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The beginning of Proclus' Fundamentals of Physics in the London manuscript, British Library , Harley 5685, fol. 133r (12th century)

Proklos ( Greek Πρόκλος Próklos with the surname ὁ διάδοχος ho diádochos "the successor", also called Proklos the Lycians , Latin Proclus ; * probably February 7 or 8, 412 in Constantinople ; † April 17, 485 in Athens ) was a late ancient Greek Philosopher and polymath . As one of the most influential spokesmen for Neoplatonism , he played a prominent role in the history of this philosophical and religious movement. For almost half a century he headed the Neoplatonic School of Athens , whose work he shaped through his intensive teaching activities and his numerous writings.

The core element of the proclical philosophy is the theory of emanation , the gradual emergence of plurality from a comprehensive, undifferentiated unity , which is considered the origin of everything. The existence of a hierarchically structured world order, structured according to the emanation levels, is attributed to this eternal process of development . Since mediating instances are required between the different levels of the world system structured in this way, which enable the cohesion of the world, the whole thing takes on a very complex character. As a countermovement to emanation, it is assumed that what has emerged is striving back to its original state. This results in a triadic (three-step) structure of the world process in the proklical model : Remaining in the cause, emerging from it and turning back to it.

Proclus wrote extensive commentaries on Plato's dialogues as well as systematic accounts of his philosophy and pagan theology, as well as works on topics of mathematics, physics and astronomy. His hymns to various gods reveal his strong religious commitment. As an enthusiastic supporter of the Greek religion, he was in opposition to Christianity, which at that time was already the state religion of the Roman Empire .

In the Middle Ages, Proclus' view of the world had a wide variety of effects, especially in an indirect way. The writings of the late antique Christian theologian Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita , which were shaped by his way of thinking, were extraordinarily powerful . The Liber de causis (book on the causes) based on his concept of emanation also received a lot of attention. From the 13th century onwards, Latin translations of main works by Proclus were also available to Western and Central European scholars. They influenced well-known Neoplatonist-oriented thinkers, including Nikolaus von Kues . In the Middle Ages, the Arabic-speaking world was also familiar with the basics of proclical philosophy.

In the early 19th century, Hegel received an essential impulse for his dialectical interpretation of history from Proclus' triadic thinking . This started a “Proclus renaissance”. On the other hand, opponents of the Hegelian dialectic directed violent criticism against the ancient Neo-Platonist, who was perceived as a forerunner of Hegel. In recent research, the effort to gain a more precise understanding of the demanding proklical world model is in the foreground, but comparisons with Hegel are still current topics.


The Proclus family came from Xanthos , a city in Asia Minor landscape Lycia . His father Patrikios (Patricius) and his mother Markella (Marcella) - both names are of Latin origin - belonged to the upper class there. Patrikios was probably the son of Flavius ​​Eutolmius Tatianus , a Lycian who had held important positions in the imperial administration. Tatianus had been Praefectus praetorio Orientis from 388 to 392 at the head of the civil administration of the most important provinces in the east of the empire, but then fell out of favor with the emperor and returned to his Lycian homeland. Patrikios was a wealthy lawyer. At the time of Proclus' birth, which according to a horoscope is usually dated February 7 or 8, 412, the family lived in the capital, Constantinople, but returned to Xanthos soon afterwards. There Proklos received the usual school lessons from a grammar teacher. After finishing school, he went to Alexandria , where he studied rhetoric , Latin and Roman law , since he was to take up his father's profession. But a trip to Constantinople ushered in a turning point; probably under the influence of scholars there, he turned to philosophy. After his return to Alexandria he gave up his previous subjects and began to study philosophy with Olympiodorus the Elder , a renowned interpreter of the writings of Aristotle . He also acquired mathematical knowledge. He is said to have attracted attention through an exceptionally powerful memory.

After completing these studies, Proklos went to Athens when he was about nineteen - i.e. 430/431 - where he first met the Neoplatonist Syrianos . Syrianos introduced him to the elderly philosopher Plutarch of Athens , the founder and director of the Neoplatonic school of Athens, which continued the tradition of the Platonic Academy there. So Proclus became a student of Plutarch, who held him in high regard and introduced him to Aristotle's De anima (On the Soul) and Plato's Dialogue Phaedo . Plutarch died about two years after Proclus' arrival. His successor as headmaster was Syrianos, to whom Proklos now joined as a student and friend. Syrianos took him into his home, treated him like a family member and regarded him as his ideal successor in the school administration. Because the school had considerable wealth and did not require outside assistance, the philosophical community was able to lead a materially carefree life and maintain its independence. With Syrianos, Proclus, following the usual curriculum of the Neoplatonists, first studied the writings of Aristotle, which took him less than two years, and then the philosophy of Plato.

When Syrianos died around 437, Proklos, who was only around twenty-five, took over the management of the school, which he then held until his death in 485. It was to this office that he owed his nickname or title diadochos ("the successor"); This meant that he was the successor of Plato who ran the academy around 387 BC. And headed the Platonic school until his death. Among his most famous students were Isidor , Ammonios Hermeiou , Zenodotos and Marinos von Neapolis , who came from Palestine and who later succeeded him as headmaster.

Proclus led an ascetic, busy, very disciplined life and remained unmarried. According to the praising description of Marinos von Neapolis, he worked tirelessly as a teacher and writer during the day, devoted himself to prayer at night and slept only a few hours. Every day in the morning he should have completed at least five teaching units ( práxeis , "lessons"), with the aim of interpreting the texts of the philosophical school authors; after that he devoted himself to writing and discussions with his colleagues. In the evenings he gave lessons again. The courses took place in a private house that had belonged to Plutarch and after his death remained the seat of the school and home of its director. Some archaeologists identify this building with the "Chi building" on the southern slope of the Acropolis , which is therefore called the "House of Proclus". The Chi building was partially excavated in 1955 and considered by the excavation manager Ioannis Meliades to be the seat of the Neoplatonic school. Meliades' hypothesis has met with approval, but also with contradiction.

Proclus did not limit himself to running his school, but also included participation in public life as one of the tasks of a philosopher. At a municipal authority he successfully campaigned for the promotion of education through a performance-related salary for qualified rhetoric teachers. He personally checked the work ethic and the achievements of those who were supported with public funds on his recommendation. He got involved in local politics by participating in citizens' assemblies, at which he took the floor and commented on current issues. He was in fierce opposition to Christianity, which was the state religion of the Eastern Roman Empire at that time; he accused the Christians of ignorance, infidelity, inner dichotomy in their souls and discord among themselves. A conflict, which was probably related to his anti-Christian attitude, caused him to evade to Lydia for a year , then he returned to Athens. He died on April 17, 485. His bones were buried in the tomb of Syrianos, as he had requested. Although the Syrianos funerary inscription was found, the tomb cannot be precisely located.


Proklos was an exceptionally versatile and prolific writer. In the course of his long scholarly life he wrote more than fifty works, many of which have survived. Although they were all written in the Greek language, their titles are often given in Latin.

Proclus's commentary on Timaeus in a manuscript written in 1314. Naples, Biblioteca Nazionale, III.D.28, fol. 112r

Philosophical comments

As part of his teaching, Proclus commented on a number of works by Aristotle and Plato. It is unknown whether any records were made of his oral comment on Aristotle. None of his commentaries on Plato's dialogues has been passed on completely. Those on Alcibiades First , Kratylos (in the form of excerpts from the notes of a student), Parmenides and Timaeus as well as a collection of 17 treatises on Politeia , including a commentary on the myth of Er contained in this dialogue, have survived to a considerable extent . His commentaries on Gorgias , Phaedo , Phaedrus , Philebus , Sophistes , Symposion and Theaetetus have been completely or barely lost . Only fragments of a commentary on the Enneades of Plotinus have survived .

When commenting, Proklos used a method in some cases that was determined by the needs of the lesson and that became exemplary for the subsequent period: he offered a general discussion of the content of a section of the commented work, in which he also responded to other doctrinal opinions received, and then following the text, an interpretation of individual statements, the "reading" (léxis) , in which he explained passages in need of explanation and dealt with details. This scheme came from the oral interpretation. According to a research hypothesis, Proklos largely adhered to the scheme in those comments that were only slightly modified versions of his lectures, while he proceeded more freely in those cases in which he revised the lecture text more or conceived the commentary from the outset as a written work completely renounced the scheme.

Philosophical and religious manuals and treatises

The beginning of the Platonic Theology of Proclus in a 15th century manuscript in the possession of Cardinal Bessarion . Venice, Biblioteca Nazionale Marciana , Gr. 547, fol. 1r

The most important theological- metaphysical works of Proclus are two manuals. One is entitled Basics (or: Elements ) of theology ( Stoicheíōsis theologikḗ , Latin elementatio theologica ); it is a compilation of 211 theorems with the accompanying evidence. The other, the Platonic theology ( Peri tēs kata Plátōna theologías , Latin Theologia Platonica ), is a comprehensive presentation of the proclical doctrine of gods in six books, which the author dedicated to the philosopher Pericles of Lydia . Each of the six books describes a level of the hierarchy of the gods with reference to the corresponding passages of the Platonic dialogues.

A text by Proclus on the theoretical justification of sacrifice and magic, whose traditional title On Priestly Art is certainly not authentic, has only survived in fragments. Three further treatises on religious subjects are lost: On the mythical symbols , On the mother of the gods (meaning Cybele ) and On the summoning (of a deity).

Under the name tria opuscula (“three small works”), which has been popular since the late Middle Ages , three treatises on the philosophy of religion by Proclus are summarized. This group of writings has only survived in a medieval Latin translation and in a modified Greek version from the Byzantine period; there are also some quotations and excerpts in Greek. Two of the treatises, On Ten Questions Concerning Providence, and On Providence and Fate and That That Belongs to Us , deal with problems arising from the acceptance of divine providence. In the third scripture, On the Nature of Evils , the philosopher examines the questions to what extent evils exist, where and for what reason they exist, and what can be said about the nature of their existence.

What has been lost is an introduction to Platonic philosophy, called Prolegomena ad Platonis philosophiam in Latin , as well as several treatises on individual topics of Platonism . A response by Proclus to Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Timaeus can be partially reconstructed on the basis of an indirect tradition. A text in which Proclus wanted to prove with eighteen arguments that the world had neither a beginning nor an end is lost and its authentic title is unknown, but its content can be reconstructed using a counter-writing by the Christian John Philoponos . The treatise On Place (Peri tópou) is only preserved in part .

Comments on seals

Proclus wrote an interpretation of Hesiod's didactic poem Works and Days as well as a very extensive commentary on the Chaldean oracles , an imperial religious doctrinal poem that was highly regarded by the late ancient Neo-Platonists. The interpretation of the oracles has not been preserved, but can be partially reconstructed using Byzantine sources. The interpretation of Hesiod's poem, which primarily Plutarch based commentary on this work is in the Hesiod- Scholien handed fragmentary.

Math and science

The surviving oeuvre of Proklos also includes three writings on mathematical and scientific subjects. He wrote a commentary on the first book of Euclid's elements (Eis to a 'tōn Eukleídou stoicheíōn) with two prefaces on the history of mathematics, which are an important historical source of science. This work is the only ancient Euclid commentary available today. In the basics of physics ( Stoicheíōsis physikḗ , Latin Institutio physica or Elementatio physica ) Proclus summarized findings from books 6 and 8 of Aristotle's physics on the theory of movement; he also used material from the first book of Aristotle's treatise On Heaven . In the short presentation of astronomical hypotheses (Hypotýpōsis tōn astronomikōn hypothéseōn) he treated the astronomy of Ptolemy . This font is considered the best ancient introduction to the standard work by the influential astronomer known as Almagest , which played a pioneering role in the late antique and medieval worldview.


As a zealous admirer of the gods, Proclus composed a number of hymns, only seven of which have survived. They testify to his good knowledge of verse and epic language; he often played artistically with his literary models. However, one looks in vain for an expression of subjective piety in these poems; the mood looks real, but the language is conventional. Proclus was not concerned with affect, not with expressing an emotional, person-bound attitude, but with sacred action that excludes the subjective and the irrational. Some of the lost hymns served the cult of oriental deities, because Proclus did not limit himself to invoking Greek gods, but also had great esteem for foreign religious traditions. He said that a philosopher should not only celebrate the gods of his city, but also be a hierophant of the whole cosmos.

The seven preserved hymns are hexametric in shape. The first is addressed to the sun god Helios , the second to Aphrodite , the third to the muses , the fourth to the gods in general, the fifth to Aphrodite as the patron goddess of Proclus' Lycian homeland. With the sixth, the philosopher turned to Rhea , Hecate and Zeus , identifying Zeus with the Roman god Ianus . The seventh hymn is an invocation to Athena .


Objective, requirements and basics

Proklos saw himself - as is usual with the Neoplatonists - as a faithful interpreter of Plato's philosophy and a guardian of the authentic Platonic tradition. He came out particularly as a systematic. His concern was the compilation of Platonic ideas and the corresponding contents of other traditions into a well-ordered, school-like teaching material. He succeeded in presenting Neoplatonic philosophy and theology for the first time in their entirety as a unified, closed system by deriving their theories as links in a chain of conclusions and making them appear as necessary consequences from plausible assumptions. In doing so, he established the building of a comprehensive world interpretation which, in his view, was both scientifically founded and in harmony with the correctly understood statements of the recognized authorities, including the great poets. Proclus, however, had a relatively distant relationship with Aristotle. Aristotelian writings were part of the curriculum at the Neoplatonic philosophy school, but Proclus was critical of parts of Aristotelian doctrine. On issues that were disputed between the Platonists and the Aristotelians, he took an emphatic stand in favor of the Platonic position.

The basis for the construction of the proklical system was the interpretation of selected Platonic dialogues. Proclus stated that Parmenides was authoritative for metaphysics and that Timaeus for cosmology ; in these two dialogues the entire Platonic worldview is contained. Since metaphysics was considered the most noble and by far the most important part of philosophy, Proclus said that the core of the Platonic doctrine can be found in Parmenides .

Like all Neo-Platonists, Proclus made a sharp distinction between the only mentally comprehensible realm of pure thought and the sensually perceptible world of material things. One spoke of a “spiritual world” (Greek kósmos noētós , Latin mundus intelligibilis ). It was considered evident that the sensory world was an image of the spiritual world to which it owes its existence. This resulted in a hierarchical ranking for the Neoplatonists, in which the spiritual is in principle superior to the material. The lower is a product of the higher, after whose model it is shaped and in whose properties it shares, as far as its conditions of existence permit. It is dependent on the higher in every way, while the higher is in no way dependent on the lower. As a higher-level area, the spiritual is the more general and simpler, the sensually perceptible appears scattered in the variety and individual peculiarity of the individual sensory objects. At the top of this order, still above the spiritual, stands “ the one ”, the absolutely transcendent and completely simple highest principle. It is the origin of everything and does not depend on anything.

This generally accepted coarse division formed the basis for further differentiation in late antiquity; In addition, the connections between the main areas had to be clarified. Since Plotinus (205–270), the founder of Neoplatonism, the Neoplatonists endeavored to give their model of total reality a thoroughly worked out and plausible structure and thus to surpass the hypotheses of their predecessors, which are now referred to as " Middle Platonists " . Plotinus assumed a three-part basic structure of the metaphysical sphere with three hierarchically ordered principles: Under the absolutely undifferentiated one (Greek to hen ) stands the supra-individual spirit or intellect (Greek nous ), followed by the soul area, which forms the lowest part of the purely spiritual world . Immediately below the soul begins the sphere of the sense objects, the formed matter; it has the lowest rank in the world order.

The neo-Platonists of late antiquity adopted the basic features of Plotin's concept, but contradicted him on some issues. They also often had different opinions among themselves. In the course of the history of ancient Neoplatonism, there was a tendency towards an increasingly complex design of the world model; additional instances and intermediate stages between the different levels of existence seemed necessary and were inserted. In this process of progressive differentiation and refinement of the worldview, Proclus played a key role. But he was not satisfied with hypothesizing and advancing theoretical speculation. As a philosophy teacher, he pursued the main goal of offering his students and readers orientation in the cosmos and at the same time giving them guidance on an ideal lifestyle according to philosophical principles. Insight into the nature of the world and the implementation of the knowledge in action were, according to his understanding, inextricably linked. The environment for the practice was formed by the milieu of the philosophy school, in which the Platonists led a life together and were linked by friendships and family ties.

As befits the Platonic tradition and especially the Neoplatonic way of thinking, for Proclus religion and philosophy formed an inseparable unit. He practiced the syncretism widespread in late antique “ paganism ” , the amalgamation of various religious traditions and philosophical schools. The syncretistic synthesis was an important concern of the Neoplatonists; it produced a holistic interpretation of the world that could be opposed to the Christian doctrine of creation and redemption as an alternative. The traditional core beliefs of the Neoplatonists made up the stable core of Proklos' system; He adapted ideas from other origins to them through appropriate interpretation. Striving for harmonization was an important part of his work.

Proklos rejected the development of a general methodology on principle. He thought that there could be no abstract methodology with absolute validity that abstracts from all special contents; rather, the method must be adapted to the respective content. The method is only an aid and should not become an end in itself.

The structure of the world

In the model of Proclus, the existence of the totality of things is traced back to a step-by-step emergence of all beings from the starting point, the one. “Proceeding” does not mean creation or emergence in time; rather, for Proclus, as for numerous Platonists, the world is beginning and ending in time. Expressions like “create” and “emerge” do not serve to designate individual events in his cosmology. They are only intended to express metaphorically that what is created or which has come about owes its existence to the existence of the creating instance. As far as the spiritual world is concerned, the connection is timeless; in the temporal realm, creation can be seen as an endless process. A timeless relationship between a cause and an effect is called "causal production" to distinguish it from an eventful cause.

One is the supreme, original reality. The individual levels of reality are arranged below it, each of which emerges from the one directly above it. The more general is always the higher ranking and productive, the more specific the lower and generated. In philosophical terminology, the emergence is called emanation (outflow, outflow); the levels are called " hypostases " in the neo-Platonic terminology . This creates a hierarchical ladder that reaches down to matter, where the lowest mode of existence is to be found. The causality is not to be understood in such a way that one level is only produced by the next higher; rather, each stage is produced indirectly by all that preceded it and immediately by the next higher. In general, the following principle applies: the more general and thus closer a level is to the one, the more powerful its influence on everything subordinate to it.

The origin of everything

Proclus claims that there must be a first and highest cause. He considers the existence of a cause of everything that is to be provable. He sees three possibilities for the opposite assumption, all of which, according to his argument, are absurd: Either being has no cause, then the principle of sufficient reason is violated; in this case the world is chaotic and thus science is impossible; or causes and effects are circular, then what is produced must produce what is produced and the cause is not superior to the effect; or there is an endless chain of causes and then knowledge is impossible. Science exists, however, there is order in the world, causes take precedence over their effects and beings are recognizable. So there must be a causal chain, the first link of which is the cause of everything that is subordinate to it.

According to the doctrine of Proclus, it is necessary that the cause of all beings is that in which all that beings have a share, or to put it in technical language: that which is participated by all that beings. This is to be understood in the sense of the Platonic term of "participation" ( Methexis ). Participation means that the participant has the quality for which the participant is responsible, because the participant gives him this quality. The participant as such always has the function of the cause, because it gives the participant a certain quality which constitutes the participant as an entity . The number of properties of a participating entity results from the number of causes which this entity participates. The most general property that is predicated of all beings is “x is one”. This statement also applies to a multiplicity, albeit to a weaker degree than to a unity, because every multiplicity is in a certain sense at the same time “one” and must therefore participate in the principle of “the one”. The quality of being one is thus graduated, but present in all beings to a lesser or greater degree. No other quality is as general as this. Even nothing is “one” and to that extent participates in “one”, it is not wholly and nothing. Thus “the one” is the first and highest cause and at the same time the first principle, because it is that which is responsible for the most general predicate . For this thesis Proclus puts forward a proof with which he tries to show that the opposite of the proposition to be proven is absurd. The conclusiveness of the evidence is debatable in research.

This raises the question of the status of the One in ontology , the doctrine of being or of being as such. The one must be absolutely simple and uniform, that is, absolutely undifferentiated; it must not have any aspect of multiplicity, since otherwise there would have to be an even higher, superordinate unit that would have to establish its unity, which would result in an infinite regress . Thus, the one cannot be sought in the realm of being, because all being is "unified", that is, it carries within itself not only unity but also a multiplicity and needs an authority that unites it. The absolutely one, however, cannot be “not being” either in the sense that it lacks being, because then it could not give being to the things that are. So the one thing has to be “overseeing”: it “is” not, but it is the principle of everything that is. It is absolutely transcendent, that is, it is not a "something" that can be grasped verbally or in thought. Therefore it can only be inferred indirectly through speculation from the subordinate entities.

One consequence of the absolute simplicity and undifferentiation of the One is that it must be free from all positive determinations. So you can't add anything to it; Determinations - that is, statements of the type “The One is x” - would be additions and as such would cancel the unity, because they would introduce a polarity . Therefore, only negative statements are meaningful, with which it is determined what the overriding One is not . With such statements one approaches the One by removing all determinations and thereby eliminating inappropriate ideas about the Absolute. For this Proklos uses the expression trópos tēs aphairéseōs ("procedure of removal"). The negations are not meant privatively ("robbing"), that is, they do not indicate a lack of something. They are only intended to remove the restrictions that always result from positive provisions. The negations thus turn out to be productive; they bring whoever does them closer to the truth. Such an approach to the truth of the One is natural and desirable, for it is in keeping with the nature of the lower to strive for the higher and to ascend to it. The higher appears to the lower as “good”, and the one as the first cause is the highest and therefore, from a human point of view, the most desirable, “ the good ” par excellence. Proclus expresses his appreciation for the negation of the provisions by describing the rise of negative thinking on the one hand in religious language; he sees in it "a single theological hymn to the one through these negations". In technical terms, this approach is referred to as " negative theology ".

However, the negations also turn out to be inadequate; they, too, ultimately cannot do justice to the inexpressible absolute. Therefore, they too must be denied. With the “negation of negation” another restriction is lifted which has resulted from the polarity of thinking. Thinking transcends itself, overcomes its polarity and thus creates a prerequisite for grasping unity. This grasping, which is an experience, is the aim of the philosopher. The one can be experienced because there is something divine in the soul which, because of its kinship with the one, enables such an experience. Access to the “one self” is provided by the “one in us” that the soul finds in itself. The prerequisite for this is the active effort of the one who removes the obstacles. The negation of negation is therefore not a return to the starting point after eliminating an error, but a progress towards the goal.

Mediation and cohesion

For the proklical model there is a difficulty in the need to explain how being can emerge from the overlying One and still preserve the absolute transcendence of the One. An immediate generation of beings through the One would be incompatible with the absolute transcendence of the highest principle. Therefore, mediating instances are needed, which, although overwriting, are participable for beings. Proclus calls these instances "Henads" (units). The two principles of the limiting and the unlimited, which, where they act as original principles, are also to be understood as overarching, have a mediating effect.

The problem of mediation does not only arise in the border area between the transcendent and the being, but also within the area of ​​being. For Proklos, the totality of the existing entities is a whole, the components of which are closely related to one another, especially in cause-effect relationships. Since the constituent parts are of different nature, one of the main tasks of philosophy is to explain the fact that despite their diversity they can be related. What is needed is a mediation that enables a community (koinōnía) between two different entities or levels of existence. There must be factors that bring things together and hold them together by mediating between them, bridging the contrast and thus structuring the world. Mediation has the effect that the members of an existing whole are related to one another and form a unity, but do not merge into one another and lose their differentiation, but rather preserve their own essence. There must be reasons why there can be unity in multiplicity, and multiplicity in unity. According to the proklical theory, these reasons lie in the “triadic shape” (schḗma triadikón) of beings, because it is the “ triad ” (trinity) that enables “at the same time” of unity and difference. The peculiarity of the trinity consists in the fact that it comprises unity and duality and is itself the “mixture” (miktón) of both, with which the third element joins. So it is a unity of three elements, which are both three aspects of a single reality and three parts of a causation process. The triad is unity in difference. As a principle, it justifies all being and thus all thinking: Since everything that is is structured triadically, the movement of thinking that pursues being must also be triadic. This structure manifests itself in a multitude of triads. Trinity can be recognized wherever the principles of identity and difference work together, where unity unfolds and thus creates multiplicity and the elements of multiplicity at the same time remain concentrated in unity.

An example of such a triad is " péras (border, delimiting, enclosing), ápeiron (unlimited, shapeless, indefinite), miktón (mixture [of limitation and unlimited])". This triad goes through everything that is and is also responsible for the emergence of beings from that which is overseen. The principle of indeterminacy is “mightiness” that gives birth and gives birth; it brings forth life; the principle of limitation constitutes the “something” as such, the determinate, demarcated and thus definable. Wherever they are most original and causal, these two principles belong to the realm of the omnipotent. When they work together as original principles, something “mixed” arises, the third element of the triad, and that is being. This is how this triad explains the causal, timeless creation of being. The other triads include "Beingness ( Ousia ), Selbigkeit, otherness" and "Beginning, middle, end".

The triad " monḗ (linger, pause ), próodos (emergence, progression), epistrophḗ (turning back, return)" occupies an outstanding special position . It is not a triad next to the others, but the reason inherent in and moving all other triads. The unity of its three elements constitutes the core of the proclical explanation of the world context; At the same time, this triad represents the structural principle of spirit and thought. Everything that happens is cyclical for Proclus, and he also describes the timeless connections metaphorically as if they were cycles. Every effect is originally present in its cause. It steps out of the cause, progresses away from it, and turns back to its starting point because of an inherent tendency. All causal relationships can be described within the framework of this dynamic triadic structure, and all processes are made up of the three aspects “persistence in the cause”, “emergence from the cause” and “return to the cause”. The reason for the emergence is the overflowing "overabundance of mightiness" of the cause, the reason for the turning back is the striving of the relatively imperfect for greater perfection; the return is already laid out in the process, the movement takes place in a circle. Thus causes and effects are closely linked through this triad, the multiform world can be understood and explained as a whole and inseparable unit.

The spiritual world

Below that which is overshadowed, in the hierarchical order of precedence, is the spiritual world, in which reason, the nous, rules. In the chain of causes it follows what is overlooked and precedes the soul and the material. The spiritual world has a complex structure, which is determined by several triads, and comprises a number of metaphysical entities that are also understood as deities and are divided into classes of rank. In the detailed presentation of the model of the spiritual world, Proklos justifies the individual intellectual steps that have led him to his assumptions. He attaches importance to making the reader understand the necessity of the steps so that the structure of his complex thought structure appears to be logically imperative.

A triad is responsible for the basic structure, which divides the spiritual world into three main areas. Designations such as “area” are used here without any spatial connotation ; they should only serve to distinguish between ontologically “previous” and “subordinate”, that is, express the hierarchy. The spiritual world is super-spatial and timeless. The highest realm is the place of the intellectually known, the noētón . There are entities that are objects of knowledge for other spiritual entities, but are not themselves, as knower, oriented towards spiritual entities in other areas. Knowledge is participation; the object of knowledge participates, the knower participates. The priority of the entities of the highest realm results from the fact that they are recognized by what is below them and thus participate, i.e. are causal in this regard, but do not themselves participate in other realms within the spiritual world, i.e. do not depend on other spiritual entities . The cognitive object is in principle superior to the knower, since the knower aligns itself with it and not the other way around. What is known is the cause, what is known is caused by what is known and, in the sense of the principle of turning back, is oriented towards its cause, to which it turns, knowing. Hence the “known” entities have the highest rank in the spiritual world; they do not participate in anything spiritual, but only that which is above the spirit, namely the overcoming henads and principles from which they receive being. The middle area is that of both the known and the knower: the deities there recognize that which is in the highest area, and are in turn recognized by those who are subordinate to them, in the lowest area. Thus they are both participating and participating in the spiritual world. At the bottom is the area of ​​the noerón , the knower. There are subordinate entities that, as deities, recognize what precedes them, but are not themselves the subject of knowledge for spiritual entities in other areas. In the specialist literature, the term “intelligible” is used for what is known, and the term “intellectual” is used for what is known; but when the “intelligible cosmos” is mentioned, the totality of the spiritual world is meant.

Each of the three main areas is in turn structured in a triadic manner. This results in a structure with different levels. The triad " on / ousía (being / being), zōḗ (life), nous (intellect)" functions as a structuring principle, the elements of which are in a hierarchical relationship to one another. For the hierarchy, the principle is decisive that the causal and the participants always stand above the effects and the participants. The extent of the causality of an entity can be deduced from the extension of the associated predicate. Most causal is the most universal cause in the world of beings, i.e. the one to which the predicate corresponds with the greatest extension. This is the predicate “x is”, because everything that is has a share in being. So being precedes everything else. In second place is life. It is above the intellect, because everything that participates in the intellect also participates in life, but not the other way around; so “life” is more general than “intellect” and thus more causal. It follows that the intellect is of the lowest rank. However, the three elements of the triad do not exist separately, but interpenetrate each other: In being, life and intellect are found according to the way of being, in life being and intellect according to the way of life, and in intellect being and life according to the way of intellect.

In the highest main area, the intelligible that is recognized and not recognizing any other area of ​​being, the two triads “being, life, intellect” and “limit, limitless / limitless, mixture of limit and limitless / limitless” structure together. This results in a triad composed of three triads, the intelligible triad. It is structured according to the following scheme:

  • The highest level, the level of being, is that of the triad “limit, limitlessness, intelligible being”, whereby the intelligible being is that of the two other elements “mixed”. This level emerges directly from what is overseen. The border element dominates here in the Triassic, that is, the mixture takes place “according to the border”. Therefore this level is the highest, because the element border has the highest rank in the triad and its dominance produces the highest mixture product, being.
  • The middle level, the level of life, emerges from the highest. It is determined by the triad “limit, limitless, intelligible life”. Here the limitless prevails as the original principle of “unlimited effectiveness” (ápeiros dýnamis) and, through its mixture with the principle of limitation, creates the intelligible life. Since the limitless dominates here within the triad, the mixture takes place “according to the limitless”, the middle element of the triad. Therefore this level is the middle one and its mixture product is life, which takes the middle rank in the triad “being, life, intellect”.
  • The lowest level, the intellect level, is determined by the triad “limit, limitless, intelligible intellect”. Here, too, the limit and the limitless mix, and this time the intellect of the intelligible realm emerges from their mix. In this case, “the mixed”, the lowest element of the triad “border, limitless, mixture of both”, is the decisive factor. Since the lowest element is mixed, the lowest mixed product is created, and this corresponds to the rank of this level.

The central main area, the site of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual entities, is also structured by a triadic triad. The intelligible and at the same time intellectual triad is designed according to the following scheme:

  • At the highest level, the triad “being, life, intellect” predominantly affects the way of being, its highest element. The intelligible aspect dominates over the intellectual, its characteristics primarily shape the level.
  • On the middle level, the triad “being, life, intellect” works according to the way of life, its middle element. The intelligible and the intellectual aspect are equally powerful.
  • At the lowest level, the triad “Being, Life, Intellect” works predominantly in the manner of the intellect. Through the predominance of the intellectual, this level shows its proximity to the main area immediately after it, that of the intellectual entities.

The main area of ​​the intellectual also has three parts. Of these, two are divided into three parts, the third has only a single element. Thus the intellectual area consists of a total of seven entities or deities, it forms a Hebdomad (sevenness) with the following three sub-areas:

  • Part of the three deities that Proclus summarizes under the name "intellectual fathers" (noeroí patéres) . These are three gods central to the myth of the origins of the world of the Greek folk religion: Kronos , his wife Rhea and the son of this couple, the god father Zeus . They form a hierarchically ordered triad in which Kronos as the highest intellectual deity stands for the limit, being and the intelligible aspect of the intellectual, Rhea as the life-giving mother for life and the powerful unlimited and Zeus as the lowest element of the triad for the "intellectual Intellect ” (noerós nous) , the intellectual aspect within the intellectual realm. The lowest rank that Zeus occupies corresponds to the position of this god in myth, where, as a child of Kronos and Rhea, he is what his parents caused, the "mixture product". Nevertheless, Zeus also has an intelligible part in him, since he recognizes himself intellectually, i.e. is intelligible for himself. Kronos is one of the intellectual deities in the overall framework of the spiritual world, but from the point of view of Zeus he is intelligible. The mutual interpenetration of the elements of the triads is particularly evident here. A schematic representation of the entities of the spiritual world can only offer a guide, but cannot do justice to the complexity of the proklical model.
  • Part of the three "Immaculate Guardians", who are called Curetes in the mythical nomenclature . These three deities stand between the intellectual fathers and the subordinate realm of the created. They are called guardians because they “guard” the intellectual fathers. This means that they protect the Fathers from too close contact with creation. This is necessary because the Fathers - especially Zeus as the Creator God - would otherwise be exposed to the danger of contamination from the influence of lower entities.
  • Part of the seventh deity. This sub-area is not subdivided. The function of the seventh deity is to produce intellectual distinctions.

The intellect plays an important role in both the top and bottom of the three main areas of the spiritual world. The top level intellect is the intelligible intellect. It is the level of the spiritual world at which the originally undifferentiated being first unfolds into a multiplicity. This happens because being is differentiated into various Platonic ideas . In Platonism, “ideas” are understood to be real, perfect and unchangeable spiritual entities, the archetypes, whose images are the transitory sense objects. They are the decisive patterns that give everything that can be sensed to be and be. In the proklical system, the Platonic ideas are thoughts of the intellect, and they are understood not as parts of it, but as its products.

Proclus identifies the intelligible intellect with the perfect primordial creature, which, according to Plato's dialogue Timaeus, is the model according to which the Demiurge , the creator god, created the world as a soulful cosmos. The intellectual intellect is in the proclical model Zeus, who is equated with the demiurge of Timaeus . Both intellects produce Platonic ideas, each in their own way. The intelligible intellect produces the higher, broader "intelligible ideas" that appear intelligible at its level. The intellectual intellect is the producer of the subordinate, more specific, less powerful "intellectual ideas"; at its level all ideas are present in an intellectual way.

Proclus defends Plato's theory of ideas against the criticism of Aristotle and the Peripatetics . He thinks that each of the four dialectical methods ( dihairesis , definition, analysis and proof) presuppose ideas in the sense of the doctrine of ideas. He examines the question of whether not only the natural but also the artificially created objects are assigned their own Platonic ideas as causes, and comes to the conclusion that such ideas are not to be accepted.

The material world

In the dialogue Timaeus , Plato spoke extensively about the origin of the material world . Nevertheless, basic questions on this subject were controversial among the ancient Platonists. The uncertainty arose from the fact that the creation of the sensually perceptible cosmos is portrayed in the dialogue in mythical language and therefore strongly divergent interpretations are possible, depending on whether individual statements are taken literally or viewed as metaphors. In the myth of Timaeus , the creation processes are described in such a way that the impression arises that an act of creation is meant that took place at a certain time. Accordingly, the world that can be perceived by the senses did not exist before and is to be assigned to the time-dependent things that have arisen. In addition, the Timaeus claims that the Creator God did not create matter but found it. It existed before creation. At that time it was still in a state of chaotic movement. The intervention of the Creator ended the chaos, and the current order of the universe has existed ever since.

The Middle Platonists Plutarch and Attikos had spoken out in favor of a literal interpretation of these statements . According to their understanding, the world does indeed have a beginning in time, but matter is uncreated not only in the temporal but also in the causal sense; like the one, it is an ungenerated original principle. Attikos professed a radical dualism . According to his teaching, the metaphysical world and matter exist independently of one another and had nothing to do with one another before the act of creation. Only through creation did matter come under divine influence.

The Neoplatonists unanimously took the opposite view. They were of the opinion that Plato had only described the creation of the world as a temporal process for the purpose of illustration. In reality he meant a timeless creation of the world order, which could only be understood as a causal relationship, and kept the ordered cosmos existing forever. Proclus strongly advocated this interpretation of the Timaeus . Among other things, he argued that a good Creator must want and do the best possible at all times, and that the best is not variable over time. Thus his creative activity cannot be limited in time if creation is the optimal action. Failure to create in a certain period of time presupposes a lack of will or ability. Neither of these two possibilities come into consideration for the Creator; the first is to be excluded because of its goodness, the second because of the immutability of its nature. With regard to primordial matter Proclus taught that, like the world order, it does not have a beginning in time, but it is causally generated. As a consistent monist , he also reduced matter to one. According to his argument, there cannot be two ungenerated, independent principles. If they existed, they would have to be two. But this would presuppose that each of them would be one and thus participate in the one. Then the one would be superior to the two; it would be their common principle shared by both. So both would be created from something higher.

In the hierarchy of the proclical world model, matter, like all other Platonists, has the lowest rank. The material is at the end of the causal chain and in the hierarchy deep below the spiritual world. Matter, however, is not only produced from the next higher level, but from all levels preceding it and primarily from the One. The two principles of limitation and infinity act as a mediator. The universal primordial matter, which Proclus describes as “first” and “simple” matter, is absolutely formless and undifferentiated; its cause is the principle of overflowing Infinity. The form, which forms the formless matter and gives it a certain structure and quality, is a manifestation of the principle of limit. From the interaction, the “mixture” of the two principles, the totality of sensually perceivable things results as “mixed”. This is how Proclus understands the timeless creation of the material world.

The authority that carries out the creation process is the demiurge. He creates the material world in two “stages”, but not in the sense of a real temporal sequence; the temporal expression is used for illustration purposes only. The first stage is the "body-creating" stage, in which simple matter is formed into the physical. Proclus identifies the physical body created in this way with what, according to the Timaeus, was in a state of disordered movement “before” creation. He rules out that this chaotically moving could be the formless primordial matter, because Plato himself describes it as visible, so it must have a form. The second stage of creation, according to the Timaeus interpretation of Proclus, is the “ordering”, in which the chaotic physical is animated. The universe receives a soul, the world soul , which takes over its control, arranges the material things and aligns the physical with the nous, the reason. This is how the material world attains the degree of perfection it can.

Matter is not part of anything, but it is capable of participation; since it is formless, it is open to any form. As a participant, it is aligned with what it participates and is receptive to what comes from there. Hence it is given the form and order that it can receive.

For Proclus it follows from his understanding of creation that the existence of matter is necessary. It has to exist because it is needed for the completion of the universe. The completeness of the cosmos also includes the material forms, which as such can only exist in matter. The cosmos must be complete if it is good; it has to be good because it has a good origin. Everything that is emerges from the one that Proclus equates with the absolutely good . If the good is the cause of everything, then total reality must form an optimally ordered whole, in which each part realizes the degree of perfection that is possible on its level. This must apply to the entire hierarchical order of the entities that have emerged from the good, i.e. also to the material level furthest from the origin. So the matter has to absorb the material forms, it has to be shaped and ordered, and not only through a temporal act, but over time. Since creation is timeless, matter as a concrete reality always appears only shaped. It is ordered as well as possible by the demiurge and therefore always shows the perfection that is due to it.

Soul, time and eternity

Proclus locates the soul in his world hierarchy, as is customary in Neoplatonism, between the spiritual and the material world. In the spirit (nous) he sees the comprehensive origin and ground of the soul, which is present in it as a preserving principle. The soul appears to him as the nous "taken up again" in another dimension. She is mind in an imaginary way, and her thoughts are images of the original thoughts of the mind. In the spirit, thinking and being are inseparable; there is a dynamic identity between them. Thought, thought and thought form an essential unity. The being of the platonic idea is the thought in the spirit. It is different in the soul: there thinking is always subordinate to its object and receives its measure from a being given to it. Therefore the thinking of the soul has to make the transition from thought to being. It must separate what is united in the spirit and pass from one being grasped in thought to the other. The soul thinks discursively. This process is shown in the Dihairesis , a method of classification and definition, with which one subdivides a more general term into sub-terms until one finds the definition of the term sought. The soul proceeds in such a way that it sees each idea separately, but not all in one glance. While the spirit thinks everything as one and in particular already thinks the whole, the soul sees everything as an individual and can only construct the whole in succession, going through each individual. In the spirit all opposites are abolished and folded, in the soul they are developed. It is the unfolded being of the spirit, which is divided into it. Everything that is in one another in the spirit is separate in it. Proclus compares the soul with a "writing board of the spirit" that is always written on. According to the proklical doctrine it is oriented towards the spirit and surpasses itself towards it by striving for its perfection. Its thinking is therefore a return movement towards its ground and origin, in which it participates by thinking.

The fundamental difference between spirit and soul is that the spirit is timeless, while the soul as self-moving substance is intertwined in time. The spirit is assigned to the sphere of the eternal, the timeless now of the aiṓn (eternity in the sense of timelessness or timelessness). The soul is temporal and temporal at the same time; it has a timeless being, but an effect in time. The temporal aspect of its existence is constitutive for the soul; if it weren't for it, it would be no different from the nous.

For Proklos, time is not an accident , but a substance (ousia) . Like all Neoplatonists, he considers them to be beginning and endless. Otherwise, a time of their creation or dissolution must be assumed, which is absurd. Regarding the nature of time, Proclus advocates a concept with which he distances himself from the view of Plotinus. According to Plotin's theory, time cannot be assumed outside the soul; only through the soul and with it there is time. For Proklos, on the other hand, time is based on the timeless eternity and is its image. It is beyond the soul and ontologically superior to it and mediates between spirit and soul. Since it is the task of the soul to align itself with the spirit and thus with eternity, the philosopher strives to overcome time through the thinking that leads him into the nous. If, in a philosophical endeavor, one turns the eye of the soul upwards to the nous and practices this attitude, it can happen that obvious truth lights up in a timeless now in which time is eliminated.

The life of souls is interpreted in the proklical system as a cyclical process. They have descended from their purely spiritual home into the physical world, have taken on bodies there and then turn back up, to their origin, in order to return home and unite with the nous. So you make a movement that first leads downwards and then upwards. The way up is to philosophize, to gain philosophical knowledge. This means the knowledge of the timeless, which results from turning to the spiritual world. The philosophical endeavor aims at liberating purification from dispersion into multiplicity and training for simplicity through concentration. It leads from the appearance of opinion to the certainty of the truth, which is revealed as such in the spiritual world. The soul naturally strives for the nous, but it is not only guided upwards by this striving; It receives a further impetus from its longing for the one, the ultimate source, which for the soul is at the same time the absolute good.

The ascent transforms the soul, makes it free, light and “spirit-like” and even deifies it, but it can never achieve an absolute identity with the timeless spirit or even with the One. Your thinking always remains an emotional one and the temporal aspect of your existence is preserved. It circles the being of the spirit with a movement that Proclus describes as a dance; it can approach the center of the circle, but it never reaches it. Even if she manages to get to the one and touch it, she does not dissolve in it, but remains soul. Their circular motion is endless; the ascent is always followed by a new descent.

With his considerations on the ascent and descent of souls, Proclus orients himself to a large extent on the basic features of the traditional Neoplatonic doctrine of the soul and redemption, which Plotinus was the first to set out. In one essential point he strongly contradicts Plotinus: He rejects his assertion that the soul remains constantly present with its uppermost part in the spiritual world even during its stay in the human body. According to the proclical doctrine of the soul, nothing remains “above” when entering the physical world; the soul as a whole detaches itself from the spiritual world and immerses itself in matter. Therefore she cannot return on her own, but needs outside help. So she is dependent on the support of gods. Theurgy , a ritual process for establishing a connection with the divine realm, plays an important role in their return to their origins . In the philosophical way of life practiced by Proklos, devotional theurgical practice complements the intensive thoughtful work. In his estimation, the highest level of theurgy is “more powerful than all human wisdom and science”.

With regard to the concrete theurgical procedure, Proclus follows a tradition which he has in the Chaldean oracles . He shows himself to be an enthusiastic supporter of the teachings of this work, which was highly valued by the late ancient Neo-Platonists. For him, other essential elements of interaction with the gods are prayer and hymn. They encourage the turning to the nous, they combine the spirit of the gods with the words of those who pray, recite or sing. The texts of the hymns contain symbols of the gods who support the ascent of the soul. With the hymn poem Proclus does not want to express his subjective piety, but rather to provide objective means with which one can approach the spiritual world as an objective reality. Thus composing and reciting hymns is an expression of the same endeavor that all philosophical endeavors serve. For Proclus, however, the highest form of turning to the divine does not consist in words and rites, but in assimilating oneself to the deity - as Plato already demanded. The requests that are addressed to the gods in prayers and hymns are not intended to induce the addressees to adopt a desired behavior, because like all Platonists Proclus professes the principle that the gods cannot be influenced by human requests. Rather, the requests only serve to open the soul to the desired divine influence.

Like all Platonists, Proclus adopts Plato's theory of the animation of the world. According to this doctrine, there is a self-moving world soul , which is the cause of all movement in nature and connects the reason prevailing in the cosmos, the nous, with world matter. According to the myth told in the Timaeus dialogue , the demiurge created the world soul together with the cosmos. Proclus opposes the view of Aristotle, according to which Plato described the world soul both as a faculty of thought and as an extended greatness and equated the thinking of the soul with the circular motion of the universe. According to Proklos' understanding, Plato's world soul and its thinking are expansionless, and the movement of the universe should only serve as an image with which the essential characteristics and contents of mental thinking are transferred to a physical movement. In doing so, Proclus rejects the literal interpretation, which for Aristotle is the starting point for his criticism of Timaeus .

The spiritual realm, the “place” of the world soul and the souls of mortal beings, is also the place of activity of gods who are subordinate to the gods of the spiritual world. They include gods such as Poseidon , Hades , Artemis and Apollon , who are known from mythology as siblings and descendants of Zeus.

The Nature of Evil and the Necessity of Evils

In examining the bad and the evil (kaká) , Proclus deals with Plotin's theory of badness. Plotinus identifies bad with matter. He understands matter to be the absolutely shapeless and non-characteristic that underlies the physical objects to which their forms give properties. For Plotinus, the absolute badness of the unformed, utterly “poor” primordial matter consists in the fact that its essence has nothing at all, that is, in no way participates in the good. Matter as such is the “first bad”, the bad in itself. It is the principle of all evils, and individual evils are bad insofar as they partake of this principle. Thus every evil has its cause in matter. For example, the bad thing about souls can be traced back to the fact that they have fallen into matter and have adjusted to it.

Proclus combats the equation of bad with matter by trying to show that this thesis leads to a hopeless dilemma. His train of thought is: Everything is either a principle or the product of a principle. If matter as such is bad, the question arises as to the principle of this badness. There are then only two possibilities: Either the bad is an independent principle lying in matter, or only the good and one is a principle and the bad matter emerged from it like everything else. The second assumption is absurd: Since the principles apply that every cause is to a higher degree what its product is, and that every product assimilates to its cause, the good as the cause of the first bad should be bad in a higher degree than this, and the first bad should become good through assimilation because of its participation in a good cause. The other possibility - the bad as a principle - leads to dualism, to the acceptance of two opposing, independent principles that fight with each other. Then there is a duality of two independent original principles, the good (one) and the bad. This is impossible, however, because such a duality presupposes a primal unity which is superior to the two principles, which are units, and then the bad is not a primal principle, but rather produced by the same cause as the good. From the refutation of both possibilities it follows for Proclus: There is only one original principle, the one which is absolutely good for humans and to which matter can also be traced back. The bad cannot be a principle and matter cannot be bad.

On the basis of these and other considerations, Proclus arrives at a different understanding of evil and evil than Plotinus. He denies the existence of something inherently bad, which is the opposite of absolutely good, and considers all evils to be relative. He considers the fact that there is any bad thing to be the result of a logical necessity. This arises for him from the fact that two types of participation in the good are possible: the eternal, unchangeable and perfect in the realm of the temporal and the provisional, changeable and inevitably limited in the temporality. As such, limited participation is imperfect. It thus represents a kind of “deprivation”, because the entity that participates in this way is partially deprived of a good that it would have completely if the limitations inherent in temporality were not opposed to it. Every evil is the opposite of a certain good and consists in the partial lack of this good due to the temporality. The absolute good, on the other hand, from which everything emerges, cannot have such an opposite. Nothing can be opposed to it.

Since everything that is has its origin in the good, the bad must be viewed as something that does not exist. The individual evils are manifestations of non-being. Specifically, it is always a certain disturbance of the natural order, a partial, temporary absence of order. There cannot be a single, common origin of the evils, for such a origin would have to be either a first principle or a form or a soul, but for each of these three theoretically possible origins a causation of evils is by nature excluded. The evils do not form a unit, they contradict each other and have many different causes.

Since there is nothing absolutely bad, the evils are not absolutely opposed to the good; rather, they have a certain part in him. Everything bad must be mixed with good. If the bad were the mere absence of the good, it would be purely passive and incapable of acting. However, the evils have their own strength and ability with which they oppose the good. They owe this ability to the good that is also present in them. Without the presence of this good, they could not have any effect.

If one considers nature as a whole, then the possibility of the existence of the bad in it is to be ruled out, because nature can be traced back directly to the principle of the good and is therefore impervious to the bad; she is good all round. Evils cannot attack nature itself, but only individual material bodies and the souls bound to these bodies. In the body, the evils show up as ugliness or illness, in the soul as weakness, as a decrease in the unifying power that would have to ensure the correct, natural relationship between the parts of the soul. Mental evils are generally greater than physical ones. They arise when the rational part of the soul no longer exercises its steering function as it would be necessary. Here, too, the evil turns out to be a disturbance of order. Bad is never chosen by the soul as such, but as supposedly good.

Providence and human will

According to Proclus, Divine Providence guides the universe and every individual. This does not happen through arbitrary acts of the deity, but because of a natural given. It cannot be otherwise, because everything that is is by nature a part of the world order, which is the product of the One. Providence is based on the One and can be equated with its influence on beings. The distance between the level of the One and that of earthly things is great, but the distance does not inhibit the power of action. Rather, the principle applies: the higher and therefore more powerful a level of reality, the deeper its effects reach. For example, the soul only has an effect on the level of living beings, while the nous, as a higher hypostasis, can also shape the inanimate, which it gives form. Nothing is more powerful than the God-mediated work of the One who pervades all of reality. The metaphysical “place” from which Providence operates on the realms below the spiritual world is the intellectual realm of the spiritual world. All gods exercise providence, and below the divine plane are beings such as daemons and heroes who are also involved in the work of providence.

Since the one is absolutely good for beings, Providence cannot strive for and realize anything other than the best possible in each case. Here for Proclus the problem of the compatibility of Providence with the existence of evils arises. He examines two approaches that combine the idea of ​​providence with the concept of a metaphysical good. One is based on the assumption that the influence of Providence only reaches down to the lunar sphere and does not affect the “sublunar” area (everything that is below the moon). The evils are real, but limited to the sublunar area. The second hypothesis for the solution is that Providence controls everything optimally and therefore there is nothing really bad. Proclus rejects both approaches as unsatisfactory. Another concept he studies is in far more stark contrast to his philosophy than either of these. This is a mechanistic determinism . According to this position, the cosmos is a machine that follows ethically indifferent natural laws. Secure philosophical knowledge is not attainable; the idea of ​​free will is an illusion; the good is not an objective reality, but a human construct that is based on arbitrary, culture-dependent conventions and is an expression of the desire for pleasure. Proclus goes into some of the arguments put forward by a proponent of this worldview. In particular, he contradicts the assertion that a divine, timeless knowledge of the future excludes not only human freedom of will, but every possibility of unnecessary events.

Proklos differentiates - here following a stoic concept - between natural evils that are independent of human will, such as poverty, disease and death, and evils that are the result of a free choice of man. He does not consider natural evils to be really bad, for they are only an inevitable consequence of the good and necessary existence of a world of flowing time. Where there is a becoming in time, there must also be a process of passing away; the corruption of one body means the creation of another. This is necessary for the sake of the endless cycle that has to take place in a world of chronological succession. Hence, from the perspective of the whole, the corruption of the body is not bad, and that is the relevant point of view here. Let it be in harmony with the work of Providence. Only the ethically bad is really bad, that is, the evils of the individual souls. But these are not effects of Providence, but the results of a weakness appearing in the souls.

According to the proklical model, the direction of the world by Providence does not mean complete determinism of all processes. There is also something that does not depend on Providence but "on us". A self-power of the soul must be assumed. This assumption arises from the principle that rational nature does nothing in vain. If everything psychic were completely determined by Providence, then the human ability to consider and make decisions, the activity of which presupposes a possibility of choice, would be superfluous. Then nature would not have endowed man with this ability. Another argument is: If everything is determined, the emergence of the assertion “not everything is determined” is determined by absolute necessity. This means that absolute necessity as a cause creates a movement in those who are caused - namely an assertion against absolute necessity - which opposes that movement which is caused by the cause's own nature. For Proclus, the assumption that a cause produces something opposite to its own nature is absurd. It follows from this that the soul has a will not determined by providence. She can make real choices and fail because of weakness.

Philosophical evaluation of poetry

In dealing with poetry, too, the concern of Proclus was philosophical and religious. He considered poets like Homer and Hesiod to be divinely inspired and regarded the Chaldean oracles as authentic revelations from gods. In his interpretation of Homer, he preferred the allegory principle . He tried to give the philosophically objectionable descriptions of the behavior of the gods in Homer a meaning that was plausible to Platonists by assuming that the poet had a hidden didactic intention.

A problem for the enthusiastic Homer admirer Proclus was Plato's fundamental criticism of poetry. He solved it by asserting that Plato only rejects imitative poetry, which is the lowest kind of poetry. With Homer, however, imitation only played a subordinate role; first and foremost he is divinely inspired and his poetry is suitable to connect the soul with the world of immaterial causes. Then step back the own, lower nature of man, the soul will be filled by the deity and thus achieve a union with it.

Proclus thus assigned Homeric poetry an important task in the context of the metaphysical endeavors of Neoplatonism. He tried very hard to harmonize Plato and Homer. The basis of his will to harmonize was his conviction that the divinely inspired poets like Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus and Pindar were theologians and preached the true doctrine of the highest principles. The instruction that they offer people is just as correct as the Plato, only they use a different way of representation than the philosopher. Through an allegorical interpretation of poetry, its hidden meaning can be found; then the correspondence of the poetic message with the philosophical knowledge is shown.

Mathematization of philosophy

The Platoists' high esteem for mathematics, which went back to Plato himself, was particularly pronounced in Proclus. In his Euclidean commentary, he claimed that all branches of human thought can be mathematized without exception, including theology (metaphysics). One consequence of this assumption was that metaphysical statements in his philosophy acquired the imperturbability of theorems of mathematics. He is convinced that mathematization enables a penetration of all fields of knowledge: Just as mathematics in the physical field enables the calculation of the planetary orbits, in political science the most favorable moment for political action can be calculated. The laws of ethics and rhetoric are also based on mathematical conditions; in poetry the laws of metrics are based on certain proportions. Thus, for Proclus, the power of mathematics is everywhere; it “purifies thinking”, “frees us from the fetters of the irrational” and gives the soul, by guiding it to the purely spiritual, “with a life of bliss”. However, Proklos is not of the opinion that physical phenomena can be completely reduced to mathematical conditions. He emphasizes that mathematical accuracy and certainty cannot be achieved in natural philosophy and that sensory objects are something different from mathematical objects. They are characterized by a certain blurriness and instability that limit their mathematical comprehensibility.


For the Neoplatonic view of the world, which was based on the idea of ​​an optimally ordered cosmos, the irregularity of the planetary movements observed from the earth represented a challenge. The cosmological framework was formed by the geocentric model of the astronomer Ptolemy , which was generally accepted in late antiquity , according to which the earth is itself is in the middle of the universe and is orbited by all other celestial bodies. This system required the assumption of secondary movements of the planets in addition to their main movement around the center of the world. The epicyclic theory was used to explain the secondary movements and was supposed to reconcile theory and empiricism by means of complicated calculations . Proclus commented on this problem in his commentary on Plato's natural-philosophical dialogue Timaeus , which he wrote at the age of 27, and in his short description of astronomical hypotheses . He expressed his dissatisfaction with the mathematical constructions that the Ptolemaic model needed to explain planetary motions. The astronomers were forced to adapt their constructions to the respective empirical findings in order to take additional observations into account. From this fact Proclus concluded that astronomy is not an exact science. His own explanation for the observed irregularity of the planetary movements was that only the outermost celestial sphere, the fixed star sky, showed a completely uniform and therefore perfect movement. As a counterpoint to this, Proklos considered the completely irregular, arbitrary, chaotic movements of objects on earth. He assigned the ordered, but not uniform, planetary motions a middle position between these two extremes.

Proclus rejected the widespread model of rigid “spheres”, according to which the stars are attached to transparent, uniformly rotating hollow spheres arranged concentrically around the center of the world. He accepted the existence of the spheres, but did not regard them as solid bodies, but as spaces of specific consistency with a material and an immaterial aspect. This meant that he no longer had the physical function that was usually assigned to them.



Proclus' student Marinos von Neapolis paid tribute to his teacher in the obituary Proclus or About Happiness , which he delivered in 486 as a speech on the first anniversary of the scholar's death . The text has been preserved. In the detailed speech, Marinos glorified the virtues and achievements of his teacher. His work is cited in modern specialist literature as Vita Procli (Life of Proclus) and is the main source for the biography of the philosopher. As the alternative title of the speech already shows, it was the Marino's concern to prove Proclus' life to be particularly happy. He was said to have been the happiest of famous men for a long time, because he had perfected himself in virtues. He was not only blessed with the happiness of the wise - eudaimonia - but also with the secondary "external" goods - favorable living conditions - he was richly blessed. Marinos admitted that Proclus tended to react violently when he encountered neglect. Therefore one could get the impression that he was irascible. In reality, however, he was able to control his passionate temperament with ease.

The influence of Proclus shaped the last phase of the Neoplatonic school in Athens, which continued for several decades after his death until Emperor Justinian I prohibited teaching in 529. His numerous students ensured the further dissemination of his ideas, his opinion had weight with the Neoplatonists. The words of his pupil Ammonios Hermeiou, who taught philosophy in Alexandria, testify to his high reputation outside of Greece. Ammonios found that his “divine teacher” Proclus had reached the peak of what a person could achieve, both as an interpreter of the traditional teaching material and with his scientific investigation of the nature of existing things. However, some of the theses of Proclus encountered opposition in the last generation of the Athens Neoplatonists: Damascius († after 538), the last head of the Athens School of Philosophy, dealt thoroughly and critically with the proclical system and rejected a large part of the doctrines of his predecessor.

The writings of a Greek-speaking Christian theologian who worked in the late 5th or early 6th century but tried as a writer to give the impression that he was Dionysius Areopagita , a disciple of the apostle mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles , are strongly influenced by the philosophy of Proclus Paul . Today this unknown author is called Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita ("the alleged Dionysius Areopagita"). His supposed identity with the apostle gave his works compiled in the "Corpus Dionysiacum" an extraordinary authority. In the Middle Ages, this led to an intensive reception of the proklical ideas contained therein. Pseudo-Dionysius adapted the Proclus system for his purposes. In doing so, he tied in particular with the concept of "negative theology". The influence of the pagan thinker is particularly evident in his doctrine of evil.

A philosophical opponent of Proclus was the theologian Johannes Philoponos . In the year 529 he wrote a treatise in which he argued for the origin of the cosmos in time and accused Proclus of a wrong interpretation of Plato's Timaeus .

middle Ages

Early and High Middle Ages

In the early and high Middle Ages, Latin-speaking scholars of Western and Central Europe had no translations of the main works of Proclus available. For this reason, his influence initially only asserted itself indirectly, above all through the works of the pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita , which were widely used in Latin from the 9th century and were highly regarded. From the late 12th century, the Liber de causis (Book on the Causes) was added, the Latin translation of the Arabic treatise on pure good made by Gerhard von Cremona . This work, which mainly contained material from Proclus' Fundamentals of Theology , was erroneously attributed to Aristotle and was widely used as a textbook.

The first work by Proclus that was made accessible in the West through a Latin translation was the Elementatio physica . The translator, who was studying medicine at the school of Salerno , had learned that the scholar Henricus Aristippus , who had been the envoy of the Norman King of Sicily in Constantinople, had brought back a Greek manuscript of the Almagest from this trip . Thereupon he set out for Sicily, where he met Aristippus and got an insight into some codices that the Byzantine emperor had given the Sicilian ambassador. Among these was a copy of the Elementatio physica , which the translator translated into Latin around the middle of the 12th century. The quality of his translation was affected by the inadequacy of his knowledge of Greek and mistakes in his submission.

Late Middle Ages

One page of a late medieval copy of Proklos' Parmenides commentary in the Latin translation of Wilhelm von Moerbeke with handwritten marginal notes by Nikolaus von Kues. Bernkastel-Kues, Library of the St. Nicholas Hospital , Codex 186, fol. 125r (mid 15th century)

The name of Proklos only became known to a broader educated public when Wilhelm von Moerbeke translated some of his main works into Latin in the second half of the 13th century . Moerbeke's first and by far the most important translation in the Middle Ages was that of the foundations of theology , which he completed in 1268. He tried to render the Greek text as literal as possible. In 1280 he translated the "three little works" ( About ten questions of doubt concerning Providence , About Providence and fate and what is up to us , About the nature of evils ). He probably also translated the Timaeus commentary completely into Latin; only extracts of it have survived. In the last years of his life, Moerbeke made his translation of the Parmenides commentary.

Using the Elementatio theologica , the Latin basis of theology , Thomas Aquinas recognized that the Liber de causis is based on Proclus' work. In his commentary on the Liber de causis written in 1272 , Thomas made his discovery known. This was the starting point for the onset of late medieval interest in Proclus, which concentrated on the Elementatio theologica . Above all, the Masters of the Paris University studied this work and referred to it; they grasped its importance soon after it became known. An early recipient was Heinrich Bate , one of Moerbeke's correspondents, who added a wealth of Proclus quotations to his great work Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium (Mirror of divine things and certain natural things) .

The philosopher and theologian Dietrich von Freiberg († around 1318/1320) owed important impulses to the cosmology of Proclus. Like the ancient Neoplatonist, Dietrich interpreted the creation of the created as an emanation from God, whom he equated with the Neoplatonic One. He also orientated himself on the proklical model in that he placed hierarchically ordered intellects between God and the visible world as intermediate stages of the cosmic order. As with Proklos, in Dietrich's model, the emergence of things from the One is followed by a return to the origin, which is brought about by longing. In Dietrich's universe, too, everything is shaped by the dynamics of emergence and return.

In the 14th century, the Neoplatonic oriented scholar Berthold von Moosburg , who was strongly influenced by Pseudo-Dionysius, followed up on Dietrich's considerations . He wrote the Expositio super elementationem theologicam Procli , a detailed commentary on Proclus' Elementatio theologica , in which he dealt particularly with the metaphysics of the highest good. From Berthold's point of view, Proklos was not only a thinker proceeding with scientific rigor, but at the same time, as a wisdom teacher, a “divine man” who showed his readers the way to deification. The preacher Johannes Tauler († 1361) probably obtained his knowledge of the theology of "Proculus" from Berthold , who as a "pagan master" was able to accurately describe the experience of God in the soul's ground. Another well-known Proklos recipient was Dionysius the Carthusian († 1471), one of the most influential scholastics of the late Middle Ages. He quoted the Elementatio theologica extensively.

Pietro Balbi, letter of dedication to King Ferdinand I of Naples for his Latin translation of Proclus' Platonic Theology , 1466. Bergamo, Civica Biblioteca Angelo Mai, MA 490, fol. 1r.

Nikolaus von Kues (1401–1464) was inspired by the basic ideas of Proclus in central areas of his philosophy. He studied intensively the Elementatio theologica and the Parmenides commentary, which he received in Moerbeke's translation. In addition, he arranged for the Italian humanist Pietro Balbi (Petrus Balbus) to prepare the first Latin translation of Platonic theology . The first version of this translation was completed in 1462. Nikolaus provided his manuscripts of the three works with numerous marginal notes, some of which contain detailed explanations. His concern was in particular the deepening of the understanding of the absolutely transcendent unity and the clarification of the relationship between the one and the plurality. In epistemology, he used a number of proclical concepts and thought structures for his own teaching, including the thesis that the decline of thinking in itself leads to the view of one's own unity, in which absolute unity is shown as a constitutive precondition of thinking, whereby an indubitable certainty can be obtained. The concept of the “non-other” developed by Nikolaus, according to which each individual contains the whole of reality and therefore the truth cannot be sought in the other, was intended as a specification and continuation of the proclical theory of the one. However, the late medieval philosopher deviated from the ancient model by assigning a trinitarian aspect to the divine non-other .

Arabic speaking area

In the Arabic-speaking world, Proklos was called Buruḳlus . He was known to medieval Muslim thinkers primarily as a proponent of the thesis that the world had no beginning. His work on this subject, the original Greek text of which has now been lost, was available to them in various Arabic translations. A complete translation is said to have existed, which has not been preserved. What has been preserved is an incomplete translation, which contains only half of the eighteen arguments of Proclus, which the scholar Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq made in the 9th century, as well as an also fragmentary Arabic version, the author of which is unknown. A third, now lost translation, was used in the 12th century by the scholar Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Karīm aš-Šahrastānī in his work on religions and philosophical directions, in which he went into detail on the proclical teaching. The reply from the Christian Johannes Philoponos was also available to the Arabic-speaking authors.

At least some of the tenets of the foundations of theology have also been translated into Arabic . A collection of twenty doctrines with considerable changes in content compared to the original Greek text was erroneously attributed to the philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias . This corpus is known today under the modern name "Proclus Arabus" (Arabic Proclus). Furthermore, the foundations of theology were the main source - not the only source, as was previously believed - of the 9th century Arabic script Kalām fī maḥḍ al-ḫayr (Treatise on Pure Good) , which apparently came from the circle around the in Baghdad scholar al-Kindī († 873) comes from. In al-Kindī, the influence of proclical theology is clearly visible. The 10th century philosopher Abū l-Ḥasan Muḥammad ibn Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī belonged to the al-Kindīs school. He wrote a book on the chapters of the divine objects of knowledge (Kitāb al-fuṣūl fī l-maʿālim al-ilāhīya) , which is primarily a paraphrase of the fundamentals of theology .

Byzantine Empire

In the Byzantine Empire a new interest in Proclus arose in the 11th century. The beginning was made by Michael Psellos , who rediscovered the previously neglected late antique philosopher and who considered his teaching to be the pinnacle of ancient Greek philosophy. Psellos 'pupil Johannes Italos dealt intensively with Proclus' foundations of theology . Isaak Sebastokrator , a brother of Emperor Alexios I , wrote three writings in which he included extensive paraphrases from the "three little works" of Proclus on the problems of providence and evil, Christianizing the content. Bishop Nikolaos of Methone turned against the positive reception of the pagan thinker initiated by Psellos in the 12th century . He wrote a pamphlet in which he polemicized against proclical theology. From the 13th century, the short description of astronomical hypotheses of Proclus was used as a textbook in astronomy lessons.

In the dispute between the theologian Gregorios Palamas and the humanist-minded philosopher Barlaam of Calabria , who shook Orthodoxy with his additions in the 14th century, Proclus was one of the authorities on which Barlaam appealed, while Palamas vehemently rejected Neoplatonism.

The pagan Byzantine philosopher Georgios Gemistos Plethon († 1452) judged the proklische philosophy partly critical. He shared some of Proclus 'metaphysical beliefs, but disapproved of Parmenides' interpretation and triadic theology. Gemistus believed that Proclus was influenced by the Christian Dionysius Areopagita; he wanted to free Platonism from Christian falsifications and stick to the authentic pagan teaching of Plato.

Georgia and Armenia

Probably in the late 11th or early 12th century, the Constantinople-trained Georgian philosopher Ioane Petrizi translated the foundations of theology into Old Georgian and wrote a commentary explaining each doctrine. He also referred to Platonic theology and the Parmenides commentary by Proclus and identified himself as a follower of his doctrine. He considered Proclus to be the most important of all philosophers, because he owed the clear exposition of what Plato had only hinted at. From Petrizi's point of view, the philosophy of the ancient Neo-Platonist is compatible with the Christian dogma of the Trinity and is not polytheistic .

On the basis of the Georgian translation of the fundamentals of theology , an old Armenian translation of the work and Petrizi's commentary was created in 1248 . It was created by an Armenian monk living in Georgia.

Early modern age

In the Renaissance , Proclus stood in the shadow of the pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, who was still considered a student of the Apostle Paul; it was believed that the pagan philosopher had adopted the ideas of the Christian theologian. This view was in particular the Neoplatonic oriented thinker Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), who emerged as the leading translator and interpreter of ancient Platonic literature. His relationship with Proclus was relatively distant; Although he was often inspired by the ideas of the late antique Neo-Platonist, he downplayed its importance.

The previously unknown part of Proklos' handwritten oeuvre was discovered by the Renaissance humanists and made accessible to the world of scholars. His works were received by the Platonists among the humanists, but the anti-Proclic polemics of the medieval Greek bishop Nikolaos of Methone also received a lot of attention. In 1469, Cardinal Bessarion published his combat pamphlet In calumniatorem Platonis (Against the slanderer of Plato) , directed against the anti-Platonic scholar Georgios Trapezuntios , in which he relied on the Platonic theology of Proclus to defend Plato . Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463–1494) included in his work 900 theses (Conclusiones nongentae) an abundance of proclical material, including 55 theses which he expressly identified as coming from Proclus. Francesco Patrizi da Cherso (1529–1597) utilized ideas from Proclus' works, especially from the foundations of theology, in his book Nova de universis philosophia (1591) .

The first edition of the Euclidean Commentary by Proclus appeared in 1533; This was followed by a Latin translation published by the mathematician Francesco Barozzi in 1560. In the 16th century this work was used in debates on questions of the philosophy of mathematics , which, in addition to Barozzi et al. a. the philosopher Alessandro Piccolomini and the mathematician Konrad Dasypodius participated. One of the topics was the question of how far mathematics can be considered a science even though it does not identify causes.

Johannes Kepler valued Proclus. He quoted the Euclid Commentary in detail and called it exemplary for the philosophical handling of mathematics. He particularly liked the criticism of the late antique Neo-Platonist of the complexity of the Ptolemaic model of planetary motions.

In the 18th century, the philosophy of Proclus found little resonance. The metaphysical concerns of the Neo-Platonists of late antiquity were alien to the zeitgeist of the time; the historian of philosophy Dietrich Tiedemann passed a devastating judgment in 1793. The common view was that it was an abstract and empty scholasticism and dreaming. Even as a poet Proclus was hardly noticed; after all, Johann Gottfried Herder translated the hymn to Athene into German. Herder published his translation in 1795 in the literary monthly Die Horen .


In the early modern period there was an increased interest in proclical philosophy. The popular scientific writer Thomas Taylor (1758–1835) translated the works of Proclus into English from the late 18th century, making them accessible to a wider audience. Ralph Waldo Emerson was one of the readers to whom he developed the ideas of the Neoplatonist . In specialist philosophical circles it was above all Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel who initiated a "Proclus renaissance" with his dedicated connection to the way of thinking of the late ancient Neo-Platonist. The judgments of the proklische doctrine were very different in the 19th and early 20th centuries; In addition to admiration for the dialectical aspect of the method and the large-scale system, there was a sometimes harsh rejection of the speculative approach. An overall positive assessment later prevailed among experts.

Hegel viewed Neoplatonism as the completion of all ancient philosophy and the metaphysics of Proclus as the completion of Neoplatonism and thus the culmination of ancient thought. What he appreciated about Proclus was his systematization of Neoplatonic doctrine, the resumption and continuation of Plato's Dialectic of One in the Parmenides interpretation, and the increase in hypostases within the framework of a system of universal mediation. Hegel drew on Platonic theology and the foundations of theology ; it is uncertain whether he also read the Parmenides commentary. In his view, Proclus' thinking is “more logical” than that of Plotinus and his interpretation of Plato is the more historically correct. Hegel regarded the elaboration of the triadic structure, the concept of the "trinity", as the main achievement of Proclus. He shared the view of the ancient thinker, according to which the manifold manifestations necessarily emerge from an original simple unity, and, like Proclus, assumed a return to the original. A fundamental difference between the two philosophers' views, however, is how they assess the role of this process. Hegel saw in this a dialectical further and higher development; the result of which is an all-encompassing Absolute that includes multiplicity and determinations, which only comes to itself through the process and thus surpasses the as yet undefined and therefore deficient original unity and simplicity. According to the proklical doctrine, on the other hand, the initial simplicity is absolutely perfect, its power consists precisely in its indeterminacy and any multiplicity is in principle excluded from it. Thus, the One does not need the entities that have emerged from it in any way, the Absolute gains nothing through the process.

Hegel's critics saw his closeness to Proclus and targeted them. So was Ludwig Feuerbach in a pejorative sense, Hegel was "the German Proclus". Arthur Schopenhauer vehemently criticized the Proclus method. The mistake is that the concepts are assumed to be given; it is worked out of the concepts instead of in them. Proclus picked up abstracts and ignored the notions "to which alone they owe their origin and all content". As a “conceptual architect” he builds a world of fantasies with uninhibited audacity. This approach is also that of contemporary philosophers such as Hegel and Schelling , who also produced such “hollow word stuff”. Proklos is a "shallow, broad, bland babbler"; he wrote the "broadest, most rambling underwear in the world". Eduard von Hartmann judged that Hegel's triadic dialectic was "related to Proclus 'sterile acumen and stereotypical addiction to schematization" and that Plotin's real fame was obscured by Proclus' false.

Friedrich Nietzsche saw Proklos as the representative of an attitude contrary to Christianity and in 1875 expressed his appreciation: “At the end of antiquity there are still quite unchristian figures who are more beautiful, purer and more harmonious than all Christian ones; for example Proclus. "

Hermann Cohen , the founder of the "Marburg School" of Neo-Kantianism , considered Proclus' Euclidean commentary to be "the best philosophy of mathematics". However, in his work Logic of Pure Knowledge, published in 1902, he rebuked the “bad influence” that Aristotle had exerted on the Neoplatonist through his “internal logical disproportionate to mathematics”. In 1909 Nicolai Hartmann published his Marburg habilitation thesis Des Proclus Diadochus philosophical beginnings of mathematics , in which he examined the philosophical mathematical understanding of Proclus from the perspective of the neo-Kantian idealism then cultivated in Marburg.

The renowned philologist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff made an unfavorable verdict from a literary point of view: the hymns are only the disguises of dogmas in the conventional epic hymn form, in the comments Proclus has completely lost sight of the explanation of the commented work and has all his philosophical writing hardly any stylistic aspirations.

Eduard Zeller found in his handbook of the history of Greek philosophy, published in the fifth edition in 1923, that Proklos had solved his task of completing the teaching of his school in its scientific structure with logical mastery. He had a rare strength of logical thinking, but this thinking was "unfree by nature", shackled by authorities and prerequisites of all kinds. So he worked astutely to remove the contradictions and inconsistencies of the mythological and dogmatic tradition. The greatness of the system and the persistence with which a basic idea is pursued right down to its finest ramifications, as well as the art with which a symmetrical whole is formed from disparate components are noteworthy. Nevertheless, the system does not leave a satisfactory impression, because its expansion was only the result of the logical consequence with which abstract prerequisites were spun out into ever more abstractions.

For Karl Praechter , whose standard work “ Ueberweg-Praechter ” appeared in its twelfth edition in 1926, Proklos was “the great scholastic of antiquity”. He worked on the conventional teachings with the most subtle treatment of terms and put together huge traditional masses of ideas into a large structure of ideas.

Ernst Bloch valued Proclus as a dialectician; He said that the Neo-Platonist had navigated “the difficult waters of dialectical contradiction, that is, the real world” and had “a bit of Heraclitic depth” in his thinking with the “triad of the first development triad: perseverance, emergence, return”. Hegel energetically rediscovered him as a kindred spirit: "Like is recognized by like."

Proklos research received strong impulses from Werner Beierwaltes , who examined questions of proklical teaching and its reception history in a series of works and with his monograph Proklos, first published in 1965 and published in 1979 in the second edition . Basics of his metaphysics created a standard work. Beierwaltes tried, according to his words, to give an impression of the wealth of development and the fascination of proclical thinking. In the present, this could become an impulse to rethink and further define central questions of metaphysics under changed conditions.

Jens Halfwassen praised Proklos in 2004 as "Hegel of antiquity", as the creator of a metaphysics which is "the most perfect systematic development of Neoplatonic thought"; he had devised the most comprehensive and differentiated of all Neoplatonic systems. His speculative talent and his "incomparable acumen" give him a prominent place in the history of Neoplatonism.

In 2006 Gyburg Radke praised the sophistication and richness of Proklos' interpretation of Plato; he understood the dialogues in a humanistic spirit and presented Parmenides “also at the level of the dialogue as the epitome of humanity”.

The assessment of the validity of Proclus' argument in the foundations of theology from the standpoint of modern logic and set theory is controversial . Among other things, it is criticized that Proclus projects the structures of logic without reflection onto those of the cosmos.

The lunar crater Proclus is named after the philosopher.

Source edition with translation

  • Henri Dominique Saffrey, Alain-Philippe Segonds (eds.): Marinus: Proclus ou Sur le bonheur . Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2001, ISBN 2-251-00496-3 (critical edition of the Greek text of the Vita Procli des Marinos of Neapolis with French translation and commentary)

Editions and translations of the works

Text output (partly with translations)

Comments from Plato

  • Michele Abbate (ed.): Proclo: Commento alla Repubblica di Platone (dissertazioni I, III – V, VII – XII, XIV – XV, XVII). Bompiani, Milano 2004, ISBN 88-452-1212-2 (without critical apparatus, with Italian translation)
  • Ernst Diehl (Ed.): Procli diadochi in Platoni's Timaeum commentaria. 3 volumes, Teubner, Leipzig 1903–1906 (critical edition, volume 1 online , volume 2 online )
  • Wilhelm Kroll (Ed.): Procli diadochi in Platonis rem publicam commentarii , 2 volumes, Teubner, Leipzig 1899–1901 (critical edition, volume 1 online , volume 2 online )
  • Robert Lamberton (Ed.): Proclus the Successor: On Poetics and the Homeric Poems. Essays 5 and 6 of His Commentary on the Republic of Plato . Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta 2012, ISBN 978-1-58983-711-9 (uncritical edition with English translation)
  • Concetta Luna , Alain-Philippe Segonds (ed.): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon. Les Belles Lettres, Paris (critical edition with French translation)
  • Giorgio Pasquali (ed.): Procli diadochi in Platonis Cratylum commentaria. Teubner, Leipzig 1908 (critical edition, online ; reprinted in: Francesco Romano (ed.): Proclo: Lezioni sul “Cratilo” di Platone . L'Erma di Bretschneider, Rome 1989, ISBN 88-7062-696-2 , with Introduction, Italian translation and commentary by Romano)
  • Alain Philippe Segonds (Ed.): Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon. 2nd edition, 2 volumes, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 2003, ISBN 2-251-00388-6 and ISBN 2-251-00393-2 (critical edition with French translation)
  • Carlos Steel (Ed.): Procli in Platonis Parmenidem commentaria , 3 volumes, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2007–2009 (critical edition, differs in some cases considerably from the Paris edition started around the same time)

Theology, metaphysics, natural philosophy, doctrine of the bad

  • Joseph Bidez (Ed.): Proclus, Περὶ τῆς καθ 'Ἕλληνας ἱερατικῆς τέχνης . In: Joseph Bidez (Ed.): Catalog des manuscrits alchimiques grecs. Vol. 6, Lamertin, Bruxelles 1928, pp. 137–151 (critical edition), online ( memento of October 24, 2009 in the Internet Archive )
  • Eric Robertson Dodds (Ed.): Proclus: The Elements of Theology. A Revised Text. Oxford University Press, Oxford 1963 (critical edition of the Stoicheíōsis theologikḗ with English translation)
  • Helen S. Lang, Anthony David Macro (Eds.): Proclus: On the Eternity of the World. De Aeternitate Mundi. University of California Press, Berkeley 2001, ISBN 0-520-22554-6 (critical edition with English translation)
  • Ernst-Otto Onnasch, Ben Schomakers (Ed.): Proklos: Theological foundation. Meiner, Hamburg 2015, ISBN 978-3-7873-1656-4 (Greek text of the Stoicheíōsis theologikḗ with German translation and commentary)
  • Henri D. Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink (eds.): Proclus: Théologie platonicienne. 6 volumes, Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1968–1997 (critical edition with French translation)
  • Erwin Sonderegger (Ed.): Proklos: Basic course on unity. Basics of the Neoplatonic world. Academia, Sankt Augustin 2004, ISBN 3-89665-270-2 (Greek text of the Stoicheíōsis theologikḗ according to Dodds [without critical apparatus] and German translation)
  • Benedikt Strobel (Ed.): Proklos, Tria opuscula. A retroversion of Wilhelm von Moerbeke's translation with critical commentary on the text. De Gruyter, Berlin 2014, ISBN 978-3-11-026625-2 (reconstruction of the lost Greek original texts based on the medieval Latin translations with detailed commentary)

Hesiod commentary

  • Patrizia Marzillo (ed.): The commentary of Proclus on Hesiod's "Works and Days". Narr, Tübingen 2010, ISBN 978-3-8233-6353-8 (critical edition with translation and explanation)

Math and science

  • Gottfried Friedlein (Ed.): Procli diadochi in primum Euclidis elementorum librum commentarii. Olms, Hildesheim 1967 (reprint of the edition Teubner, Leipzig 1873; critical edition, inadequate, but still relevant; online )
  • Karl Manitius (Ed.): Procli Diadochi hypotyposis astronomicarum positionum. Teubner, Stuttgart 1974, ISBN 3-519-01732-6 (critical edition with German translation, online )
  • Albert Ritzenfeld (Ed.): Procli diadochi Lycii institutio physica. Teubner, Leipzig 1912 (critical edition with German translation)


  • Robbert M. van den Berg (Ed.): Proclus' hymns. Essays, translations, commentary. Brill, Leiden 2001, ISBN 90-04-12236-2 (with English translation and detailed commentary)
  • Ernst Vogt (Ed.): Procli hymni. Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden 1957 (critical edition)

Translations (modern)

Comments from Plato

  • Dirk Baltzly, John F. Finamore, Graeme Miles (translator): Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Republic. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2018 ff.
  • Brian Duvick (translator): Proclus: On Plato Cratylus. Bloomsbury, London 2014, ISBN 978-0-7156-3674-9
  • André-Jean Festugière (translator): Proclus: Commentaire sur la République. 3 volumes, Vrin, Paris 1970
  • André-Jean Festugière (translator): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Timée. 5 volumes, Vrin, Paris 1966–1968
  • William O'Neill (Translator): Proclus: Alcibiades I. A translation and commentary. 2nd edition, Nijhoff, The Hague 1971, ISBN 90-247-5131-4
  • Harold Tarrant, David T. Runia , Michael Share, Dirk Baltzly (translator): Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. 6 volumes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2007–2017
  • Hans Günter Zekl (translator): Proklos Diadochos: Commentary on the Platonic Parmenides. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-8260-4383-3

Other fonts

  • Matthias Baltes (translator): Proklos: About the eternal duration of the cosmos. In: Matthias Baltes: The emergence of the world of the Platonic Timaeus according to the ancient interpreters , part 2: Proklos . Brill, Leiden 1978, ISBN 90-04-05799-4 , pp. 134-164
  • Michael Erler (translator): Proklos Diadochos: About the existence of evil. Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1978, ISBN 3-445-01882-0 (with explanations)
  • Michael Erler (translator): Proklos Diadochos: About providence, fate and free will to Theodoros, the engineer (mechanic). Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1980, ISBN 3-445-02100-7 (with explanations)
  • Jan Opsomer, Carlos Steel (translator): Proclus: Ten Problems Concerning Providence. Bloomsbury, London 2012, ISBN 978-0-7156-3924-5
  • Max Steck (ed.), Leander Schönberger (translator): Proclus Diadochus 410–485: Commentary on the first book of Euclid's "Elements". German Academy of Natural Scientists, Halle (Saale) 1945
  • Ingeborg Zurbrügg (translator): Proklos: Elements of theology. Gardez, Remscheid 2004, ISBN 3-89796-123-7 (with explanatory booklet: Enchiridion - Handbuch. To explain, comment and deepen the translation of the elements of the theology of Proklos , Gardez, Remscheid 2005, ISBN 3-89796-160-1 )

Translations (Latin, Medieval)

  • Rainer Bartholomai (Ed.): Proklos: Commentary on Plato's Parmenides 141 E - 142 A. 2nd, revised edition, Academia, Sankt Augustin 2002, ISBN 3-89665-206-0 (Latin translation by Wilhelm von Moerbeke with German translation by Bartholomai)
  • Helmut Boese (ed.): The medieval translation of the Stoicheiosis physike des Proclus. Procli Diadochi Lycii elementatio physica . Akademie-Verlag, Berlin 1958 (critical edition)
  • Helmut Boese (Ed.): Proclus: Elementatio theologica translata a Guillelmo de Morbecca . University Press, Louvain 1987, ISBN 90-6186-244-2
  • Daniel Isaac (ed.): Proclus: Trois études sur la providence. Les Belles Lettres, Paris 1977–1982 (critical edition of the Latin translations of Wilhelm von Moerbeke with a French translation and some Greek fragments)
    • Vol. 1: Dixproblemèmes concernant la providence , 1977
    • Vol. 2: Providence, fatalité, liberté , 1979, ISBN 2-251-00290-1
    • Vol. 3: De l'existence du mal , 1982, ISBN 2-251-00291-X
  • Carlos Steel (Ed.): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke. University Press, Louvain 1982–1985, ISBN 90-6186-124-1 (critical edition)
    • Volume 1: Livres I à IV , 1982
    • Volume 2: Livres V à VII et Notes marginales de Nicolas de Cues , 1985

Translation (Arabic, Medieval)

  • Gerhard Endress (Ed.): Proclus Arabus. Twenty sections from the Institutio theologica in Arabic translation . Steiner, Wiesbaden 1973


Overview representations

  • Concetta Luna, Alain-Philippe Segonds, Gerhard Endress: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques. Volume 5, part 2 (= 5 b), CNRS Éditions, Paris 2012, ISBN 978-2-271-07399-0 , pp. 1546–1674 (contains a comprehensive overview of the works, also takes into account the oriental reception)
  • Matthias Perkams : Proklos. In: Christoph Riedweg et al. (Ed.): Philosophy of the Imperial Era and Late Antiquity (= Outline of the history of philosophy . The philosophy of antiquity. Volume 5/3). Schwabe, Basel 2018, ISBN 978-3-7965-3700-4 , pp. 1909–1971, 2136–2152
  • Carlos Steel: Proclus. In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity. Volume 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, ISBN 978-0-521-19484-6 , pp. 630-653, 1124-1128

Introductions, general presentations, general information

  • Radek Chlup: Proclus. An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2012, ISBN 978-0-521-76148-2
  • Elena Gritti: Proclo. Dialettica, Anima, Esegesi. Edizioni Universitarie di Lettere, Economia, Diritto, Milano 2008, ISBN 978-88-7916-385-9
  • Gyburg Radke : Parmenides' smile. Proklos' interpretations of the Platonic form of dialogue. De Gruyter, Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-11-019014-1
  • Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus. Neo-Platonic Philosophy and Science. Yale University Press, New Haven / London 1996, ISBN 0-300-06806-9

Collections of articles

  • Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana. Late antique thinking and its traces . Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-465-03513-8 (collection of essays by the author, some of which deal with topics relating to the history of reception)
  • Egbert P. Bos, Pieter A. Meijer (Eds.): On Proclus and his influence in medieval philosophy . Brill, Leiden 1992, ISBN 90-04-09429-6
  • Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, ISBN 978-0-521-19849-3 ( review by H-Soz-Kult )
  • Alain Lernould (Ed.): Études sur le Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Éléments d'Euclide. Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, Villeneuve d'Ascq 2010, ISBN 978-2-7574-0155-2
  • Jean Pépin , Henri Dominique Saffrey (eds.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens. Éditions du CNRS, Paris 1987, ISBN 2-222-04043-4
  • Matthias Perkams, Rosa Maria Piccione (ed.): Proklos. Method, theory of the soul, metaphysics. Brill, Leiden 2006, ISBN 90-04-15084-6
  • Alain Philippe Segonds, Carlos Steel (ed.): Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne. University Press, Louvain 2000, ISBN 90-5867-020-1


  • Werner Beierwaltes : Proklos. Basic features of his metaphysics. 2nd, revised and expanded edition, Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1979, ISBN 3-465-01353-0
  • Dirk Cürsgen: Henology and Ontology. The metaphysical doctrine of principles of late Neoplatonism . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2007, ISBN 978-3-8260-3616-3 , pp. 37-284
  • Veronika Maria Roth: The Eternal Well. A paradox in Proclus' philosophy. Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 2008, ISBN 978-3-428-12273-8

Natural philosophy

  • Marije Martijn: Proclus on Nature. Philosophy of Nature and Its Methods in Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Timaeus. Brill, Leiden 2010, ISBN 978-90-04-18191-5
  • Benjamin Gleede : Plato and Aristotle in the cosmology of Proclus. A commentary on the 18 arguments for the eternity of the world by Johannes Philoponos (= studies and texts on antiquity and Christianity , volume 54). Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen 2009, ISBN 978-3-16-150043-5

Ethics and doctrine of bad

  • Nestor Kavvadas: The Nature of Evil in Proklos. An interpretation of Plato and its reception by Dionysius Areopagites. De Gruyter, Berlin 2009, ISBN 978-3-11-021230-3
  • John Phillips: Order from Disorder. Proclus' Doctrine of Evil and its Roots in Ancient Platonism. Brill, Leiden 2007, ISBN 978-90-04-16018-7
  • Reinhard Pichler: Allegory and ethics in Proklos. Investigations on the commentary on Plato's Politeia. Frank & Timme, Berlin 2006, ISBN 3-86596-027-8


  • Markus Schmitz: Euclid's geometry and its mathematical theoretical foundation in the Neoplatonic philosophy of Proclus . Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 1997, ISBN 3-8260-1268-2

Web links





  1. However, the reliability of the horoscope is controversial. Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, p. 25 f. considers it implausible and advocates a date for the birth towards the end of 410 or beginning of 411. To calculate according to the horoscope, see Alexander Jones : The Horoscope of Proclus . In: Classical Philology 94, 1999, pp. 81-88.
  2. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1548 f .; Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, pp. 1-4.
  3. See Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus' life, works, and education of the soul . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 33–56, here: 37 f.
  4. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1549; Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, pp. 4-6.
  5. For the dating see Henri D. Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink (ed.): Proclus: Théologie platonicienne , Vol. 1, Paris 1968, pp. XVI f .; John M. Dillon : General Introduction . In: Glenn R. Morrow, John M. Dillon (translator): Proclus' Commentary on Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1992, pp. XI – XLIV, here: XII f .; Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, p. 6.
  6. See on the diadochos Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, p. 21 f.
  7. On the students see Dominic J. O'Meara: Platonopolis , Oxford 2003, p. 21 f .; Henri D. Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink (eds.): Proclus: Théologie platonicienne , Vol. 1, Paris 1968, pp. XLIX-LIV.
  8. Marinos, Vita Procli 22: 29-37. See Otmar Schissel : The timetable of the Neo-Platonist Proklos . In: Byzantinische Zeitschrift 26, 1926, pp. 265–272; Henri Dominique Saffrey, Alain-Philippe Segonds (eds.): Marinus: Proclus ou Sur le bonheur , Paris 2001, pp. 91, 142.
  9. Arja Karivieri: The, House of Proclus' on the Southern Slope of the Acropolis: A Contribution . In: Paavo Castrén (ed.): Post-Herulian Athens , Helsinki 1994, pp. 115-139. Philippe Hoffmann offers a research overview : Damascius . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 2, Paris 1994, pp. 541-593, here: 548-555.
  10. ^ Marinos, Vita Procli 16: 1-9.
  11. ^ Marinos, Vita Procli 15.
  12. ^ Philippe Hoffmann: Un grief antichrétien chez Proclus: l'ignorance en théologie . In: Arnaud Perrot (ed.): Les chrétiens et l'hellénisme , Paris 2012, pp. 161–197, here: 164 f., 173 f., 180–197.
  13. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1549 f.
  14. ^ Robbert M. van den Berg: Proclus' Commentary on the Cratylus in Context , Leiden 2008, p. 94 f.
  15. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1555–1562 (on Aristotle's comment), 1566–1589 (on Plato's comment).
  16. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1597–1599.
  17. ^ André-Jean Festugière: Modes de composition des Commentaires de Proclus . In: Museum Helveticum 20, 1963, pp. 77–100, here: 81–91; Alain Philippe Segonds (ed.): Proclus: Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon , 2nd edition, Vol. 1, Paris 2003, pp. XLIII-XLVII; Erich Lamberz: Proclus and the form of the philosophical commentary . In: Jean Pépin, Henri Dominique Saffrey (eds.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens , Paris 1987, pp. 1–20, here: 16 f .; Concetta Luna, Alain-Philippe Segonds (ed.): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon , Vol. 1, Part 1, Paris 2007, pp. XLII-LIII.
  18. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1606–1608.
  19. See Concetta Luna et al. For information on these works. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1608–1610.
  20. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1617–1622.
  21. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1564 f., 1590–1597.
  22. ^ Benjamin Gleede: Plato and Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos , Tübingen 2009, pp. 1–36; Concetta Luna u. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1622–1624.
  23. See on the fragments Concetta Luna u. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1624.
  24. On the question of Proclus' own contribution, see Chiara Faraggiana di Sarzana: Le commentaire à Hésiode et la paideia encyclopédique de Proclus . In: Jean Pépin, Henri Dominique Saffrey (ed.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens , Paris 1987, pp. 21–41 and Patrizia Marzillo (ed.): The commentary of Proclus on Hesiod's “Works and Days” , Tübingen 2010 , P. XLVIII f.
  25. Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1562 f., 1625–1630.
  26. Michael Erler: Interpretation as a service . In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (ed.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 179-217, here: 179, 180-185.
  27. See Robbert M. van den Berg (Ed.): Proclus' hymns , Leiden 2001, pp. 224–227.
  28. Concetta Luna u. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1631–1635.
  29. On the significance of the systematic character of Proklos' thinking see Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, pp. 65–84; Christoph Horn : Proklos. On the philosophical-historical position and the state of research . In: Matthias Perkams, Rosa Maria Piccione (Ed.): Proklos. Method, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik , Leiden 2006, pp. 7–34, here: 10–12.
  30. See on Proclus' Aristotle reception Carlos Steel: Why should we prefer Plato's Timaeus to Aristotle's Physics? In: Robert W. Sharples , Anne Sheppard (eds.): Ancient Approaches to Plato's Timaeus , London 2003, pp. 175–187; Christoph Helmig: Forms and Concepts , Berlin 2012, pp. 205–221.
  31. Proklos, In Platonis Timaeum I 12.30-13.7.
  32. See also Michael Erler: Plato's Scriptural Criticism and the Meaning of the Aporias in Parmenides after Plato and Proclus . In: Jean Pépin, Henri Dominique Saffrey (eds.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens , Paris 1987, pp. 153–163, here: 154 f.
  33. Pauliina Remes provides an overview: Neoplatonism , Socksfield 2008, pp. 7–9, 35–47.
  34. Pauliina Remes: Neoplatonism , Socksfield 2008, pp. 47–59, provides an overview .
  35. Pauliina Remes: Neoplatonism , Socksfield 2008, pp. 59–75 and Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 16–32, provide an overview .
  36. See on the philosophical practice Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 234–254. Cf. Henri D. Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink (ed.): Proclus: Théologie platonicienne , Vol. 1, Paris 1968, pp. XXVI-XXXV.
  37. Robbert M. van den Berg (ed.): Proclus' hymns , Leiden 2001, pp. 27–31; Henri D. Saffrey: Accorder entre elles les traditions théologiques: une caractéristique du néoplatonisme athénien . In: Egbert P. Bos, Pieter A. Meijer (eds.): On Proclus and his influence in medieval philosophy , Leiden 1992, pp. 35-50.
  38. Gyburg Radke: The smile of Parmenides , Berlin 2006, p. 72 f. Cf. Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, p. 228 f .; Marije Martijn: Proclus' geometrical method . In: Pauliina Remes, Svetla Slaveva-Griffin (Ed.): The Routledge Handbook of Neoplatonism , London 2014, pp. 145–159.
  39. ^ See on the concept and terminology of Nestor Kavvada: Die Natur des Schlechten in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 28–32. Cf. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 259–267, 303–311.
  40. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, p. 31 f .; Klaus Kremer: The Neoplatonic philosophy of being and its effect on Thomas Aquinas , Leiden 1971, pp. 207-209.
  41. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 70–72; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 40–42.
  42. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 76–82; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 41–50.
  43. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 82–86; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 51–55.
  44. ^ Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem 1128.
  45. Jens Halfwassen: Plotin and the Neo-Platonism , Munich 2004, pp. 158-160.
  46. ^ Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem 1191.
  47. Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 279–284; Jens Halfwassen: Plotin and the Neo-Platonism , Munich 2004, p. 160 f .; Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt am Main 1979, pp. 361–382.
  48. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 89–110; Christoph Horn: Proklos. On the position in the history of philosophy and the state of research . In: Matthias Perkams, Rosa Maria Piccione (Ed.): Proklos. Method, Seelenlehre, Metaphysik , Leiden 2006, pp. 7–34, here: 22–25; Anthony C. Lloyd: The Anatomy of Neoplatonism , Oxford 1990, pp. 166-169; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 74–83, 115.
  49. Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, p. 80; Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, extended edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 24–50; Veronika Maria Roth: Das Ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 111–113.
  50. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 50–89; Veronika Maria Roth: Das Ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, p. 117 f .; Friedemann Drews: Human free will and divine providence in Augustine, Proklos, Apuleius and John Milton , Vol. 1, Frankfurt 2009, pp. 262-291.
  51. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 118-164; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 63–65.
  52. See Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 87–94, 139–142.
  53. See Werner Beierwaltes' method of Proclus in the metaphysical discourse: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, pp. 82–84; Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 15-19.
  54. See on the problem of terminology Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, p. 113.
  55. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 110–115.
  56. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 74 f., 115 f .; Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 92-99.
  57. See Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 117–123, 128–131.
  58. See also Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 131-136.
  59. See also Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 136–143; Michele Abbate: Il divino tra unità e molteplicità. Saggio sulla Teologia Platonica di Proclo , Alessandria 2008, pp. 128-138.
  60. Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 150–155.
  61. See also Veronika Maria Roth: Das ewige Nun , Berlin 2008, pp. 142 f., 147–149, 155–160.
  62. ^ Pieter d'Hoine: The Status of the Arts. Proclus' Theory of Artefacts . In: Elenchos 27, 2006, pp. 305-344; Carlos Steel: Proclus et les arguments pour et contre l'hypothèse des idées . In: Revue de Philosophie Ancienne , Vol. 2 No. 2, 1984, pp. 3-27.
  63. ^ Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes: The Platonism in the Ancient World , Vol. 5, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1998, pp. 375–377; Matthias Baltes: Dianoemata , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 305-308.
  64. See for these models Matthias Baltes: The world emergence of the Platonic Timaeus according to the ancient interpreters , part 1, Leiden 1976, pp. 38–63; Matthias Baltes: Dianoemata , Stuttgart 1999, pp. 90-95.
  65. ^ John F. Phillips: Neoplatonic Exegeses of Plato's Cosmogony (Timaeus 27C-28C) . In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 35, 1997, pp. 173-197.
  66. ^ Benjamin Gleede: Plato and Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos , Tübingen 2009, p. 48; Matthias Baltes: The world emergence of the Platonic Timaeus according to the ancient interpreters , part 2, Leiden 1978, p. 43 f., 46–50.
  67. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of evil in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 29–33.
  68. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 30–33.
  69. ^ Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 28, 36; John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, pp. 140-148.
  70. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 40 f., 55 f.
  71. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 34–38.
  72. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 193–196.
  73. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, p. 196 f.
  74. Benjamin Gleede: Plato and Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos , Tübingen 2009, pp. 160–162.
  75. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 197-199; Emilie F. Kutash: Eternal Time and Temporal Expansion: Proclus' Golden Ratio . In: Panayiota Vassilopoulou, Stephen RL Clark (eds.): Late Antique Epistemology , Basingstoke 2009, pp. 44–66, here: 47–52; Éric Joly: Le temps n'est pas un produit de l'âme: Proclus contre Plotin. In: Laval théologique et philosophique 59, 2003, pp. 225-234, here: 229-234.
  76. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 210 f., 213 f.
  77. Werner Beierwaltes: Proklos , 2nd, expanded edition, Frankfurt 1979, pp. 207-214.
  78. ^ Proklos, Platonische Theologie 1,25, edited by Henri D. Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink: Proclus: Théologie platonicienne , Vol. 1, Paris 1968, p. 113, lines 6-10. For an interpretation of this passage see Anne Sheppard: Proclus' attitude to theurgy. In: The Classical Quarterly 76 (= New Series 32), 1982, pp. 212-224, here: 219-221. On the theurgy of Proklos see also Robbert M. van den Berg: Towards the Paternal Harbor. Proclean Theurgy and the Contemplation of the Forms. In: Alain-Philippe Segonds, Carlos Steel (ed.): Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne , Leuven / Paris 2000, pp. 425–443; Ilinca Tanaseanu-Döbler: Theurgy in Late Antiquity , Göttingen 2013, pp. 186-257. See Michael Erler: Interpretation as a service . In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (ed.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 179–217, here: 183 f.
  79. Michael Erler: Interpretation as a service. In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (Ed.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 179-217, here: 180-185, 216 f.
  80. Robbert M. van den Berg (Ed.): Proclus' hymns , Leiden 2001, pp. 18–34.
  81. Robbert M. van den Berg (ed.): Proclus' hymns , Leiden 2001, pp. 18-22, 138-140.
  82. ^ Plato, Timaeus 29e – 37c.
  83. See also Mischa von Perger: Die Allseele in Platons Timaios , Stuttgart 1997, pp. 33–35.
  84. See on these divine classes Robbert M. van den Berg (Ed.): Proclus' hymns , Leiden 2001, pp. 35–43; Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 119–127. See Emilie Kutash: The Ten Gifts of the Demiurge , London 2011, pp. 177–192.
  85. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 41–44, 46, 94–98.
  86. ^ Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 46–49; John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, pp. 43-46, 82-88; Jan Opsomer, Carlos Steel (translator): Proclus: On the Existence of Evils , London 2003, pp. 15-19.
  87. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of evil in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 59–62; John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, pp. 46, 57-74.
  88. ^ Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 62, 74–79; John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, pp. 44 f., 80-84.
  89. ^ John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, p. 85; Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 60–62.
  90. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 64–71, 80 f., 83–85; John Phillips: Order from Disorder , Leiden 2007, pp. 46 f., 50 f., 105, 227-240; Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 208-218.
  91. ^ Anthony C. Lloyd: The Anatomy of Neoplatonism , Oxford 1990, pp. 106 f .; Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, p. 99.
  92. Jean-Michel Charrue: Providence et liberté dans la pensée de Proclus . In: Philotheos 9, 2009, pp. 57–83, here: 59–61.
  93. ^ Proclus, On Ten Questions Concerning Providence 65.
  94. ^ Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, p. 98 f.
  95. See also Carlos Steel (translator): Proclus: On Providence , London 2007, pp. 11–34 (introduction by the translator).
  96. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of the bad in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 98-105.
  97. Nestor Kavvadas: The nature of evil in Proklos , Berlin 2009, pp. 139–141.
  98. Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 185–193.
  99. Proklos, Commentary on Politeia I 177.4–179.2 and I 192.4–205.23.
  100. Michael Erler: Interpretation as a service. In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (eds.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 179–217, here: 187–192; Suzanne Stern-Gillet: Proclus and the Platonic Muse. In: Ancient Philosophy 31, 2011, pp. 363-380. Cf. Anne Sheppard: Proclus as exegete. In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 57–79, here: 68–73.
  101. Reinhard Pichler: Allegorese and Ethics in Proklos , Berlin 2006, pp. 66–79. See Radek Chlup: Proclus , Cambridge 2012, pp. 185-200; Patrizia Marzillo (Ed.): Proclus's commentary on Hesiod's “Works and Days” , Tübingen 2010, pp. XXII – XLVIII.
  102. Shmuel Sambursky: Naturerkenntnis und Weltbild , Zurich / Munich 1977, pp. 24–26.
  103. Marije Martijn: Proclus on Nature , Leiden 2010, pp. 179–192.
  104. Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, pp. 266-268, 278-284, 293-301; Emilie Kutash: The Ten Gifts of the Demiurge , London 2011, pp. 128-132; Alain Philippe Segonds: Philosophy et astronomie chez Proclus . In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (eds.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 159–177, here: 163–177; Shmuel Sambursky: The Physical World of Late Antiquity , London 1962, pp. 145-150; Dirk Baltzly (translator): Proclus: Commentary on Plato's Timaeus , Vol. 5, Cambridge 2013, pp. 17-21.
  105. Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, p. 282.
  106. Marinos, Vita Procli 16.9 to 23.
  107. Ammonios Hermeiou, In De interpretatione 1.6-11.
  108. See on Damascios' Proklos reception Joseph Combès : Proclus et Damascius . In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (eds.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 221–246; Gerd Van Riel: Damascius . In: Lloyd P. Gerson (Ed.): The Cambridge History of Philosophy in Late Antiquity , Vol. 2, Cambridge 2010, pp. 667-696, here: 671, 696.
  109. ^ See on Dionysius' Proklos reception the overview by John M. Dillon: Dionysius the Areopagite . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 111–124.
  110. ^ Benjamin Gleede: Plato and Aristoteles in der Kosmologie des Proklos , Tübingen 2009, pp. 1–36.
  111. Cristina D'Ancona and Richard C. Taylor provide an overview of the Liber de causis and its reception : Le Liber de causis. In: Richard Goulet u. a. (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. Supplément , Paris 2003, pp. 599–647.
  112. The dating is controversial; see Richard Lemay: De la scolastique à l'histoire par le truchement de la philologie: itinéraire d'un médiéviste entre Europe et Islam . In: La diffusione delle scienze islamiche nel medio evo europeo , Rome 1987, pp. 399–535, here: 443–446.
  113. See Concetta Luna u. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1563; Helmut Boese (ed.): The medieval translation of the Stoicheiosis physike des Proclus , Berlin 1958, pp. 16-20.
  114. ^ Carlos Steel: William of Moerbeke, translator of Proclus. In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 247–263.
  115. ^ Helmut Boese: Wilhelm von Moerbeke as translator of the Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus , Heidelberg 1985, pp. 11-15.
  116. ^ Helmut Boese: Wilhelm von Moerbeke as translator of the Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus , Heidelberg 1985, p. 60 f .; Stephen Gersh: One thousand years of Proclus . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 1–29, here: 18.
  117. Loris Sturlese: Il "De animatione caeli" di Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Raymond Creytens, Pius Künzle (ed.): Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli OP , Vol. 1, Rome 1978, pp. 175–247, here: 217–223; Kurt Flasch : Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 311, 546 f.
  118. Markus Führer, Stephen Gersh: Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 299–317, here: 299–302.
  119. See also Helmut Boese: Wilhelm von Moerbeke as translator of the Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus , Heidelberg 1985, pp. 69 f., 84; Kurt Flasch: Introduction . In: Maria Rita Pagnoni-Sturlese, Loris Sturlese (Ed.): Berthold von Moosburg: Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1-13 , Hamburg 1984, pp. XII-XIV; Markus Führer, Stephen Gersh: Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg . In: Stephen Gersh (ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 299–317, here: 305–316; Loris Sturlese: Homo divinus , Stuttgart 2007, pp. 143–148, 181–197.
  120. Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, pp. 172–177, 187–189, 191–212, 217–222; Stephen Gersh: Nicholas of Cusa . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 318–349.
  121. ^ Gerhard Endress: Proclus de Lycie. Uvres transmises par la tradition arabe . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1657–1674, here: 1657–1661.
  122. ^ Gerhard Endress: Proclus de Lycie. Uvres transmises par la tradition arabe . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1657–1674, here: 1661–1668; Elvira Wakelnig: Feder, Tafel, Mensch , Leiden 2006, p. 52 f.
  123. Elvira Wakelnig: Feder, Tafel, Mensch , Leiden 2006, pp. 71–73, 397–400; Elvira Wakelnig: Al-ʿĀmirī's Paraphrase of the Proclean Elements of Theology . In: Cristina D'Ancona (Ed.): The Libraries of the Neoplatonists , Leiden 2007, pp. 457-469.
  124. ^ Stephen Gersh: One thousand years of Proclus . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 1–29, here: 15 f .; Dominic J. O'Meara: Michael Psellos . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 165–181; Michele Trizio: Eleventh- to twelfth-century Byzantium. In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 182–215, here: 182–190, 200–208. For Isaak Sebastokrator's approach, see Benedikt Strobel: Proklos, Tria opuscula , Berlin 2014, pp. 37–42.
  125. Michel Cacouros: Deux épisodes inconnus dans la reception de Proclus à Byzance aux XIII e –XIV e siècles . In: Alain-Philippe Segonds, Carlos Steel (ed.): Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne , Leuven / Paris 2000, pp. 589–627, here: 601–615, 626.
  126. Michele Trizio: Eleventh to twelfth-century Byzantium. In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 182–215, here: 208.
  127. Stephen Gersh: George Gemistos Plethon . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 216–225.
  128. See on the controversial dating Hans-Christian Günther : The translations of the Elementatio Theologica des Proklos and their meaning for the Proklostext , Leiden 2007, p. 1 f. and note 1; Lela Alexidze, Lutz Bergemann (eds.): Ioane Petrizi: Commentary on the Elementatio theologica des Proklos , Amsterdam 2009, pp. 1–4; Tengiz Iremadze: Conceptions of Thought in Neo-Platonism , Amsterdam 2004, pp. 19–23.
  129. Lela Alexidze, Lutz Bergemann (ed.): Ioane Petritsi: Comment on Elementatio theologica of Proclus , Amsterdam 2009, pp 1-18; Levan Gigineishvili, Gerd Van Riel: Ioane Petritsi: A Witness of Proclus' Works in the School of Psellus . In: Alain-Philippe Segonds, Carlos Steel (ed.): Proclus et la Théologie Platonicienne , Leuven / Paris 2000, pp. 571–587; Concetta Luna, Alain-Philippe Segonds, Gerhard Endress: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1612 f .; Lela Alexidze: Ioane Petritsi. In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 229–244; Tengiz Iremadze: Conceptions of Thought in Neo-Platonism , Amsterdam 2004, pp. 53–58.
  130. Lela Alexidze, Lutz Bergemann (ed.): Ioane Petritsi: Comment Elementatio theologica of Proklos , Amsterdam 2009, p 37; Hans-Christian Günther: The translations of the Elementatio Theologica of Proclus and their meaning for the Proklostext , Leiden 2007, p. 4, note 6.
  131. Michael JB Allen: Marsilio Ficino . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 353–379.
  132. Michael JB Allen: Marsilio Ficino . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 353–379, here: 355–358; Paul Oskar Kristeller : Proclus as a Reader of Plato and Plotinus, and His Influence in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance . In: Jean Pépin, Henri Dominique Saffrey (eds.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens , Paris 1987, pp. 191–211, here: 198–210; James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 441-444.
  133. ^ Thomas Leinkauf : Francesco Patrizi . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 380-402; Stephen Gersh: One thousand years of Proclus . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus , Cambridge 2014, pp. 1–29, here: 21 f.
  134. David Rabouin: Le rôle de Proclus dans les débats sur la "mathématique universal" à la Renaissance. In: Alain Lernould (ed.): Études sur le Commentaire de Proclus au premier livre des Éléments d'Euclide , Villeneuve d'Ascq 2010, pp. 217–234.
  135. On Kepler's Proklos reception, see Judith Veronica Field: Kepler's Geometrical Cosmology , Chicago 1988, pp. 167–171.
  136. Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, pp. 11, 247-253.
  137. Jay Bregman: Proclus Americanus . In: Panayiota Vassilopoulou, Stephen RL Clark (ed.): Late Antique Epistemology , Basingstoke 2009, pp. 228–249, here: 228–234.
  138. ^ Albrecht Dihle : The Greek and Latin Literature of the Imperial Era , Munich 1989, p. 502; Lucas Siorvanes: Proclus , New Haven / London 1996, p. 37 f.
  139. Jens Halfwassen: Hegel and the late antique Neo-Platonism , Bonn 1999, p. 398.
  140. On Hegel's relationship to Proklos see Jens Halfwassen: Hegel und der lateantike Neuplatonismus , Bonn 1999, pp. 386–400, 411–444, 461 f .; Werner Beierwaltes: Platonism and Idealism , Frankfurt 1972, pp. 154–187.
  141. Ludwig Feuerbach: Principles of the philosophy of the future . In: Feuerbach: Complete Works , 2nd Edition, Vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1959, pp. 245-320, here: 291 (first published in 1843).
  142. Arthur Schopenhauer: The world as will and conception , ed. by Arthur Hübscher , Vol. 2, Leipzig 1938, pp. 90-92.
  143. Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena , ed. by Arthur Hübscher, Vol. 1, Leipzig 1938, p. 61.
  144. ^ Eduard von Hartmann: History of Metaphysics , Vol. 1, Leipzig 1899, p. 180.
  145. Friedrich Nietzsche: Thoughts and drafts for the consideration: We philologists . In: Nietzsche: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 7, Munich 1922, p. 198.
  146. ^ Hermann Cohen: Logic of pure knowledge , Berlin 1902, p. 485.
  147. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff u. a .: The Greek and Latin literature and language , 3rd, improved edition, Leipzig 1912, p. 282. Cf. Michael Erler: Interpretieren als Gottesdienst . In: Gilbert Boss, Gerhard Seel (Ed.): Proclus et son influence , Zurich 1987, pp. 179–217, here: 180–182.
  148. ^ Eduard Zeller: The philosophy of the Greeks in their historical development , part 3, division 2, 5th edition, Leipzig 1923, pp. 841 f., 846, 888 f.
  149. Karl Praechter: The Philosophy of Antiquity , 12th, expanded edition, Berlin 1926, p. 626.
  150. Ernst Bloch: Subject - Object. Notes on Hegel. Extended edition , Frankfurt 1962, pp. 130, 357, 480.
  151. Werner Beierwaltes: Procliana , Frankfurt 2007, p. 21.
  152. Jens Halfwassen: Plotin and the Neo-Platonism , Munich 2004, pp. 154, 156, 161.
  153. Gyburg Radke: The smile of Parmenides , Berlin 2006, p. 555.
  154. An overview is provided by Markus Schmitz: On the logic of henological metaphysics . In: Maria Barbanti u. a. (Ed.): ΕΝΩΣΙΣ ΚΑΙ ΦΙΛΙΑ. Unione e amicizia. Omaggio a Francesco Romano , Catania 2002, pp. 455-467.
  155. See Concetta Luna et al. a .: Proclus de Lycie . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5 b, Paris 2012, pp. 1546–1674, here: 1582.
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