Naturalistic fallacy
As naturalistic fallacy (Engl. Naturalistic fallacy ), the test is referred to the property as "good" a certain descriptive define natural or metaphysical property or relation. The naturalistic fallacy was described by George Edward Moore in his 1903 work Principia ethica . According to Moore, the naturalistic fallacy is a fallacy of naturalistic ethics as well as most non-naturalistic ethics, especially all metaphysical ethics, and represents a case of reductionism .
There is a certain affinity to the moralistic fallacy , which assumes that properties that are associated with certain ethical values express natural tendencies. Moore's argument is directed against the reduction of ethical and natural predicates in both directions.
A well-known example is the derivation of a “right of the strong” from the observation that in nature the stronger survives (in the conviction that this natural is good).
Moore's argument
According to Moore, evaluative ( prescriptive ) statements cannot be defined on the basis of natural or supernatural properties. Already David Hume had pointed out that one can not conclude from a description of the state of the world on an ethical imperative without additional assumptions ( is-ought problem ). The attempt to conclude this way is therefore also referred to as the “should-be-fallacy”. A correct conclusion on an evaluative statement requires at least one evaluating premise . According to Moore, this premise must contain good , bid or a comparable value predicate at least implicitly and be traced back to descriptive predicates. According to Moore, such a premise turns naturalistic justifications of ethics into a petitio principii (dt. Circular reasoning ).
In contrast to Hume, Moore, strictly speaking, does not speak of a conclusion, as the German translation suggests, but of fallacy , i.e. an error. Whether the conclusion called naturalistic fallacy is actually a fallacy or a logical error is indeed controversial and depends, for example, on whether descriptive and prescriptive predicates can always be clearly distinguished. Moore rejects the possibility of defining the good in the way naturalistic or what he classifies as metaphysical ethics attempt. According to his metaethical position, it should be possible to intuitively decide which things can be classified as good (or as bad). Moore builds an intuitionist ethic on this. On the other hand, with every proposed definition, one could always question whether the proposed property is really good, i.e. involves an ethical obligation or whether it results in positive attributions (the argument of the open question ). Also because the alleged fallacy or error is not specifically just a problem of ethical naturalism , as the term “naturalistic fallacy” initially suggests, it is occasionally criticized as inaccurate.
Examples in the Principia ethica
As an example of a naturalistic fallacy within a naturalistic ethic, Moore cites in his Principia ethica the suggestion popular in naturalistic circles that good is to be equated with natural . This is wrong, however, since the natural, as far as normal or necessary is meant, cannot seriously be accepted as always good or as the only good things:
“As typical of naturalistic views, other than Hedonism, there was first taken the popular commendation of what is natural: it was pointed out that by natural there might here be meant either normal or necessary, and that neither the normal nor the necessary could be seriously supposed to be either always good or the only good things. "
Moore also sees the equation of good and pleasant ( pleasant ) or desirable ( desirable ), as was assumed by the hedonists and the utilitarian John Stuart Mill , as a naturalistic fallacy. He notes that for Mill as Desirable implicitly apply only such desires would that be desirable should :
“Mill has made as naïve and artless a use of the naturalistic fallacy as anybody could desire. “Good”, he tells us, means “desirable”, and you can only find out what is desirable by seeking to find out what is actually desired […]. The fact is that “desirable” does not mean “able to be desired” as “visible” means “able to be seen.” The desirable means simply what ought to be desired or deserves to be desired; just as the detestable means not what can be but what ought to be detested [...] ”
According to Moore, naturalistic fallacies also occur in metaphysical ethics. Moore cites the ethics of Spinoza , Kant and the Stoics as an example . For example, the good cannot be defined simply by following metaphysically justified instructions, whether in the sense of a categorical imperative or the commandments of a supernatural authority:
“And Kant also commits the fallacy of supposing that 'This ought to be' means 'This is commanded'. He conceives the Moral Law to be an Imperative. And this is a very common mistake. "
Bartley's argument
From WW Bartley's point of view , the naturalistic fallacy is inadmissible because it presupposes the possibility of justification . Bartley, however, interprets the Munchausen Trilemma in such a way that there can be no absolute justifications, so an ought cannot be adequately justified by a being. Instead, consistency checks can only be carried out for him within the sets of prescriptive and descriptive statements: One can check whether what is to be done is compatible with other things that are also to be done. One can also criticize the ought with being by checking whether what is to be done can also be done. Seen logically, one cannot derive ethical demands from empirical theories, but only falsify them ; Bartley sees here an analogy to the relationship between empirical theories and observational sentences in critical rationalism .
criticism
The encyclopedia of philosophy divides the critics of the conception of the naturalistic fallacy according to their reasons for rejection into ontological ethicists, naturalistic reductionists and internal realists.
Against the thesis that the predicate “is good” cannot be reduced to a descriptive one, advocates of natural law argue, among other things, that there is no alternative to being. If the ought could not necessarily be derived from being, then no ethics at all would be possible, since nothing can justify anything. Incidentally, intuition is also a being, but it alone is not sufficient for a scientific justification of an ethical system. According to the doctrine of natural law, the good is that which is just, that is, that which corresponds to the unchangeable essence of things.
The assumptions behind the concept of the naturalistic fallacy have also been criticized by linguists . In his contribution to speech act theory , John Searle speaks of the “ naturalistic fallacy fallacy ”. The linguistic description of what is necessarily contains normative elements. What is included in the canon of human language and thus in the discourse has already been changed in an evaluative way. Therefore there can be no “value-free” description of objective things, and the ought is already implicit in the naming of what is. Even Hilary Putnam's internal realism assumes that the transition from factual statements about statements about norms and values is possible.
The naturalistic fallacy was viewed critically by William K. Frankena in an article in the journal Mind . Frankena's approach was taken up by Arthur Norman Prior , for example , who undertook a historical analysis of the should-be dichotomy in Logic and the Basis of Ethics and stated that Moore's formulation was insufficient to reject an intelligent naturalism.
literature
- William K. Frankena : The Naturalistic Fallacy. In: Mind 48, 1939, pp. 464–477 (German in: G. Grewendorf / G. Meggle (Ed.): Seminar: Language and Ethics. On the Development of Metaethics . Frankfurt am Main 1974).
- Alexis Fritz: The naturalistic fallacy. The end of a knock-out argument , Herder / Academic Press, Freiburg / Switzerland 2009, ISBN 978-3-451-31064-5 / ISBN 978-3-7278-1643-7 .
- Barbara Merker: Naturalistic fallacy . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 1: A – N, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, p. 914 f.
Individual evidence
- ^ GE Moore: Principia Ethica . On: fair-use.org .
- ↑ Michael Ridge: Moral Non-Naturalism . In: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- ↑ Discussed for example by Lukas Gschwend: Foreword to Ignaz Paul Troxler: Philosophical legal theory of nature and the law, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2006, p. 33. ISBN 3-8260-3140-7
- ^ B. Williams: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Harvard University Press, 1985.
- ↑ Article History of Utilitarianism . In: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
- ^ WW Bartley: Theories of Demarcation Between Science and Metaphysics. Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics 49 (1968), pp. 49-119
- ↑ Barbara Merker: Naturalistic fallacy . In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy . Vol. 1: A – N, Meiner, Hamburg 1999, p. 914 f.
- ^ William K. Frankena: The Naturalistic Fallacy. In: Mind 48, 1939, pp. 464–477.
- ^ Arthur Norman Prior, Logic and the Basis of Ethics , Oxford University Press, 1959 ( ISBN 0-19-824157-7 )