Speech act theory

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The speech act theories or speech act theories address linguistic utterances as sub-areas of linguistic pragmatics , e.g. B. Speeches that not only describe facts and make claims, but also perform actions (acts) themselves . Accordingly, commands, naming, oaths, promises, warnings, insults, etc. active changes in reality. The essays published mainly in the 1950s and 60s on the basis of this theory analyze and classify such linguistic acts and their implications. Key representatives include John Langshaw Austin (How to Do Things with Words) and John Searle .


Speech act theory was born in 1955, when John Langshaw Austin gave a series of lectures entitled How to Do Things with Words at Harvard University . It was published posthumously in 1962; a German translation appeared in 1972 under the title Zur Theorie der Speechakte . The book Speech Acts, published in 1969 by John Searle , a student of Austin, is largely responsible for the dissemination of ideas on speech act theory, in which certain aspects of Austin's thoughts are more systematized, but others are also neglected or recorded. In particular, Searle developed a model for the description of individual speech act types using the example of the speech act of "promise".

The first reflections on a theory of language action and the designation of a statement as an "act" can already be found in Charles S. Peirce . He differentiated between the sentence as such and the statement: “Let us distinguish between the sentence [proposition] and the statement [assertion] of that sentence. We are happy to admit that the sentence itself is just an image with a label or a pointer attached to it. But to say that sentence means for him to take responsibility. ”(CP 5.343) As an example Peirce chose the act of swearing an oath:“ It is not just saying, but acting . The law calls it an act, I believe. "(CP 5.346)

In a certain way, Ludwig Wittgenstein can be seen as a pioneer of speech act theory in terms of the philosophy of language (“words are deeds”). In the Philosophical Investigations published posthumously in 1953 , he already explicitly speaks out against the theory that words generally only serve to name things:

“As if with the act of naming, what we are going to continue to do is already given. As if there was only one thing that means: 'to talk about things'. While we do the most diverse things with our sentences. ”(PU p. 28, §27) Wittgenstein opposes the thesis of language as“ naming ”(and nothing but naming) with the idea that“ speaking ”is also“ acting ” : "The word ' language game ' is intended to emphasize that speaking the language is part of an activity or a way of life" (ibid., P. 26, §23). Some examples later used by Austin for speech acts, such as commands, requests or thanks.

However, this tradition has to be taken with the utmost caution as the cognitive interests of Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searles, but John Austin, are especially very different. In particular, the attempt to further base Searle's speech act theory in a theory of the human mind makes it clear that the key questions of speech act theory with Wittgenstein's language game thinking are more likely to be criticized. The unchecked appeal to Wittgenstein, whose still unsystematic ideas Searle systematized, is incorrect in terms of the history of ideas. This becomes particularly clear with the term rule- rule sequences , since speech act theory - like other grammar theories (e.g. Noam Chomsky's Generative Transformation Grammar ) - has to assume through the introduction of a technical concept of rules that rules can be followed without them (in what form always!) to express. This idea finds its sharpest criticism in Wittgenstein's philosophical investigations (see Matthias Ohler: Language and its rationale ).

Speech acts

While Austin divides a speech act into three sub-acts, his student Searle distinguishes four such sub-acts, which take place simultaneously in an everyday communication process. Both researchers have the intention of the speaker ( illocution ) and the effect ( perlocution ) in common. In addition, there is the correct use of linguistic expressions ( locution , in the locutive act or in the act of utterance).

Austin theory

According to Austin, the following acts can be distinguished, which run simultaneously:

1. The locutionary act

The locutionary act (from Latin locūtiō = 'language' or loquor = 'I speak'): the act of ' saying something ' ( saying something "in the full normal sense", as Austin says), consisting of three sub-acts:

  • Phonetic Act (phonetic act) : the making of speech sounds and sound chains that can be recorded in phonetic writing a particular language.
  • Phatic act: the production of utterances that are formed according to the rules of the grammar of a particular language using words (lexemes) and syntactic structures.
  • Rhetical act: the production of utterances that have a meaningful relation to objects and events in the world (reference) as well as meaning (sense) by making statements about the reference objects .

An example: Hannah says to her friend: “Drive carefully, the road up there in the curve is smooth.” She thus produces a chain of sounds (phonetic act), which is a grammatical utterance of German (phatic act), and thus points on a job, assigns a quality to it and expresses itself about the driving behavior of your friend (rhetorical act).

2. The illocutionary or illocutive act

The illocutive act: performing a conventional speech act, such as a question, request, warning, recommendation, threat, etc. ( doing something in saying something , as Austin says).

The illocutionary act is the central aspect of a speech act and contains the interpersonal determination. From a social interaction, a speech act - the act of expression - is carried out (that which is to be communicated), from the third aspect of which the listener may draw a conclusion.

For the previous example, this means: Hannah uses her sentence to draw the attention of her friend to the danger spot and issues a warning. With this example one can understand Searle's criticism that illocutionary and rhetical acts can hardly be separated.

3. The perlocutionary or perlocutive act

The perlocutive act is the achievement of an effect that goes beyond the illocutionary act, such as convincing, changing one's mind, annoying, unsettling, offending, comforting, etc. ( doing something by saying something, as Austin says).

Example: Hannah intends to use her utterance to influence the behavior of her boyfriend by persuading her. If he understands the speech act, this has consequences (a perlocutionary effect) for the further communication and action process (reduction of the speed and / or continuation of the conversation).

According to Austin, a distinction must be made between the perlocutionary act and the perlocutionary effect. The perlocutionary effect is the effect that occurs due to a perlocutionary act. The speaker can e.g. B. intended to make the listener laugh. The actual effect, however, is that the listener is annoyed. The intended perlocutionary act of the speaker has thus failed. One can only speak of the execution of a perlocutionary act if the intention of the speaker agrees with the actual effect.

The perlocutionary act is linked to the illocutionary act by a "through that relation", i.e. H. causal. Accordingly, this is the result of a speech act. On the other hand, the illocutionary act is connected to the locutionary act by a “being-in-relation”; H. inclusive. Accordingly, this is the result of a speech act and coincides with its execution.


  1. A speaker performs the perlocutionary act of offending the listener by performing the illocutionary act of assertion by performing a locutionary act, e.g. B. the statement "You are ugly."
  2. A speaker performs the perlocutionary act of unsettling the listener by performing the illocutionary act of questioning, by performing a locutionary act, e.g. B. the statement: "When was the last time you took a shower?"
  3. A speaker performs the perlocutionary act of diverting the listener from something by performing the illocutionary act of warning, by performing a locutionary act, e.g. B. the statement: "It is too dangerous what you are planning."

Searle's theory

While Austin divides a speech act into three partial acts, Searle distinguishes four such partial acts.

  1. Act of expression
  2. propositional act
  3. illocutionary act (as in Austin)
  4. perlocutionary act (as in Austin)

The changes to Austin's theory proposed by Searle mainly concern the rhetical act. Since this is indistinguishable from the illocutionary act, he replaces it with the propositional act and redefines it by differentiating it into reference act and predication act. He summarizes the phonetic and the phatic act under the concept of the act of utterance.

1. Act of expression

(utterance act) : The utterance act combines the phonetic and the phatic act in Austin, i.e. H. it consists of producing utterances according to the rules of phonology and grammar of a language.

2. propositional act

(propositional act) : According to Searle, the propositional act consists in turn of two partial acts, the reference act and the predication act. With the act of reference, the speaker refers to certain objects in the world, e.g. B. with the proper name "Peter" on the person Peter. With the act of predication, the speaker assigns a quality to the object to which he has referred (e.g. “is brave”). In the following speech acts, the speaker performs the same propositional act: Peter is brave. Is Peter Brave? Peter, be brave! . One does not only predict and report on assertions, but also on other illocutionary acts.

3rd illocutionary act

like Austin

4th perlocutionary act

like Austin

Speech act theory as meaning theory

Speech act theory is - according to some theorists, but not Austin! - not only a theory of linguistic action, but also a theory of sentence meaning. Speech act theory thus calls for an expansion of the concept of meaning : the explication of “meaning” cannot, as in the one-sided logic- oriented philosophy of language, only take recourse to truth conditions. In addition to assessing their truthfulness , linguistic utterances require an assessment under other aspects such as success or failure. Speech acts are complex actions whose components are hierarchically layered on top of each other. This stratification analyzes speech act theory and shows how one accomplishes something by doing something, by saying something, by saying something.

The sentence meaning of an utterance like (1) includes the meaning component that (1) is a question, the meaning of (2) that it is a prohibition.

  1. "Where is the train station here?"
  2. "You are not allowed to smoke here!"

In this case it is said that the utterance has a certain 'illocutionary role' or “illocution”. Speakers perform illocutionary acts, utterances have “illocutionary roles” or “illocution”. The illocutionary role of an utterance can be recognized by the so-called illocution indicators. The indicators of illocation include:

sentence position
"Peter smokes." "Does Peter smoke?"
Modal particles
"Can you be silent?" "Can you stay silent?"
so-called performative verbs
"I ask you to help me." Or: "I advise you to take the job."
“You come from Braunschweig?” (Position of a “statement” with increasing intonation. Illocation: question.)

Classification of speech acts (Searle)

Searle uses twelve criteria to classify illocations , three of which are:

Illocutionary joke
With the illocutionary joke he describes the purpose of a speech act.
This is how the real world and words relate to one another. Are the words based on the real world (like a description) or should the world be based on the words (like e.g. an order or a promise)?
Expressed mental state
What internal state is the utterance based on? In a description it is based e.g. B. insist that the speaker believes what he is saying. However, the inner state does not have to be the actual psychological state. Rather, it is the state that a speaker is expressing. When someone thanks them, they are expressing gratitude - regardless of whether they are actually grateful or not.

According to these three criteria, Searle further divides the illocations into five classes:

purpose Alignment mental state Examples
Representative a tell how it behaves Word on world Faith claim, communicate, report
Directives induce someone to act / omit Word on word wish ask, command, advise
Commissiva commit yourself to an act / omission Word on word intention promise, agree, offer, threaten
Expressiva Expression of one's own emotional state no Status thank, greet, congratulate, complain
Declaratives change the world by saying what is said both One's responsibility for an act appoint, dismiss, baptize

Representatives (also called assertiva, assertive) are speech acts such as: ascertain, assert, report, testify, conclude, etc. What they have in common is that they “fix the speaker on the truth or falsity of the proposition expressed in the utterance ”. Assertiva "oblige the speaker to the truth of the expressed proposition".

Direktiva or directive speech acts
A speaker obliges his listener to carry out an action. Directional speech acts are determined by directive verbs: ask, ask, command, all verbs in the imperative.
Commissiva or commissive speech acts
A speaker undertakes to carry out a future action. Commissive speech acts are determined by commissive verbs: promise, vow, swear, threaten, etc.
Expressiva or expressive speech acts,
in which a speaker expresses his psychological state and thereby uses social "rules of sincerity". Expressive speech acts are determined by expressive verbs: thank, congratulate, excuse, condolate, etc.
Declaratives or declarative speech acts,
in which, on the basis of a certain social institution (e.g. school, church, offices, etc.) a certain condition is established. Declarative speech acts are determined by declarative verbs: baptize, appoint, resign, etc. Examples of typical declarative utterances are:
  • "I hereby declare my resignation ..."
  • "In the name of …"
  • "In my function as ... I declare ..."

Explicit and implicit, direct and indirect speech acts

Explicit speech acts are e.g. B. "I hereby promise to do X" or "I hereby name this ship the name Y". One speaks of explicitly performative direct speech acts. Explicitly performative because a so-called performative verb is used, in the first example “promise”, in the second “baptize”. One speaks of direct speech acts because the proposition (“X to do”) corresponds exactly to the illocutionary joke, the goal of the utterance.

In contrast, there are also implicit (primary), direct speech acts. These are much more common. For the explicitly performative, direct speech act “I promise to do X”, the implicitly performative “I will do X” is, so the performative verb is simply left out.

In addition, there are - at least according to Searle - also indirect speech acts. Here the illocutionary goal is not recognizable from the proposition. Indirect speech acts refer to conditions that exist for a speech act (type). You can z. B. say “Give me the salt!”, But you can just as easily refer to an introductory condition for this speech act: “The listener must be able to pass the salt”; accordingly one can ask “Can you hand me the salt?”. This is (literally) a question of the listener's ability to reach the salt. The illocutionary act that the speaker wants to perform is a request.

In the case of indirect speech acts, a distinction is made between primary and secondary illocution. The secondary illocution is literal, i.e. in our example the question of the listener's ability to pass the salt. The primary illocution, the actual goal of the utterance, is a request that can also be made by saying “Please give me the salt!”. One performs the primary speech act while performing the secondary. According to Searle's conception of indirect speech acts, the primary illocution (request) must be inferred from the secondary through a complicated sequence of conclusions. Only after these conclusions do the listener recognize, according to Searle, that it is not a question of the ability to act, but a request. In order for an indirect speech act to succeed, i.e. for the listener to recognize further propositional content beyond what has been said, the maxim must apply to the speaker: Be sincere and relevant! The maxim for the listener is: search for meaning! Both must also have the same (linguistic and extra-lingual) background knowledge. However, this position is not undisputed in research. Opponents of this view argue that the expression “Can you hand me the salt?” Conventionally means “Give me the salt, please!”. The listeners do not have to laboriously develop this.

Historical speech act analysis

Recently one can speak of the existence of a historical speech act analysis. Andreas Jucker, who also manages a bibliography on historical pragmatics, and Irma Taavitsainen have founded the Journal of Historical Pragmatics as the central publication organ . The question of how a certain speech act has been realized in the course of history also falls into the field of onomasiology (the journal Onomasiology Online published by Joachim Grzega , Alfred Bammesberger and Marion Schöner has also started to include articles from this area).

Other historical people

Ludwig Wittgenstein's controversially interpreted Philosophical Investigations (1953, posthumously) are often cited as a point of reference for speech act theories , insofar as the author uses the dyadic theory of meaning ("Every word has a meaning. [...] It is the object for which the word stands. “-PU 1) refuses. On the other hand, “[the] meaning of a word […] its use in language”, the rules of which are determined by the fact that linguistic utterances take on different functions in everyday communication in different situations (Wittgenstein called it “language game”). “See the sentence as an instrument, and its meaning as its use!” (PU 421) - (More under The semantic theory in the discussion. )

Charles Peirce relates his ideas of semiosis (i.e. the process of the development of a sign's effect) as the actual object of semiotics to ontology : to general categories of perception. He is concerned with epistemological universality and metaphysical universality . The starting point of his deliberation is the effect that the person assigns to the subject of a concept (object) in his imagination and which determines the conceptual content. Against this background, he developed a triadic relation in his pragmatic semiotics from the dyadic symbol model (the symbol - the representative - has a direct relation to the extra-linguistic object) by using an intermediate instance, the interpreter , which means: the individually recognized meaning, which arises through the interpretation of the speaker / listener in a - culturally pre-determined - context of action. Since the respective representative names are interpreted differently depending on the situation, the sign relationships are always perspective, i.e. This means that misunderstandings and deceptions can occur and the interpretation of the actual object (the dynamic object ) may have to be adapted. Understanding gives the signs an intersubjective interpretation that is accepted as conventional .

George H. Mead also designed a dynamic model: In his philosophy he examines the function of language in an interpersonal, social context and includes non-verbal communication in addition to verbal communication : Through words, gestures and facial expressions, people can create certain reactions in themselves and - in an interactionism - triggering in others, giving clues to yourself and thus triggering reactions in yourself and in others. In this way, the individual absorbs the social communication process and processes it. For Mead, this process is important for the development of identity through interaction. Mainly via the signs of language - through the cooperation of subjects - feedback occurs, however not in a simple behavioristic stimulus-reaction scheme , but in a complex process of consciousness (social behaviorism ): The human being registers the stimulus for the behavior like his behavior other is. In this way, he is able to control and correct his behavior and that of others, so that linguistic cooperation processes can be optimized. The speaker connects the reaction of the counterpart with his sign - the sign becomes significant, i.e. H. a symbol .

For Mead's student Charles W. Morris , pragmatics is to be understood as a relation of signs to interpreters (Foundations of the Theory of Signs, 1938). In his communication theory - similar to Peirce - he divides a sign into three parts for semiosis (sign process) , indirectly taking notes through the mediation of something third: the mediators are sign carriers ; the taking of notes are interpretants (instead of a concept or thought he uses a behavior: the interpretation is understood as a disposition of behavior, as an act of indirect taking of notes ); what is noted are designates (objects). Later he added the actors in this process to his model: the performers . Morris calls the part of semiotics that deals with the relationship between the character carrier and the interpreter pragmatics . In this context - in contrast to Peirce - he advocates a behavioristic view that observes the use of signs in a descriptive and empirical manner in a social context : “He defines interpretant as an effect that is triggered in some recipient and through which the thing in question becomes a sign appears ". “The interpreter of a sign is the habit by virtue of which the sign carrier is assigned the designation of certain types of objects or types of facts; ... “(Fundamentals of Sign Theory, 1988).

See also



  • William Alston : Illocutionary Acts and Sentence Meaning. Cornell University Press, Ithaca NY et al. a. 2000, ISBN 0-8014-3669-9 (attempt to build a bridge between speech act theory and semantics; the meaning of a sentence is to be understood as its potential for the execution of illocutionary acts).
  • John L. Austin : How to Do Things with Words (=  The William James Lectures. 1955, ZDB -ID 1101386-2 ). Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1962, (In German: On the theory of speech acts (=  Universal Library. Bd. 9396). German version by Eike von Savigny . Reclam, Stuttgart 1972, ISBN 3-15-009396-1 ).
  • George H. Mead : Mind, Self, and Society. University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL 1934, (In German: Spirit, Identity and Society from the View of Social Behaviorism. With an introduction, edited by Charles W. Morris . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1968).
  • Charles W. Morris: Foundations of the Theory of Sign (=  International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Vol. 1, No. 2, ZDB -ID 599244-8 ). University of Chicago Press, Chicago IL 1938.
  • Charles Sanders Peirce : Writings. Volume 2: From pragmatism to pragmatism. With an introduction edited by Karl-Otto Apel . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1970.
  • John R. Searle : Speech Acts. An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1969, (In German: Speech Files. An essay on the philosophy of language. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1971).
  • John R. Searle: Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 1979, ISBN 0-521-07184-4 (In German: Expression and meaning. Investigations on speech act theory (=  Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch Wissenschaft. 349). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1982, ISBN 3-518-27949-1 ; Various investigations on special problems in speech act theory, including the classification of speech acts and fictional speech).
  • Ludwig Wittgenstein : Philosophical investigations (=  library Suhrkamp. 1372). On the basis of the critical-genetic edition, newly edited by Joachim Schulte. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2003, ISBN 3-518-22372-0 .


  • Klaus Baumgärtner, Hugo Steger (Ed.): Funkkolleg Language. An introduction to modern linguistics. Beltz, Weinheim 1972.
  • Friedrich Christoph Dörge: Illocutionary Acts. Austin's account and what Searle made out of it. Tübingen 2004, digitized version (PDF; 1.83 MB) , (Tübingen, Eberhard-Karls-Universität, dissertation. 2004; affirmative reconstruction of Austin's speech act theory, comprehensive criticism of that of Searle).
  • Claus Ehrhardt, Hans Jürgen Heringer : Pragmatics (=  UTB 3480 Linguistics ). Fink, Paderborn 2011, ISBN 978-3-8252-3480-5 , p. 57 ff.
  • Götz Hindelang: Introduction to speech act theory. Speech acts, forms of expression, speech act sequences (=  Germanistic workbooks. 27). 5th, revised and expanded edition. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2010, ISBN 978-3-11-023147-2 .
  • Stephen C. Levinson: Pragmatics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge u. a. 1983, ISBN 0-521-29414-2 (In German: Pragmatik (=  Concepts of Linguistics and Literature Studies. Vol. 39). Translated into German by Ursula Fries. Niemeyer, Tübingen 1990, ISBN 3-484-22039-2 ).
  • Sven Staffeldt: Introduction to speech act theory. A guide for academic teaching (=  Stauffenburg introductions. Vol. 19). Stauffenburg, Tübingen 2008, ISBN 978-3-86057-292-4 .

further reading

  • Jacques Derrida , Limited Inc. 2 essays. Northwestern University Press, Evanston IL 1988, ISBN 0-8101-0788-0 (Harsh criticism of Searle).
  • Dirk Greimann, Geo Siegwart (Ed.): Truth and Speech Acts. Studies in the philosophy of language (=  Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. Vol. 5). Routledge, New York NY et al. a. 2007, ISBN 978-0-415-40651-2 .
  • Götz Hindelang, Young Sook Yang: Speech Act Theoretical Dialog Analysis. In: Sven Staffeldt, Jörg Hagemann (Hrsg.): Pragmatic Theories. Analysis in comparison (=  Stauffenburg introductions. Vol. 27). Stauffenburg, Tübingen 2014, ISBN 978-3-86057-807-0 , pp. 149-182.
  • Frank Liedtke : Grammar of Illocution. About speech acts and their forms of realization in German (=  Tübingen Contributions to Linguistics. 436). Narr, Tübingen 1998, ISBN 3-8233-5102-8 .
  • Anthonie Wilhelmus Marie Meijers: Speech Acts, Communication and Collective Intentionality beyond Searle's Individualism. s. n., s. l. 1994, ISBN 90-801946-1-1 , (Leiden, University, dissertation, 1994).
  • Eckard Rolf: Illocutionary forces. Basic concepts of the logic of illocution. Westdeutscher Verlag, Opladen 1997, ISBN 3-531-12921-X (gives a description of a large number of Illocutions on the basis of Searle / Vanderveken (1985)).
  • Eckard Rolf: The other Austin. For the reconstruction / deconstruction of performative utterances - from Searle to Derrida to Cavell and beyond. transcript-Verlag, Bielefeld 2009, ISBN 978-3-8376-1163-2 .
  • Thorsten Sander: speech sequences. Research on the grammar of discourses and texts. mentis, Paderborn 2002, ISBN 3-89785-062-1 (Simultaneously: Essen, Universität, Dissertation, 2001; examines the relationship between speech acts and conversations or texts).
  • Hans Julius Schneider: Imagination and Calculation. About the polarity of action and structure in language. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1992, ISBN 3-518-58114-7 .
  • Stephen R. Schiffer: Meaning. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1972, ISBN 0-19-824367-7 .
  • John Rogers Searle, Daniel Vanderveken: Foundations of Illocutionary Logic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1985, ISBN 0-521-26324-7 (formally demanding).
  • John R. Searle, et al .: (On) Searle on Conversation (=  Pragmatics & beyond. NS Vol. 21). Compiled and introduced by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren. Benjamin, Amsterdam a. a. 1992, ISBN 90-272-5033-2 (anthology on the relationship between individual speech acts and conversations).
  • Maria Ulkan: On the classification of speech acts. A basic theoretical case study (=  linguistic work. 174). Niemeyer, Tübingen 1992, ISBN 3-484-30174-0 .
  • Dieter Wunderlich: Studies on speech act theory (=  Suhrkamp-Taschenbuch. 172). Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 1976, ISBN 3-518-07772-4 .

Web links

Wiktionary: Speech act theory  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. both Peirce quotes in Ekkehard Martens : Introduction. In: Ekkehard Martens (Ed.): Pragmatism. Selected texts. By Ch. S. Peirce, W. James, F. C. S. Schiller, J. Dewey (=  Universal Library. 9799). Reclam, Stuttgart 1992, ISBN 3-15-009799-1 , pp. 3–60, here p. 8.
  2. ^ A b Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical investigations. 2003.
  3. “A speech act is primarily described by its communicative function or the speaker's intention (illocution). Further levels of description are the correct use of linguistic expressions (locution) and the effect (perlocution) of the speech act. ”In Lenz, F .: Speech act theory. In dictionaries for linguistics and communication studies (WSK) Online. De Gruyter, Berlin / Boston 2015, Retrieved 10 Feb 2017 (limited online)
  4. ^ Searle, John R .: A Classification of Illocutionary Acts . In: Language in Society, 5 (1) . 1976, p. 1-23 .
  5. Winfried Ulrich : Dictionary of basic linguistic terms. = Basic linguistic terms. 5th, completely revised edition. Borntraeger, Berlin a. a. 2002, ISBN 3-443-03111-0 , Speech Act Classification.
  6. ^ Norbert Fries: Assertive. In: Helmut Glück , Michael Rödel (Hrsg.): Metzler Lexikon Sprache. Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart 2016, ISBN 978-3-476-02641-5 , p. 63; Winfried Ulrich: Dictionary of basic linguistic terms. = Basic linguistic terms. 5th, completely revised edition. Borntraeger, Berlin et al. 2002, ISBN 3-443-03111-0 , speech act classification; Hermann Stadler (Ed.): German (=  Fischer-Kolleg Abiturwissen. ). Updated and revised new edition. Fischer, Frankfurt am Main 2002, ISBN 3-596-15600-9 , p. 69.
  7. ^ Norbert Fries: Assertive. In: Helmut Glück , Michael Rödel (Hrsg.): Metzler Lexikon Sprache. Metzler Verlag, Stuttgart 2016, ISBN 978-3-476-02641-5 , p. 63.
  8. ^ Peter Ernst: Pragmalinguistics. Basics, applications, problems. de Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 2002, ISBN 3-11-017013-2 , p. 102.