Hume's Law

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As Hume's Law (also humesches law or His-Shall dichotomy ) is a metaethisches called principle that not one of his to an Shall can be closed or not of a lot of purely descriptive statements easily on normative or prescriptive closed logical statements can.

Historical formulation by David Hume

Hume's Law refers as a short title to an argument by the Scottish philosopher and historian David Hume (1711–1776). He emphasized that all systems of philosophical ethics known to him move from descriptive statements about what is (to be) or not is to statements about what should or should not be. However, both types of statements are very different. A deduction from the former to the latter is simply incomprehensible.

In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark'd, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz'd to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, 'tis necessary that it shou'd be observ'd and explain'd; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it ... [I] am persuaded, that a small attention wou'd subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceiv'd by reason.

“In every system of morality that I have come across so far, I have always found that the author advances for a certain time in the usual way of reasoning and justifies that there is a God, or makes observations about human behavior; then suddenly I am surprised to find that instead of the usual sentence combinations, namely 'is' and 'is not', I only come across sentences that are connected with 'should' or 'should not'. This change happens imperceptibly. However, it is very important. This 'should' or 'should not' express a new connection or assertion. Therefore it must necessarily be observed and explained. At the same time, a reason must necessarily be given for what seems completely incomprehensible: namely, how this new connection can be a logical consequence of other, completely different connections ... I am convinced that such a slight attention would overturn all customary moral systems . It would also show us that the distinction between vice and virtue is not only based on the relationships between objects and is also not perceived with reason. "

- David Hume : A Treatise of Human Nature (Book III, Part I, Chapter I)

According to this ironic aside in A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–1740), Hume's contemporaries of moral philosophy are subject to a fallacy . The reader is advised to pay close attention to whether an explanation or justification for their conclusions is given by descriptions of should statements.

While Hume can be understood to the effect that such a conclusion is excluded in principle, the question of whether and how such conclusions could actually be justified remains an important topic in metaethics, which is often referred to as the problem of should-be for short .

Hume explains his law with the division of consciousness in reason ( reason ) and will . The task of reason is a correspondence between conviction and reality, in other words the knowledge of truth . The will, on the other hand, is geared towards shaping reality according to wishes and intentions and has a component that motivates human action . Reason has no motivating force, while the will, on the other hand, is not based on an objective truth.

Hume's separation of will and reason leads him to the view that ought presupposes participation of the will, since otherwise it cannot have a guiding function. On the other hand, since moral judgments do not arise solely from reason, they have no correspondence in the facts and are also not completely brought into agreement with them. In contrast, ethical terms and judgments occurring in everyday use always have a descriptive and prescriptive content.

Differentiation from the "naturalistic fallacy"

Hume's Law is often interpreted to prohibit what is known as the naturalistic fallacy . Despite the close relationship (from both follows the inadmissibility of the inference from being to ought), the thesis of the naturalistic fallacy and Hume's law must be distinguished. Hume's law is a thesis about the logical structure of ethical forms of justification, while the naturalistic fallacy is a thesis about the semantics of the adjective “good”. This is namely indefinable and therefore not reducible to naturalistic terms. Hume's law states that a transition from descriptive to normative statements is not possible through purely logical deductions; However, this does not exclude the possibility that there are normative sentences that assign natural properties to quality qualities, or that there are normative sentences that place certain should statements under the condition of certain actual statements. With the addition of such sentences (bridging principles) a transition from being to ought is definitely possible. However, it is only legitimate if the normative 'bridging principle' used has already been recognized as valid. A legitimation of ought at all only from being is therefore not possible, but only from other ought.

However, according to George Edward Moore , such bridging principles are inadmissible because of the open question argument. For Moore, therefore, every transition from being to ought, which he subordinates primarily to naturalistic ethics, but also to metaphysical ethics, is a naturalistic fallacy .

Skeptical consequence?

If one connects the should-be problem with Hume's fork (the idea that all areas of knowledge are based either on ( analytical ) logic and definitions or on (empirical) experience and observation), the validity of normative statements becomes questionable. If ought-to-be statements cannot appear in either analytical or empirical sentences, the consequence is that there is no moral knowledge. This problem led, among other things, to moral skepticism and noncognitivism .

David Hume himself saw the root of moral values ​​ultimately in feeling and tradition . But he also stated that it is ultimately irrelevant for people what origin their moral convictions have (whether they can be determined objectively or only based on their subjective worldview), since they have the same "reality", i.e. the same action-guiding force, for their behavior owned.

The criticism of Hume's law primarily attacks the delimitation of normative and descriptive terms. In the legal philosophical school of legal positivism , which was important in the 20th century , for example in the pure doctrine of law by Hans Kelsen , a strict separation of being and ought is assumed.

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  1. ↑ Such a common paraphrase today, cf. e.g. Gillian Russell: In Defense of Hume's Law ( Memento of February 5, 2013 in the Internet Archive ) (PDF; 2.4 MB) , in: Charles Pigden (ed.): Hume on Is and Ought , Palgrave MacMillan, New York 2010 .
  2. ↑ See Julian Dodd and Suzanne Stern-Gillet: The Is / Ought Gap, the Fact / Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy , Dialogue, 34, pp. 727-746