is the gradual realization of ever higher forms of reflexivity, “from the principles of conservation of mechanics to the self-preservation of living things and the animal's self-awareness to the self-understanding spirit of philosophy ”. As a real structure, nature must also be tangible and that it must be for him also means that it is structured in such a way that it can produce beings from itself who can also experience it:

“We can assume a priori that the choice of natural laws (including the natural constants given in them) and of antecedent conditions is restricted by the conditions to create a cosmos that can be recognized by finite spirits. The existence of such spirits - at least at a later point in time in the universe - is therefore necessary, and ontologically, not just epistemologically ” .

Nature and moral law

For Hösle, the great discovery of modern times is subjectivity and its freedom. But the formal concept of freedom of modernity falls short for him, because freedom must, based on Kant, “consist in the right will”. Anyone who wants to do something illegitimate through the heteronomy of the blind satisfaction of innate or socially induced instincts is unfree because “his needs do not come from the essence of his personality”.

For this reason, the Kantian ethics must be continued in such a way that the “moral law”, which belongs to its own ideal world, “principles the empirical world”. In the development of nature, which culminates in the creation of the spirit, the ideal world is present, whereby this remains the supporting ground. And insofar as nature participates in this structure, it is itself something of value, whereby the value in the being that alone is able to pose the question of value is always superior to the purely organic value. According to Hösle, this “does not imply that anything that is only natural may be sacrificed to fulfill every human whim. In one way, for example, the result of a selection process lasting millions of years, so much sophistication, so much natural wisdom has congealed that its destruction can only be moral if it helps to preserve human life ” .

Ethical consequences and problems of the ecological crisis

According to Hösle, the ecological crisis is an existence-threatening crisis which for the first time involves the whole of being human. By plundering nature and exterminating species, man is robbing the world to a unique extent of numerous values ​​realized in animal and vegetable species.

The starting point for ethical reflection on this must be the person as a morally autonomous subject; For Hösle, however, that is not enough for a consistent justification of environmental ethics. The ecological crisis is more about an overall connection between spirit, nature and society through which the necessary moral regulations can be provided.

The modern shift in the concept of values

The superiority of humans over nature through its use for one's own purposes by means of modern technology proves to be dialectical in that although it is "liberated" from nature, the faster, more extensive and more intensive satisfaction of needs connected with it binds humans to it by generating new needs, namely the "meta-needs" for a certain way of "technically mediated" need satisfaction. Economic ideas have changed accordingly, since at the beginning of industrialization and in the course of the industrial revolution, economics were still understood as part of a comprehensive social science, whereas today it is characterized by an exclusively quantitative consideration of all results. Due to the postulate of the freedom of values ​​in the social sciences and their restriction to a purely descriptive representation of socially realized value systems, these too could no longer contribute to the solution of the normative question of which value system is reasonable and moral:

“As Marx saw very correctly, in capitalism the exchange value of a commodity gains the upper hand over the use value - but with this the special quality of the commodity loses its importance compared to the price that can be expressed quantitatively in money. By imposing the form of money on every commodity, every service, capitalism continues the Cartesian program of transforming qualities into quantities in the sphere of the economy ” .
The problem of crisis management in modern times

For Hösle, the real problem of ethics in the age of the ecological crisis does not lie primarily in the establishment of new norms, but in their implementation. In premodern societies, the existing problems were also familiar from everyday life. "The punch line of modern technology, however, is that it radically exceeds the imagination". It has expanded the possibilities and consequences of human activity in space and time in a way that is unique in world history. Innate moral instincts no longer help in dealing with this problem. One of the main causes of the ecological crisis is therefore that “firstly, we do not know what we are doing and, secondly, when we are informed of the consequences, we have no drive system that could change our actions”.

Metaphysics of the ecological crisis

Causes of the ecological crisis

Hösle sees the metaphysical reason for the ecological crisis as being based on the special structure of the human mind. If the mind were only opposed to nature, it could not possibly endanger itself by destroying it. On the other hand, if it were only part of nature, it could not endanger it to such an extent. “It is this structure, to turn against that as another, which is one's own basis, that promises us some insight into the essence of being”.

For Hösle, the ecological crisis begins with the modern notion of subjectivity. This led to the suppression of an absolute (God) and the autonomy of conscience as the last authority of legitimation from ethics, which resulted in the will to complete control of nature and an ideologization of the idea of ​​progress. But it is only the decoupling of modern science from the program of finding reason in nature and reality that produces the "absolutism" of technology:

“The specifics of modern technology since the 19th century, on the other hand, seem to me to be only explicable if one assumes that since that time the technical has shed its ties to holistic metaphysics as well as to ethics. This does not necessarily mean that the technology is used for immoral purposes; but with the decline of value rationality in the ethos of western culture as well as in the philosophies that dominate public discussion, the question 'What should I do?' more and more pushed back by the question 'What is feasible?' "
Metaphysical solution to the ecological crisis

A metaphysics of ecological crisis must neither make the spirit its own substance, nor raise nature or an alogical absolute to true being. All that remains for Hösle is that one “has to accept ideal being as its own sphere of being”, analogous to objective idealism. The logical and ideal world "principles" the real, that is, the spiritual and the natural. The relationship between nature and spirit is a dialectical: the spirit is part of nature, but it does not dissolve in nature, but in the cognition it also annuls the disparity of nature. At the same time he is part of nature and its negation.

The negation can happen in two ways, as recognition and thinking comprehension, as well as real annihilation, which the human being as an organism is capable of. The last form finds its completion in the ecological crisis. Only insofar as the spirit itself is partially nature can it also turn against nature, and insofar as man is an organic nature being, he even has to do this to a certain extent. The release of this tension must be achieved by an ontology and ethics that is convincing in the ecological crisis.

The "spiritlessness" of the modern world, which is particularly evident in the unrestrained satisfaction of needs, consists for Hösle in the lack of reference to the prerequisites of subjectivity, namely to the natural and social foundations as well as to "an ideal whole", the absolute. Only a philosophy that thinks life as the basis of the spirit and thinks this as the truth of life has a chance of interpreting the ecological crisis metaphysically. What is necessary is a sharp separation between spirit and modern subjectivity, which is the actual trigger of the crisis.

Political consequences of the ecological crisis

As a political consequence of the ecological crisis, Hösle is obliged to use scarce resources efficiently. Framework conditions would have to be created so that the pursuit of self-interest not only leads to more efficiency, but can also contribute to the common good. In this context, Hösle calls for the introduction of an ecological tax reform through which “self-interest and morality could coincide again”.

The main task of a contemporary economic philosophy would still be to develop a theory of value that goes beyond Marx and classical economics , especially in the use of nature in economic processes. The duty to preserve future generations has institutional consequences for Hösle in the philosophy of the state , including the promotion of a new morality by the “great politician” who must have morality and morality at the same time. An appropriate education of political and social elites also seems to make sense to Hösle.

Hösle also sees great changes in the legal philosophy , as the division of the legal world into things and persons, as a continuation of the Cartesian program of res extensa and res cogitans , must be corrected. In particular, it is about the adequate consideration of the ontological "realm of the organic", i. H. the dignity of the sentient animal.

Hösle also calls for a correction of the concept of property : For ecological reasons, property should no longer be defined in terms of possession (as, for example, with Hegel ), but rather in terms of use (as in Fichte ). So it should be excluded that the condition of the possibility of the survival of humanity may be destroyed by an individual or a collective. The owner of vital renewable resources (sea, tropical rainforest, etc.) should "not have the right to destroy them - he can only use their fruits, but must not touch the natural capital". For Hösle, however, this does not necessarily include the “transformation into public property”.

With the ecological crisis, the sovereignty of the individual states becomes questionable for Hösle, since these are precisely the expression of modern world domination by the subject. It is crucial to introduce procedural mechanisms that guarantee the protection of the interests of all those affected by individual decisions and actions.

Philosophy of history

Cycles of the history of philosophy according to Vittorio Hösle
phase Greek classical Hellenism middle Ages Modern times
Thesis
(realism)		 Eleates Aristotle Thomas Aquinas Metaphysics
(Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz)
Transition
(empiricism)		 Empedocles, Anaxagoras, atomists Stoa, kepos empiricism
Antithesis
(skepticism)		 sophistry skepticism Nominalism, mysticism subjective idealism, skepticism, enlightenment
Transition
(self-abolition of negativity)		 Socrates Philo of Larissa, Antiochus Criticism, finite transcendental philosophy
Synthesis
(objective idealism)		 Plato Neoplatonism Nicolaus Cusanus absolute idealism

After an analysis of the history of philosophy, in particular the cycle concept of Friedrich Ast and Franz Brentano and the Dilthey typology of worldview, Vittorio Hösle developed his own cyclical scheme of the history of philosophy , expanding the dialectical structure of the story by two intermediate stages, each in the transition from Develop thesis (empiricism) and antithesis (skepticism) towards synthesis (objective idealism). This is on the one hand the positivistic-empirical relativism shaped by the idea of ​​usefulness and on the other hand the position of a transcendental philosophy of this world, which rejects the recognizability of objective ideas ( I know that I don't know ) and only recognizes transcendence as "regulatory ideas" (Kant). With this "modification of Hegel's philosophy of history, enriched by the idea of ​​cycles", he wants to combine the idea of ​​dialectical development with a linear notion of progress, resulting in a historical development in the form of a spiral movement. In classifying the historical epochs, Hösle essentially follows Hegel's classification into the Greek Classical period as a starting point, followed by the Hellenistic-Roman times, the Middle Ages and the modern age, which he regards as an epoch completed by Hegel, as well as the modern age. Hösle does not give an explicit structure for the last period. The problem with the Hösles model is that it lacks a reflexive justification for its model, that it neglects individual phases of the history of philosophy such as late antiquity and the Renaissance, and that it is not open to the simultaneity of antithetical positions, i.e. a thetic philosopher within an antithetical epoch.

Criticism of Hösle's philosophy

This article or the following section is not adequately provided with supporting documents ( e.g. individual evidence ). Information without sufficient evidence could be removed soon. Please help Wikipedia by researching the information and including good evidence.

From the point of view of critical rationalism and postmodernism , Hösle's adherence to the idea of ​​an ultimate justification, his option for the possibility, even necessity, of a systematic philosophy based on a rational metaphysics appears to be open to attack.

The belief in necessary truths can neither be logically justified ( Münchhausen Trilemma ), nor can Hösle's idea of ​​a philosophical unity of knowledge in view of the conditions of modernity be realized. So far, his metaphysics or theory of principles, which based on the ultimate justification argument, would have to develop a theory of the absolute, as well as the well-founded ethics of values ​​he called for, had not been redeemed.

According to the opposing view, the contours of such a theory of principles are at least hinted at in dealing with Plato ( truth and history ) and with Hegel's objective idealism, even if its systematic overall presentation is missing.

Works

Web links

Commons : Vittorio Hösle  - Collection of images, videos and audio files
Texts
Audios and videos

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ See Committee for a Democratic UN
  2. ↑ John Monczunski: The Amazing World of Vittorio Hösle , Notre Dame Magazine (Spring 2007), p. 58a.
  3. ^ Vatican: German philosopher appointed to the papal academy . Vatican Radio website. Retrieved September 14, 2013.
  4. ↑ See e.g. B. Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. Pp. 13-38.
  5. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 10.
  6. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 125.
  7. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 274.
  8. ↑ Hösle, Practical Philosophy in the Modern World , p. 23.
  9. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 199f.
  10. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 226.
  11. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 227.
  12. ↑ Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. P. 228.
  13. ↑ Hösle, Philosophy of Ecological Crisis , p. 73.
  14. ↑ Hösle, Philosophy of Ecological Crisis , p. 63.
  15. ↑ Hösle, Philosophy of the Ecological Crisis , p. 87.
  16. ↑ Hösle, Philosophy of Ecological Crisis , p. 82 f.
  17. ↑ Hösle: Being and subjectivity. On the metaphysics of the ecological crisis. In: Prima Philosophia 4/1991, pp. 519-541. Cuxhaven: Junhans (republished in: Practical Philosophy in the Modern World , pp. 166–198), p. 520.
  18. ↑ Hösle: Practical Philosophy in the Modern World. P. 100.
  19. ↑ Hösle: Being and subjectivity. P. 534.
  20. ↑ On the following: Hösle, Philosophy of Ecological Crisis , pp. 121–146.
  21. ↑ Vittorio Hösle: Truth and History. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 1986; the contents of the table correspond to the chapter structure of parts II and III of the book; a brief explanation can be found in: Vittorio Hösle: The crisis of the present and the responsibility of philosophy. Beck, Munich, 3rd ed. 1997, pp. 38-58
  22. ↑ Vittorio Hösle: Truth and History. Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart 1986, p. 128
  23. ↑ Fernando Suárez Müller: Skepticism and History: The Work of Michel Foucault in the Light of Absolute Idealism. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2004, pp. 150–151
personal data
SURNAME Hösle, Vittorio
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH June 25, 1960
PLACE OF BIRTH Milan