Observation set

Empirical observation sentences , also protocol sentences , are called statements in logical empiricism , about the validity of which an intersubjective agreement can be reached through sensory observation. They serve as an empirical basis for testing theories and were the subject of the protocol sentence debate of the Vienna Circle at the beginning of the 1930s. Opinions held up until then that observation sentences offer an absolutely secure basis have largely been abandoned as a result of the debate and replaced by fallibilism . Accordingly, an intersubjective agreement can be reached in the context of a research context with such sentences through empirical testing, but this is always provisional insofar as observational sentences can ultimately prove to be wrong through further checks. The problem of protocol records is the subject of the basic problem of experience .

Observation theorem (Moritz Schlick)

According to Moritz Schlick , only one's own statement in which the contact between theory and reality comes about can offer absolute certainty. An experience of fulfillment, caused by the agreement of prediction and stating, leads to the formulation of observation sentences. These observational sentences are only absolutely certain at the exact point in time when they were formulated. After this point in time, they turn into hypotheses without mandatory absoluteness, since sources of error (memory errors, incorrect writing, etc.) can then be present. For this reason, Schlick also sees a difference between protocol records and observation records. The protocol sentence is that sentence which addresses the perception of a subject. The stating does not do this because it cannot be written down.

It is criticized that even a subjective certain experience does not guarantee certain intersubjective statements, the induction problem is not solved and the subjective certainty of one's own experience is not certain.

Protocol record (Otto Neurath)

Motivated by Pierre Duhem's thesis that all observations are full of theory, Otto Neurath criticized Schlick's view of the absolute certainty of observational sentences as a metaphysical pseudo thesis . According to Neurath, theories must be brought into agreement with protocol sentences. These must be formulated inter subjective and contain a reference to a (perceiving) person, for example in the form: "The person has at the time at the place perceived this and that." According to Neurath, protocol records have no absolute certainty, but their recognition is based on conventions. ${\ displaystyle X}$ ${\ displaystyle t}$ ${\ displaystyle O}$

Neurath suggested a form for minutes in which a person's name always occurs several times in a certain combination with other terms: "Otto's protocol at 3:17 pm: [Otto's speech thinking was at 3:16 pm: (In the room was at 3:15 am a table perceived by Otto)] "

Observation theorem (Rudolf Carnap)

According to Rudolf Carnap, the difference between singular sentences , to which the observation sentences belong, and general statements (for example natural laws) is only gradual, so that singular sentences as well as general statements cannot ultimately be finally verified. According to Carnap, the acceptance or rejection of an observational sentence therefore contains an intersubjective conventional component, since there is no general rule for the acceptance or rejection of a sentence. In principle, every observation sentence can also be discarded. In addition to the conventional component, there is also an objective component that results from the observation made. Observations can e.g. B. be so clear that in practice one cannot help but accept an observation sentence, even if it is theoretically possible to reject it. According to Carnap, observational sentences are not absolutely certain truths, but neither are they pure conventions. Carnap divided the scientific language into a theoretical artificial language and an empirical observation language, to which the observation sentences belong.

Basic set (Karl Popper)

Karl Popper treats protocol sentences as the problem of the empirical basis (in short: "basic problem") in the logic of research (1934). In his opinion, there can be no pure protocol sentences, since they already presuppose theories, that is, they are “theory-guided” and already contain an interpretation , e.g. B. the naming of perceived objects, identification of people and places. A singular statement asserts far more than we ever perceive; Popper calls this the "transcendence of representation".

Popper therefore introduced the concept of "basic sentences". With Popper, basic sentences have instead of “The person has perceived the place at the time : the table is white” the form “The table is currently at the place is white”, because this makes an objective statement about the table itself, not just a statement about the subjective impression of a particular person. ${\ displaystyle X}$ ${\ displaystyle t}$ ${\ displaystyle O}$ ${\ displaystyle t}$ ${\ displaystyle O}$

They are not given the character of evidence; instead, they are of a conventional nature. Because if we accept observations as true or false, we decide on the basis of an uncertain assessment of the relevant observation situation. These decisions can therefore always be revised on the basis of further and / or other observations.

Nonetheless, there is a modification of his epistemology resulting from a simplified reception of Popper's work, which falls back on protocol sentences instead of basic sentences and is therefore referred to as dogmatic falsificationism .

Observation Theorem (Willard Van Orman Quine)

Willard Van Orman Quine's view of observational sentences is shaped by his radical empiricism, behaviorism, and naturalistic holism. In contrast to Carnap, Quine does not think it is possible to make a sharp distinction between theoretical and observational language. Since for him theory and language are inextricably linked, the boundary between the two is fluid. In spite of this, Quine sticks to the observational sentences, which for him are distinguished by their intersubjectivity and the close causal connection to the sensory receptors from the other sentences. Specifically, these two requirements mean that judgments about the observational sentences depend only on stimulation of the sensory receptors and only on the stored information that is necessary for their understanding, as well as that all members of a language community arrive at the same judgment about them, provided they are exposed to the same sensory stimuli .

literature

Rudolf Carnap: About protocol sentences . In: Knowledge . Leipzig, Vol. 3, No. 2/3, 1932, pp. 215-228. Reply to Otto Neurath. doi: /10.1007/BF01886421
Rudolf Carnap: Observational Language and Theoretical Language. In: Dialectica , 12, 1958, pp. 236–248, doi: /10.1111/j.1746-8361.1958.tb01461.x (full text; PDF)
Otto Neurath: Minutes . In: Knowledge . Leipzig, Vol. 3, No. 2/3, 1932, pp. 204-212. Also in Haller / Rutte: Collected philosophical and methodological writings . Vol. 2. doi: /10.1007/BF01886420
Peter Ehlen, Gerd Haeffner, Friedo Ricken: Philosophy of the 20th Century. 3rd edition. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2010, pp. 337–343.
Wolfgang Stegmüller : Main currents of contemporary philosophy. Vol. I, Chapter IX, ISBN 3-520-30807-X .
Rainer Schnell , Paul B. Hill , Elke Esser: Methods of empirical social research . 10th edition. Oldenbourg, Munich 2013, ISBN 978-3-486-59106-4 , pp. 75–79 ( limited preview in Google Book Search).

Individual evidence

^ Moritz Schlick: About the foundation of knowledge. P. 513 , accessed January 18, 2020 .
↑ Hans Günther Russ: Theory of Science, Epistemology and the Search for Truth. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer 2004 (Kohlhammer-Urban-Taschenbücher; 59), ISBN 3-17-018190-4 , p. 71
^ Thomas Mormann: Rudolf Carnap . Beck, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-406-41954-2 , p. 112 ( limited preview in Google Book search).
↑ ^a ^b Herbert Keuth: Science and value judgment. On discussion of value judgments and the argument about positivism . JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1989, ISBN 3-16-345453-4 , p. 101–107 ( limited preview in Google Book search).

[1] Moritz Schlick: About the foundation of knowledge. P. 513 , accessed January 18, 2020 .

[2] Hans Günther Russ: Theory of Science, Epistemology and the Search for Truth. Stuttgart, Kohlhammer 2004 (Kohlhammer-Urban-Taschenbücher; 59), ISBN 3-17-018190-4 , p. 71

[Mormann_2000-3] Thomas Mormann: Rudolf Carnap . Beck, Munich 2000, ISBN 3-406-41954-2 , p. 112 ( limited preview in Google Book search).

[Keuth1989-4] Herbert Keuth: Science and value judgment. On discussion of value judgments and the argument about positivism . JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1989, ISBN 3-16-345453-4 , p. 101–107 ( limited preview in Google Book search).