Philosophy of life

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Philosophy of life is created in the 19th century flow of philosophy in France by Henri Bergson and in Germany by Wilhelm Dilthey as an alternative to positivism and Kantianism was developed according to the philosophy of life with one-sided emphasis on rationality on the type of science that are of life , in particular its holistic nature, is not adequately captured and described with concepts and logic alone . To an encompassing oneLife also included non-rational, creative, and dynamic elements. The starting point of the philosophy of life is the concrete experience of the human being, which in addition to reason also includes intuition, instinct, drives and will, and which is shaped by its historical conditions. A philosophy of life had already developed at the end of the 18th century, but it was more of a philosophy of the art of living , comparable to the ars vivendi in antiquity.

The philosophical approaches of the representatives of the philosophy of life are so different that it is impossible to set up uniform criteria for this school of thought that go beyond the fact that the phenomenon of life is the focus of investigation. What they have in common is the negative demarcation from rationalism, intellectualism, scientism and a materialistic worldview. As a critique of rationalism and the Enlightenment , it is already laid out in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche , who can therefore be regarded as forerunners of the philosophy of life, even if they did not yet know the term. The philosophy of life influenced representatives of existential philosophy , but also Edmund Husserl , who made the concept of the lifeworld a fundamental category in his later philosophy.

root

The roots of the philosophy of life go back to the distinction made by Immanuel Kant with regard to Christian Wolff between theoretical school philosophy and a philosophy based on the concept of the world, which comes from life itself and aims at practical life. Wisdom of life and the world were fashionable terms in higher social circles at the end of the 18th century. The philosophy of life was less a specific philosophical teaching than a certain cultural mood that influenced large parts of the intelligence. Philosophy of life was equated with the popular philosophy widespread in the late 18th century , which specifically set itself apart from school philosophy and, as a philosophy of practical action, had committed to a general dissemination of the ideas of the Enlightenment. The life and the world of wisdom are often since that time in aphorisms shown, such as Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi in the Flying Scroll , "philosophy is itself a heartfelt life. A philosophical life is a collected life. True philosophy makes the soul still, ultimately devout. ”In terms of conceptual history, the first works to be recorded are by Gottlob Benedict von Schirach : About human beauty and philosophy of life from 1772 and by Karl Philipp Moritz : Contributions to the philosophy of life from the Year 1780 (1791 already in the third edition). Goethe's verse is characteristic of this philosophy of life :

"Gray, dear friend, is all theory, and life's golden tree is green."

The philosophy of life received new encouragement in the romantic movement. Romantics like Novalis emphasized that not only reason, but also feeling and willing, which is more closely related to life, must be taken into account in philosophy. "Philosophy of life contains the science of independent, self-made life under my control - and belongs to the art of living - or the system of rules for preparing such a life." Immanuel Kant opposed this type of "salon philosophy" in 1794 with the Writing about the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but is not suitable for practice . Friedrich Schlegel's lectures on the philosophy of life , which were expressly directed against the system philosophers Kant and Hegel , helped to attract broader attention to the philosophy of life in 1827 . Schlegel viewed the formal concepts of school philosophy, such as logic, only as preparation, not as philosophy itself. This must mediate between the philosophy of reason and natural science. It is important to research “the inner spiritual life, and indeed in all its fullness”. The “interpreting soul” includes full consciousness and not just reason. “In the interpreting soul, however, the distinguishing, connecting, inferring reason as well as the pensive, inventive, anticipating fantasy are included; it embraces both forces, standing in the middle between them. But also between understanding and will it forms the turning point of the transition and, as the connecting middle link, fills the gap that lies between the two and separates them. "

With Arthur Schopenhauer , the first approaches to the philosophy of life can be found when he no longer puts reason, but will and thus factual life, at the center of his thinking. The will is the primary thing, the basis of ideas. It is a blind, unstoppable urge that encompasses all of nature. Reason and knowledge are dependent on it and are an expression of the will. The whole life force of the world is reflected in the will. “Since the will, the thing in itself, the inner content, is the essence of the world; life, the visible world, appearance, but only the mirror of the will; so this will accompany the will as inseparably as the body its shadow: and if there is will, there will also be life, the world. So life is certain of the will to live. ”In Chapter 46 of Die Welt als Wille und Bild, with the title “ Of the nothingness and suffering of life ”, Schopenhauer describes man as a suffering and lost individual who only becomes his through death Finds redemption. Man lives in a constant desire with limitless desires and inexhaustible demands, so that he can never find happiness and redemption. If a wish is fulfilled, it becomes immediately unreal and there is always only sadness and pain. In this way man's life is nothingness, voidness (vanitas) and vanity, covered by the deceptive veil of the Maya. In earthly life man can only escape this emptiness through abstinence and asceticism, the highest form of which, complete contemplation, can be found in art. Supplementary considerations on life practice can be found in the aphorisms on wisdom ( Parerga and Paralipomena )

Even Friedrich Nietzsche applies his critical philosophy of culture as a precursor of the philosophy of life. Already in his early work The Birth of Tragedy he contrasted rational thinking, the Apollonian, with the instinctual striving, the Dionysian . Looking back, he stated in the Twilight of the Idols : “Saying yes to life even in its most strange and toughest problems; the will to live in sacrifice glad becoming its highest types of are inexhaustible - that I called Dionysian, I guessed as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet "Throughout the work developed Nietzsche thought that apply to brainstorm on a philosophy of life.. Mention should be made here of the title of his work Menschliches, Allzumenschliches or the consideration of world events as an organic structure and the concepts of the will to power and the eternal return . Nietzsche turned Schopenhauer's concept of the will as the will to live into the formula of the will to power, which governs all life.

Wherever I found living things, I found the will to power; and still in the will of the servant I found the will to be master. [...]
And life itself spoke to me this secret. “See, said it, I am that which always has to overcome itself.
“Of course, you call it the will to procreation or drive for the purpose, for higher, more distant, multiple: but all this is one and one secret.
“I'd rather go under than cancel this one; and verily, where there is downfall and falling leaves, behold, there life sacrifices itself - for power!
“That I have to be a struggle and becoming and purpose and the contradiction of purposes: oh, whoever guesses my will, probably also guesses which crooked paths he has to take!
“Whatever I can do and however I love it - soon I'll have to be an opponent of him and my love: that's my will.
“And you too, one who knows, are only a path and footsteps of my will: verily, my will to power also walks on the feet of your will to truth!
“Of course, the one who shot the word after it about the“ will to exist ”did not hit the truth: this will - does not exist!
“Because: what is not, cannot want to; But what is in existence, how could that still want to exist!
“Only where there is life there is also will: but not will to live, but - this is how I teach you - will to power!
“Much is valued more highly by the living than life itself; but from the treasure itself speaks - the will to power! "-

Philosophy of life as a systematic philosophy

The philosophical current of the philosophy of life at the end of the 19th century went well beyond the claim made 100 years earlier to give practical life an orientation. The modern philosophers of life deal critically with the modern epistemology and ontology and try to gain a systematic point of view. Philosophy of life is part of a reaction to a zeitgeist that is shaped by the rapid progress of technology, industrialization and the rationality of positive science and modern economy. In the fin de siècle , the youth movement , art nouveau or symbolism and decadence poetry come together to find a new departure against the constraints of modern civilization . According to Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Henri Bergson are considered to be the founders of the new way of thinking in philosophy.

Wilhelm Dilthey

Wilhelm Dilthey , around 1910

Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911) made life the starting point of his philosophical thinking. “Life is the basis that must form the starting point of philosophy. It is what is known from within, it is what cannot be traced back to. Life cannot be brought to the judgment seat of reason ”Dilthey used the term life in two different meanings. On the one hand, it referred to the life of the individual person, on the other hand, he used the term to describe life in general. With this distinction he said: “Life encompasses life here.” Like all philosophers of life, Dilthey criticized the traditional modern philosophy, which focused on rationality and neglected the dimensions of will and feeling. "In the veins of the knowing subject, which Locke, Hume and Kant constructed, it is not real blood that runs, but the diluted juice of reason as a mere thought activity." Only when one accesses the "whole, full, unmutilated experience" in philosophizing, does one succeed it to grasp "the whole, full reality". Real life can only be understood from the inside out and that means with consideration for the psyche. Because life forms the limit of philosophizing, Dilthey called for the renunciation of transcendental quantities as points of reference for philosophy.

Against the knowledge of reason, Dilthey placed the experience at the center of his considerations. Above all, he turned against the limitation of the sciences to the deterministic scientific method, as postulated by John Stuart Mill , Herbert Spencer and others. Experience is an experience of connections that cannot simply be broken down into individual elements. "The expansion of knowledge about what is given in the experience takes place through the interpretation of the objectivations of life and this interpretation is in turn only possible from the subjective depth of the experience." By interpretation or interpretation Dilthey understood the "artistic understanding of permanently fixed expressions of life" The method of hermeneutics as a doctrine of understanding interpretation was significantly influenced by Dilthey. Objectifications are all concrete, everyday things and processes that have become historical. “Only through the idea of ​​the objectivations of life do we gain an insight into the essence of history. Everything was created through intellectual work and has the character of historicity . It is woven into the world of the senses as a product of history. […] History is nothing separate from life, nothing separated from the present by its temporal distance. ”In the conception of historicity, Dilthey distances himself from Hegel:“ Hegel constructs metaphysically; we analyze the given. And today's analysis of human existence fills us all with a feeling of frailty, the power of dark instincts, suffering from darkness and illusions, the finitude in everything that life is, even where the highest structures of community life are made out of them arise. ”The objective spirit does not result from an absolute world spirit , but from the structural context of life. This also applies to art, religion and philosophy.

Because the access to the individual phenomena of externally given facts is different from the experience gained through introspection , Dilthey introduced the distinction still common today between natural sciences and humanities . While the scientific principle of the former is explaining , in the humanities the principle of understanding must be taken as a basis.

“The processes of the whole mind work together in the experience. In it there is context, while the senses only present a manifold of details. The individual process is carried by the whole totality of soul life in experience, and the connection in which it stands in itself and with the whole of soul life belongs to immediate experience. This already determines the nature of understanding ourselves and others. We explain through purely intellectual processes, but we understand through the interaction of all mind forces in the perception. "

The natural sciences try to find a general rule from individual phenomena . In the humanities, on the other hand, one deals with the individual phenomenon such as a historical event or a biography . A cornerstone of Dilthey's philosophy is the inner connection between experience, expression and understanding . The subject of understanding and interpretation is the expression, which on the one hand comes to light as a concept, judgment or a more complex thought structure, but also as action or the result of actions. Unlike Nietzsche or Bergson, Dilthey assumed that mere introspection is not enough to grasp the fundamental connections in life. “The expression can contain more of the psychological context than any introspection can perceive. He lifts out of the depths that the consciousness does not illuminate. ”The principle and the theory of understanding, the hermeneutics , is not only applicable to texts, but also to works of art , religious ideas or legal principles. Not only cognitive thinking is effective in understanding , but also the emotive willingness and feeling of the viewer. It requires a holistic approach that z. B. through an analytical psychology that examines individual aspects, could not be achieved. As a result of Dilthey's thoughts, Gestalt psychology developed , which is primarily descriptive .

Henri Bergson

Henri Bergson, 1927

The original problem of the philosophy of Henri Bergson (1859-1941) was given to him by his teacher, Emile Boutroux , who had turned critically against the determinism asserted by the contemporary sciences . In his dissertation, Time and Freedom , Bergson examined what is immediately given in consciousness and developed new ideas with regard to the intensity of sensations and time in consciousness . He came to the conclusion that apparent differences in intensity both in feeling and in perception are actually based on different emotional qualities. Different perceived shades of blue are summarized in the term “blue”. Every degree of sadness, for example, is an expression of a single quality of feeling.

Bergson also examined the phenomenon of time in terms of the quality of the sensations associated with it. Space is closely related to number, since every object has a certain place in space that can be determined by coordinates. If you apply this quantitative approach to time, you get the measurable time. Processes of consciousness are arranged next to one another as in space. Bergson now asked “whether time as a homogeneous medium is not ultimately a bastard concept that owes its origin to the penetration of spatial ideas into the realm of pure consciousness.” The measured time is a concept used in natural sciences to describe external things . In this perspective, time is “spatialized”. But experiencing time in consciousness is a different way of knowing. The inner sense of time is immediate and intuitive. Here time is felt as extended, as duration (durée) . Such a duration is heterogeneous, "a succession of qualitative changes [...] which merge with one another, penetrate one another, have no precise outlines, do not have the tendency to exteriorize in relation to one another and are not in the least related to the number."

In connection with the concept of two modes of knowledge, Bergson developed a theory of consciousness with two layers; on the one hand a “superficial I” (moi superficiel) and on the other hand a “deep self” (moi profond) . While the surface ego is directed towards the outer world, the deep ego grasps the inner subjective experience. Correspondingly, the manifolds contained in the surface ego are quantified and spatially, in the deep ego they are qualitatively and temporally connected with a duration "of which we feel that it is the substance of our life itself." I mostly ousted by the surface ego. Because it is “infinitely better suited to the needs of social life in general and language in particular, consciousness prefers this I and gradually loses sight of the fundamental I.” One penetrates into the deep I only in reflection and in of contemplation. In the final chapter of his dissertation, Bergson came to the conclusion that the philosophical problem of freedom is based on a misunderstanding because the distinction between extension and duration, quantity and quality is not or not clearly enough. The processes of the outside world are quantitative and deterministic. However, this does not hinder the inner freedom of the deep ego. "Acting freely means: taking possession of yourself, going back to pure duration."

“Consciousness and materiality thus turn out to be radically different and even conflicting forms of existence that enter into a modus vivendi and come to terms with each other badly and well. Matter is necessity, consciousness is freedom; however much they oppose each other, life finds a way to reconcile them. Because life is precisely the freedom that fits into necessity and turns it to its benefit. "

In his essay "Creative Development" , which is fundamental for the philosophy of life , Bergson took up the juxtaposition of intellect as the scientific way of thinking and intuition as the experiencing way of thinking. He opposed traditional evolutionary theories about of Darwin or Spencer , as far as this life mechanistic or teleological try to explain (finalistic). For Bergson, life is not predictable because it is based on a life swing ( élan vital ). The intellect is directed to dead matter , but intuition is the mode of knowledge to grasp the reality of life. "Intuition, however, would lead us into the interior of life, that is, instinct that has become disinterested and that is self-conscious and capable of reflecting on its object and infinitely expanding it."

The interplay of both modes of knowledge is philosophically relevant. Intuition grants immediate experience, but it is fleeting and preconceptual. Only what is experienced is brought to the concept by the intellect, which in this process forms and consolidates the intuitive and at the same time pushes it into the background. A dialectical process arises between the two modes of knowledge , in which the philosopher must always be careful to fall back on intuition if he does not want to become dogmatic or lose himself in intellectual gimmicks. The theoretical diversity in philosophy is based on the fact that every philosopher who brings his intuition to the concept with the abstracting intellect can only do so imperfectly. "Intuition, on the other hand - if otherwise it could extend over more than a few moments - would not only ensure that the philosopher agrees with his own thinking, but also between all philosophers."

The background of Bergson's epistemological analysis is a metaphysical understanding of life, the origin of which is èlan vital, as an everlasting changing process. “The more we actually get used to perceiving everything 'sub species durationis' [under the aspect of duration], the more we immerse ourselves in the true duration. And the more we immerse ourselves in it, the more we immerse ourselves in the direction of the albeit transcendent principle in which we participate and whose eternity is not an eternity of immutability, but an eternity of life: how can we live and move differently in it ? In ea vivimus et movemur et sumus [In this we live and move and we are]. "

Georg SImmel

Georg SImmel

For Georg Simmel (1858-1918), the cultural philosopher and co-founder of sociology , including the recognition categories a priori , but in the course of evolution and the person is a development going through. The chaos of experiences is ordered in cognition . However, our individual thinking cannot fully grasp the unity of totality. Ideas such as truth are independent of the psyche . The conception of the truth induces man to behave useful according to the demands of life. What is true is what has proven itself in selection in the course of evolution and is expedient. The ought is an original category , even if in practice the content changes. In it the will of the species is expressed. Altruism is egoism of the species.

Simmel, who was originally considered a Kantian , turned intensively to the philosophy of life in his later work. He found his starting point in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, and above all in Bergson, while largely neglecting Dilthey's historical-hermeneutical approach. Instead, he combined the basic ideas of the philosophy of life with his cultural-philosophical consideration of the phenomena of modernity.

Simmel agreed with Bergson's analysis that the scientific, linear concept of time does not adequately capture the essence of life. He saw the reason in the fact that science concentrates on the grasping of facts, which are always only snapshots of a whole, while the totality continues to develop and runs in a fluid interaction. “Every moment of life is the whole of life, the steady flow of which - this is its incomparable form - has its reality only at the height of the wave to which it rises; Every present moment is determined by the whole previous life course, is the success of all previous moments, and for this reason alone every present life present is the form in which the whole life of the subject really is. ”The modern separation of body and mind is based on misunderstanding to want to grasp life alone in permanent conceptual clarity. For Simmel, this results in a wrong thinking about substance, which cannot explain becoming in the world. "Being, so much more plastic, more secure in form, less problematic than becoming it appears, is still puzzling and closed in the end, while becoming, which lacks everything, can still only really be felt and every stage of being assimilates and makes us understandable inwardly - perhaps because understanding is also a life and only the living can actually be grasped from life. ”The attempt to describe the world purely analytically overlooks the unity of body and soul, in which the awareness of one's own personal identity in the background of the Thinking is always present. "What we call self-confidence or inner sense is not a juxtaposition and succession of our perceived individual life elements, but a knowledge of the unity of all this or our person - no matter at which moment in our life story it appears and just as little we do this here be able to define what is called a »unit« in more detail. "

For Simmel, the dialectic of being and becoming is reflected in the basic categories of life and form. The form is a structured snapshot, an abstraction, in the overall process of incessantly advancing life. “The two terms, between the interpretation and evaluation of which existence has to decide at every turn, are: life and form. Life, according to its principle, is quite heterogeneous in terms of the principle of form. If you say yourself that it consists of constant change, breaking and creating new forms, this is also easy to misunderstand. Because it seems to presuppose that somehow, ideally or real, fixed forms exist, each of which is granted an extremely short temporal existence only because life creates or reveals them. But then what we actually call life would only consist in the movement that intervenes between the one and the next form, would only exist during the interval that transfers the former into this; because the forms themselves, as somehow stable, cannot accommodate themselves within life, which is absolutely continuous movement. "

Life itself as a process is the result of the past and is always directed towards the future. “Life is really past and future; these are not only added to him, as in the case of inorganic, merely punctual reality. And on this side of the level of the spirit, too, one will have to recognize the same form in procreation and growth: that the respective life transcends itself, that its present forms a unity with the not-yet of the future. As long as one separates past, present and future with conceptual clarity, time is unreal, because only the temporally unexpanded, i.e. H. untimely present moment is real. But life is the peculiar way of existence, for whose actuality the divorce does not apply; The three types of time can only be applied in their logical split-up in a subsequent decomposition following the mechanical scheme. ”In this respect, Simmel agreed with Bergson. In his main work on the philosophy of life, which he had only completed shortly before his death, he went beyond Bergson's “fear of life” by making the thesis that it is part of the essence of life to transcend oneself. Simmel speaks of transcendence. “Time is the - perhaps abstract - form of consciousness of what life itself is in unpredictable, only experienced, direct concreteness; it is life, disregarding its contents, because only life transcends the time-free present point of every other reality in both directions and only with this and entirely alone the extension of time, i.e. H. the time realized. "

Simmel also describes the tension between continuous life and ephemeral form as an antinomy of continuity and individuality. “We imagine life as a continuous flow through the gender sequences. Only the bearers of it (i.e. not those who have it, but who are) are individuals; H. closed, self-centered beings unequivocally separated from each other. As the stream of life flows through, or more correctly: as these individuals, it accumulates in that of them, becomes a firmly defined form and stands out against its peers as well as against the environment with all its contents as a finished product and does not tolerate any blurring of its scope . Here lies a final metaphysical problematic of life: that it is limitless continuity and at the same time limitless self. ”The continuity of life is limitless. In so far as it takes a form in the individual, it is also subject to limits. The procedural striving of life for procreation and growth, for the creation of anew, both in the physiological and in the spiritual processes, is the way in which life transcends itself. This transgression occurs in two ways, which Simmel characterizes with the difference between the concepts of life in Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. He calls Schopenhauer's will to live “more life”. This addresses the dynamic biological processes that lead to the fact that living individuals are always geared towards innovation, towards their reproduction. “The deep relationship that has always been felt between procreation and death, as a continuation between them, as life catastrophes, a kinship of forms, has one of its metaphysical pivots here: both events adhere to subjective life and transcend it; the life beyond which they reach is nevertheless inconceivable without them; to increase in growth and procreation above oneself, to sink below oneself in aging and death, these are not additions to life, but such abolition, over-washing of the boundaries of the individual existence is life itself. "

The spiritual life, which is an integral part of human life, reaches beyond itself insofar as it creates structured contents, forms in the sense of Simmel, which become objectivations of life. This means actions, words, concepts and content in general. In Simmel's diction, this “more than life” corresponds to Nietzsche's determination of life as the will to power. “As far as the mental life is viewed in terms of its content, it is finite and limited in itself; it then consists of these ideal contents, which now have the form of life. But the process reaches beyond them and beyond itself. We think, feel, want this and that - these are firmly circumscribed contents, this is a logical thing that is only now realized, something that is in principle completely definite and definable. But when we experience it, there is something else about it, the inexpressible, indefinable that we feel in every life as such: that it is more than any given content, that it swings beyond everyone, not only looks at and has everyone from their point of view as it is the essence of the logical statement of contents, but at the same time from outside, from what is beyond it. We are in this content and at the same time are outside of it; by taking this content - and nothing further that can be given - into the form of life, we eo ipso have more than it. ”The products of the spirit become objective independent contents. In this way - as with Dilthey - an objective spirit arises, generated by the individual subject, valid but independent of him. “That our ideas and knowledge, our values ​​and judgments with their meaning, their factual comprehensibility and historical effectiveness are completely beyond creative life - that is precisely what is characteristic of life. Just as the transcending of life beyond its currently limiting form within its own level is more life, which is nevertheless the immediate, inescapable essence of life itself, so its transcending into the level of factual content, the logically autonomous, is no longer vital sense, the more-than-life, which is completely inseparable from it, the essence of the spiritual life itself. "

The creative structures produced by the spirit with their own logic and historicity, the forms that have become independent of the individual, are the products of culture that give life “content and form, play and order: such as the social constitutions and the works of art, the religions and the scientific ones Insights, the techniques and the civil laws and countless others. ”In his lecture “ The Conflict of Modern Culture ” , Simmel now states that these intellectual, cultural structures have a detachment and independence with a tendency towards unity, duration and timelessness. Spiritual life “itself flows on incessantly, its restless rhythm occurs at every new structure in which it creates a new form of existence, in contradiction to its fixed duration or timeless validity. At a faster or slower pace, the forces of life gnaw at every cultural structure that has once arisen; As soon as it has reached its full development, the next one begins to form underneath, which it is intended to replace after a shorter or longer struggle. "

This dialectic between independent, persistent form and dynamic, creative flow of life is the reason why culture has a history in which old forms are constantly and constantly being replaced by new ones. Each historical period has its own form of expression, which is adapted to the circumstances and the respective knowledge; for example in the economy, where the labor organizations developed from the slave economy to the feudal economy and guilds to free wage labor. It is similar with the ideological paradigms. The main idea of ​​antiquity was substance, the Christian Middle Ages placed divine creation at the center of thought, the Renaissance and early modern times chose nature and its laws as the explanatory model, the Enlightenment made reason the measure of all things. Finally: “It was not until the turn of the 20th century that other layers of intellectual Europe seemed to be reaching out for a new basic motif for building a worldview: the concept of life strives to become the central point in which reality and values ​​- metaphysical as well as psychological, moral as well as artistic - have their starting point and their meeting point. "

However, according to Simmel's view as early as 1914, it is characteristic of modernity that it lacks a standard, a fixed worldview, a fundamental formative principle. Expressions of disorientation and the lack of a central idea are, for example, the formlessness of expressionism or the tendency towards mysticism as a substitute for religion, because positive religions are considered to have been overcome, but not religious need as such. It is similar with the youth's addiction to originality, which deliberately breaks through cultural forms. In philosophy, pragmatism is a way of thinking that is oriented towards practice without the search for an ultimate justification. “It is the essence of life to produce its leading and redeeming, its opposing and victoriously conquered things out of oneself; it maintains and rises itself, as it were, in a roundabout way above its own product, and that this stands opposite it, independently and judging - that is precisely its own original fact, is the way in which it lives itself. The antagonism into which it thus gets with the higher-self is the tragic conflict of life as spirit, which of course now becomes more palpable to the extent that life becomes conscious of actually generating it out of itself and therefore organic, to be inevitably afflicted with it. ”For Simmel, modernity has not yet won the appropriate form, its model, but is fighting for it. "But this fulfills the real preliminary drawing of life, which is a struggle in the absolute sense that encompasses the relative opposition between struggle and peace, while absolute peace, which perhaps also includes this opposition, remains the divine secret."

The moral-philosophical considerations of the late Simmel are also based on the philosophy of life. Simmel criticized the classic positions of ethics, be it the virtue ethics , whether Kant's ethics of duty , it is the utilitarian rationalism as one-sided. Here, actions from the holistic life of an individual would be analytically cut out of the context of life and assessed with the measure of general norms from a higher-level perspective that opposes the individual. Kant can only support the illusion that when reason commands sensuality so that "we ourselves" give ourselves the duty of duty, Kant can only support the naively dogmatic assertion, which has not been proven in any way, that that rational, universally valid part of us is the "real thing." "I make up the essence of our being."

For Simmel, however, the experience of the ought, like the experience of reality, is one of the indissoluble facts of the individual's self-experience. “Certainly the subject is always conscious of life as it really is; but at the same time categorically quite independent of how it should be. One is as good a whole life as the other. I am just as aware that my life as something constituted is the real one, as that it is ought as something constituted in one way or another. In its constant flow it produces its contents in this as in that form. The ought does not stand above or over against life in general, but is just as much a way in which it becomes conscious of itself, as reality is. "

General principles of moral philosophy certainly have their significance and are formative for cultural history and social structures. But they are secondary for the individual, brought to their own flow of life from outside. “The general of the individual is not an abstraction from his individual qualities and actions. Because the very fact that there are individual such, in the exact sense of detail, is an artificial abstraction that does not affect the inner form of action within real life activity, but only the circumscribed visibility of its external success or its external stimulus. "The standard for Rather, the individual has arisen out of his or her personal history, socialization and experiences and changes with every new experience. “Even with all rights, one may acknowledge as many sanctions of a rational, objective, social kind as it is: the action only becomes my duty when it is classified in the series of duties determined by my entire image of existence. Because no one can specify a single action, a general law, which we do not have to refuse to recognize as our duty under special circumstances - that is, none whose content does not have the question as the highest authority over itself: if it is my duty, it belongs to them objectively ideal design of my life? ”With this individual standard, Simmel calls it“ the individual law ”, the antagonism of generality and individual particularity is overcome in the individual. The result is an individual generality that is recognized by the individual as a norm and responsibility because it corresponds to their own life experience, the wholeness of their own life. “If you are different from the others, there is no less an ideally predetermined ought for you than for everyone else, because it comes from your own life, not from a content that is conditioned by the possibility of generalization and therefore perhaps your case does not include. "

Hans Driesch

Hans Driesch (1867–1941) determined on the basis of his biological research that germs that are split up develop again into fully fledged new germs. From this he concluded that there is a non-causally determined natural force in nature, which he called entelechy in terms of terminology based on Aristotle , but conceptually in clear contrast to this . Based on his views, Driesch is considered a representative of neovitalism .

Ludwig Klages

Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) emphasized the body and soul unity and its opposition to the spirit ( ratio ). In the thinking of the spirit we detach the object from its phenomenal reality for a finite moment , from a continuous spatiotemporal continuum . Chemist by training , Klages was a philosopher and poet who was critical of the natural sciences . For him epistemology was the science of consciousness . To Nietzsche , he appreciated the detection of self-deception, forgery and value compensatory ideals but rejected the theory of knowledge from basic. Through his holistic life with constant commitment to nature conservation , he is considered one of the forefathers of the modern ecological movement . As early as 1913 he complained: “Most of them are not alive, but only exist anymore, be it as slaves of the 'profession' who wear themselves out machine-like in the service of large companies, or as slaves of money, indulged in the delirium of numbers of shares and start-ups, be it finally as slaves of the urban frenzy of diversion, but just as many feel dully the collapse and the growing joylessness. In no time has the dissatisfaction been greater or more poisonous. [...] And since man always interprets the world in the image of his own condition, he believes he sees a wild struggle for power in nature too, believes himself to be right if he is left alone in the 'struggle for existence', paints the world according to the likeness of a great machine, wherever the pistons only pound, the wheels only have to purr so that 'energy' - you can't see at which end - is converted, and manages it with a talkative so-called monism, that To falsify the trillion-fold lives of all the stars and to degrade them to the mere pedestal of the human ego. "

For Klages, too, life is the inevitable starting point for philosophizing: “Any deeper penetrating metaphysics will have to presuppose the primal reality of life.” Compared to Simmel, for example, Klages has a very broad concept of life. “The falling of the stone, the formation of the clouds, the downpouring of the rain are expressions of life, first and foremost of the earth, then also of the larger life contexts: the planetary system and the fixed star sky.” Life is not like that of Bergson or James only the stream of consciousness , but subconscious rhythm, swinging and pulsating happenings in the whole of nature. Life is holistic and cannot be grasped analytically with the intellect. “Life is not perceived, but it is felt with all-darkening strength. And we only need to reflect on this feeling in order to become aware of the reality of being alive with a certainty beyond which there can be no more certain. Whether we judge, think, want or wish, dream, fantasize, it carries and permeates them all the one and the same stream of elementary feeling for life, which cannot be compared to anything, reduced to nothing, cannot be thought out or dissected, but of course never ' is understood '. And because we feel ourselves alive, what is alive also meets us in the image of the world. To put it in a nutshell: We experience our own life and experience the life of others in it. It follows from this that we can only know about life to the extent that we immerse ourselves deeply enough in it to immerse ourselves in the waking consciousness of a memory of it, in order to save the waking consciousness a memory of it. Life science has its anchor not in the objectivity of what is externally and internally perceptible with its basic concepts of thing, force, cause, effect, movement, but rather solely in the reflection on what has been experienced. "

In his main work on the philosophy of life, "The Spirit as Adversary of the Soul", Klages criticizes the logocentrism that has shaped culture more and more since modern times , the direction of the spirit that has been detached from life in the form of ratio and which he opposes with a biocentric, life-dependent philosophy. “In order to emphasize what is common to all ideological and material worldviews to this day, we therefore call them logocentric worldviews. Having said this in advance, we bring again a few theses-like negations, but at once we add the thesis which fills a result that deviates from previous research with an affirmative content. The negations: neither man nor the universe is structured like a storey into body, soul and spirit; These three are evidently present in man and only in man, but as a merely numerical, not as an organic trinity. The positions: the primordial triad, from which all true triads are based, is life polarized in body and soul: through man, more precisely man on the threshold of “world history”, an extramodern (acosmic) power called spirit has broken into it , with the tendency to split body and soul apart and thus kill the life cell. "

Like Nietzsche, Klages is of the opinion that the will to power is an essential factor that determines life. But for Klages, the will is not the reason for life. Rather, the will is to be assigned to the sphere of the spirit which controls action. The instinctual does not find expression in the will. Drives mostly work subconsciously and directly and lead to behavior, not to action. Only when instincts become conscious do value judgments and voluntary actions arise, each of which is determined by the influence of the spirit. “It is one of the oldest false doctrines of mankind that the will moves, the will even creates, where in reality, conversely, it stops the continuous vibration of the movement of life. We are willing precisely to the extent that we suppress instinctual impulses. "

José Ortega y Gasset

According to José Ortega y Gasset (1883–1955), it is a philosophical advance of modernity to make the concept of life the starting point for philosophizing. The ancient realism which, after Ortega a static concept of being - the substance or basis lying - had made the starting point of thinking, focused on the past than man realities. The idealism prevailing from Descartes until the 19th century, on the other hand, regards things as pure contents of consciousness. According to Ortega, reality takes place within, the spirit becomes a substance of its own, the world becomes an idea. Ortega, on the other hand, sets the insight: "I who think, and the world in which I think - one thing together with the other, without the possibility of separation.", Form an indissoluble connection. Ortega's core thesis is "that there is a primary and fundamental fact that establishes and vouches for itself: this fact is the interconnected existence of an ego or a subjectivity and its world."

The insight into the indissoluble connection of the subjective spirit with its lifeworld directs the gaze on life. “The abstractions are over. In the search for indubitable facts, I do not encounter the general term "thinking", but rather the following certainty: I, who I think of the rational fact, I, who philosophize at the moment. "Anyone looking for the indubitable does not come across a philosophical theory but "he encounters philosophizing, theorizing in the form of an act of life and a fact of life, a detail of life in his life, in his immeasurable, happy and sad, hopeful and terrifying life."

Ortega concludes from this, like Dilthey, that life cannot be evaded. “Therefore the radical problem of philosophy is to define the mode of being, this primary reality that we call 'our life'. But now life is precisely what no one can do for me - life is inalienable - it is not an abstract concept, it is my individual being Coexistence and the mutual dependence of my thoughts and my living environment not properly grasped. “The being of the world in front of me is - we could say - an effect on me, and I also act on the being of the world. But this - a reality, the essence of which is that an ego sees a world, it thinks, looks at it, loves it or detests it, is enthusiastic about it or afraid of it, it transforms and grabs and endures, is something that has always existed "Live" calls, "my life", "our life", the life of each individual. "

In search of categories with which he can philosophically grasp the phenomenon of life, Ortega initially rejects the purely biological concept of life. “My life is not what is going on in my cells, any more than what is going on in my stars, those tiny gold dots that I see in my nocturnal world. Even my body is nothing more than a detail of the world that I find within me - a detail that for many reasons is of exclusive importance to me, but which does not give it the character of a mere part of the countless others I present in the world meet me, take. "

In determining what life is all about, Ortega rejoins Dilthey, emphasizing experience as the first and decisive attribute. “Life is the strange and unique reality that has the privilege of being there for itself. All life is experience, a feeling for life, a knowledge of existence - whereby knowledge no longer means spiritual knowledge or any special knowledge, but only this surprising presence that has life for each individual; without this intuition, without this self-awareness, the toothache wouldn't hurt. ”As Ferdinand Fellmann later emphasized, for Ortega an essential characteristic of life is self-awareness. “By perceiving and feeling ourselves, we take possession of ourselves; and this constant finding oneself in possession of oneself, this constant and fundamental presence in everything we do or are, distinguishes life from everything else. “Life only exists in a circle that is full of other things, be they things or creatures; it consists in the sight of things and scenes, in the love for them or in the hatred for them, in the longing for them or in the fear of them. Every life is a concern for the other that is not oneself; every life is coexistence with a jurisdiction. "

In Ortega's reflection on life there are thoughts that appear in a similar form in Heidegger or later in Sartre's existentialism . “Life is given to us - rather, it is thrown to us, or we are thrown into life; however, what is given to us, namely life, is a problem that we have to solve ourselves. And that applies not only to those cases in which it is particularly difficult for us and which we specifically call conflicts and emergencies, but it always applies and generally. ”Ortega complained to Heidegger that these thoughts, the idea of ​​existence, were first developed have, but recognized Heidegger's special achievement in their analysis.

The amazement that life is happening to people does not trigger pessimism at Ortega. Rather, life is a possibility for him. Man can act freely. But this also means - again a category that is similar to that found in Heidegger with the term “determination”. - that people have to make constant choices. "[...] our life is our being. We are what our life is, but nothing beyond; and yet this being is not predetermined, decided in advance, but we have to decide it ourselves, we have to decide what we will be [...] “This forces people to constantly orientate themselves towards the future, Heidegger's concept of care. “It's not the present or the past that we live in the first place, no; Life is an activity that is designed in advance, and the present or the past is only discovered afterwards, in relation to this future. Life is futurition, doing into the future, is what is not yet. "

Ferdinand Fellmann

In 1993 Ferdinand Fellmann attempted to rehabilitate the philosophy of life, as it was rejected by academic philosophers as a destruction of reason as a result of its ideological instrumentalization during the time of National Socialism after the Second World War. In Fellmann's approach, human self-experience is not exhausted in Descartes ' Cogito , but also encompasses the rationally insoluble areas of physical and emotional existence. This gives people a realistic picture of themselves and the world. The philosophy of language analysis is also differentiated from the philosophy of life; Today the philosophy of the mind in the USA shows clear borrowings from the classics of the philosophy of life.

reception

Max Scheler wrote a first overview of the philosophy of life in 1913, in which he showed the similarities between Nietzsche, Dilthey and Bergson. A critical and negative portrayal of his rationalist position of the neo-Kantian comes from Heinrich Rickert , who looked at the philosophy of life as a fad. Ernst Cassirer complained: "A self-apprehension of life is only possible if it does not simply remain in itself." Fritz Heinemann viewed the philosophy of life as an intermediate stage in the transition from the philosophy of spirit to the philosophy of existence . After taking a position on the philosophy of life in the Kant studies in 1926 , Georg Misch , Dilthey's student and son-in-law, worked out the relationship between Martin Heidegger's and Edmund Husserl's philosophy in 1930 .

Philipp Lersch formulated an early systematic presentation in which he dealt with Bergson, Dilthey and Spengler, Simmel and Klages as the main representatives. Georg Lukács , in particular, has accused the philosophers of life of being hostile to reason, representing irrationalism and the standpoint of the “imperialist bourgeoisie”. They were the pioneers of National Socialism. Otto Friedrich Bollnow , who had completed his habilitation on "the philosophy of life FH Jacobi", stated after the war that the philosophy of life had largely been displaced by the philosophy of existence, but demanded that its narrowing to the problematic, to thrownness, despair and fear be overcome . In addition to the well-known names, Bollnow dealt with José Ortega y Gasset and named John Dewey , Helmuth Plessner and Max Scheler as related thinkers . In addition to Ferdinand Fellmann, Karl Albert in particular has recently advocated a renewal of the philosophy of life and tried to combine the philosophy of life with the ontological tradition.

See also

literature

  • Karl Albert : Philosophy of Life. From the beginnings with Nietzsche to her criticism in Lukács . Alber, Freiburg im Breisgau 1995, ISBN 3-495-47826-4 .
  • Ferdinand Fellmann : Philosophy of Life. Elements of a theory of self-awareness. Rowohlt, Reinbek near Hamburg 1993
  • Ferdinand Fellmann: Philosophy of Life. In: Hans Jörg Sandkühler (Ed.): Encyclopedia Philosophy. Volume 2, Meiner, Hamburg 2010.
  • Jürgen Große: Philosophy of Life . Reclam, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-15-020331-6 .
  • Robert Kozljanic: Philosophy of Life. An introduction. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 2004, ISBN 3-17-018354-0 .
  • Volker Schürmann: The unfathomable life. Politics of life between biopower and cultural criticism. Transcript, Bielefeld 2011, ISBN 978-3-8376-1905-8 .

Primary texts

Web links

Wiktionary: Philosophy of life  - explanations of meanings, word origins, synonyms, translations

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Wolfgang Röd: Philosophy of Life. In: History of Philosophy. Volume XIII: The Philosophy of the Late 19th and 20th Century 3. Philosophy of Life and Philosophy of Existence. ed. by Rainer Thurnher, Wolfgang Röd and Heinrich Schidinger. Beck 2002, p. 113.
  2. ^ Wilhelm Traugott Krug : General concise dictionary of the philosophical sciences, together with their literature and history. Volume 2, Brockhaus 1827, keyword: philosophy of life. For popular philosophy see: Christoph Böhr: The popular philosophy of the German late Enlightenment in the age of Kant. frommann-holzboog, Stuttgart 2003.
  3. ^ Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: Flying leaves. In: Works. 6 volumes, Leipzig 1812–1827 (reprint: Volume VI, Wissenschaftliche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1968, p. 136).
  4. ↑ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Faust I , 2038 f
  5. ^ Novalis writings. The works of Friedrich von Hardenberg. Historical-critical edition (HKA) in four volumes. Volume II, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 1965-1975, p. 599.
  6. ↑ Friedrich Schlegel: Philosophy of Life. In fifteen lectures held in Vienna in 1827. Critical edition of his works. Volume 10, pp. 1-308, 7.
  7. ↑ Friedrich Schlegel: Philosophy of Life. He gave fifteen lectures in Vienna in 1827. Critical edition of his works. Volume 10, pp. 1-308, 19.
  8. ↑ Arthur Schopenhauer: The world as will and idea. Works in five volumes (last edition), ed. by Ludger Lütkehaus. Volume 1, Haffmans, Zurich 1988, p. 362.
  9. ^ Friedrich Nietzsche: Götzendämmerung. What I owe to the elderly § 5, KSA 6, 160
  10. ^ Friedrich Nietzsche: Thus spoke Zarathustra. Volume II: On self-overcoming. KSA 4, p. 148, (online)
  11. ^ Karl Albert: Philosophy of Life. Alber, Freiburg 1995, p. 9.
  12. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 359.
  13. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 136.
  14. ↑ Wilhelm Dilthey: Introduction to the humanities. Attempt to lay the foundations for the study of society and history. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume 1, 10th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2008, p. XVIII.
  15. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Weltanschauungslehre. Treatises on the philosophy of philosophy. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume 1, 6th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1991, p. 171.
  16. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 152.
  17. ↑ Wilhelm Dilthey: the spirit world. Introduction to the philosophy of life. First half: Treatises on the foundations of the humanities , ed. by Georg Misch, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 8th edition. Göttingen 1990, 319
  18. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, pp. 147-148.
  19. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910 In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 150.
  20. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: Ideas about a descriptive and dissecting psychology. (= Collected Writings V). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1924, p. 172.
  21. ^ Wilhelm Dilthey: The structure of the historical world in the humanities. Berlin 1910. In: Bernhard Groethuysen (Ed.): Collected writings. Volume VII, 8th edition. Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 1992, p. 206
  22. ^ Henri Bergson: Les données immédites de la conscience , 1889, German: Time and Freedom , Diederichs, Jena 1911
  23. ^ Karl Albert: Philosophy of Life. Alber, Freiburg 1995, 89
  24. ^ Henri Bergson: Time and Freedom , Diederichs, Jena 1911, 84, reprint EVA, Hamburg 1994, 76
  25. ^ Henri Bergson: Time and Freedom , Diederichs, Jena 1911, 88, reprint EVA, Hamburg 1994, 80
  26. ^ Henri Bergson: Creative development , Diederichs, Jena 1912, 245
  27. ^ Henri Bergson: Time and Freedom , Diederichs, Jena 1911, 107, reprint EVA, Hamburg 1994, 97
  28. ^ Henri Bergson: Time and Freedom , Diederichs, Jena 1911, 191, reprint EVA, Hamburg 1994, 171
  29. ^ Henri Bergson: L'énergie spirituelle [1919], printed in: Philosophy of Duration. Text selection by Gilles Deleuze, from the French by Margarethe Drewsen, Meiner, Hamburg 2013, 188
  30. ^ Henri Bergson: L'évolution creatrice, 1907, German: Schöpferische Entwicklung, Diederichs, Jena 1912
  31. ^ Henri Bergson: Creative development , Diederichs, Jena 1912, 210-211
  32. ^ Henri Bergson: Creative development , Diederichs, Jena 1912, 242
  33. ^ Henri Bergson: The perception of change , lecture 1911, printed in: Denk und schöpferisches Werden , Hain, Meinenheim 1948, 179 (Original: La perception du changement , in: La pensée et le mouvant , 1934)
  34. ↑ Georg Simmel: Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (1907), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 10, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1995, 167–408
  35. ^ Georg Simmel: Henri Bergson (1914), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 13, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2000, 53-69
  36. ^ Georg Simmel: Rembrandt. An attempt at art philosophy (1916), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 15, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003, 305–516, here 314
  37. ^ Georg Simmel: Rembrandt. An attempt at art philosophy (1916), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 15, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003, 305–516, here 327
  38. ^ Georg Simmel: Rembrandt. An attempt at art philosophy (1916), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 15, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003, 305–516, here 329
  39. ^ Georg Simmel: Rembrandt. An attempt at the philosophy of art (1916), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 15, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 2003, 305–516, here 379
  40. ↑ a b Georg Simmel: Life view. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 221
  41. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 222
  42. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 229–230
  43. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 231
  44. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 232
  45. ↑ Georg Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 181–207, here 183
  46. ↑ Georg Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 181–207, here 184
  47. ↑ Georg Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 181–207, here 188
  48. ↑ Georg Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 181–207, here 199–200
  49. ↑ Georg Simmel: The Conflict of Modern Culture (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 181–207, here 207
  50. ↑ Ferdinand Fellmann: Philosophy of Life. Elements of a theory of self-awareness. Rowohlt, Reinbek 1993, 135-136
  51. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 355
  52. ↑ Georg Simmel: Philosophy of Life. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 348
  53. ↑ Georg Simmel: Life view. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 386
  54. ↑ Georg Simmel: Life view. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 407
  55. ↑ Georg Simmel: Life view. Four metaphysical chapters (1918), in Georg Simmel Complete Edition Volume 16, Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt 1999, 209–425, here 417
  56. ↑ Ludwig Klages: Man and Earth. [1913], Collected Papers, Kröner, Stuttgart 1973, 13
  57. ↑ a b Ludwig Klages: Man and Earth. [1913], Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Kröner, Stuttgart 1973, 38
  58. ↑ Ludwig Klages: Man and Earth. [1913], Gesammelte Abhandlungen, Kröner, Stuttgart 1973, 37
  59. ↑ Ludwig Klages: The spirit as adversary of the soul [three volumes 1929-1932], 6th edition, Bouvier, Bonn 1981, 374
  60. ↑ Ludwig Klages: The spirit as adversary of the soul [three volumes 1929-1932], 6th edition, Bouvier, Bonn 1981, 197
  61. ↑ Ludwig Klages: Expression Movement and Shape Power [1913], 4th edition Leipzig 1923, new print Munich 1968, 104
  62. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 208; Original: Que es Filosofia , Madrid 1958, edition of the lectures from 1930 that Ortega did not give at the university but in a theater because of a ban, on the concept of life see in particular Chapters IX - XI
  63. ↑ a b José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 201
  64. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 204
  65. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 205
  66. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 212
  67. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 216
  68. ↑ a b José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 218
  69. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 221
  70. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 223; See Martin Heidegger: Being and Time , § 38 "The Fall and Thrownness" as well as Jean-paul Sartre: The Being and the Nothing, Rowohlt, 12th edition. Reinbek 2006, 642
  71. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 220
  72. ↑ Martin Heidergger: Being and Time , §§ 61-66
  73. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 224
  74. ↑ José Ortega y Gasset: What is philosophy? DTV, Munich 1967, 227
  75. ↑ Max Scheler: Attempts at a Philosophy of Life , first in: Die Weiße Blätter , 1. Jg., No. III (Nov.) 1913, with additions republished in: Max Scheler: Vom Umsturz derwerte , 1915, reissued as 4th edition by Maria Scheler, Francke, Berlin and Munich 1972, 311–339
  76. ↑ Heinrich Rickert: The philosophy of life. Presentation and criticism of the philosophical fashion trends of our time [1920], 2nd edition Mohr, Tübingen 1922
  77. ↑ Ernst Cassirer: Philosophy of symbolic forms. Part III: Phenomenology of Knowledge. (1929), reprint of the 2nd edition 1954, WBG, Darmstadt 1982, p. 46.
  78. ^ Fritz Heinemann: New Paths of Philosophy. Mind, life, existence. An introduction to contemporary philosophy , Quelle & Meyer, Leipzig 1929, and Fritz Heinemann: VIVO SUM. Basic remarks about the meaning and scope of the philosophy of life. In: New Yearbooks for Science and Youth Education , 9 (Issue 2/1933), 113–126
  79. ↑ Georg Misch: The idea of ​​the philosophy of life in the theory of the humanities , Kant studies 31 (1926), 536-548
  80. ↑ Georg Misch: Philosophy of Life and Phenomenology. A discussion of the Dilthey direction with Heidegger and Husserl. [1931], 2nd edition. Teubner, Leipzig / Berlin 1931. online
  81. ^ Philipp Lersch: Philosophy of Life of the Present , Munich 1932, reprint in: Philipp Lersch: Erlebnishorizonte. Writings on Philosophy of Life , ed. and introduced by Thomas Rolf, Albunea, Munich 2011, 41–124
  82. ↑ Georg Lukács: The Destruction of Reason. The path of irrationalism from Schelling to Hitler. Berlin 1953 (especially the chapter: The philosophy of life in imperialist Germany, pp. 351–473.)
  83. ↑ Otto Friedrich Bollnow: The Philosophy of Life , Springer, Berlin 1958, 1-2
  84. ↑ Karl Albert, Elenor Jain: Philosophy as a form of life. On the ontological renewal of the philosophy of life , Alber, Freiburg / Munich 2000