Transcendental philosophy

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The term transcendental philosophy encompasses philosophical systems and approaches that describe the basic structures of being not through an ontology (theory of beings), but rather in the context of the emergence and substantiation of knowledge about being. Since transcendental approaches examine the conditions of knowledge that lie before every experience ( a priori ) in the subject , metaphysics, as a universal basic theory , is preceded by a critique of knowledge . The transcendental philosophy is thus also a critique of conventional metaphysics .

Immanuel Kant first associated the transcendental philosophy with the claim to have created a completely new basis for philosophy. In the period that followed, attempts were repeatedly made to pursue questions of transcendental philosophy in a new way. These include German idealism , neo-Kantianism and phenomenology and, more recently, methodical constructivism and various individual designs in the present. In analytical philosophy the question has been taken up again since Strawson with the discussion of transcendental arguments .

Modern topics of transcendental philosophy are the ultimate justification , the body-soul problem in the philosophy of spirit , the intersubjective relationship to the other and the z. Partly related issues of recognition .

Origin of the designation

The term “transcendental philosophy” was largely coined by Kant in his epistemological main work, the Critique of Pure Reason (1781 / ²1787). For the first time in the history of philosophy, Kant separated the meaning of the terms “ transcendent ” and “ transcendental ”. He related both concepts to the possibility of knowledge. As a science of the general and necessary conditions of knowledge, Kant defines transcendental philosophy as a system of concepts that deals with the possibility of recognizing objects or facts "a priori" (Immanuel Kant: AA III, 43). On the other hand, objects or facts are transcendent that are not the object of possible knowledge.

Critique of Pure Reason

Kant's conception

Historically, Kant's project of a transcendental philosophy is to be understood as a methodological reflection on the cognitive faculties of rational beings (Immanuel Kant: AA XVIII, 20) and as a response to the dispute between empiricism and rationalism . Empiricists like John Locke believed that only sensory perception provides knowledge; without this, the mind is a blank sheet of paper, a tabula rasa . The rationalists in the tradition of Descartes and Leibniz , in which Kant also stood, assumed, on the other hand, that only the understanding is capable of understanding things without deception. The impermanent dark sensations are only clearly ordered through the mind.

In the Critique of Pure Reason , which contradicted both the empiricists and the rationalists, Kant developed an approach with which, above all, he also rejects the skeptical empiricism of David Hume . Kant's solution is a both-and-also. For every non- analytical knowledge man needs the concepts which he forms in the mind as well as the sensory perception . Sensuality and understanding are the two only, equal and interdependent sources of knowledge. "Thoughts without content are empty, views without concepts are blind." ( Immanuel Kant: AA III, 75 )

In doing so, Kant did not ask how objects are correctly recognized, but above all about the prerequisites of knowledge that lie in the subject, in his words: about the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. It is not about the physiological, psychological or logical prerequisites of knowledge, but about the structural conditions of the knowledge process. To this end, Kant developed the theory that man has the pure forms of perception of space and time and uses categories to combine the appearances of objects into one knowledge. For the appropriation of the inner and outer world, man needs basic structures that lie within himself as a knowing subject . For Kant, however, sensual perception was a prerequisite for intuitions to receive a content . Kant calls the knowledge of the conditions of knowledge itself, which lie before all experience, transcendental (Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 373). It is decisive for the Kantian epistemology that humans do not perceive the reality of the objects directly, but rather shape the appearances of the objects in their consciousness . The appearance is real, while the world or its individual objects remain unknowable as a thing in themselves .

The area of ​​possible knowledge is thus limited to the processing of experience and the structures of this processing: The pure visual forms of space and time as well as the categories determine which objects and facts can be recognized and in what way. Since all knowledge is subject to these conditions, it does not grasp the “ thing in itself considered in itself”. By this Kant means what remains of the object if the subjective part of the knowledge that we have about it is disregarded. For Kant, this thing in itself, also known as the noumenon, is, however, unknowable; we only have it as a limiting concept of our cognitive abilities. The object of (objective) knowledge is only the sensually perceptible world of appearances ( phenomena ).

The concepts of the understanding are functions of the human faculty of knowledge. They give the perception the formal structure and thus only enable its recognizability by creating the actual object of knowledge. Provisions such as “necessity and strict generality” ( Immanuel Kant: AA III, 29 ) arise from the categories of the understanding, not the perception. The connection of the thought-determinations is the judgment . This synthetic achievement is provided by self-confidence . "'I am an object of intuition and thought to myself' is a synthetic a priori sentence and the principle of transcendental philosophy ." ( Immanuel Kant: Lectures on Metaphysics )

A thought process takes place in consciousness in which reason has itself as its object. What appears presupposes a thinking subject. Man not only thinks of causality, but also knows that he has this thought. In reflection he becomes his own mental object. This self-reference of reason in the cognitive process was formulated by Kant as the highest principle of all synthetic judgments : "[T] he conditions of the possibility of experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of objects of experience and therefore have objective validity in a synthetic a priori judgment." ( Immanuel Kant: AA III, 145 )

The “transcendental ego” as a purely logical formal determination of the identity of reason, without which a thought process could not be imagined for him, is what Kant called the synthetic unity of transcendental apperception . This pure I is a mere thought of the object-constituting consciousness, i.e. before every experience and not an element of things in themselves and not an object of perception. As the highest principle of thinking, it is the starting point of all knowledge, always present and not deducible from another conception and thus the highest point of transcendental philosophy (Immanuel Kant: AA III, 109).

The special interest in making statements about transcendent objects like God , about infinity or about human freedom , which Kant subordinates to reason, can therefore only be satisfied by speculation or belief, not by knowledge. Concepts that refer to something transcendent are needed as “regulative ideas ” in order to orientate oneself practically and theoretically in the world; but they have no objective content. Kant was not interested in a fundamental rejection of metaphysics. On the contrary, he was of the opinion that man has a striving to expand his knowledge, which belongs to his being (Immanuel Kant: AA IV, 9).

The method of transcendental philosophy, however, helps him to recognize more clearly where he is entering the realm of speculation. A metaphysics that violates the conditions of the possibility of knowledge cannot be a valid metaphysics. Kant himself tried to put into practice his methodological principle from pure reason in the field of natural sciences in the metaphysical foundations of natural science and in the field of ethics with the metaphysics of morals .

Critical reception

Various recipients were of the opinion that the application of Kant's critical method to his own philosophy showed that some of the theses presented there did not do justice to Kant's own standards:

  • With his metacriticism on the Critique of Pure Reason of 1799 and the Kalligone (1800), Herder turned against the transcendental philosophy of Kant: Reason itself is dependent on experience, must first be acquired and therefore cannot be postulated before all experience. In this sense, Hamann argued that Kant did not take into account that language and history were constitutive for human knowledge before reason.
  • At the center of the criticism of the Kantian epistemology is the concept of things in themselves. Already Jacobi - like Fichte and others later - pointed out that the process of “affecting” the senses in Kant, contrary to Kant's express assertion, describes a process of cause and effect and thus contradicts the concept of causality as a pure understanding concept. In this respect, the Critique of Pure Reason does not offer a solution to the conflict between realism and idealism .
  • Another approach to criticism from the beginning was Kant's conception of space and time.
  • A point of criticism that is still frequently expressed today is directed against the judgment table, for which there is no sufficient justification in the Critique of Pure Reason. Kant here systematically summarized forms of judgment of traditional logic in an affirmative manner, without justifying their generality and necessity. Schopenhauer reduced the categories to causality. In a critical analysis, the logician Peirce came up with a number of three basic categories. Cassirer spoke of non-rigid functions of the mind.
  • For Dilthey , life as such was the starting point for all justification. “Life itself, the vitality behind which I cannot go back, contains connections, in which everything experiencing and thinking is then made explicit. And here lies the point that is decisive for the whole possibility of knowing. "
  • By Leonard Nelson , the argument comes that an epistemology become entangled in a paradox justification, inasmuch as they also have their own truth itself must justify if it is to meet scientific standards.
  • Already Fries and Peirce had noted that theoretical statements based on experience, always fallible are. Kant's statements about (three-dimensional) space, about (linear) time, about Euclidean geometry , about the closure of logic or about Newton's physical laws , which he considered to be universal laws of nature, have proven to be no longer tenable due to the further development of the natural sciences. Popper subsequently considered synthetic judgments a priori possible, but took the view that these could not be made with necessity. A more radical position comes from Quine , who in his essay " Two Dogmas of Empiricism " denied that synthetic judgments are a priori at all possible and thus fundamentally rejected a transcendental philosophy.

Even though Kant himself claimed in the Critique of Pure Reason that he had provided sufficient grounds for an apodictic validity of his theses, he had emphasized in the introduction that his explanations were methodical with regard to the question of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge should be understood as a hypothesis . He spoke of an "experiment of pure reason" ( Immanuel Kant: AA III, 14 ). In this respect, his fundamental question about the limits of knowledge is not canceled by the criticism of individual solution concepts, but has an effect right up to contemporary philosophy.

Transcendental Philosophy in German Idealism

In Kant's epistemological method, the subject reflexively becomes the object of one's own observation. With this shift in emphasis, Kant became the source of ideas for German idealism . The systems of Fichte and Schelling , however, reject the fundamental unrecognizability of the "thing in itself" that Kant had asserted. They start from a concept of the transcendental ego that eliminates the difference between the two "tribes of knowledge" of Kant, because Fichte and Schelling posited the "I" as an absolute one in which the inner world and the outer world become one. Transcendental philosophy is now viewed from the perspective of the pure subject.

"Just as natural science produces idealism out of realism by spiritualizing the laws of nature into laws of intelligence, or adding the formal to the material, so transcendental philosophy brings realism out of idealism by materializing the laws of intelligence into laws of nature , or to add the material to the formal. "

- Schelling : system of transcendental idealism

The main difference between the two approaches lies in the fact that Schelling assumed a reality of nature independent of consciousness, in which the ego is absorbed ( objective idealism ), while, according to Fichte, the absolute is identical with the self-positing subject ( subjective idealism ). Schelling characterized this as follows:

“Fichte could keep the point of view of reflection with idealism, but I would have taken the point of view of production with the principle of idealism: in order to express this opposition in the most understandable way, idealism would have to assert in the subjective meaning that the I is Everything that is reversed in the objective meaning: Everything is = I, "

- Schelling : Presentation of my system

In Fichte's work, the transcendental question concentrated on the " act of deed " of a completely autonomous and self-sufficient subject. The idealist does not seek the basis of experience in dogmatic empiricism , but in the “I in itself”, which is something real in consciousness. The basis of freedom lies in the self-determination of the thinker. Transcendental freedom is the ability to be the first independent cause.

“That whose being (essence) consists merely in the fact that it posits itself as being is the I, as absolute subject. It is as it is; and as it is, it sits down; and the ego is therefore absolutely and necessary for the ego. What is not for itself is not an I ... "

- Spruce : the basis of science

The self-positing of the ego is without a prerequisite. With the intellectual intuition, the essence of the ego is grasped. This I is not something and therefore cannot have a predicate. In contrast to Kant, Fichte tied the validity of the objective (appearing) world to intersubjectivity. For Fichte, reality is "only brought about by the imagination". Although this reality is independent of consciousness, it is transcendental because the knowing reason knows that this independent “is a product of its own thinking power”.

Hegel welcomed the basic idea of ​​self-reflecting reason, elaborated by Kant and Fichte, as a basic condition of experience, but referred to its concrete form as the philosophy of consciousness and not of the mind , i.e. psychologism . He saw the difference between Fichte and Schelling in the principle of identity and in the concept of system:

“It has been shown as the basic character of Fichte's principle that subject = object emerges from this identity and is unable to restore itself to it because the difference has been placed in the causal relationship. The principle of identity does not become the principle of the system; as soon as the system begins to form, the identity is given up. The system itself is a consistent, sensible set of finiteness, which the original identity cannot bring together in the focus of totality, for absolute self-perception. [...] The principle of identity is the principle of the whole Schelling system; Philosophy and system coincide; the identity is not lost in the parts, much less in the result. "

- Hegel : Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's systems

Revival in Neo-Kantianism

After a phase of psychologizing epistemology, which reached from Fries to Eduard von Hartmann , Neo-Kantianism brought the transcendental question back into focus, whereby the rigid concepts of Kant such as the thing in itself and the categories were partially rejected or modified. So Friedrich Albert Lange started from different worldviews such as the scientific, the poetic or the religious, which stand side by side on an equal footing. In the Marburg School, the compatibility of philosophy and modern science was at the fore at the end of the 19th century. For Hermann Cohen , transcendental philosophy was "the possibility of a knowledge which has the value of a priori or scientific validity." For Cohen , transcendental philosophy becomes a fundamental reflection on the methods of the sciences that ensure the unity of knowledge. Above all, Paul Natorp worked on the functional concept, which forms the starting point for general laws with which the infinite individual knowledge can be brought into order. Even with him there is already the opinion that there is no final justification for statements. Heinrich Rickert succinctly described the transcendental philosophy as the "science of the object of knowledge and of the knowledge of the object." Above all, he drew attention to the methodological differences between the natural sciences and the humanities. In his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms Ernst Cassirer emphasized that the basic forms of intellectual production include not only knowledge, but also linguistic thinking, mythical-religious thinking and also artistic perception. The broadening of the perspective makes it possible "to transform the passive world of mere impressions, in which the mind initially seems trapped, into a world of pure spiritual expression."

The transcendental I in Husserl

Edmund Husserl's concern was to grasp the logical constitution of general concepts through analysis of consciousness. The objects of investigation are therefore not objects or facts, but the awareness of them. The method he introduced is the epoché , in which all validity claims are excluded and the essential features of the object of investigation are worked out through variations of the observation. Important moments are the intentionality of consciousness and the evidence as a measure of truth. Husserl's phenomenology was directed against psychologism (“to the things themselves”) and initially stood at a distance from Kant. However, the more he dealt with the question of the self, the closer he came to Kant's question. From around 1907 onwards, one speaks of a “transcendental turning point” in Husserl. The transcendental turning point was not carried out by a substantial part of his students; in particular the “Göttingen Circle” with Pfänder , Geiger , Conrad-Martius , von Hildebrand and Scheler continued to understand phenomenology as an analysis of the essence of the ontological prerequisites of all intellectual acts. In the end, Husserl described the transcendental phenomenology as the "final form of the transcendental philosophy". Husserl spoke of a correlative relationship between knowing consciousness and an objectively worldly object that is analyzed in a philosophical-meditating situation.

“I myself use the word 'transcendental' in the broadest sense for the original motif, which through Descartes is the most meaningful in all modern philosophies and in all of them, so to speak, comes to oneself, the real and pure task form and systematic effect. It is the inquiry into the ultimate source of all cognitive formations, the knower's reflection on himself, and his knowing life, in which all scientific structures applicable to him occur purposefully, are kept as acquisitions and have become and are freely available. Having a radical effect, it is the motif of a universal philosophy founded purely from this source, i.e. ultimately founded. This source has the title I-MYSELF with my entire real and possible life of knowledge, ultimately my concrete life in general. The whole transcendental problem revolves around THIS of my I - the 'ego' - to what is initially set for it as a matter of course: my SOUL and then again around the relationship of this I and my conscious life to the WORLD, of which I am conscious and whose true being I am recognize in my own cognitive structures. "

- Husserl : Crisis of European Sciences

Husserl claimed universal validity for phenomenology, even if the achievement of universally valid statements is “an infinite goal”. The place of ultimate justification is the transcendental I, which one wins through reflection. The ego is the ultimate authority for every form of meaning. Its existence is beyond doubt (apodictically evident ). The contents of consciousness, however, flow in time and their evidence can only be adequate. The task of phenomenology is not to determine the existence, but rather the content of being of this ego in a reflexive analysis. This act is a form of “transcendental self-awareness”. The transcendental self-criticism is the first critique of knowledge itself aimed at the ultimate justification.

"In such research, the pre-scientific and scientifically cognitive subjectivity becomes thematic, that is, itself to experienced, considered, and it becomes the field of a cognitive activity aimed at true being, true judgments, theories about it, of the scientific persons active in this epistemological activity."

- Husserl : First Philosophy

“The transcendental I is pure in itself; but it carries out a self-objectivation in itself, gives itself the sense shape 'human soul' and 'objective reality'. "Husserl emphasized the" identity of the transcendental I and the empirical I ", but at the same time pointed to the difference that unites has a paradoxical character.

“The difference between empirical and transcendental subjectivity remains inevitable, and yet its identity is also inevitable, but also incomprehensible. As a transcendental I myself, I 'constitute' the world and at the same time, as a soul, I am a human I in the world. The understanding that prescribes its law for the world is my transcendental understanding, and this forms me according to these laws, it which is my, the philosopher's, mental faculty. The self-positing I, of which Fichte speaks, can it be something other than Fichte? "

- Husserl : Crisis of European Sciences

For Husserl, the transcendental I, which carries out the epoch and the reflection, becomes the absolute foundation for everything that lies outside of himself. Like Fichte, Husserl countered the danger of idealistic subjectivism through the concept of intersubjectivity.

"But what about other ego's that are not just a mere idea and imagination in me, synthetic units of possible testing in me, but also others?"

- Husserl : Cartesian meditations

Husserl's answer is: If the transcendental ego claims for itself that it is constitutive for all knowledge, then every other transcendental ego will also make this claim. Every transcendental ego has its own “primordinal sphere”, which in a mutual relationship becomes a community of experience. The pure self can only be understood as a person from a foreign perspective. Self-objectification is not possible without the other.

The difference between Husserl and Kant lies primarily in the method, in the “purely immanent theory of the essence of intentionality”, which was previously unknown to Kant and his successors. In the course of his work, Husserl described various paths to a transcendental self-awareness.

  • The Cartesian way is the skeptical bracketing of all transcendental opinions of experience. This path ultimately leads to solipsism .
  • The way through psychology is the investigation of the purely psychic. This kind of world access leaves implications that still have to be resolved in a transcendental reduction. This path leads into the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, which as such is a “transcendental idealism”.
  • The third path finally leads to the transcendental ontology. In this way, the world of life and the open-mindedness of people become an issue. Man is not an empty ego, but a possibility of encountering the world. In the transcendental perspective, he reflects on his own way of knowing and attitudes, his “mundane being” from his attitudes to the world.

Transcendental arguments

The discussion about transcendental arguments goes back to Peter Strawson . He had dealt intensively with Kant from the approach of analytical philosophy and in his fundamental work “Individuals” (1959), in which he dealt with the universals question , among other things , he put forward the thesis that there are terms that are considered necessary for Knowledge can be substantiated. It is the question of the basic facts and the way in which people think about the world. Strawson cited as an example the distinction between one's own consciousness and that of others. This presupposes the ability to make this distinction as well as criteria in order to be able to make this distinction at all. The second example is the term single thing. What are the implications and presuppositions of the thought that material things are different from others and are spatially related to each other in different ways at different times? Without the existence of a space-time world, man could not talk about individual things. Kant had used a similar argument to refute idealism and formulated it as a doctrine:

"The mere, but empirically determined, awareness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside of me"

- Immanuel Kant: AA III, 191

In the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories in the 2nd edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant argued roughly as follows: There are judgments about the temporal order of my consciousness. These judgments are only possible with the experience of a permanent substance other than myself. Hence there is a permanent substance. Kant's example is water and ice (frozen water). The concept of substance cannot be derived from observations, but the concept cannot be filled with content without observation. Strawson examined this argument in detail in a commentary (The Bounds of Sense, 1966) and formulated basic requirements for transcendental arguments. From the analytical perspective, he rejected Kant's doctrine of the categories and the pure forms of perception of space and time as well as the dualism of sensuality and understanding as psychologism, but particularly welcomed the approach first found in Kant, "the general structure of ideas and Principles ”.

Transcendental arguments are aimed at refuting skepticism and establishing the existence of unconscious or mind-independent facts. They claim that there are conditions of cognitive ability or knowledge, which are general and necessary conditions for one to speak of certain knowledge. They are often presented in the logical form of modus ponens .

Transcendental arguments
general form Example after Strawson
(1) p → q When talking about p, one assumes q When talking about individual things, one assumes an outside world
(2) p because q is a necessary condition for a statement about p, q is the case One can only talk about individual things because there is an outside world
(3) q q is the case So there is an outside world

In order for the present schema to have the characteristics of a transcendental argument, (1) the major proposition must not only be synthetic a priori, but also substantial and informative, and (2) the minor proposition as a certain known fact must be an analytically true proposition. Only then is it true that the conclusion (3) is also synthetic a priori, because the truth value of the major premise is transferred to the conclusion . The discussion of transcendental arguments, in addition to the content of the respective theses, focuses on the question of whether conclusions of this kind are at all suitable for giving a final justification.

Well-known examples of transcendental arguments come from Hilary Putnam with an externalist argument against the brain-in-the-tank thesis of outside world skepticism, Donald Davidson , who with the thesis of the general translatability of all languages ​​put forward an interpretative theoretical argument against the possibility of a fundamental misunderstanding, or John Searle who tried to establish the existence of the outside world and who considered external realism not to be "a thesis or hypothesis, but rather the condition for the establishment of certain types of theses and hypotheses". He described the outside world as a “space of possibilities” that is “independent of all representation”. The figure of performative contradictions (see: Retorsion ) is also counted among the transcendental arguments.

Barry Stroud expressed one decisive criticism of the formal structure :

“Kant demands that a transcendental argument should answer the question of 'justification' and thereby prove the 'objective validity' of certain concepts. I understood this to mean that the term 'X' has objective validity only if there is Xe, and that proving the objective validity of the term is equivalent to proving the actual existence of X's. Kant believed that he could infer the falseness of 'problematic idealism' from the necessary conditions of thought and experience and in this way infer the actual existence of the external world of material objects, and not just the fact that we believe there is one such a world, or that it exists, for all we can say. The examination of a few more recent attempts to argue in an analogous way gives rise to the assumption that - if one does not take a verification principle as a basis, with the help of which every further indirect argument automatically becomes superfluous - at the most it is proven by an investigation of the necessary conditions for language that we have to believe, for example, that there are material objects or consciousness in others (other minds) in order to even be able to speak with meaning. "

- Barry Stroud : Transcendental Arguments

For Stroud, transcendental arguments always contain the background assumption of transcendental idealism. The “it has to be like this” involves a hidden change from the level of statements to the assumption of a fact. Without the assumption of some external premise (that there is an outside world), there is no logical reason to accept the argument. Because even if an outside world appears intuitively necessary for talking about individual things, there is no evidence that it does not behave otherwise. Transcendental arguments can therefore only be valid if the premises are verified ( verificationism ). The fact that a person has to exist when you talk about doing something does not mean that he actually exists. The requirement of existence remains on the linguistic level. In a later work, Strawson admitted that Stroud's criticism was justified. Similar to Stroud, Stephan Körner argued that transcendental arguments provide no evidence of necessity. It is still conceivable, if not necessarily imaginable, that completely different cognitive principles (conceptual schemes) apply in another world unknown to humans.

As an alternative, Stroud suggested using "moderate" or "humble" transcendental arguments. This proposal corresponds to an epistemological idealism. If one cannot prove the existence of an outside world, then one can at least argue that one must be convinced that one has the ability to interpret (an interpretive framework) to speak about an outside world. It is then no longer about statements about how the world is, but about how people experience the world. In order to be able to talk about individual things, he has to assume that individual things continue to exist even if he does not see them. The prerequisite for such a belief (the existence of individual things) to be held to be true is its indispensability. The only thing that matters is that there are no arguments against these beliefs, not whether they are actually wrong.

Further approaches

Transcendental Pragmatics

The position of transcendental pragmatics conceived by Karl-Otto Apel and Wolfgang Kuhlmann in discussion with representatives of critical rationalism , which was further developed in particular in the discussion with Hans Albert, claims a final justification . In place of the transcendental self-confidence, this “transformation of transcendental philosophy” is replaced by the concept of an “a priori of the communication community”, which Apel developed from the pragmatic maxim of Peirce in connection with the idea of language games by Wittgenstein and the conception of speech acts by John Searle . Apel and Kuhlmann admit that attempts to refute skeptical arguments fail because of the Münchhausen trilemma . Nevertheless, they consider an ultimate justification to be possible against critical rationalism. Because even the skeptic is already in an argument that follows certain presuppositions and constitutive rules as a language game . Even a skeptic without self-contradiction cannot deny this general practice.

"If I cannot deny something without actual self-contradiction and at the same time cannot justify something deductively without a formal-logical petitio principii , then it belongs to the transcendental pragmatic prerequisites of argumentation that must be recognized if the language game of argumentation is to keep its meaning."

- Apel : problem of ultimate justification

Jürgen Habermas' universal pragmatics, like Apel, ties in with pragmatic attempts at solving the problem of transcendental arguments in Jaakko Hintikka or Henry L. Ruf. Habermas, however, distances himself from Apels final justification claim.

“Certainly, the intuitive rule-based knowledge that subjects capable of speaking and acting must use in order to be able to participate in argumentation at all is in a way not fallible - but our reconstruction of this pre-theoretical knowledge and the universality that we associate with it. The certainty with which we practice our knowledge of rules does not carry over to the truth of reconstruction proposals for hypothetical general presuppositions; because we cannot put these up for discussion in any other way than, for example, a logician or a linguist his theoretical descriptions. "

- Habermas : Discourse Ethics

Habermas speaks of a detranscendentalization of the argument when he restricts himself for his ideal discourse to requirements that should de facto apply so that certain practices are possible. This includes the pragmatic assumption of a common, objective world and the rationality of responsible actors in the context of communicative action .

Transcendental philosophers in contemporary philosophy

In the second half of the 20th century, a number of individual positions were developed that are closely linked to the Kantian transcendental philosophy, partly to German idealism, and each work out and emphasize particular aspects or perspectives.

By asking about the conditions for the possibility of a belief in revelation, Joseph Maréchal attempted a transcendental justification of Neuthomism , which became effective in the positions of Johannes Baptist Lotz , Emerich Coreth and Karl Rahner , among others .

Wolfgang Cramer emphasized "experience" as the basic form of all subjectivity, which is formed reflexively through the direct reference and, in a second stage, through the reference to this reference and thus becomes productive. Cramer developed an ontology of subjectivity and tried to approach the idea of ​​“I think” by “thinking away from thinking”.

Based on the correlation of subject, object, act (noesis) and content (noema), Hans Wagner developed a concept for reflection in which object-oriented thinking, reflective thinking and the question of the validity of theories are placed in a uniform relationship.

Hermann Krings placed the concept of a “transcendental act” at the center of his considerations, which in reflection creates on the one hand a progression to fullness of content and on the other hand a return to itself. Krings dispensed with a final justification and looked in the categories of thought concepts that are formed from experience and are updated in the transcendental act in a new context. The absence of boundaries in history and in science does not limit the emergence of new categories.

Odo Marquard assessed the transcendental philosophy of Kant, Fichte and Schelling as a refusal to “accept the given as an authority.” He saw a close connection between the transcendental philosophy and psychoanalysis . The impotence of reason shown by Kant leads to the explanation of man from the instinctual reason. Psychoanalysis “is therefore not an 'opposition', but a 'condition' of transcendental philosophy.” Marquard's criticism applies above all to the one-sided orientation of reason in Kant towards rationality and natural sciences. He contrasted this with the concept of “instinctual nature”, which limits the autonomy of the self.

Harald Holz has designed a transcendental relationism in a rethought connection to Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Schelling as well as taking up newly formulated Neoplatonic motifs, in which relation becomes effective as a subsistence dynamic, which opens up a new view of ultimate justification and at the same time serves as a basis a comprehensive open system, in which contingency and absoluteness, i.e. H. World total sense and Einzelprozessualität, a priori - and a posteriori -Stufung, corporeality and mind (brain life and reflexivity) as well as aesthetics and morality 'synthesize'.

Further to be mentioned are Dieter Henrich's theory of self-confidence, Hans Michael Baumgartner's transcendental philosophy of history , the transcendental existential philosophy by Heinrich Barth , the "open transcendental philosophy " developed by Henri Lauener and Wolfgang Röds in the discussion with Quine, or the interpretationism of Günter Abel and Hans Lenk . The open-mindedness of man, which enables him to overcome his instinctual structure, is the approach of a transcendental theological anthropology in Wolfhart Pannenberg.Gerold Prauss turns with a non-empirical theory of subjectivity based on space and time as intentionality against attempts at naturalization in modern philosophy. Peter Rohs tries to link Kant's philosophy with Spinoza's in the form of a field theory of time. From the point of view of philosophical anthropology, Thomas Rentsch advocates the thesis that reference to the primary lifeworld comes before all theory. That is why the human being can only be understood in his situationality and a subject-centered philosophy of consciousness should be rejected.

literature

  • Werner Flach : The idea of ​​the transcendental philosophy. Immanuel Kant , Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg 2002, ISBN 3-8260-2363-3 .
  • Forum for Philosophy, Bad Homburg: Siegfried Blasche, Wolfgang R. Köhler, Wolfgang Kuhlmann and Peter Rohs (eds.): Kant's transcendental deduction and the possibility of transcendental philosophy. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1988, ISBN 978-3-518-28323-3 .
  • Thomas Grundmann : Analytical Transcendental Philosophy. A criticism. Schöningh, Paderborn 1993, ISBN 3-506-73446-6 .
  • Ders .: Transcendental philosophy without idealism? , in: Dirk Fonfara (ed.): Metaphysics as Science, Freiburg-Munich 2006, pp. 190–210.
  • That. / Catrin Misselhorn: Transcendental Arguments and Realism , in: H.-J. Glock (eds.): Strawson and Kant, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003, pp. 205-218. ( Draft ; PDF; 69 kB)
  • Otfried Höffe : Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. The foundation of modern philosophy . 4th edition. Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-50919-3 .
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  • Nikolai F. Klimmek: Kant's system of transcendental ideas (= Kant studies , supplementary books. Volume 147, Kant Society (ed.)). Verlag Walter de Gruyter , Berlin 2005, ISBN 978-3-11-018349-8 .
  • Andreas Lorenz (Ed.): Transcendental Philosophy Today. Wroclaw Kant Symposium 2004. Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-8260-3438-1 .
  • Wolfgang Röd : Experience and reflection: theories of experience from a transcendental philosophical point of view. Beck, Munich 1991, ISBN 978-3-40635231-7 .

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Christoph Asmuth : Introduction ( Memento of the original from July 3, 2010 in the Internet Archive ) Info: The archive link was inserted automatically and has not yet been checked. Please check the original and archive link according to the instructions and then remove this notice. (PDF; 105 kB), in: Ders. (Ed.): Transcendental Philosophy and Person. Corporeality - Interpersonality - Recognition, Bielefeld 2007, pp. 11–21. @1@ 2Template: Webachiv / IABot / www.transcript-verlag.de
  2. ↑ Norbert Hinske : Diversity and Unity of the Transcendental Philosophies, in: Archive for Concepts History 14 (1970), 41–68, here 43. Both terms will, however, also later be used largely synonymously by other authors.
  3. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 43 .
  4. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA XVIII, 20  / Reflexion 4890.
  5. ↑ Thomas Grundmann : What actually is a transcendental argument? In: Dietmar H. Heidemann, Kristina Engelhard (eds.): Why Kant today ?, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 44–75, here 47.
  6. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 75 .
  7. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 373 .
  8. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 29 .
  9. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Academy edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences , Berlin 1900 ff., Volume XXIX.
  10. ^ Béatrice Longuenesse: Self-confidence and awareness of one's own body, German magazine for philosophy, 55 (6/2007), 859-875.
  11. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 145 .
  12. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 109 .
  13. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA IV, 9 .
  14. ↑ Wolfgang Röd : Transcendental philosophy without final justification, in: Andreas Lorens (Hrsg.): Transcendental philosophy today. Wroclaw Kant Symposium 2004. Königshausen and Neumann, Würzburg 2007, 9–24.
  15. ↑ Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: About the enterprise of Criticism to bring reason to understanding (1801)
  16. ↑ It can be found, for example, in Gottlob Ernst Schulze : Critique of Theoretical Philosophy , 2 volumes, Hamburg 1801 and in the present in Malte Hossenfelder : Kant's Constitutional Theory and the Transcendent Deduction , de Gruyter, Berlin 1978.
  17. ↑ Georg Mohr: Kant "Discovery of all pure understanding concepts" , in: Reinhard Hiltscher, André Georgi (Ed.): Perspektiven der Transzendentalphilosophie in connection with the philosophy of Kants , Alber, Munich 2002, 123-138.
  18. ↑ Wilhelm Dilthey: The spiritual world. Introduction to the philosophy of life. First half. Treatises on the foundation of the humanities. Collected Writings, Volume V, ed. by Georg Misch , 2nd edition, Stuttgart, Göttingen 1957, 83.
  19. ↑ Jakob Friedrich Fries: New or anthropological criticism of reason (1807), 2nd edition in three volumes 1828–31, reprint Berlin 1955, volume 1 §§ 70–73.
  20. ^ Charles S. Peirce: Minute Logic (1902), Collected Papers CP 2.35.
  21. ↑ Karen Gloy : Kant and the natural sciences - their significance for the present , in: Andreas Lorenz (Ed.): Transcendental Philosophy Today: Breslauer Kant Symposium 2004, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2007, 39–58.
  22. ^ Karl Popper: The two basic problems of epistemology, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1979, 30–31.
  23. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 14 .
  24. ↑ Andreas Lorenz: Certainty versus Hypothesis. Notes on the theoretical status of Kant's transcendental philosophy, in: Gerhard Schönrich (Ed.): Normativität und facticity, Dresden 2004, 89-102.
  25. ↑ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: System des transzendentalen Idealismus, 1800, in: Complete Works III, 352 text at zeno.org.
  26. ^ Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling: Presentation of my system of philosophy, reprint from: Journal for speculative physics, Volume 2, ed. and commented by Manfred Durner, Meiner, Hamburg 2001, 331.
  27. ↑ Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Contribution to the correction of the public's judgments about the French Revolution, complete edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences I / 1, 252.
  28. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Basis der Wissenschaftslehre (1802), complete edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences I / 2, 359-360.
  29. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Basis der Wissenschaftslehre (1802), complete edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences I / 2, 271.
  30. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Basis of the Science Theory (1802), Complete Edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences I / 2, 267.
  31. ^ Johann Gottlieb Fichte: Basis der Wissenschaftslehre (1802), complete edition of the Bavarian Academy of Sciences I / 2, 368.
  32. ↑ Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel: Faith and Knowledge or Philosophy of Reflection of Subjectivity in the Completeness of its Forms as Kantian, Jacobian and Fichtean Philosophy (1803), Collected Works 4, 372.
  33. ↑ Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel: Encyclopedia of Sciences in Plan (1830), § 415 , Collected Works 20, 422-423.
  34. ↑ Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel: The difference between the Fichte and Schelling systems of philosophy (1801), works in 20 volumes. New edition based on the works from 1832 - 1845, editors: Eva Moldenhauer and Karl Markus Michel, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1970, Volume 2, 94.
  35. ↑ Friedrich Albert Lange: History of Materialism and Critique of Its Significance in the Present, 1866, reprint in 2 volumes, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1974, based on: Wolfgang Röd : Transzendentalphilosophie without final justification, in: Andreas Lorenz (ed.): Transzendentalphilosophie heute: Breslauer Kant Symposium 2004, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2007, 9–24.
  36. ^ Hermann Cohen: The principle of the infinitesimal method and its history (1883) § 9, in: Works, ed. by Helmut Holzhey, Volume 5, p. 6; see also: Kant's Justification of Ethics (1877), 24.
  37. ^ Paul Natorp: The logical foundations of the exact sciences, Leipzig, Berlin 1910, 31–32.
  38. ↑ Heinrich Rickert: Two ways of the epistemology, in: Kant studies 14 (1909) 169–228, here 170.
  39. ↑ Ernst Cassirer: Philosophy of symbolic forms, Volume I, 1923, 11-13.
  40. ↑ Elizabeth Ströker: Husserl's principle of evidence. Sense and limits of a methodological norm of phenomenology as science, Journal for philosophical research, 32 (1/1978), 3–30.
  41. ↑ A new approach is the lecture: The Idea of ​​Phenomenology. Edited and introduced by Walter Biemel. (Husserliana Volume 2) Reprint of the 2nd extended edition. 1973.
  42. ↑ Wolfhart Henckmann: Max Scheler, Beck, Munich 1998, 25th
  43. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd verb. Edition. 1976 (Husserliana Volume 6), 71.
  44. ^ Edmund Husserl: Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures. Edited by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd verb. 1992 edition (Husserliana Volume 1), 65.
  45. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd verb. Edition. 1976 (Husserliana Volume 6), 100-101.
  46. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, (Husserliana Volume 8), 3.
  47. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, (Husserliana Volume 8), 196.
  48. ^ Edmund Husserl: Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures. Edited by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd verb. 1992 edition (Husserliana Volume 1), 62.
  49. ↑ Elizabeth Ströker : Husserl's principle of evidence, Journal of Philosophical Research 32 (1/1978), 3-30, 27th
  50. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, 277.
  51. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, 460.
  52. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd verb. Edition. 1976 (Husserliana Volume 6), 268.
  53. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd verb. Edition. 1976 (Husserliana Volume 6), 205.
  54. ^ Edmund Husserl: Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures. Edited by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd verb. 1992 edition (Husserliana Volume 1), 121.
  55. ↑ Edmund Husserl in a letter to Jonas Cohn , quoted from: KH Lembeck_ keyword “Transzendental; Transzendentalphilosophie “, in: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy , Volume 10, Section X: The Phenomenological Movement, Sp. 1412-1420, here 1413.
  56. ↑ Elisabeth Ströker: Husserl's last path to transcendental philosophy in the crisis work, magazine for philosophical research 35 (2/1981), 165-183.
  57. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The idea of ​​phenomenology. Five lectures. Edited by Walter Biemel. Reprint of the 2nd supplementary edition 1973 (Husserliana Volume 2), 2nd lecture (1907)
  58. ↑ Edmund Husserl: The crisis of the European sciences and the transcendental phenomenology. An introduction to phenomenological philosophy. Edited by Walter Biemel, reprint of the 2nd verb. Ed. 1976 (Husserliana Volume 6), § 215.
  59. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, 108.
  60. ^ Edmund Husserl: Cartesian meditations and Paris lectures. Edited by Stephan Strasser. Reprint of the 2nd verb. Edition 1992 (Husserliana Volume 1), IV. Med. § 41, 117-118.
  61. ^ Edmund Husserl: First Philosophy (1923/24). Second part: theory of phenomenological reduction. Edited by Rudolf Boehm. 1959, (Husserliana Volume 8), 212-217.
  62. ↑ Peter Strawson: Individual thing and logical subject. A contribution to a descriptive metaphysics, Reclam, Stuttgart 1972, 17.
  63. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Collected Writings. Ed .: Vol. 1-22 Prussian Academy of Sciences, Vol. 23 German Academy of Sciences in Berlin, from Vol. 24 Academy of Sciences in Göttingen, Berlin 1900ff., AA III, 191 .
  64. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason: Academy Edition of the Prussian Academy of Sciences, Berlin 1900ff, Volume III, p 122 -127 (§ 26: Transcendental Deduction of the generally possible empirical use of the pure conceptions of the understanding.)
  65. ↑ Peter Strawson: The Limits of Sense. A commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, Hain, Königstein 1981, 15.
  66. ↑ Thomas Grundmann: What actually is a transcendental argument? In: Dietmar H. Heidemann, Kristina Engelhard (eds.): Why Kant today ?, de Gruyter, Berlin 2003, 44–75, here 52, and Holm Tetens : Philosophisches Argumentieren, Beck, Munich 2004, 69–71.
  67. ↑ Peter Strawson: Einzelelding und logisches Subject, Reclam, Stuttgart 1972, 48-49.
  68. ↑ Detailed discussion of the mentioned and other examples in: Thomas Grundmann: Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie. A criticism. Schöningh, Paderborn 1993, Section 6.3.
  69. ↑ Hilary Putnam: Vernunft, Truth, and History (Reason, Truth, and History, 1981), Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1982, Chapter 1.
  70. ↑ Donald Davidson, What is actually a conceptual scheme ?, in: ders., Truth and Interpretation, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1986.
  71. ^ John Searle: The Construction of Social Reality. New York: Free Press 1995, German: The construction of social reality: To the ontology of social facts. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1997, 188, 192 and 200.
  72. ↑ Barry Stroud: Transcendental Arguments. The Journal of Philosophy 65 (1968), pp. 241-256. German translation under the title “Transcendental Arguments”, in: Peter Bieri : Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, Weinheim 1997, 350–366, here 364.
  73. ↑ Peter Bieri: Analytical Philosophy of Knowledge, Weinheim 1997, 301.
  74. ↑ Peter Strawson Skepticism and Naturalism: Some varieties. London 1985.
  75. ↑ Stephan Körner: Transcendental Tendencies in Recent Philosophy, in: The Journal of Philosophy, 63, 1966, pp. 551-561, as well as On ontological necessity and the justification of ontological principles, in: Neue Hefte für Philosophie, 14, 1978, p. 1-18.
  76. ↑ Thomas Grundmann: Analytical Introduction to Epistemology, de Gruyter, Berlin 2008, 442–444, with reference to the excellent presentation by R. Stern: Transcendental Arguments and Skepticism. Answering the Question of Justification, Oxford / New York 2000, 43-65.
  77. ↑ Barry Stroud: The Goal of Transcendental Arguments, in: Robert Stern (Ed.): Transcendental Arguments: Problems and Prospects, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1999, 155–172.
  78. ↑ Wolfgang Kuhlmann: Reflexive final justification, Alber, Freiburg 1985.
  79. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: Transformation of Philosophy, Volume II, 358–435 (The Apriori of the Communication Community and the Basics of Ethics), Suhrkamp 1973.
  80. ↑ Hans Albert: 'The problem of justification' in: Ders., Treatise on critical reason, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 1968, and later, chap. I; as well as from the 5th edition, z. B. UTB edition from 1991, Appendices I, especially pp. 220-242, Appendices II and III.
  81. ^ Karl-Otto Apel: Discourse and Responsibility, Suhrkamp 1988, 123.
  82. ↑ Karl-Otto Apel: The problem of the philosophical ultimate justification in the light of a transcendental language pragmatics, in: Bernulf Kanitscheider (Ed.): Language and knowledge, Innsbruck 1976, 55–82, here 72–73.
  83. ↑ Jaakko Hintikka: Cogito, ergo sum: Inference or Performance? In: Descartes. A Collection of Critical Essays. Ed .: by W. Donney, New York 1967. pp. 108-139.
  84. ^ Henry L. Ruf, H .: Transcendental logic. An essay on critical metaphysics. Men world 2 (1969), pp. 38-64.
  85. ↑ An overview of these positions in: Thomas Grundmann: Analytische Transzendentalphilosophie. A criticism. Schöningh, Paderborn 1993, 313-323.
  86. ↑ Jürgen Habermas: Discourse Ethics. Notes on a justification program, in: Ders .: Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1983, 53–126, here 107.
  87. ↑ Jürgen Habermas. Communicative action and detranscendentalized reason. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2001, 10-12.
  88. ↑ Harald Holz: Transcendental Philosophy and Metaphysics. Study on tendencies in today's basic philosophical problem, Mainz 1966, and Otto Muck: The German-speaking Maréchal School - Transcendental Philosophy as Metaphysics. JB Lotz, K. Rahner, W. Brugger, E. Coreth, and others. a., in: Emerich Coreth (ed.): Christian Philosophy in Catholic Thought of the 19th and 20th Century II, Graz et al. 1988, 590–622.
  89. ↑ Wolfgang Cramer: Foundation of a theory of the mind, Frankfurt, 3rd ed. 1975, 24.
  90. ^ Hans Wagner: Philosophy and reflection. Munich and Basel 1959; third edition 1980.
  91. ^ Hermann Krings: Transzendental Logic, Munich 1964.
  92. ^ Odo Marquard: Difficulties with the philosophy of history, Frankfurt 1973, 42.
  93. ↑ Odo Marquard: Transcendental idealism, romantic natural philosophy, psychoanalysis (= Habil. 1962). Dinter, Cologne 1987, 5.
  94. ↑ Harald Holz: Werkausgabe, Berlin et al. European University Press 2008–2015, approx. 45 volumes, mainly volumes 1–8: Bde. 1 u. 2 System of the Transcendental Philosophy, Vol. 3 u. 4 Transcendental Formal Philosophy, 6 u. 7 Collected Essays on Transcendental Philosophy, Vol. 8 Writings on Transcendental Philosophy.
  95. ↑ Dieter Henrich: conscious life. Studies on the relationship between subjectivity and metaphysics, Reclam, Stuttgart 1999.
  96. ^ Hans Michael Baumgartner: Continuity and History. On the critique and metacriticism of historical reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1972.
  97. ↑ Heinrich Barth: Outline of a Philosophy of Existence, ed. v. Christian Graf, Cornelia Müller u. Harald Schwaetzer, Regensburg 2007.
  98. ^ Henri Lauener: Open Transcendental Philosophy. Kovac, Hamburg 2002.
  99. ^ Günter Abel: Language, Signs, Interpretation, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999 and Hans Lenk: Interpretations Konstrukte. On the critique of interpretative reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999.
  100. ↑ Wolfhart Pannenberg: Anthropology in theological perspective, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1983.
  101. ↑ Gerold Prauss: The world and us, two volumes in four parts, Stuttgart 1990 to 2006; The article provides an overview: The inner structure of time as a problem for formal logic, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 47 (1993), 542–558.
  102. ↑ Peter Rohs: Feld-Zeit-Ich. Draft of a field theoretical transcendental philosophy. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1996.
  103. ↑ Thomas Rentsch: Negativity and practical reason, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000.