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Image of the outside world on the display of a mobile phone
A perspective implementation connects the image with the object. Illustration from Salomon de Caus, La perspectiue (Londres: R. Field / J. Mommart / Brussels: R Barker, 1611).

Image refers to an image and its relationship to a recognizable object depicted on it . An image can have a natural origin (e.g. shadow, mirror image) or be artificially created (e.g. painting, symbolic sign).

The relationship between object and image is called the image relationship in philosophy . This is intended to describe the relationship between thing and image. Different scientific disciplines deal in different ways with images as objects of investigation, or use them as tools:

  • In mathematics, a map is a clear association between two sets . The element-wise mapping of a set onto itself is called identical mapping . If certain additional relations are presupposed for each of the two sets (e.g. if they are groups ), then a mapping is called homomorphic if it contains these relations. A homomorphic mapping is called isomorphic if it has a homomorphic inverse mapping with which it creates the identical mapping.
  • The measurement theory studied homomorphic images fundamentally and finds such application. B. in statistics.
  • Predicates can also be understood as mathematical images in logic .
  • Material images are also dealt with in image science .

In the context of epistemology, philosophers have repeatedly asked what the relationship between archetypes and likeness is and have developed image theories from different perspectives about the extent to which human knowledge is an image of reality . Images are therefore linked to the constitution of subjects and objects .

Images can be assigned religious or magical meanings. Since ancient times , monotheistic religions have often issued a ban on images , which in the course of European history has repeatedly led to disputes (see picture controversy , iconoclasm ).

Sensory impressions, perceptions or ideas as well as terms, judgments and conclusions up to theories on the linguistic level are considered images . In the 20th century, philosophers again discussed the extent to which a statement or the description of a state of affairs can depict the facts in the world. The difference of opinion between idealism and realism that arose in antiquity has persisted to the present day.

The ideology criticism deals with the socio-political significance of images.



The basic positions in antiquity are divided into those of materialism , idealism and realism .

Linking epistemology with thinking about images goes back a long way to ancient philosophy - the first considerations can already be found in Heraclitus :

"The soul boundaries you can not Figure out, and if you abschrittest any road; it has such a deep reason ”,“ he maintained that eyesight is deceptive ”, and“ people are wrong in getting to know visible things ”.

The Greek philosophers Leukippus and Democritus developed an early theory of mapping , whose doctrine is also known as atomism . According to their knowledge, invisible atoms or images ( eidola ) are constantly being sent out by the real objects , which reach the soul through the sense organs. The Epicureans later advocated this materialistic theory .

The allegory of the cave from the seventh book of Plato's Dialogue Politeia is considered a central formulation of the problem that arises as soon as one turns the optical image into a metaphor for knowledge and points out that we do not perceive the image process ourselves. Plato builds up his parable in such a way that he makes the imaging process complex and withdraws it from the perceiver: The focus is on a person tied up in a cave. All he gets to see are the shadows of objects that appear on the opposite wall of the cave. Not even the shadows of real things are presented to him - he follows a staged shadow play. What attitude, so the philosophical question goes, will the chained develop into the forms emerging on the wall? Doesn't he have to mistake them for the real objects? Plato shows the way out of the cognitive dilemma through his parable. The only chance of knowledge that the perceiver has lies in philosophical reflection . If he could get a correct idea of the mapping process, he could see through what is being simulated to him. At least one thing he can do: appreciate that his current ideas have little to do with the world as it really is. Accordingly, Plato designed a worldview in which the sensory perceptions only provide images of ideas that, as archetypes, define the essence of the world. He saw the entire natural cosmos as an image of the divine and time as an image of eternity.

His pupil Aristotle opposed the idealistic conception of Plato, who held against him that he was at least doubling the number of objects in the world by presenting the ideas. For Aristotle, knowledge does not arise in a single perception as, so to speak, "immediate" representation of reality, but in the correct constellation of the respective meaningful contents (symplokä noämaton) , which he related to each other according to certain forms of judgment. Aristotle thus rejected a model according to which the correct representation of reality in human knowledge can only be traced back to the (material) influence of the outside world and affective reactions to it. For a "correct image" in the Aristotelian sense, it is crucial that the human mind correctly relates the respective sensory impressions to one another. From the dispute over whether there are independent ideas, the universal dispute arose in the Middle Ages .

In late antiquity, the Stoa drew on the naturalistic worldview of the atomists, but, like Aristotle, represented the theory of a more differentiated process of knowledge. The correct idea of ​​the object not only requires the implementation of sensory stimulation in perceptions, but also the rational processing of the sensory data and a rational assessment (sygkatathesis) .

middle Ages

Man as a limited image of God
Christian influences in the Middle Ages

Until modern times , thinking about knowledge by means of images remained a cornerstone of religious, idealistic and transcendental philosophy. It seemed plausible that human knowledge, as long as it was limited to sensory perception , yields to deceptions and does not advance to higher knowledge - especially that of God . Thinking about image and reality stood for the gap between our imagination and reality. The Bible provided the links to the ancient problem with passages like that from 1 Corinthians 13 (in Luther's translation from 1545):

“Prophecies must cease and languages ​​cease, and knowledge itself will cease. Because our knowledge is piecemeal, and our prophecy is piecemeal [...] We now see through a mirror in a single word, but from face to face. "

The present condition binds man in the image of God to an imperfect knowledge. What he sees of himself is nothing more than what he gets to see in a bad mirror. Truthful knowledge is only possible when man faces God.

It was above all Augustine who, around AD 400, transferred the image to a Christian framework. Because man has spirit and understanding, he stands out from all other creatures and becomes the image of God on earth. Because he has free will , the human being is also imperfect and can not recognize the truth on his own terms. He only finds access to God as the archetype of all that is in contemplation . The trinity of being, love and knowing as the image of God only reveals itself within the human being. (De Trinitate)

The Arab , Jewish and Latin scholasticism discussed many basic problems of general epistemology , including the question of the reason for our beliefs and their knowledge, often with recourse to the metaphor of archetype and image. Even in antiquity, universals - and sometimes also individual terms - were seen as ideas in the divine creative spirit. This means that both the structures and the individual objects of reality can be described as images of archetypes in the divine spirit. According to the idea of ​​the “absolute simplicity” of the divine being and its “uniqueness” as an eternal and necessary being , these ideas are viewed in God as partially connected with one another. According to this conception, God's spirit gives the limited cognitive faculty the concepts, either spontaneously or based on the senses, which can recognize individual things, but not the entire divine spirit. The concept of an "active mind" ( intellectus agens ), which was not explained by Aristotle, is often used as a basis for this view. On this theoretical basis, in addition to the ontological relationship of dependency, all concepts within epistemology can be interpreted as images of archetypes in the divine spirit.

At the latest as soon as a more precise knowledge of the Aristotelian work was available in the Latin medieval West, which had been conveyed through Arabic translations, and the theological and philosophical discussion had become academically professional, this topic was debated in many ways. Numerous theologians and philosophers now saw human knowledge less as an image of divine, but rather earthly, finite reality. They put forward the thesis that there is nothing in the intellect that has not previously been perceived by the senses. Knowledge or truth is based on a correspondence of the intellect with the matter.

In terms of history, such concepts have been very significant. Contrary to this often as Aristotle called epistemological approach went in the late Middle Ages as theorists Meister Eckhart believes that the human mind direct reflection is the divine intellect: he that is so completely identical, and the implementation of this identity is to man goal of the spiritual path.

Renaissance and modern times

The eye creates an image of the object (which has to be mirrored in the brain and put the right way round), illustration from James Ayscough, A Short Account of the Eye and Nature of Vision (London, 1752).
Empiricism. Linking science back to mapping functions

Even in the course of the scholastic debate, but especially in the Renaissance , philosophers dared to break away from Augustinian dogmas and turn the well-known thinking about the inadequacy of images. With the advent of using math -driven perspective painting as with the development of science , it was interesting in a turn and appropriation of the existing debate, just to propagate a knowledge of the world that plied the safety of imaging processes. Sensory organs were dissected, experiments were carried out with optical lenses and cameras that projected perfect images of the outside world into interiors, and the entire empirical philosophy associated with modern natural sciences was based on an imaging model that was radically streamlined compared to the Platonic:

According to this model, there is an outside world. We have sensory organs to perceive them. Our organs generate sensory impressions, images of the world in our consciousness . We must therefore develop instruments with which we can create far more perfect images of the world: thermometers , barometers , telescopes , microscopes - an instrumentation with which we expand our sensory perception to the macro and microcosm .

According to empiricists, the cognitive process becomes delicate when it is “contaminated” and when “erroneous ideas” penetrate into it. Francis Bacon already warned against false idols that become illusions. The epistemology of empiricism understands the soul and the mind as a tabula rasa , as an empty board on which, through sensual perceptions, images of reality emerge to a certain extent. John Locke, for example, described the mind in An Essay concerning Humane Understanding 1690 as "empty cabinet", "sheet of blanc paper" or "waxed tablet", on which images of the objects are imprinted . George Berkeley developed an image theory according to which he understands knowledge as "ideas, imprinted on the senses by the Author of Nature".

Our ability to invent new things is therefore based on the fact that we passively arrive at ideas from sensory impressions, but - according to John Locke - we can combine them into new ideas. All of our thinking happens in an "association of ideas", a continuous combination of ideas. If we got wrong ideas, we could develop all kinds of superstitious ideas.

In contrast to empiricism, a new position of idealistic philosophy developed in the course of the 17th and 18th centuries, the rationalism of Descartes 'and Leibniz ', which integrated the empirical model of knowledge into their thinking: If what we deal with is sensory data and if we Just as the empiricists maintained that our ideas derive from a combination of sensory data, the proponents of empiricism themselves had to admit that they ultimately could not gain any knowledge of what their knowledge was based on, the outside world. They only processed sensory data. The things we see are not the " things in themselves " and what we do with the concepts, our linking and combining, is not itself part of the world that can be reduced to perceptions. Even after Descartes it is a mistake to assume that there is a similarity (Med. III) or even correspondence between object and representation. The sensual impulses are dark and fuzzy and only become clear and distinguishable through the mind.

The result was a turn to the knowing subject; with Locke it had already begun when he assumed the “connection of ideas” as the ultimate process of knowledge. His main work deals with "human understanding", he does not deal with the outside world. Thus, according to Kant, cognitive images are generated by the productive imagination as part of the active understanding. A direct conclusion about the external reality is not possible.

Denis Diderot (1713–1784), French scholar of the Enlightenment and, together with Jean-Baptiste le Rond d'Alembert, founder of the great universal dictionary Encyclopédie ou Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers (1751–1780), represented after Descartes the thesis that knowledge of reality is only possible through scientific experiments . To do this, however, the results would have to be interpreted according to rules that cannot be obtained inductively, but must be intuitively guessed or guessed. In a parable of Diderot, five people meet, one of whom only sees, hears, smells, tastes and touches. They can hardly communicate about living in the same world. This is intended to illustrate the constitutive importance of the sense organs for the experience of objects.

The German-born philosopher of the French Enlightenment, Holbach , who represented atheist positions, developed a mechanistic worldview and presented a deterministic concept of reality in relation to humans.

Also in the 18th century, the Scottish historian and philosopher David Hume formulated what was later known as Hume's Law , according to which statements about reality do not give any clues about ethics and morals . For Hume, the human mind consists of reason and will. While reason strives for a match between conviction and reality, that is, truth, the will is oriented towards influencing reality according to the ideas and wishes of the individual. Hume assumed that will and reason should be strictly separated. While the former motivates people but does not lead them to the knowledge of reality, only reason strives for truth and knowledge.

19th and 20th centuries

Transcendental Philosophy, Materialism and Positivism

The philosophical spectrum split into further differentiated positions in the 19th century. Representatives of the transcendental-philosophical / idealistic tradition denied the possibility of a mapping relationship in general ( Neo-Kantianism , Husserl ) because the actual nature of a reality external to man eludes his cognitive ability. The empirical / materialistic schools, like critical realism ( Oswald Külpe , Nicolai Hartmann ), designed mapping theories that assumed at least structural ( isomorphic ) correspondences between reality and consciousness. The newcomer to this diversity was the positivist school of thought, the protagonists of which focused on the analysis of physiological and psychological realities.

The complex of pictorial sensations (seen with just one eye for simplicity). Illustration from Ernst Mach : The Analysis of Sensations . 1900, p. 15.

The positivists abandoned mapping theory as early as the middle of the 19th century. Together with the empiricists, they assumed that humans have to interpret perceptions. However, like the so-called transcendental philosophers, they changed the perspective previously taken: The image that precedes our knowledge is therefore not that of the outside world, in which reality is reflected as on the screen of a camera obscura . The eye does not depict the world either; rather, the sensual impression of the eye is more similar to what Ernst Mach outlines in his analysis of sensations . The person only separates the outside world and the inside world when dealing with the image received by the eye, namely through an analysis , categorization and interpretation of the perceptions. People have the sensation of a voluntary effort with which they raise their arms and at the same moment see parts of the image that connect them with their arms in motion. However, they interpret these sensations as tactile . In this way they organize and link the sensations and decide to regard some as belonging to the body and to attribute others to the environment. According to this concept, however, the same sensations could just have arisen from a dream . Because the dreamer also forms categories and sees some sensations as physical, others as belonging to the outside world.

According to Mach, this analysis takes place unconsciously and pragmatically , which means that humans interpret data recorded by the sensory organs, which allow them to make predictions. His idea of ​​what the world is like, however, only has a model character : "The data situation behaves as if things had the following nature ..." The scientist ultimately only classifies the findings " economically ": mechanisms of action that he does not need, in order to make a prediction, he disregards it in his model.

Many problems of the previous philosophical debate no longer arise with this assumption. If there are areas such as For example, there is that of quantum physics , in which the same objects behave in one experiment as if they consisted of particles (e.g. atoms) and appear as waves in the other , so the adherent of positivism must himself do not commit to one or the other. Rather, he can deal with the information in one way or another, depending on the respective context . In his opinion, for example, it can also be useful to calculate residential buildings for conventional three-dimensional space and, at the same time, to interpret data from space telescopes on the basis of four-dimensional space - time .

From the point of view of Marxist philosophy , positivism is a bourgeois subjectivist worldview. Lenin , for example, formulated this view in his criticism of Mach. In positivism, the real material world, which according to Lenin needs to be changed, is spoken of only in model assumptions. The positivists were not interested in what this world is like, they just wanted to “calculate practically”.

According to the positivists, on the other hand, the Marxist materialists make a claim to truth with their reflection theory , for which they cannot provide any evidence . They want to understand the model of a representation of the material world together with the cultural history as a cornerstone of the approach to the truth. This is not possible in detail, according to the controversial positivist criticism, without hidden idealistic or metaphysical assumptions in materialism. The article on "image theory" in the Marxist-Leninist- oriented philosophical dictionary of the GDR presupposes the existence of a "spirit" into which the image of the material world is reflected, and of matter that is reflected:

Images are ideal results of the reflection process in which people spiritually appropriate objective reality through social awareness in various forms, such as science, ideology, morality, art, religion, on the basis of social practice. They arise in a complicated process of translating and converting the material into the ideal [...] An image is characterized by the fact that it is different from the depicted, is dependent on it and agrees with it.

The neo-Marxist criticism of dogmatic Marxist epistemology, which Antonio Gramsci and Karl Korsch , for example, put forward, grasped the reflection theory and thus the term image in a more differentiated manner.

Philosophy of language

Language as a model of reality. Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach

Can be broken down into statements about facts, the image of a chess position ( study by Alexei Alexejewitsch Troizki from 1921, White wins on the move)

Various chess games are set up in one room . We ask someone to check whether the situation from 1921 shown in the illustration is also included. This is not an impossible task - there has to be a chess game in the room with a black bishop on a8, a white king on b1, a black pawn on h7…; you can step in front of any chessboard and check that all of this is the case. The picture depicts a complex issue with statements on individual issues . Every single statement quoted made sense because we knew what should be the case if it was true. (Then there is actually a black bishop on the first designated field, etc.) Meaningful statements neither have to obey the laws of nature nor depict any actual situation. The sentence “There is a white pawn on every square on the chessboard” also makes sense. So there must be 64 white pawns, and chess players may object that a game only has eight white pawns that cannot go anywhere; Nevertheless, it is conceivable that an artist would distribute 64 white pawns on the individual fields of a board. The statement makes sense, regardless of whether a chessboard is ordered like this somewhere, since we know what should be the case if it is true.

The book in which Ludwig Wittgenstein re-asked the question of how images work was the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from 1922. It was no longer about how the image of the outside world arises in our consciousness, as in previous studies, where the The world is and where our consciousness is to be located. Instead, Wittgenstein now asked why a picture in everyday life can serve us to depict a situation. The answer was: Any picture can be broken down into statements about what should be the case according to the statements of the picture.

2.1 We make pictures of the facts.
2.12 The picture is a model of reality.
2.19 The logical picture can depict the world.
2,203 The picture contains the possibility of the state of affairs which it represents.
3 The logical picture of the fact is the thought.
3.1 In the sentence, the thought is expressed in a sensually perceptible way.
4.01 The sentence is a picture of reality
4.031 In the sentence a state of affairs is put together on a trial basis.

Wittgenstein came up with two surprises with his Tractatus : All illustrations, whether pictorial or linguistic, function the same to the extent that they are meaningful. Does the photo that opens the article Cologne Cathedral offer an image of Cologne Cathedral? Yes, as it allows us to make statements about the existing facts. Is the picture under the following link a picture of Cologne Cathedral? No, because Cologne Cathedral has two towers, but this building only has one - there are also numerous other differences that make it clear that the second picture in question is one of the Strasbourg Cathedral .

Any photographic image is suitable as a representation, since we can break it down into statements about alleged facts. It notes facts, and we can step in front of the depicted and say whether these facts can be ticked off one after the other with a note "it is the case". Sentences make sense if they are not tautological (analytical) or metaphysical. It must be possible to measure them against reality , so they are an image of an - at least possible - reality. So man can depict the entire empirical world, to the same extent as he perceives it and can identify it as this world, with precisely such statements on facts.

In Wittgenstein's remarks, traditional philosophers were particularly astonished that they brought arbitrary images back to the level of statements and that at the same time they managed without a metaphysical theory on "spirit", "ideas" and "things in themselves" and yet explained why linguistic statements and images or sound documents can be used as images for us and what happens when we evaluate images.

Wittgenstein was convinced that he had not only found the answer to why images work: namely because they are based on meaningful statements. At the same time, he noted that the project of mapping the world had logical limits that resulted from thinking about the verification of statements. Statements are therefore meaningful as long as we know by which investigation method we find them to be true or untrue. Statements on morality and causality cannot be formulated to the same extent sensibly. In the preface to the Tractatus as well as in the course of the treatise, Wittgenstein's main concern was to exclude these statements from thinking about illustrations, to assign them a completely different status.

Placeholder for René Magritte, La condition humaine I (1933): Links to images on the Internet:

The Tractatus also says:

2.151 The form of the illustration is the possibility that things relate to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture.
2.1511 The picture is so connected with reality; it goes up to her.
2.1512 It is applied to reality like a yardstick.
2.15121 Only the outermost points of the graduation marks touch the object to be measured.

Which is why we look at pictures that they are images, talking about it was easy. The more difficult question was how we learned the language of statements, with which we can exchange ideas about the extent to which a picture depicts something; it was to be at the center of Wittgenstein's later work on Philosophical Investigations (first published posthumously in 1953): How do we find our way into language? His considerations, which he linked to this question, were pragmatic. He was fascinated by the fact that human communication works. In his last writings, in particular in About Certainty (first published posthumously in 1969), he suggests a differentiation. In everyday life , most philosophical problems not arise. We'd even find it strange if someone mentioned them in this context and, for example, doubted that a thing we see is there. The philosophical problems arise only in special debates, primarily in philosophical university seminars and specialist journals. Therefore it is not a question of real human problems that are discussed there.

The difficulties that images pose in everyday life are of a different nature from the philosophical ones. In the everyday handling of images , it is important to have clear imaging methods , data-saving reductions to the statements to be made, easily searchable image formats , instruments that allow images to penetrate into the atomic range, large telescopes that make it possible to provide more precise images of the universe.

The problems to which philosophy referred have a core that can be named: As soon as we think about images epistemologically and as soon as we elevate the image and the imaging process to an image of the cognitive process, we usually bring instances into our thinking that are outside the same images and our knowledge stand: the “outside world”, the “consciousness”, the “spirit”, the “things in themselves”, the “ideas” that we develop from them. The word image directs our attention to the end result that we have, to the picture of the world. The relationship that the picture has with the world is never part of the picture. However, the word image defines that this image has a relationship with the outside world. This cannot be fathomed scientifically, but it is not significant, since it has no meaning for mankind. Only ideologies such as materialism or idealism refer to it.

Nelson Goodman. Image without resemblance: symbol theory

In the second half of the 20th century, the American philosopher Nelson Goodman gave new impetus to the discussion about a philosophical image theory with his work Languages ​​of Art (SdK). As a representative of analytical philosophy and a Quine student, he developed - influenced by Charles S. Peirce and Charles W. Morris - a symbol theory with which he made connections between the philosophy of language and the philosophy of culture by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne K. Langers .

Goodman sees images as symbols that “represent” an object. Because of the vastly different ways in which such a representation is possible, he rejects the notion that similarity is a characteristic by which the essence of an image can be determined. The connection between representation and the depicted object is rather arbitrary. Similarity is also not limited to images, such as showing the similarity of twins.

“The fact is that in order to be able to represent an object, an image must be a symbol for it, stand for it, refer to it; and that no degree of similarity is sufficient to establish the required relationship of reference. Similarity is not necessary for reference either, almost anything can stand for almost anything else. An image that represents an object - just like a passage that describes it - refers to it and, more precisely, denotes it. Denotation is the core of representation and independent of similarity. "

Nelson Goodman thus represents an epistemological constructivism . When seeing an object, it is constructed at the same time. An interpretation is made. Following Kant , Goodman postulates:

"The innocent eye is blind and the virgin spirit is empty."

The concept of the symbol is broad in Goodman. Symbols can be words, texts, dance, pictures, drawings, sounds, models and more. In factual contexts or in areas of life such as art, science or mathematics, symbol systems exist . They each contribute to the creation of the world.

"The creation of the image is usually also involved in the creation of what is represented in the picture."

With regard to the relationship between representation and object, Goodman distinguishes between denotation and exemplification . The denotation is therefore an extensional reference to a represented object - e.g. B. a portrait, a fact - that exists or can be fictional. Exemplification according to Goodman means that an image or a symbol conveys an exemplary selected perspective on the object, i.e. in terms of content it represents something of its own that goes beyond what is represented through interpretation.

Denotation describes the “what” of the representation and exemplification the “how”. Denotation points from the object to the image, exemplification from the image to the object. However, both are not to be construed as a reversal, because the exemplification only emphasizes the reference to certain properties or symptoms. A special form of exemplification is metaphorical exemplification, which Goodman calls "expression". The expression is a "native feature" of a symbol. A picture that expresses fear refers neither to the painter's nor to those of the viewer, but tries to show the phenomenon with his own stylistic devices. Not every exemplification is an expression, but every expression is an exemplification. Representation stands for objects, events and facts. Expression stands for feelings that cannot be directly explained.

Pictures are not pure representations of reality, but models that contain an always interpretive view of reality.

“Few expressions are used in a more undifferentiated manner in popular and scientific discourse than 'model'. A model is something you admire or emulate, a sample, a blanket case, a type, a prototype, a copy, a full-size model, a mathematical description - almost anything from a blonde to a quadratic equation. "

For Goodman, an image is realistic if it represents an object in the way one is used to . It is therefore not important that the image or symbol reflects as much information as possible about the object shown. Symbol systems can be “digital” (discrete) like language or “analog” (continuous) like paintings or photos. Digital systems have a lower “density” than analog ones. Unless linguistic systems are denser than language, language can never describe them completely, but only exemplify them.


Critics of an image theory are representatives of "direct realism ". William James , for example, formulated his critique of image theories as a parody:

“I imagine that I am the only reality in the world and then ask what else I could claim if I was allowed to. I could possibly make the claim that a ghost comes out of the desolate emptiness, stands in front of me and depicts me. I can imagine what this image means, but I cannot conjure up any motive for it. I cannot find out what it should be of use to me to be portrayed or what it should be of use to the spirit to portray me if further consequences are expressly and in principle excluded. "

More recently, based on James Hilary Putnam, he has embraced a direct realism and described image theory as an impermissible longing for the absolute.


Primary literature

  • Plato: The state . Edited by Andreas Schubert, Paderborn 1995, ISBN 3-8252-1866-X .
  • John Locke : An Essay concerning Humane Understanding (London: Printed for Tho. Basset / Sold by Edw. Mory, 1690). e-text ILT
  • Immanuel Kant: Prolegomena to every future metaphysics that will be able to appear as science . Ms. Hartknoch, Riga 1783 ( Bibliotheca Augustana e-Text ).
  • Ernst Mach: The analysis of sensations and the relationship between the physical and the psychological . [1900], 9 edition (Jena 1922).
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein: Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [1922] dt./engl. (London Routledge & Keagan, 1955).
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations German / English. trans. GEM starter. (Blackwell, Oxford 1953).
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein: About certainty. On certainty . Edited by GEM Anscombe and GH von Wright (Blackwell, Oxford 1969).
  • Georg Klaus / Manfred Buhr (Hrsg.): Philosophical dictionary. 1st volume. 11th edition. Verlag das Europäische Buch, Berlin 1975, pp. 31–33, ISBN 3-920303-35-0 .
  • Nelson Goodman: Languages ​​of Art. Draft of a symbol theory . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1997.
  • Wolfgang Fritz Haug : image . In: Historical-Critical Dictionary of Marxism . Volume 1, Argument-Verlag, Hamburg 1994, Sp. 7-21. ISBN 3-88619-431-0 .

further reading

  • Christoph Asmuth : Pictures on pictures, pictures without pictures. A new theory of imagery. Scientific Book Society, Darmstadt 2011, ISBN 978-3-534-24181-1 .
  • Andreas Dorschel : Pictures and words . In: Weimarer Contributions XLIII (1997), No. 1, pp. 110-122.
  • Alois Drexler: Representation and Identity. On the concept of intelligibility. Lang, Berlin a. a. 2000, ISBN 3-631-35741-9 .
  • Paul Naredi-Rainer (ed.): Symbol and image. About the function of the picture. University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck 1994, ISBN 3-901249-09-5 (Innsbruck Art History Studies NF Vol. 1)
  • Oliver R. Scholz: image, representation, sign. Philosophical theories of pictorial representation. Alber, Freiburg / Munich 1991, 3rd edition Klostermann, Frankfurt 2009, ISBN 978-3-465-04083-5 .
  • PW Simonow: Reflection Theory and Psychophysiology of Emotions. Publishing house Volk und Gesundheit, Berlin / Ost 1975.
  • Bernhard Waldenfels : mirror, trace and image. To the genesis of the picture. Salon, Cologne 2003, ISBN 3-89770-033-6 (édition questions vol. 8)
  • Lambert Wiesing : Artificial Presence. Studies on the Philosophy of the Image. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 2005, ISBN 978-3-518-29337-9 .

Web links

Wiktionary: image  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. Heraklit , fragment B 45.
  2. Heraclitus, fragment 55.
  3. Heraclitus, fragment 56
  4. Lucretius : De rerum natura IV.
  5. ^ Plato: Phaedrus , 250 b
  6. ^ Plato, Timaeus 29b and 37c.
  7. a b Jürgen Nieraad: Image theory . In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy . Volume 1, 1-3.
  8. cf. Gene. 1, 26/27
  9. see also: Augustine's comparison of "Mundus intelligiblis" (world of reason), in which there is truth, and "Mundus sensiblis" (world of the senses), which is an image of the divinely determined world of the spirit and in which one can find truth only comes close, in the treatise Contra Academicos, chap. 3
  10. See for example Mauritius Wilde: The new image of the image of God, image and theology in Meister Eckhart. Univ.-Verlag, Freiburg / Switzerland 2000, ISBN 3-7278-1298-2 . Wilde analyzes Eckhart's vivid illustrations, for example using mirror images, and deals briefly with some of his predecessors, initially within the Dominican School . The theoretical background in particular: Burkhard Mojsisch: Meister Eckhart, analogy, univocity and unity. Meiner, Hamburg 1983.
  11. John Locke: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding . I, 1.15; II, 1, 1;
  12. Berkeley: Principles of human knowledge . I, 33.
  13. René Descartes' theory of visual perception
  14. KrV B 179-182
  15. Wolfgang Röd: The way of philosophy from the beginnings to the 20th century . Volume 2, ed., CH Beck, Munich 2009, ISBN 3-406-58581-7 (Beck series 1391), pp. 102-103.
  16. WI Lenin: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909), in: Works . Berlin 1961ff, Volume 14.
  17. Marx / Engels 23, 27
  18. ^ Alfred Kosing , Dieter Wittich : Image theory (also: reflection theory) . In: Georg Klaus / Manfred Buhr (Hrsg.): Philosophical dictionary . 1st volume. 11th edition. Verlag das Europäische Buch, Berlin 1975, pp. 31–33 ( reprint of the 8th edition, Berlin 1970).
  19. ^ Wittgenstein: Tractatus . 1922.
  20. La condition humaine - Image . Archived from the original on May 6, 2009. Retrieved July 3, 2010.
  21. Olga Mataev: René Magritte. La Condition humaine. - Olga's Gallery . Retrieved July 3, 2010.
  22. ^ Wittgenstein: Tractatus . 1922.
  23. SdK 17
  24. SdK 20
  25. SdK 20, see KrV B. 75
  26. SdK 41
  27. SdK 164
  28. SdK 44-50
  29. ^ SdK 209
  30. ^ SdK 59
  31. William James: The Pragmatism . A new name for some old way of thinking . Translated by Wilhelm Jerusalem, 2nd edition, Meiner, Hamburg 1994, p. 149.
  32. ^ Hilary Putnam: The Craving for Objectivity . In: Hilary Putnam: Realism with a Human Face . Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1990, pp. 120-131, here p. 131; see also Hilary Putnam: Reason, Truth and History . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1982, p. 11.
This version was added to the list of articles worth reading on January 14, 2006 .