Judgment (logic)

from Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In logic, judgment is the form of a statement that is expressed in the linguistic form of a sentence . Here, the judgment with the process of forming noting her is propositional content or the assessment of that level identified ( judgment form vs a judgment make vs an opinion cases ). Judgment is not explicitly defined as a basic concept of logic in every theory of logic.

Different standpoints exist with regard to the question of whether and to what extent a psychological consideration of the thought process (e.g. in association psychology ) plays a role in judgment theory or, in addition, an independent judgment theory is possible at all ( psychologism ). Finally, epistemological or ontological assumptions (as is already clear from Aristotle) ​​sometimes have a very strong influence on the design of any logic concept.

In traditional logic , “judgment” is a basic term that denotes a certain view of the logical statement . Every logical statement - every judgment - assigns a more general determination - a logical predicate - to a logical subject . At the latest , however, classical logic assumes that, in addition to predication , there must also be more complex forms of judgment, and that not every predication formed has a truth value, but only the complete sentence.

Meanings outside of classical logic

In philosophical logic, the term “judgment” is used instead of the term “statement” reduced to the logically formal. Correspondingly, from Aristotle to Immanuel Kant, the judgments are divided into categories in a judgment table . Kant distinguishes in particular between analytical and synthetic judgments that relate ( a posteriori ) to experience or are made before all experience ( a priori ).

Romanticism and German idealism reject an analytical breakdown into individual parts as a primary method and give absolute priority to the coherent, unified whole of knowledge, feeling and belief. Friedrich Hölderlin writes in Judgment and Being that the parts receive their essential purpose through the judgment, but defends himself against the interpretation that the parts can be viewed separately from one another like workpieces. Novalis notes in his Allgemeine Brouillon : "You don't just want the sentence or the judgment, but also the relevant acts."

For the judgment theory of Neo-Kantianism , every judgment is affirmative or negative and accordingly implies a position on the value of truth, which is why one could speak of valuations even in the sphere of knowledge.

Judgment in the sense of logic can mean different things:

  1. an assertion or a statement ;
  2. the "final context of a syllogism " or the "member of a syllogism";
  3. a conceptual connection or separation or an act of knowledge in the sense of Kant

According to Husserl , the word "judgment" can mean:

  1. holding to be true;
  2. an ideal unit of meaning.

Psychological, linguistic and ontological conception

psychologically linguistically ontological
Judgment (as a psychological act) Statement (sentence)
  • Thought (Frege);
  • Circumstances (Husserl, formerly Wittgenstein);
  • Proposition (Anglo-Saxon philosophy);
  • Statement (Anglo-Saxon philosophy)
Table according to Tugendhat

If one roughly differentiates between a basic psychological, linguistic and ontological conception of logic with Ernst Tugendhat , the word has three very different basic meanings (which, however, have an analogous context). What is meant by judgment therefore depends on the respective epistemological and conceptual theory (see the table).

See also

  • Judging from the perspective of psychology.
  • Syllogistics to the traditional logic of judgment

literature

  • Joseph M. Bochenski, The contemporary methods of thinking , 10th edition 1993, ISBN 978-3825200060
  • Lotz, Judgment , in: Walter Brugger, Philosophical Dictionary , 1976
  • Article judgment , in: Arnim Regenbogen, Uwe Meyer: Dictionary of Philosophical Terms , 2005, ISBN 9783787313259
  • Ernst Tugendhat, Ursula Wolf, Logisch-Semantische Propädeutik , 1983, ISBN 9783150082065
  • Thomas Zoglauer, Introduction to Formal Logic for Philosophers , 1999, ISBN 9783825219994
  • Thomas Zwenger , Judgment , in: Rehfus, Wulff D. (Ed.), Concise Dictionary Philosophy (2003)

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Rudolf Eisler : Dictionary of Philosophical Terms. (1904), judgment theory.
  2. ↑ see the lexigrahical overview in: Rudolf Eisler: Dictionary of philosophical terms. (1904), "Judgment"
  3. ^ Alois Halder / Max Müller: Philosophical Dictionary , Freiburg im Breisgau 1993, p. 328
  4. ↑ Albert Menne : The Kantian judgment table in the light of the history of logic and modern logic. Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie , 20 (2), 1989, pp. 317-324
  5. ↑ Novalis: The General Brouillon. Materials for encyclopedia 1798/99. With an introduction by Hans-Joachim Mähl . Felix Meiner Verlag: Hamburg 1993. ISBN 3-7873-1088-6 . P. 61.
  6. ↑ Wolfgang Schluchter : The emergence of modern rationalism. An analysis of Max Weber's history of the development of the Occident . 1st edition Frankfurt am Main 1988. ISBN 3-518-28947-0 . P. 76f. / Heinrich Rickert : The object of knowledge . Tübingen 2nd edition 1904 (first 1892). P. 148ff. / Emil Lask : The doctrine of judgment . In: Collected writings, Volume 2, Tübingen 1923. P. 283 ff.
  7. ↑ Zwenger, judgment, in: Rehfus, Wulff D. (ed.), Handwortbuch Philosophie (2003)
  8. ^ Rainbow / Meyer, Dictionary of Philosophical Terms (2005), judgment
  9. ↑ Zwenger, judgment, in: Rehfus, Wulff D. (ed.), Handwortbuch Philosophie (2003)
  10. ^ Rainbow / Meyer, Dictionary of Philosophical Terms (2005), judgment
  11. ^ Rainbow / Meyer, Dictionary of Philosophical Terms (2005), judgment
  12. ↑ Zwenger, judgment, in: Rehfus, Wulff D. (ed.), Handwortbuch Philosophie (2003)
  13. ↑ Husserl, Logical Investigations I, in: Meixner, (Ed.), Philosophy of Logic (2003), p. 83 (101)
  14. ↑ Tugendhat / Wolf, Logisch-semantische Propädeutik (1983), p. 17