Metalanguage

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A metalanguage is a " language about language". The language that a metalanguage speaks about is the associated object language .

Meta comes from the Greek (μετά) and means, among other things, something like 'behind', 'over'.

term

Meanings of the term "metalanguage"

Metalanguage generally refers to (1) a language about a language .

In the normal case and thus in the main meaning (2), metalanguage denotes a language about an object language in the sense of a language about non-linguistic objects. The examples below are school examples of these main meanings.

In another meaning (3) meta-language may be a meta-language on a meta language and is then (in the case of a two-stage Metasprachlichkeit) Metametasprache . So there is a metameta language , a metalanguage and an object language.

A pure metalanguage (4) should also be rare in artificial languages, so that the above definition describes an ideal.

Metalanguage is then in a weaker meaning (5) a language "in the even talk about sets of object language".

In summary, a metalanguage is a language about a language (1), which can either be an object language (2) or even a metalanguage (3), whereby this can be in pure form (4) or mixed with object language elements (5).

Ambiguity of the expression "object language"

The expression "object language", which corresponds to the expression metalanguage, is also ambiguous:

  • Language about non-linguistic objects
(= absolute object language; = lowest statement level (zero level); = first level language;);
  • Language that is the subject of a metalanguage (probably main meaning)
(= relative object language; = language that is "mentioned" as the object of the investigation, about which is talked about);
  • the natural language or everyday language

Examples of the main meanings

  • Example 1 :
    • Giessen is a city (object language).
    • 'Gießen' has six letters (metalanguage).
    • The phrase 'Giessen is a city' is descriptive (metalanguage).
    • From the sentences 'Anyone who writes a lot of books is not a good lecturer .' and 'Lecturer A. has written many books.' logically follows the sentence 'Lecturer A. is not a good lecturer.' (Metalanguage).
  • Example 2 :
    • Metalanguage = 2nd level = The sentence 'Vienna is a city' is true.
    • Object language = 1st level = Vienna is a city.
    • Object = 0. level = {Vienna, [is a city]}
  • Example 3 :
Objects Object language Metalanguage
<bird> Bird (thing) 'Bird' (word, name)
<flying bird> The bird is flying. a1 (state) ,The bird is flying.' 'A1' (sentence, statement)
a "A" (proposition variable)
'The bird flies' is true. alpha1 / alpha

Relativity and hierarchy of metalinguistics

The property of a language to be a metalanguage is relative : the metalanguage of an object language can be the object language of a meta-metalanguage.

Bertrand Russell has "considered the possibility of an infinite hierarchy of language levels". Then there are basically any number of metalanguages.

However, it is also questionable whether everyday language is not the first object language and the highest metal language at the same time.

Metalinguisticality can be intralingual or interlingual (interlingual; English: metalinguistical ). In a German English textbook, the German language is the metalanguage of the English language. In an English French textbook, the English language metalanguage of French etc.

Object and metalanguage in everyday language

In the vernacular , there are several levels of language. In the literal sense, there is an object and metalanguage only in certain artificial languages.

"The colloquial language is a mixture of object language and metalanguage in which all three parts of the metalanguage appear". “The appearance of words such as 'word' and 'statement' indicate the use of the metalanguage. Words like 'conclusion' and 'deducible' are part of syntax , words like 'true', 'likely' and 'maybe' are part of semantics , and words like 'assertion', 'incredible' and 'natural' are part of pragmatics . "

A language that, like colloquial language, does not differentiate between object and metalanguage, is what Alfred Tarski calls semantically closed language . In it the liar's paradox can be formulated.

"Words that have similar meanings in different languages ​​are called 'ambiguous about language level'."

Syntax, semantics and pragmatics of the metalanguage

"In the metalanguage the rules for the object language in question are formulated, especially semantic and syntactic rules, and theorems that result from the rules."

According to Reichenbach, a (logically analyzed) metalanguage breaks down into three parts according to the arguments in the sign relation : “The first part, the syntax , deals exclusively with relationships between signs and therefore concerns structural properties of the object language.” “The second part, semantics , deals with signs and related to objects; it therefore includes in particular statements about the truth values ... ”The pragmatics adds a reference to people. There must therefore be (1) formation rules, (2) truth rules and (3) derivation rules.

Meaning of the distinction between metalanguage and object language

The term 'metalanguage' is a concept from the semantic level theory . According to the theory of semantic levels , language about things is to be distinguished from language about language itself. All beings that are not signs are thereby the zero level. The class of signs that designate these objects are "first level" or "object language" signs. Signs that designate the object language form the metalanguage of the first language (language “second level”). And so on.

The concept of metalanguage is used in many theoretical sciences today . In this sense, metalanguage is a scientific language system that does not refer to the object domain of a science , but to the language of science. The distinction between metalanguage and object language - and the semantic levels in general  - initially proved necessary in formal logic and basic mathematical research in order to resolve or avoid antinomies , but is now used in many theoretical sciences.

The classic liar paradox dissolves when one regards self-referential statements as pointless.

The distinction between object and metalanguage is considered a "logical feat". The significance of the distinction lies in the fact that the "theory of the language level" expressed in it clarifies the prohibition of self-reference of linguistic expressions of the same language level and avoids the antinomies that arise when disregarded.

The distinction between object and metalanguage leads to a "new important rule of meaning ": "every expression in which this expression itself is mentioned is meaningless". It is an important principle: "According to this principle , in a sentence in which we want to say something about a thing, we do not have to use this thing itself, but its name or designation."

“On the basis of the metalanguage one can then and only then give methodologically correct and factually applicable definitions of the semantic terms if the metalanguage contains variables of higher logical types than all variables of the language that is the subject of the investigation”, and a proof of freedom from contradictions cannot be carried out "if the metalanguage does not contain any variables of higher types".

Precursors, parallels and applications

The theory of the language levels had its forerunner in the scholastic doctrine of supposition , which in the early modern period was discredited and forgotten as scholastic.

The distinction between Frege between the auxiliary and the presentation language "is the distinction between language and metalanguage at hand."

In his type theory , Russell made a distinction between object and metalanguage.

"In the language of set theory , the principle of levels or types can be expressed as follows: A set must not be an element of itself at the same time, ..."

Russell also speaks of a transparent and non-transparent occurrence of a character. A transparent occurrence is the occurrence of a character where the character denotes something. A non-transparent occurrence is the occurrence of a character that is not used as such, but only mentioned (example: Arno is a name made up of four letters).

“The distinction between object and metalanguage is often indicated with the password use and mention . When we talk about the horse firebird, we need the sound sequence “firebird” as a symbol to refer to an object that is part of the world. On the other hand, if we talk about the sound sequence “firebird”, B. say that this sequence of sounds is four-syllable, we mention the sequence of sounds "Firebird" by using the name-like structure "the sequence of sounds 'Firebird'" to talk about it. "

The pair of meanings use and mention has its equivalent in German linguistics in “ use of an expression” - “ citation of an expression”: An expression is used when it describes something other than itself, normally an extralinguistic reality. A term is cited when talking about the term itself. (See also material and formal supposition .)

Abbreviations are not of a metalinguistic type: "An abbreviation is not a designation for a character, it is used in place of a character."

The theory of language levels is also important for the definition of truth of Tarski .

In legal interpretation, the principle of protestatio facto contraria non valet applies : custody that is against a certain interpretation of one's own behavior is irrelevant if one's own behavior contradicts the custody. Example: "I don't want to offend you, you idiot!"

In computer science z. B. the Backus-Naur-Form (short: BNF) for the metalinguistic description of the syntax of programming languages .

Spellings

Object and metalinguistic expressions are differentiated optically differently:

  • Use of quotation marks of a certain type (example: 'pour' is six characters long);
  • Use of a different print type (example: Gießenis six characters long);
  • Use of some other special metalinguistic symbolism.

How, changes from author to author or publisher to publisher etc.

An expression in quotation marks etc. is then "a metalinguistic expression relating to a similar expression without quotation marks".

Example: "House" has four letters and is monosyllabic (true); the house has four letters (wrong).

In non- axiomatic contexts, ambiguity is also accepted. Double quotation marks can be used e.g. B. use both for the metalinguistic designation of linguistic expressions and for the identification of semantically not (yet) sufficiently definite or overly metaphorical linguistic expressions. If one is aware of the importance of the distinction between object and meta-language, the meaning can be derived from the respective context.

See also

literature

  • Joseph M. Bochenski: The contemporary methods of thinking . 10th edition. 1993, ISBN 3-8252-0006-X (UTB No. 6).
  • Holm Bräuer: object language. In: Concise dictionary of philosophy. Edited by Wulff D. Rehfus . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2003, ISBN 3-525-30148-0 , p. 506 f.
  • Hans Reichenbach : Basic features of symbolic logic. Vieweg, Braunschweig / Wiesbaden 1999, ISBN 3-528-08366-2 (Original: Hans Reichenbach: Gesammelte Werke, Vol. 6).
  • Paul Ruppen: Introduction to formal logic: a learning and exercise book for non-mathematicians. Lang, Bern a. a. 1996, ISBN 3-906756-85-8 .
  • Erhard Schüttpelz: object and metalanguage. In: literary studies. Edited by Jürgen Fohrmann , Harro Müller. Fink, Munich 1995, ISBN 3-8252-1874-0 , pp. 179-216.
  • Harald Weinrich : About the everyday nature of metalanguage. In: H. W .: Language in Texts. Ernst Klett, Stuttgart 1976, ISBN 3-12-908580-7 , pp. 90-112.

Web links

Wiktionary: Metalanguage  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations
Wiktionary: Object language  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Individual evidence

  1. ^ Ulrich: Metalanguage . In: Basic Linguistic Concepts. 5th edition. 2002
  2. ↑ Wunderlich: Semantics workbook. 2nd Edition. 1991, p. 343
  3. ^ Wilhelm K. Essler: Introduction to Logic (= Kröner's pocket edition . Volume 381). 2nd, expanded edition. Kröner, Stuttgart 1969, DNB 456577998 , p. 16; see. also Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 10: “Metalanguage” can also be used in the sense of “as a mixture of words of the first and second level”.
  4. ^ So Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 14
  5. ↑ so Homberger: Object language . In: Specialized dictionary linguistics . 2000
  6. ^ Joseph Maria Bocheński : The contemporary methods of thinking . 10th edition. 1993, ISBN 3-8252-0006-X , p. 59
  7. ↑ a b c d e Seiffert: Statement levels . In: Theory of Science IV. 1997
  8. ^ Reichenbach: Basic features of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 14
  9. ^ Salmon: Logic . 1983, p. 245
  10. ^ Ansgar Beckermann : Introduction to logic. 2nd Edition. 2003, p. 54
  11. ^ So Ulrich: Language . In: Basic Linguistic Concepts. 5th edition. 2002
  12. ^ For fur: Linguistics . 1996, to 2.1, p. 31
  13. ↑ Hoyningen-Huene: Logic . 1998, p. 74
  14. ↑ from: Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 14
  15. ↑ Holm Bräuer: Object Language. In: Wulff D. Rehfus (Hrsg.): Short dictionary philosophy . 2003, p. 506 (507)
  16. ↑ Hoyningen-Huene: Logic . 1998, p. 76 f.
  17. ↑ a b Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 15
  18. ↑ Holm Bräuer: Object Language. In: Wulff D. Rehfus (Hrsg.): Short dictionary philosophy . 2003, p. 506 f.
  19. ^ So Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 10
  20. ^ Rudolf Carnap : Logic. 3. Edition. 1968, p. 77
  21. ^ So Reichenbach: Fundamentals of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 15
  22. ^ Salmon: Logic . 1983, p. 247. Joseph M. Bochenski: The contemporary methods of thinking . 10th edition. 1993, ISBN 3-8252-0006-X , p. 59
  23. ^ Herberger, Simon: Theory of Science for Jurists . P. 229 ff.
  24. ↑ Bochenski: Methods of Thought . 1993, p. 59
  25. ↑ Tarski: Introduction to Mathematical Logic. 5th edition. 1977, p. 70
  26. ^ Tarski: Logical Semantics. In: Meixner (Hrsg.): Philosophy of logic . 2003, p. 191 (196 f.)
  27. ^ Tarski: Logical Semantics. In: Meixner (Hrsg.): Philosophy of logic . 2003, p. 191 (198)
  28. ↑ Hoyningen-Huene: Logic . 1998, p. 76
  29. ↑ Tatievskaya: propositional logic . 2003, p. 37
  30. ↑ after Tatievskaya: propositional logic . 2003, p. 9
  31. ↑ Ruppen: Introduction to formal logic: a learning and exercise book for non-mathematicians. Lang, Bern a. a. 1996, p. 56
  32. ^ Fur: Linguistics . 1996, p. 31
  33. ^ Reichenbach: Basic features of symbolic logic . 1999, p. 10
  34. ↑ Flume: legal transaction. 3. Edition. 1979, § 5/5, p. 76
  35. ↑ Joseph M. Bochenski: The contemporary methods of thinking . 10th edition. 1993, ISBN 3-8252-0006-X , p. 60
  36. ^ So Lothar Czayka: Formal logic and philosophy of science: Introduction for economists. P. 5