hedonism

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Hedonism (from ancient Greek ἡδονή hēdonḗ , German: Joy, Pleasure, Pleasure, Pleasure, Sensual Desire ' ; word formation with the suffix -ism ) mostly describes a philosophical or ethical trend whose basic thesis is that only pleasure or joy and avoidance of pain or suffering develop their effect intrinsically . In contrast to the philosophical understanding, the term hedonism is often used in everyday language to denote an egoistic attitude towards life that is only oriented towards momentary enjoyments . In this sense, the term hedonism is often used disparagingly and interpreted as a sign of decadence . The term “psychological hedonism” actually means that people generally only strive for pleasure or pleasure.

Philosophical hedonism

Antiquity

Aristippus of Cyrene , who died from 435 BC. Until approx. 355 BC And was a contemporary of Socrates and founder of the Cyrenean school , is considered the founder of hedonism. Aristippus distinguishes three states of the human soul, all of which can be understood under the allegory of ocean movements: pain is the storm of the soul , pleasure is gentle wave movement and in between lies perfect peace of mind, ataraxia . Here pleasure is expressly understood as “transitional pleasure”, namely as a transitional state from an unnatural state to a natural state. However, there is no difference between different lusts. This means that every pleasure, regardless of its nature, has the same quality. Insofar as pleasure corresponds to the natural state of man, the way to happiness, according to Aristippus, is to maximize pleasure while avoiding pain. He even claims that physical pleasure is the real meaning of life . However, the Cyrenaists are less concerned with a blueprint for a successful life ( eudaimonia ) , but rather with a concept of a successful moment, since it is entirely determined by pleasure and - only conveyed through this - the quantitative and resultant assessment of a successful life from its end.

Other important classical exponents of philosophical hedonism were Theodoros and Hegesias .

Epicurus connects to the terminology of Aristippus. From the few surviving statements it is concluded that with the word 'lust' he describes the joy of life as a principle of successful life. He also called ataraxia as pleasure, even as the highest pleasure. 'Ataraxia' means, among other things, serenity that arises when you have clarified the most important questions in life. He therefore differentiates between temporary feelings of pleasure (dynamic pleasure) and state pleasure (catastematic pleasure). The waking existence alone, insofar as it is free from pain, is most pleasurable. Researchers today describe this Epicurean zest for life as the "natural and healthy constitution of all vital functions". In contrast, other amusements are only variations that occur for a limited time. In Epicurus, an almost ascetic , virtuous way of life leads to the maintenance of catastatic pleasure . It is not possible for Epicurus to live with pleasure without living wisely, beautifully and justly. Opposed to the “unreasonable” desires are “reasonable” desires - desires that correspond to our nature, accordingly do not cause any harm and are easy to achieve. A person with a moderate desire, which is only focused on the bare essentials, will permanently experience the highest pleasure.

The “unreasonable” desires arise from the misjudgment of the mind about the natural and necessary. They arise from irrational ideas and fears - such as B. the fear of death. Accordingly, Epicurus sees the main task of philosophy in enlightening people about these very irrational ideas and fears in order to free them from irrational needs. His natural philosophy is geared towards bringing to light the natural and necessary aspects of being human and thus countering any irrational fears, revising them and thus enabling the human being to enjoy lasting and highest pleasure.

Modern

In contrast to antiquity, where considerations of morality always go hand in hand with considerations of the good life, these areas are separated in modernity. Hedonism now functions as a pure theory of the individually good (i.e. a pleasurable or joyful life is a good or successful life) or as a theory of values ​​(i.e. only pleasure is intrinsically valuable). Hedonism as a theory of the good life initially only makes a statement about what a good life is. The importance of a theory of the good life in the context of appropriate action decisions is not (yet) decided. Certain moral concepts that are often associated with hedonism (i.e. ethical egoism , amoralism and hedonistic utilitarianism ) should therefore be differentiated from hedonism. At least hedonism as a theory of the good life does not suggest a specific moral theory and can also be linked to deontological moral concepts .

In the French Enlightenment, hedonism was updated in the book L'art de jouir by Julien Offray de La Mettrie . His pupil Donatien Alphonse François de Sade also represented a hedonistic theory of the individual good, which he linked to amoralism.

However, it was only with Jeremy Bentham and his moral concept of hedonistic utilitarianism that hedonism regained popularity. Bentham advocates a quantitative hedonism on which he builds utilitarianism. Quantitative hedonism means that a life better runs, the more pleasure / joy (Engl .: pleasure - translates as "joy") is experienced, this "more" of joy from the duration of the expected joy and their intensity calculate is. For the decision to act, however, further circumstances should be taken into account: how certain it is that the joy can be achieved (certainty), the temporal distance to the expected joy (propinquity / remoteness) , the probability that further joy will follow and the probability (fecundity) , that pain or suffering can be expected after joy (purity) . This calculation is often referred to as hedonistic calculus . The decisive step towards utilitarianism (and thus towards a complete criterion for decision-making) is ultimately to apply this hedonistic calculus interpersonal and to maximize the overall benefit of all those affected by the action. To justify the individual ethical hedonism (joy is the only individual good), as well as what Henry Sidgwick called universal hedonism (i.e. hedonistic utilitarianism), Bentham cites so-called psychological hedonism:

“Nature has placed mankind under the rule of two sovereign masters - suffering and joy. It is up to them to show what we should do as well as to determine what we will do. Both the standard for right and wrong and the chain of causes and effects are tied to their throne. "

- Jeremy Bentham : in Höffe 1992, p. 55

Citing psychological hedonism as a justification for ethical hedonism was heavily criticized (but above all this was accused of John Stuart Mill , who also advocated psychological and ethical hedonism), because Hume's law is not observed here, i.e. inadmissible from being to ought will be closed. However, it can be argued that the derivation is not to be understood as a conclusive argument, but merely that being is viewed as a strong clue for what is ought.

Contemporary representatives of hedonistic positions are for example Michel Onfray , Torbjörn Tännsjö , Fred Feldman and Bernulf Kanitscheider . The international network Hedonist International often comes into action with a left-wing political background to emphasize the joy of action-oriented protest.

See also

literature

Web links

Wiktionary: Hedonism  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Wilhelm Gemoll : Greek-German school and hand dictionary . G. Freytag Verlag / Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, Munich / Vienna 1965.
  2. Hartmut Westermann, Moment, Duration and Eternity of Lust. On the relationship between hêdonê and eudaimonia in Cyrenean and Epicurean philosophy. In: Dominic Kaegi (ed.): Philosophy of lust . orell füssli, Zurich 2009, pp. 27–49, here p. 32.
  3. Dagmar Fenner: The good life. P. 40.
  4. On the concept of pleasure in Epicurus: Dagmar Fenner: The good life. Berlin / New York 2007, pp. 39–43.