Dietrich von Freiberg

The refraction of rays of light on a crystal according to Dietrich's book About the Rainbow . Above the light source, below the surface on which the rays emerging from the crystal hit. Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek , F.IV.30, fol. 24r (14th century)

Theodoric of Freiberg ( Latin Theodericus de Vriberch * probably around 1240 / 1245 ; † after 1310 , probably around 1318 / 1320 ) was a late medieval philosopher , theologian and physicist. As a monk, he belonged to the Dominican Order , in which he held high offices. His work includes numerous philosophical, theological and scientific writings. His work focuses on questions of ontology , epistemology , cosmology , anthropology and time theory . A core theme of his thinking is the intellect theory .

Dietrich was an outsider in the philosophy and theology of his time. He developed his doctrine in a militant confrontation with widespread views, the weak points of which he criticized. He took the discovery of deficiencies in common doctrines as the starting point for considerations with which he moved from rejecting previous assumptions to his alternative concepts. From a model that claims to offer a coherent explanation of the world, he demanded consistent freedom from contradictions and rational comprehensibility. His uncompromising insistence on this understanding of science brought him into conflict with influential currents, in particular the Thomism founded by Thomas Aquinas , against which he accused him of inconsistency. He was well aware of the difficulty of the tasks that he had set himself, but he considered it possible to obtain reliable knowledge and believed that he had found sound solutions. A central concern of Dietrich was the investigation of the human intellect, the role of which, in his opinion, was not sufficiently understood and appreciated by his contemporaries. He said that the “ active intellect ” of man is by nature “god-shaped” and in principle capable of knowing everything.

As a scientist, Dietrich mainly dealt with questions of optics . His experiments led him to a new theory of the rainbow , which is considered to be a significant advance, since he only explained the phenomena by analyzing the path of the rays.

A few decades after his death, Dietrich was largely forgotten. Only in the second half of the 20th century did intensive research into his life's work begin. Today he is counted among the most important thinkers of the late Middle Ages and also honored as a successful physicist.

Life

Dietrich's origin and family are unknown. He came from the city of Freiberg, which was already characterized by silver mining at that time . His birth is set around 1240/1245. Probably around 1260, between the ages of eighteen and twenty, he entered the Dominican order. His life in the Dominican monastery - probably in the St. Pauli convent in Freiberg - began with the novitiate year . This year was a trial period for those newly admitted to the order, the novices, which served to practice the way of life of the monks and was associated with severe asceticism . As a novice, Dietrich also had to learn to beg because the Dominicans were a begging order . He then began basic theology studies in his home convent, which lasted one to two years. This was followed by a two-year study of logic , which was prescribed in the Dominican study regulations. The subject matter consisted primarily of the logical writings of Aristotle . The purpose of this training was to familiarize the monks with semantics , evidence and reasoning, as they needed such skills for their future work as preachers and defenders of the faith. According to a regulation introduced in 1259, the study of logic among the Dominicans was not organized by the monk's home convention, but by his religious province . It was to take place in a provincial study center set up for this purpose, which, however, was not fixed locally, but moved from convent to convent. So Dietrich might have had to leave Freiberg for this training. However, the new regulation was initially implemented only hesitantly in the individual provinces, including Germany. As a logic student, Dietrich also had to take part in theology lectures, because the monks were not allowed to neglect their theological training in this phase of their training either.

After that, Dietrich probably received an in-depth theological and philosophical training, which also included natural philosophy . The philosophy of nature ( studium naturae or scientia naturalium ) at that time also included the science of nature, which included physics, astronomy, biology and the science of the soul. The metaphysics was considered part of natural philosophy. The study of these branches of knowledge took place on the basis of the relevant writings of Aristotle. The Dominicans introduced natural history lessons only hesitantly from the 1250s, it had to be enforced against the resistance of an anti-education current in the order and was only prescribed for the entire order in 1305. Albert the Great († 1280) played a pioneering role in the inclusion of natural history material in lessons ; he built up the "General Studies" in Cologne, an important educational institution of the order. Dietrich may have studied in Cologne around 1267/1270, but this assumption is hypothetical. Eventually Dietrich became a teacher himself; around 1271 he was a lecturer ( reading master ) in the Dominican convent of Freiberg, that is, he gave lectures there and was solely responsible for the training of his confreres ; the convention had only one lecturer. Tuition was compulsory for the Dominicans; in addition, the convent school was open to the general public. The lecturer had to impart conventional theological teaching material that was considered to be certain knowledge; Innovations were undesirable.

From the autumn of 1272 until at least the end of 1274 Dietrich completed advanced training in theology at the University of Paris . Perhaps he stayed there until 1277, when he returned to Germany. In 1280 he worked as a lecturer at the Dominican Convention in Trier. There are no reports about him for the period following up to 1293; he was probably staying in Paris again and, as a baccalaureate, gave a lecture on the sentences of Petrus Lombardus . On September 7, 1293 he was elected provincial (head) of the German province of his order (Teutonia). He chose Meister Eckhart as his vicar (representative) for the Thuringia region , with whom he had a close professional relationship at the latest. He headed the German Dominican Province until 1296. From November 1294 to May 1296 he was also the general vicar (representative of the order general ) at the head of the entire Dominican order, since the office of general was vacant . He then went back to Paris. There he received his doctorate in theology in 1296/97. Then for some time he held the chair reserved for the non-French Dominicans in the theological faculty of Paris University. As far as is known, Dietrich and Albert the Great were the only Germans who taught as Masters in the 13th century at the University of Paris, which at that time occupied a dominant position in European higher education.

In 1303 Dietrich was elected in Koblenz by the provincial chapter of his order province as one of the provincial definitors, with which he took over an administrative office of the order. His last mention in the sources dates from 1310. It concerns his appointment as provincial vicar of the Upper German order province of Teutonia. It was one of the two parts of the now divided German province. This function, the temporary fulfillment of the official duties of the provincial superior, was exercised by Dietrich until the regular election of a new provincial superior, which took place in September 1310. Meister Eckhart was elected. However, since Eckhart's election was canceled by the order general, Dietrich had to convene a new electoral assembly that same year. In the research literature, his death is usually put in the time around 1318/1320, but there is no concrete evidence of the date.

Works

Dietrich wrote numerous writings that only partially survived. Narrated are 23 essays on philosophical, theological and scientific subjects, two treatise fragments, some Quaestionen and five letters. Nothing of his sermons has survived. None of the treatises is precisely dated, but a framework for an approximate chronology can be established and the order in which they were written is partially known. According to today's research, the works were all created between 1285 and 1311.

Dietrich's first work, probably written around 1286 or a little later, deals with problems of ontology , the philosophical doctrine of being or of beings as such. It is entitled De origine rerum praedicamentalium (On the origin of things that can be categorized) . The starting point is Aristotle's theory of categories . Dietrich's concern was to clarify what Aristotle actually meant. The question is whether the categories originate in nature or in the intellect. Thus, it is about the connection between the principles of thinking, which have led to the division of beings into ten categories , which has been common since Aristotle , and the principles of being.

In the apparently early writing De corpore Christi mortuo (On the dead body of Christ) , Dietrich took a theological topic as an occasion for a fundamental discussion of the soul as a “form” that determines the essence of man.

Probably around 1296/1297 - according to other speculations a few years later - Dietrich wrote three treatises on controversial issues: De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus (About three difficult problems) . They are titled De animatione caeli (About the animation of heaven) , De visione beatifica ( About the blissful vision , which means the perception of God by the blessed after death) and De accidentibus ( About the accident ) . The three problems discussed are thematically far apart; the combination to a three-part work resulted from the intention of the author to use three examples to counter the views of the communiter loquentes - the representatives of the prevailing doctrines. Here he meant the Thomists , the followers of the teachings of the Dominican Thomas Aquinas, who died in 1274 . Thomas was an older contemporary of Dietrich; the school of thought he had founded had already largely established itself in the Dominican order by the end of the 13th century. Dietrich resisted this influence. With his antithomistic statements he wanted to create the basis for a fundamental criticism of Thomism. The treatises De quiditatibus entium (On the quiddities of things) and De ente et essentia (On beings and essence ) followed a little later . They contain sharp criticism of Thomism, which destroys science and is incompatible with the philosophy of Aristotle to which the Thomists appealed. Dietrich's attack was directed against contemporary Thomists such as Aegidius Romanus , Bernhard von Trilia and Thomas von Sutton.

The next important philosophical work of Dietrich is the epistemological treatise De intellectu et intelligibili (On the intellect and the intelligible ) . In it he discusses the questions of how the human intellect recognizes itself and its principle, how the "active reason" ( intellectus agens ) relates to the "possible reason" (intellectus possibilis) and how in this regard the Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic approach to a coherent one Whole can be merged.

Two writings on special questions can be assigned to a later creative phase of the philosopher: the treatise De magis et minus (On more and less) , which deals with the problem of the qualitative increase and decrease in substances , which was often examined in the late Middle Ages , and De natura contrariorum (On nature contrary pairs of opposites) , in which Dietrich explains his theory of opposites. Perhaps two treatises on the philosophy of duration and time belong to the same period: De mensuris durationis entium (On the measure of the duration of things that are) and De natura et proprietate continuorum (On the nature and particularity of the continua ) .

Five surviving letters from Dietrich date from the period 1294–1296.

The late work is on the one hand devoted to questions of natural philosophy, on the other hand it deals with main themes of medieval theology. However, Dietrich does not discuss theological issues in a theological way (based on the presupposed authority of the Bible), but as a philosopher on the basis of mere reasoning (secundum rationem) . In cosmology , to which he paid special attention in this late phase of his work, the metaphysical- theological problems overlap with the natural-philosophical and astronomical ones.

The determination of the angle between the incident and the reflected rays that create the secondary rainbow , according to Dietrich's treatise On the Rainbow . Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, fol. 38r (14th century)

The most extensive work by Dietrich is his writing De iride et de radialibus impressionibus (About the rainbow and the impressions produced by rays), which was written in 1304 at the earliest . Other relatively late writings on nature research are De miscibilibus in mixto (About the components in a mixed substance) , De elementis corporum naturalium (About the elements of natural bodies) , De coloribus (About the colors) and De luce et eius origine (About the Light and its origin) .

Late writings on theological topics include De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis (On the spiritual substances and bodies of the future resurrection ) and De cognitione entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatarum (On knowledge in disembodied beings, especially souls separated from the body ) . In two old works, Dietrich dealt "according to the principles of a philosophical investigation" with cosmological topics: De intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum (About the intelligences and the movers of the heavens) and De corporibus caelestibus (About the heavenly bodies) . These two treatises also touch on theological questions; it is about the “intelligences”, disembodied beings gifted with reason, and the movement of the heavenly bodies through heavenly souls.

Philosophy and theology

Understanding of science, methodology and oppositional stance

Methodically, Dietrich took precedence over argumentative justification over appeal to authorities, but assumed that the two paths would be in harmony. One of his concerns was a clean separation of theology and philosophy, but if they were correct, no contradiction should arise between their statements. He rejected an escape into irrational assumptions such as the declaration that for God also absurd things are possible. He considered coherence to be essential; where in his opinion it was absent, he demanded a radical rethink and took a different path. He fought against the views that he considered erroneous as inconsistent and inadequately thought out. As was customary in scholasticism and already in ancient philosophy , he viewed science as the return of the accidental to what is in itself and necessary. What he found fault with other Masters was the implementation of this program; he found that they both defended and denied it. He did not want to tolerate such a lack of consistency.

Dietrich attached great importance to the defense of freedom of thought. According to him, the threat came from the communiter loquentes ("those who talk like everyone"). By that he meant the representatives of the mainstream teachings whom he criticized. He treated these scholars as if they were an opposing group, even if they disagreed among themselves. He appeared combative. He liked to choose paradoxical, provocative formulations for his theses. He accused the communiter loquentes of winning because of their number, not because of the quality of their arguments. Dietrich's intellectual independence is particularly evident in the fact that he did not shy away from statements that might be suspicious of heresy : He took up allegations that had been condemned by the church in the Paris conviction of 1277 with the threat of excommunication , and advocated them, sometimes in modified versions. He deliberately played his role as an oppositional outsider and representative of minority positions in relation to the prevailing contemporary currents, especially Thomism. The resistance against Thomism was risky, because in 1279 the General Chapter of the Dominican Order had forbidden the monks to criticize Thomas and in 1286 Thomas had been declared a teacher. The Dominicans had thus made a clear definition that was later tightened. Nevertheless, the critical voices in the order were not silent. Probably around 1286 or a little later, Dietrich wrote that he had previously had to remain silent on sensitive questions because of the resistance of the communiter loquentes , but now wanted to comment on them. He later pointed out the calumnia that his writings brought him. In his appearance, a rebellious trait was combined with a conservative one: while he impartially criticized and rejected some of the theses of leading scholastics of the 13th century, he appealed to ancient thinkers (Aristotle, Augustine , Proclus ) and the medieval Arab Aristotle commentator Averroes . He endeavored to show that these authorities were on his side: if one read their scriptures carefully and understood their teachings correctly, they would be in accordance with his. However, he did not consider them infallible. He did not hesitate to vehemently contradict Averroes where he felt it necessary.

ontology

For ontology, the doctrine of being or of beings as such, Aristotle's theory of categories was fundamental in Dietrich's time. Aristotle divided all beings into ten main groups, the categories. The categories are his fundamental concepts for the classification of the whole of reality. According to the Aristotelian understanding, the categorization includes everything that is, and thus at the same time everything that can be the subject or predicate of a statement, i.e. the totality of what can be linguistically expressed. The first category is the ousia , the "essence", in medieval terminology the " substance ". What is meant is a stable substrate that underlies the existence of an individual and ensures its constant identity. Substance as "the underlying" is everything that "is neither predicated of an underlying nor is in an underlying". The remaining nine categories include the accidental , that is, variable properties that are added to the substrate and then attach to this ousia , for example quantity or quality. As an addition, an accident is not part of the nature of the thing with which it is connected, for it is not necessarily present. The presence or absence of the accidental does not affect the identity of the thing; this depends solely on the substance. Aristotle cites the color on a body as an example. The body is as underlying ousia , the color is akzidens.

Like the other masters of his time, Dietrich started from this model. However, he found the common understanding of the model and the usual handling of it unsatisfactory. He was concerned with the question of how being is related to thinking. He wanted to find out what the reason is that statements made with terms within the framework of the category system are applicable to categorically determinable things ( praedicamentalia or res praedicamentales ). He did not take the assumption that categories derived from the analysis of human speech about the world are at the same time determinants of real being for granted, but rather as requiring explanation. His question, why real things can be categorically determined, aimed at the connection between human thought and speech and the world. He asked about the reason why world knowledge is possible.

According to the then common doctrine, the classification of categories relates to the real being of the world, which is not dependent on human thought. From this follows their validity also for thinking, for the principles of being and thinking are the same. According to the Thomistic understanding, natural things move the human intellect; they form the measure for him and produce in him a true knowledge with which he depicts reality. The predefined correspondence between the principles of thought and those of being, established by God, is the reason that correct statements about beings are possible. However, Dietrich was not satisfied with these assumptions, which were common at the time. He asked ontologically for the reason that being is as such and that it can be conceptually determined.

Aristotle assumed four reasons that something existed, two external and two internal. Outwardly are the causing cause ("effective cause", Latin causa efficiens ), that is, the producer of something created, and the ultimate cause or the target reason ( causa finalis ) , that is, that for whose sake something happens. Inwardly are the form cause ( causa formalis ) to which the thing owes its special nature, and the material cause ( causa materialis ) , the matter to which the form cause gives shape. Dietrich assigned the effective cause and the ultimate cause of natural things exclusively to the realm of nature, the area of ​​responsibility of physics; he removed it from the ontology. He assumed that everything that is categorized has only two origins, nature and intellect. They correspond to two realms of being, the physical and the spiritual, which are both equally real. For Dietrich, nature is the origin of a thing insofar as it is a natural thing, insofar as it was produced by a producer and serves a purpose. With regard to the “whatness” ( quiditas ) of the thing, however, its formal essential determination expressed in the definition, its origin is the intellect. Thus the intellect is the effective cause and also the form cause in this respect. In Dietrich's context, “intellect” always means the human intellect, not a divine or cosmic one. This means that the quiditas of a thing is constituted by human thought. Therefore everything that follows from the wasness also has its origin in the human intellect. This includes in particular some relationships , including spatial and temporal relationships as well as relationships between different properties within a carrier. Only that which is the principle of natural processes is constituted by nature. Everything else - the determinations not required by the natural process - is the product of the intellect. Dietrich did not regard these products of the intellect as mere abstractions or " things of thought" (entia rationis) , but as something real, an immaterial reality. In particular, he included the categorical structure of the objects of knowledge. Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, viewed the categorical structure as the nature of natural things.

Dietrich justified his theory with the fact that nature, in contrast to the intellect, is incapable of setting differences. You cannot distinguish between a thing and its essential determination, whatness. In the realm of whatness, however, distinguishing is producing. Therefore, it is not nature but only the intellect that can be the causing cause. The thinkability and determinability of an object is not based on its natural composition, but is solely due to the spontaneous activity of the intellect. Whoever defines something and thereby introduces a distinction between the components of its definition, thereby effects these components.

Dietrich drew far-reaching consequences from these considerations. Since the whatness of a thing posited by the intellect was determined as its inner law of essence, it emerged that not only the determination of the essence of the thing, but also the thing itself is constituted by the intellect from the point of view of its whatness. If, for example, the intellect is the cause of the definition of man as a living being endowed with reason, then it is also the principle and cause of man himself insofar as he belongs to the type of "man" or, as Dietrich puts it, of man, insofar as this one Being in the sense of “waslike being” (esse quiditativum) has.

Thus the relationship between the intellect and the things of nature consists in the fact that the intellect constitutes the thing of nature insofar as this is a "what" (quid) and is determined by its whatness. For this activity of the intellect Dietrich coined the expression "quidify". In addition, the thing of nature also exists independently of the intellect, namely insofar as it is constituted by the natural principles. In this sense, Dietrich differentiates between natural things (entia naturae) and the thought content produced by the intellect ( entia conceptionalia , a term coined by Dietrich in connection with Averroes ). Under entia conceptionalia all forms of existence are to understand the knowledge objects in the knowing intellect. Aristotle's system of categories is not applicable to them. Thought contents correspond to natural things, but are not their images, but exist independently alongside them. The world of thought is not a replica of the natural world.

According to Dietrich's doctrine, which is influenced by Avicenna's ideas , the "active intellect" ( intellectus agens ) - the intellect as an active authority that brings about all knowledge - is a pure substance that does not contain anything accidental. Therefore, it has no composition, but is absolutely simple. It emerges from God and represents his perfect image (imago) . By nature - not through a special gift of grace - it is "god-shaped" (deiformis) ; there is a substantial correspondence between him and God. In this it differs from natural things, which do not emerge as images but as things from God and result from the interaction of form and material. This pictorial character of the active intellect results in its unique closeness to God. In his image he has God in him, so to speak. In the human individual, the active intellect is not only the factor that generates insight in the soul, but also the effective cause of the soul substance.

In the controversial question of whether there is a real or just a conceptual difference between being and essence, Dietrich, like Siger von Brabant , fought the thesis of the real difference. He turned against Thomas Aquinas, who at the time was counted among the proponents of this thesis, although he had not used the expression "real difference". The conflict was explosive, because both the assumption and the denial of the real difference could lead to the conclusion that the world is eternal. This resulted in a contradiction to the Christian doctrine of creation, according to which God created the world out of nothing.

Exclusion of the irrational from philosophy

Dietrich's consistent adherence to the demand that theological and philosophical statements must together result in a consistently consistent system brought him into conflict with the philosophical justification of the church's teaching of transubstantiation , the conversion of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist . This teaching was a binding dogma in the medieval church . According to ecclesiastical dogma, the bread substance disappears at the Eucharist and is replaced by the divine substance of the body of Christ, but the properties of the bread are preserved. In philosophical terms, this means that properties (accidents) can exist without the substance to which they belong as their carrier. However, this contradicts the definition of the accident as that which cannot exist by itself (per se), i.e. cannot be separated from its substance. The characteristic properties of a bread can only exist as long as the bread; if this ceases to be bread, the corresponding properties must also disappear, since they then no longer have a carrier. This situation posed a difficult problem for the philosophically educated medieval theologians, including Thomas Aquinas, because they assumed that God does nothing contradictory and thus logically impossible, but observes the law of contradiction to be avoided. Thomas tried to resolve the contradiction with the thesis that an accident is usually but not necessarily bound to its substance, and that in exceptional cases it could be insubstantial according to God's will. Dietrich turned against it. He asserted that the assumption of an accident without an associated substance was absolutely impossible according to the definition of the term accident, which was also adopted by Thomas. This violates the principle that God's omnipotence cannot achieve anything that includes a contradiction, although the Thomists also accepted this principle.

The fundamental question behind this dispute was whether one should accept a contradiction and thus consciously introduce an irrational element into science in order to arrive at a desired result. Dietrich criticized participants in the discourse who claimed to justify their position rationally, but gave up the rational discourse as soon as it led to consequences that they considered unacceptable. In the philosophical defense of the doctrine of transubstantiation, he saw the attempt to escape a dilemma through subtle excuses, terminological fuzziness and inconsistency. He protested against this vehemently, because he believed that such procedures would destroy the foundations of science.

Epistemology

According to Dietrich's understanding, knowledge is finding the truth in a hidden treasure trove, in the “hiding place of the spirit” ( abditum mentis ) , which a person can discover in himself when he turns to him. He does not need to seek the truth in the outside world, for he already has it in his own mind. This explanation of knowledge is a concept, the starting point of which is a reflection by the late antique church father Augustine . For Augustine and Dietrich, the “hiding place of the spirit” is, as it were, the “place” in the soul where their treasures of knowledge are stored. There she has always carried the knowledge within her, but she only becomes aware of it when she directs her attention to it. Dietrich took up the concept of Augustine and developed it further, sharpening the terminology of the previously rather vague use of abditum mentis .

In Dietrich's model, Augustine's “hiding place” is equated with the “active intellect” of the Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy. The active intellect is human reason in its capacity as a cognitive authority that currently grasps a certain object of knowledge. The active intellect actively grasps its objects by means of its own activity; it is not only passively affected by it like a sensory organ that “suffers” a sensory perception by absorbing an incoming sensory impression. By taking concrete action, the active intellect differs from the "possible" (intellectus possibilis) . The possible intellect is reason as an authority capable of knowing but not currently knowing a particular object.

With his understanding of the active intellect, Dietrich distinguishes himself fundamentally from Thomism. For the Thomists, the active intellect is an "accidental soul faculty", that is: an ability or functioning of the soul that does not necessarily belong to its essence, but as something external, as it were from the outside "added" to the soul. He is to her like an instrument, the only task of which is to enable her to understand. For Dietrich, on the other hand, the active intellect is not a mere means of knowledge, but is itself the knowing authority. As a substance, it does not exist independently of the soul; it does not join it from outside, but is inside ( intrinsically ) as a constituent factor in it and makes it what it is. However, during the earthly life of man it is not so connected to the soul as a substantial (essential) Aristotelian form; otherwise man would have perfect insight. The perfect connection of the active intellect with the soul is reserved for future bliss. As an earthly being, man is dependent on the possible intellect and therefore only inadequately recognizes, although the god-shaped active intellect is in his soul.

The contrast between Dietrich's intellectual theory and the Thomistic theory also emerges sharply in the doctrine of the knowledge of God. It is about the "blissful vision" (Latin visio beatifica ), the immediate perception of God of the blessed in heaven, announced in the biblical promise. Dietrich considers the vision of God to be a direct consequence of the nature of the active intellect. Because of his nature he is able to perceive the divine being; for this he does not need any special external grace from God. Thomas, on the other hand, rules out that a creature is capable of itself to bridge the distance to the creator and to grasp his essence. He thinks that this requires a special accidental disposition. This is bestowed on the blessed through an act of divine grace through which the “light of grace” or “light of glory” (Latin lumen gloriae ) is received. Only then does the intellect become “god-shaped”.

According to a fundamental thesis of Dietrich, the human intellect is by its nature always in actual practice (intellectus per essentiam semper in actu) . He is never limited to the mere inherent ability to work; rather, this ability is realized under all circumstances as an activity actually performed. It has nothing of what belongs to the active intellect from outside or only accidentally; rather, everything that he has inevitably belongs to him as an essential characteristic. Thus it turns out to be autonomous. When something enters into him, it can only happen in his own way, that is, as an intellectual activity. In contrast to the Aristotelian view, according to which a being must first be before it can be active, according to Dietrich's understanding the human intellect constitutes itself as being by recognizing itself, i.e. by grasping its divine ground in thinking. Accordingly, the intellect does not think because it is, but is because it thinks; he thinks both his thinking and his being. Within the intellect, no distinction between active and activity, subject and object is possible; rather, it is so simple and unified that in it its substance, its activity and its object coincide into one. Knowing yourself must be as simple as the intellect. It is therefore error-free, because it is not based on a judgment whose parts could be incorrectly linked.

As “active” the intellect basically has the ability to set everything, and as “possible” the ability to become anything. Through its own being it bears a resemblance to the totality of beings, and that in a simple way, since its being is simple. The plurality is an intellectual unity in him, and on the basis of this unity he is able to recognize everything. In knowing himself, he also knows his cause and the rest of the things. He does not grasp these three objects of his knowledge in three executions, but in a single simple act. Due to his nature, which enables him to do so, he has an extraordinarily high rank in the order of creation.

An essential aspect of Dietrich's epistemology is the distinction between the imagination or imagination (virtus imaginativa) , the power of thought ( virtus cogitativa or ratio particularis ) and the intellectual insight (ratio universalis) . All “sensory beings” (animalia) , including animals, have a phantasy ; the other two powers are reserved for man. The power of thought determines a perceived individual as a specimen of his kind, for example a dog as a dog. It puts together and separates, as Dietrich puts it, it connects things that belong together and keeps the different apart. By disregarding the individual peculiarities, it approaches the general. But it cannot provide definitions; only intellectual insight is capable of this. Only this has to do with the general in the narrower sense; only it recognizes the determinateness of a thing, which forms the basis of the definition, and judges whether a concept is used properly and always in the same sense. Intellectual insight grasps the general as the necessary, which is always given regardless of space and time. What is necessary is known to the intellect from within itself. It is not proven by deduction from anything else, but is itself the basis of all evidence. Evidence is provided by deduction from necessary. This is how science arises. It consists of having knowledge of what is necessary and what is correctly deduced from it.

Burkhard Mojsisch points out that Dietrich's understanding of knowledge should not be understood as mystical . This designation would be wrong, because Dietrich thinks through the dynamics of reason itself in its different executions and does not place reason in opposition to God. Rather, he considers such a contradiction to be absurd, because then, when reason is concerned with God, it would have something external and alien to think that would be incompatible with its essence.

Time theory

Before explaining his theory of time, Dietrich deals with the concept of the continuous. He sees its clarification as a prerequisite for understanding time. Following Aristotle, he understands a continuum to be something that on the one hand is infinitely divisible and on the other hand extends between two ends (termini) . The terminus of a line is a point. With reference to Euclid , Dietrich defines this as something that can only be determined through its reference to the continuum. The end point of a line is nothing but an element of negation in relation to the extent of the continuum. This means that the termini is realized in the continuous and dependent on it and not the continuum through them. The continuum is the overriding fact. For Dietrich it follows from this that the continuous cannot be composed of indivisible quantities. Time does not consist of points in time. Like movement and in contrast to space, it is not a permanent, but a successive continuum, since a temporal beginning is no longer real when a temporal end point is reached.

Based on these considerations, Dietrich explains and justifies his time theory. From the successive character of the time continuum he deduces that its termini cannot exist in nature like those of space, otherwise the successive continuum would become permanent. Rather, the terms of the one who measures time must be set as limit points. The measuring authority is the soul. Therefore Dietrich does not count time as a natural thing (entia naturalia) , but as a product of the soul. He thus rejects “time realism”, according to which the temporal as well as the spatial belong to the natural features. He considers the idea of ​​time “extended” analogous to spatial expansion to be an illusion; with his argument he wants to prove that time realism is contradicting itself. For him, time is the product of an interplay between imagination and intellect. The individual human intellect is indivisible, but through his imagination the individual can experience himself as divisible and thereby experience time. The connection of the indivisible with the divisible enables time. The moment, the “now”, is indivisible; thus divisible time also contains a moment of indivisibility. Past and future are produced as such by the rational soul in that it determines them in this way. If no soul measures time and thereby gives it a numerical character, time does not exist. Only because the active intellect does not flow with the flow of time itself, but rather exists beyond time and is superior to it, can it mark points in time and measure time, thereby creating an "earlier" and a "later". The continuity of time, which does not contradict its number, results from its origin; it is a mental continuum. According to this understanding, time is not an object of physics, but falls within the sphere of competence of metaphysics.

Dietrich supports his thesis with a number of arguments, addressing possible objections. One objection is that according to the Aristotelian theory of time, movement is the necessary condition for the formation of time consciousness. What is meant is the celestial movement as the normal basis for measuring time. It provides the outer-soul time substrate that enables the distinction between a “before” and “after”. Dietrich counters this argument by stating that the time substrate only enables the formation of a before and after; realization is exclusively a matter of the soul. For Dietrich the movement of the heavens is not a real cause of time. It is only very indirectly involved in their constitution, in that it sets the constitution process in motion in the soul. This happens because the heavenly movement gives the person the opportunity to experience the time continuum in the soul as such through his imagination. The constitution of time is then done by the intellect.

cosmology

Dietrich's rejection of Thomism is particularly evident in cosmology. His worldview is in sharp contrast to the Thomistic understanding of creation. He interprets the emergence of the created as an eternal emanation , as the emergence of things from God, whom he equates with the Neoplatonic one . However, Dietrich points out the hypothetical character of the doctrine of emanation, which is not contained in the Bible. Between God and the visible world, he places hierarchically ordered, creatively active intellects as intermediate stages of the cosmic order. He owes the inspiration for this concept to the cosmology of the late antique Neo-Platonist Proklos .

Dietrich's astronomical model is the geocentric one prevailing in his time . It is based on the assumption that the earth rests in the middle of space. The movements in the sky are explained with the hypothesis that the stars are attached to transparent hollow spheres arranged concentrically around the center of the world, the celestial spheres, which rotate uniformly. The celestial bodies are held in their circular paths by the fastening. So your movements are a result of the rotation of the invisible spheres. Dietrich adopts a view that was common at the time, according to which the rotation of the celestial spheres can be traced back to rational beings who act as movers. In contrast to Thomas, Dietrich does not count these beings among the angels, but sees heavenly souls in them, which are inseparably connected with the individual heavenly bodies. He dislikes the Thomistic view that the star movers are lower angels whom God has assigned to move the star bowls. According to the Thomistic model, the movers for their stars are only the effective cause, not the form cause. They are only accidentally, not essentially connected with the heavenly bodies assigned to them by God. Dietrich rules out such an external, lower form of causality for heaven, since the movements would then have something violent that is unworthy of heaven. He thinks that the movement of the stars must be natural and based on an inner, essential connection between the mover and the moved. Anyone who accepts an accidental relationship here is not only betraying his ignorance, but his foolish rawness. With this sharp polemic, Dietrich avoids naming Thomas or individual Thomists.

Dietrich is aware of the speculative character of his cosmological hypotheses. Here, too, he strives for coherence and values ​​strict rationality; he states that he has to limit himself to rational guesswork. He does not even claim secure knowledge with regard to the existence of "intelligences" (disembodied rational beings). He emphatically opposes theological interventions in the doctrine of the structure of the universe; cosmology has nothing to do with beliefs and should not be confused with them.

Like the ancient Neo-Platonists, Dietrich is convinced that the universe is perfect. With reference to Augustine, he states that everything that can be said about a perfect universe on the basis of correct thinking must inevitably be identical with what God actually achieved. What is important to him is the orderly, regular nature of the cosmos, which excludes any coincidence in the movements of the stars. It is based on the principle that God founded the world rationally and that its rationality must therefore be assumed.

In Dietrich's late work his anchoring in the Neoplatonic cosmology is solidified. His approval of their model, previously expressed with reservations, is now presented with certainty. These are ideas of Proclus and the Neo-Platonic Liber de causis (Book of the Causes) .

The return to the origin

As with Proklos, in Dietrich's model, the emergence of the universe from unity is followed by the return of all things to their divine origin. It is caused by longing. Every creature has a natural tendency to actively transcend itself and take the path to its origin. This striving is the expression of the destiny of all beings; it is their natural activity. The resulting focus on the good shows that creation is good. In Dietrich's universe, as in Proklos, everything is shaped by the dynamics of emergence and return.

It should be noted, however, that with regard to the active intellect, the return is not to be understood as a process in time. In contrast to the possible intellect, the active one is not subject to temporality, external influences and chance, but is eternal and unchangeable. Hence for him there is no period of time between coming and going; it is not a question of two activities, but of one. In the future he will not attain salvation according to the biblical promise, because he is always happy in himself and cannot become anything that he would not already be. The future bliss hoped for by Christians concerns the possible intellect that exists in time and for which there is therefore a temporal goal attainment. Man attains bliss when the relationship of the active to the possible intellect changes, in that the active takes on the function of being the substantial form of the possible. The eternal happiness of man can only reveal what is already shining in the “hiding place of the spirit”, in the active intellect.

anthropology

Despite Dietrich's fundamental criticism of Thomism, there are similarities between his teaching and Thomistic. They particularly concern anthropology . With regard to the relationship between form and matter in humans, Dietrich's concept follows that of Thomas Aquinas. According to the view of the two masters, there is only one “substantial” form in man - that determines his essence - the soul, and only one single matter, the physical matter of the body. Spiritual substances like the human soul are not composed of a form and a spiritual matter, but are pure forms, and the body is pure matter and has no form of its own, but receives its form exclusively from the soul. The opposite model is the Augustinian -influenced anthropology of well-known theologians of the Franciscan order , the so-called "Franciscan School". The Franciscan School ascribes to the soul its own, body-independent, non-sensually perceptible matter and assumes that body matter receives its quality as a human body from its own "form of corporeity " (forma corporeitatis) . Such a form of corporeality independent of the soul is excluded in the Thomistic anthropology, which Dietrich follows on this point. Its core theses include the principle of the soul as the only form of the body (anima unica forma corporis) .

Dietrich is convinced that people acquire their specific perfection through their intellectual activity. In this he sees the highest form of human life. From the high rank of this top form, he deduces the conclusion that it must have its principle in itself. From this it follows for him that the active intellect is not only the fundamental principle of the human soul, but is essentially identical with it. It is not only in terms of its effect, but also its substance in terms of its inner being. Its function in the soul corresponds to that of the heart in the body.

Individuation

Among the biggest challenges facing the medieval philosophy was confronted, the problem of the relationship between the general (the genera and species) and the variety of each to a particular species counted (species) belonging copies (individua) . In Dietrich's time, most philosophers, following an ancient way of thinking, tried to explain the existence of individual things - their particular existence as specimens of their kind - by tracing the individual thing, the individual concrete expression of something, back to the general and species-specific . This raised the question of the cause of the “individuation”, the existence of the various specimens of a species linked by common species-specific properties. What was needed was an individuation principle , that is, a reason for not just terms - Platonic “ideas” or Aristotelian "forms" - there, but also "individuals", individual beings and objects, which here and now carry and embody the general and appropriate to the species.

In dealing with this problem, Dietrich first clarifies the term “individual”. For him, an individual is a unit that is not only determined by its species-specific characteristics, but also by special provisions that are not part of the essential characteristics of the species in question. The special determinations are random individual properties, for example in the case of an object the spatial extent peculiar to it. If, on the other hand, a unit is determined exclusively by its specific species characteristics and has no other special features, then it is not an individual; such a unit is rather the species itself.

Starting from these assumptions, Dietrich turns to the question of the individuation of the intellect. In its essence, the intellect is universal, because its content is exclusively concepts, i.e. only general things. Therefore, it needs to be explained that, despite its completely general nature, it can be assigned to individual persons and that this or that person appears as the intellect. Everyone has their own active intellect. According to Dietrich's teaching, this individuation results from the fact that the human intellect and the soul form an essential unit, which as a whole is an individuality. Within the whole, the intellect unfolds in individually different ways. As a result, the whole thing has individual characteristics in addition to the species characteristics. These result from the “qualitative substantial peculiarities” (modi substantiales qualiti) of the respective intellect, the intensity of which fluctuates depending on the nature of the individual soul. They are called “substantial” because they concern the individual as a substance, that is, are firmly assigned to him. The different expression of the qualitative substantial peculiarities of the intellect in the different souls is for Dietrich the basis of individuation. This means that the active intellect effects the existence of the individual souls and thus of the human individuals.

With his individuation concept, Dietrich turns against the competing theory of Thomas Aquinas, according to which matter, i.e. his body, is the principle of individuation for humans. For Thomas it is the substance that causes there to be a body-soul unity that is not just "human" but "this human". According to Dietrich's understanding, however, human individuality does not result from the connection between the soul and the body. The body is not needed for individuation, because the active intellect individuates itself by setting acts whose peculiarities go beyond what lies in its essential definition. Thus Dietrich's concept differs from the Thomistic one in that his principle of individuation is not material but spiritual.

For Dietrich, however, these considerations do not result in an appreciation of individuality. He understands the cosmos as hierarchically ordered, with the species naturally being above the individuals. The species necessarily belong to the world population, but the individual individuals only exist by chance. Nature aims only at the conservation of the species, because it is exclusively geared towards the general and permanent. Individuals are brought up incidentally, they are ephemeral and replaceable. They are important only in their capacity as interchangeable representatives of the universal, not for their own sake. Their existence serves the purpose of enabling the species to survive.

physics

The relevant writings of Aristotle gave Dietrich the impetus for the scientific investigation of physical questions. His treatise on meteorology was treated in class with the Dominicans; it raised the question of the origin of the rainbow , which Dietrich dealt intensively with. In natural research, he mainly focused on problems of optics. From a natural-philosophical point of view, he took a position on questions of light theory; As a physicist, he investigated other light phenomena in addition to the rainbow, especially the halo . He also studied the teaching of the elements .

Light theory

Like other masters who dealt with light theory, Dietrich explained light and colors using the Aristotelian, scholastic terminology. Here, too, he fought an established position. He denied that the knowledge of sense objects comes about because the objects act directly on the sensual cognitive power. In his view, sense things have an effect on the organs of cognition, but the assertion that the object produces the cognitive image in the sense organ is wrong, because something lower cannot produce something higher. Rather, sensory perception takes place on the basis of an inner principle of the perceiver, it is an activity of the soul, as Dietrich stated with reference to Augustine and Averroes.

When asked whether the light is a substance or an accident, Dietrich decided on the latter. He considered the light to be a "perfecting form" (forma perfectionalis) , a form that gives an already existing being a perfection that this being previously only potentially carried within itself.

The formation of the main rainbow according to Dietrich's treatise On the Rainbow . Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, fol. 33v and 34r (14th century)

The explanation of the rainbow

The course of the light rays from the sun (top left) to a transparent sphere (right) and from there after refraction to the eye (bottom left) according to Dietrich's treatise On the Rainbow . Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, fol. 21r (14th century)

The determination of the angle between the incident and the reflected rays that create the main rainbow , according to Dietrich's treatise On the Rainbow . On the left the sun, in the middle a spherical body. Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, fol. 29r (14th century)

The generation of colored light according to Dietrich's treatise On the Rainbow . Rays of light emanating from the sun (top left) are refracted in a raindrop (right); the reflected rays show the basic colors red, yellow, green and blue (bottom left). Diagram in the handwriting Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.IV.30, fol. 23r (14th century)

Dietrich was deeply impressed by the beauty of the atmospheric celestial phenomena. Since he was particularly interested in the order and regularity of the cosmos, he admired the regularity of the color sequence in the rainbow and tried to explain it. The result of his research was the writing De iride et de radialibus impressionibus (About the rainbow and the effects of rays) , a late work. There he explained, based on the evaluation of “different and unmistakable experiences”, the origin of the rainbow colors, their number and “inviolable sequence”. According to his information, he relied on both his own observations and relevant literature. His theory of the rainbow ties in with Avicenna's considerations. In 1304 he reported about her to the order general Nicolás Aymerich at a convent in Toulouse. He made observations on the refraction and reflection of light with a hexagonal rock crystal, a small and a larger crystal ball, and dew drops. He used the sun and candles as light sources. His explanation of the origin of the rainbow is fundamentally correct. Their novelty compared to older theories consists in the fact that the phenomena are exclusively attributed to the beam path, as well as in the knowledge that the refraction and reflection of the radiation within the individual water droplets is the cause.

Dietrich distinguished between five types of beam path. The first is the simple reflection that takes place in an ordinary mirror. The second occurs when the light beam penetrates a denser medium; then it is refracted twice at an oblique angle of incidence. This can be demonstrated, for example, with a prism , a hexagonal rock crystal. The third type occurs when rays of light fall into a transparent spherical body: the ray of light penetrates the sphere, is refracted when it enters the denser medium, reflected once or several times by the inner surface of the spherical jacket and refracted again when it exits. The entering beam does not cross with the exiting one. In the fourth type, the beam path corresponds to that of the third, but with the difference that the light beam is more oblique and the spherical body is further away from the eye; in this case the entering and exiting rays cross each other. The fifth type is the double refraction and reflection of the beam in a layer of haze.

Dietrich traced the origin of the main rainbow to the third type of ray path, and to the fourth that of the secondary rainbow, in which the colors appear in reverse order. He explained the arrangement and location of the colors from the beam path. Unlike Aristotle, he did not take on three colors of the rainbow, but four: from the outside to the inside, red, yellow, green and blue. In doing so, he relied on observations of dispersion in various objects, including dew drops in spider webs and on blades of grass and artificial atomization. He saw the reason for the four number in the fact that there are four possibilities of combining greater or lesser luminosity of the beam with greater or lesser transparency of the refractive medium. According to his theory, the rainbow colors arise from the interaction of these factors. Dietrich's model also provides an explanation for the height of the rainbow above the horizon, for its circular shape and for the fact that it sometimes appears as a semicircle, sometimes smaller than a semicircle, as well as for the darkness of the band between the main and secondary rainbows. With regard to the geometry of the rainbow, the model (which also uses the concepts described by Alhazen ) is based on that of Aristotle.

Element theory

The starting point of Dietrich's investigations into the elements and their connections was the then prevailing four-element theory , according to which the four elements earth, water, air and fire are the components that make up all earthly bodies. Dietrich tried to solve problems that arose from this idea. The fact that the four elements form opposites on the one hand, but on the other hand can be mixed and connected with one another and become uniform bodies when they come together, required explanation. In addition, the question arose what will become of the individual elements, their essence and their properties when they combine to form a new natural thing. It had to be clarified whether they are actual in the natural thing or only present if possible. Another question was whether there is an undifferentiated primordial matter, an element of the elements that underlies the four elements.

Dietrich distinguished between two ways of using the term "elements": elements in the common sense, "according to the substance", that is, the visible substances earth, water, air and fire, and elements "according to the quality". By the latter he understood primal qualities, principles which he distinguished from empirical materials. He said that the elements were not given as pure qualities in the earthly world, that they were always mixed here. The original qualities are withdrawn from sensual experience and can only be inferred by means of reason.

When the elements came together, Dietrich distinguished between a mere mixture (confusio) and a connection (mixtio) , through which a unified body emerges from the elements, as is the case with minerals. According to his theory of nature, the elements must continue to exist in the connection, otherwise they would not be the components of things. But they have to be changed, otherwise the natural thing would not have a uniform quality. The nature of its presence in the natural thing can not be satisfactorily determined within the framework of the usual strict distinction between act and potency : its whereabouts there cannot be classified either under the merely possible or under the realized, the actual being. Rather, they must have an average status, as Dietrich discovered after Averroes. The conventional scheme, which only provides for an either / or, thus proves to be too rigid. The connection is not a juxtaposition of the elements, but a penetration that means continuity and change. The mutual penetration has the consequence that the elements in the connection do not differ in position. In every point in space all four always exist; they only occur in combination. The nature of the connection depends on which of the elements in it has the predominance. Natural processes are to be interpreted as a change in dominance between the elements.

Regarding the question of the original material, the “first matter”, Dietrich considered all previous theories unsatisfactory, since they would not have solved the difficult problem. He shared the widespread belief that the processes of change must have an immortal reason, a permanent first that enables all growth and decay and is itself withdrawn from change. This primordial material was viewed by Thomas and the Thomists as completely indeterminate and uniform. On the other hand, Dietrich objected that this model was inconsistent. It cannot explain how the difference between the four elements emerges from the absolute unity and why there are four. The multiformity cannot join the completely shapeless, as if it had been added by chance from outside. In addition, Thomas could not give a concrete function of the primordial matter in the creation of the elements. In view of this problem, Dietrich came to the hypothesis that the primordial matter should not be imagined as uniform, but as already structured.

reception

middle Ages

During Dietrich's lifetime and in the first decades after his death, his ideas received some attention from the Dominicans in the German-speaking world: Johannes Tauler and Berthold von Moosburg influenced his teaching , probably also Meister Eckhart . Eckhart's reception of Dietrich's ideas is not expressly attested in the sources, but only indirectly and hypothetically derived from correspondence in terms of content. However, since they were contemporaries, a reverse relationship can also be considered as an explanation of similarities: Dietrich may have known Eckhart's remarks. There is evidence that this was the case. Berthold von Moosburg often quoted Dietrich without naming him. The question of whether or to what extent it makes sense to speak of a “German Dominican school”, the starting point of which is said to have been the teaching activities of Albert the Great in Cologne, is answered differently in research. The non-Homistic German Dominicans Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and Berthold von Moosburg, as well as Eckhart's pupils, were particularly included in this school. In recent research, however, the term “school” is viewed with skepticism, as it suggests a commonality that does not exist, conceals serious differences between the approaches of the thinkers and leads to a narrowing of the view. Niklaus Largier identified the problem in 2000. In 2007 Kurt Flasch vehemently criticized the "rage of division" and the "coarsening of historical thinking through the concept of 'currents' and 'schools'". The questionability of the term “German Dominican School” has become clear since it was known “how inconsistent this 'school' was and how little is said with this title”.

Dietrich's philosophy was also received in vernacular literature: The early 14th century author of the doctrine of bliss (also called the treatise on effective and possible reason or treatise on bliss ) was well acquainted with Dietrich's work and thought and pleaded for his doctrine of bliss. As with Thomas Aquinas, bliss is not to be understood as a passive attitude; rather, it is an ongoing intellectual activity that constitutes the essence of man. Another author who dealt with Dietrich's philosophy was the author of the fifth of the so-called "Gaesdonckschen tracts", an anonymously transmitted treatise from the Dutch-speaking area. The two texts document that there was a debate about Dietrich's intellect theory conducted in the vernacular, and that the topic also attracted laypeople. The discussion with Dietrich's point of view took place against the background of the teaching of Meister Eckhart. In two anonymously transmitted German poems that belong to “nun poetry” and come from monasteries in which Dietrich preached in German, his work as a preacher is discussed. A nun writes that the “high master” Dietrich wanted to “make his audience happy”; he wanted to sink the soul "into the ground without a reason". This means the “ soul ground ”, which also plays a central role in Eckhart's teaching.

However, the ideas of the Dominican philosopher did not have a broad and lasting effect. In his own order he encountered opposition from Heinrich von Lübeck († after 1336) and Nicholas of Strasbourg († after 1331). The Augustinian hermit Jordan von Quedlinburg , one of the most influential preachers of the 14th century, took a stand against Dietrich's doctrine of the divine show. After the middle of the 14th century, Dietrich was largely forgotten. His explanation of the rainbow apparently received very little attention in the centuries that followed.

Modern times

Research in the history of natural sciences

Interest in Dietrich only reawakened in the 19th century. His rainbow theory first came into focus. It has now been recognized as a scientific achievement. It all started with the Italian physicist and science historian Giovanni Battista Venturi , who went into detail on Dietrich's treatise De iride in his description of the history of optics published in 1814 . He said that Dietrich had anticipated the discoveries of Markantun de Dominis (1560-1624) and René Descartes (1596-1650); he even surpassed de Dominis in terms of clarity and understanding of the matter.

Venturi's point of view had a lasting influence on the history of science research into the 20th century. Dietrich's experiments became a prime example of the thesis that late medieval natural science was efficient and made a lasting contribution to scientific progress. The proponents of this view were historians of science who followed the approach of the Pierre Duhem school . They said that Dietrich's successful rainbow research shows that it was possible to experimentally solve a specific physical problem on the basis of the then natural science understanding. Even researchers who did not share the Duhem School's point of view viewed the rainbow theory as a touchstone for evaluating the method used by the Aristotelian-scholastic natural science. The causes of success and failure in scholastic physics have been discussed using this example. The question of the extent to which Dietrich can be regarded as the forerunner of Descartes and Isaac Newton or anticipated their theories often dominated the debate. The danger of an unhistorical “modernization” of Dietrich became apparent. Behind this research discussion is the general question of continuity or discontinuity in the history of science.

Dietrich von Freiberg, sculpture by Bernd Göbel at the Freiberger Fortunabrunnen

Research on the history of philosophy

In older research, Dietrich's philosophical achievement was much less valued than his natural science. His time was compared to the previous epoch, which was shaped by the work of Albert the Great, Bonaventura and Thomas Aquinas, as epigonal and relatively insignificant. Engelbert Krebs , who published the first comprehensive study of Dietrich's life and work in 1906 , proceeded from such ideas . His work shaped the image of the Freiberger for the following decades. Krebs judged that although Dietrich had represented an independent philosophical system, he had compiled it more than he had thought up himself. He was "a strong character", who can be placed "worthy, if not equal for a long time" next to the great scholastics of the 13th century. In 1952 Anneliese Maier stated that Dietrich was “still far too little” appreciated for his importance as a natural philosopher and natural scientist.

The one-sided picture of the late medieval history of philosophy has been revised since the second half of the 20th century. A better development of the sources has contributed significantly to this. In the course of this change, a far more favorable assessment of the philosophical innovations in the late 13th and early 14th centuries has prevailed. This also includes a reassessment of Dietrich's philosophy, whose independence and forward-looking traits are recognized.

The four-volume critical complete edition of Dietrich's works was published between 1977 and 1985, a joint effort by several scholars. The work of Loris Sturlese was groundbreaking and made significant contributions to researching Dietrich's life and to the editing and interpretation of the writings. His compilation and analysis of the biographical sources and the handwritten tradition of the works, published in 1984, was particularly groundbreaking.

Ruedi Imbach (1979) saw Dietrich's "epochal significance" in the fact that he tried to redefine the relationship between being and thinking. He claimed and justified the origin of the determinations of being in the human mind "in all desirable clarity". With his intellect theory, he anticipated modern theses. Theo Kobusch made a similar statement in 1984 . He wrote that, for the first time in the history of philosophy, Dietrich specifically addressed the being of human consciousness and its modes (types) as opposed to the being of nature and saw it in its autonomy.

In 1997, Jens Halfwassen commented on Dietrich's importance in the history of Western philosophy. He thought it justified to call the Dominican's intellect theory the “philosophy of subjectivity”, since it had emphasized with the greatest emphasis that self-referentiality was fundamental to thinking. It should be taken into account, however, that Dietrich traced back the power of the intellect that established and communicated being, as well as nature, to God as the primary cause. This is an essential difference between his theory and the modern elevation of subjectivity to the principle of philosophy. Nevertheless, Dietrich belongs in the prehistory of modern subjectivity, because he analyzed the essential self-relation of thought far more thoroughly than any other medieval thinker. He has combined the reference to tradition, the recourse to ancient spiritual metaphysics, with innovation.

Theodor W. Köhler judged in 2000 that Dietrich had opened up a completely new perspective with his “conception of the human intellect that went far beyond his time”. The novelty of his approach consists in having reflected the human intellect as intellect towards its inner dynamic structure.

In 2004, Dominik Perler advocated a cautious assessment: Dietrich did not carry out a “ Copernican turn ”, but only creatively combined and elaborated existing theoretical elements. His achievement lies in the innovative use of older ideas, especially in the application of the Neoplatonic program to the category problem, which is "undoubtedly a brilliant move". Perler pointed out "some problematic points" in Dietrich's intellect theory. For example, Dietrich was unable to explain what role sensory impressions play in the creation of intentional acts . He had turned his attention one-sidedly on the intellect and had failed to explain the connection and coordination of the various cognitive faculties. Important questions remained open because Dietrich did not analyze the reception and processing of sensory impressions.

In 2007 Kurt Flasch presented an extensive monograph on Dietrich's work. He characterized him as an important, resourceful and headstrong thinker and naturalist. Due to the sharpness of his analyzes and the “productive otherness of his designs”, Dietrich was one of the greats in the history of the self-revision of European thought from the 1270s onwards. After the end of the great reception movement, which was characterized by the translation and development of fundamental works of Greek and Arabic philosophy, a phase of review began in Dietrich's time. The major drafts of the previous epoch have now been critically examined. It turned out that the powerful authorities of the 13th century, when attempting to "erect the building of the philosophical-theological explanation of the world" like a cathedral, had overlooked errors and shortcomings. Dietrich's critical review of the life's work of Thomas Aquinas belongs in this context. Dietrich had "drawn the outlines of a new conception of the Christian self-image". According to Flasch, if this conception had prevailed, it would have initiated a more serious change than Luther's Reformation. Dietrich also played an important role as a forerunner of Meister Eckhart.

Burkhard Mojsisch found in 2008 that Dietrich's theory of consciousness was “an important step towards a theory of intellectual constructivity par excellence”, but he had “not thought through the concept of possibility as it could have been thought through”. Hence his theory is deficient in some respects; he did not think intellectual constructiveness constructively enough, because he got stuck in the networks of Aristotelian philosophy.

Text editions, translations, sources

Text output (partly with translation)

• Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia . Edited by Loris Sturlese, Georg Steer u. a., Meiner, Hamburg 1977–1985 (critical edition)
  • Volume 1: Writings on the theory of intellect , ed. by Burkhard Mojsisch , 1977, ISBN 3-7873-0372-3
  • Volume 2: Writings on Metaphysics and Theology , ed. by Ruedi Imbach et al., 1980, ISBN 3-7873-0446-0
  • Volume 3: Writings on natural philosophy and metaphysics , ed. by Jean-Daniel Cavigioli et al., 1983, ISBN 3-7873-0545-9
  • Volume 4: Writings on natural science. Letters , ed. by Maria Rita Pagnoni-Sturlese et al., 1985, ISBN 3-7873-0640-4
• Dietrich von Freiberg: Treatise on the accidents. Meiner, Hamburg 1994, ISBN 978-3-7873-1173-6 (Latin text based on the edition of Pagnoni-Sturlese without the critical apparatus and German translation by Burkhard Mojsisch)
• Fiorella Retucci (ed.): Un nuovo testimone manoscritto del De luce e del De coloribus di Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 77, 2010, pp. 193–219 (new critical edition of De coloribus with the inclusion of an additional manuscript not included in the edition of Opera omnia )

Translations

• Dietrich von Freiberg: Treatise on the intellect and the content of knowledge. Meiner, Hamburg 1980, ISBN 3-7873-0502-5 (translation by Burkhard Mojsisch)
• Hartmut Steffan: Dietrich von Freiberg's treatise De cognitione entium separatorum. Study and text. Bochum 1977 (dissertation; contains p. 318–477 translation of the treatise)

Source collection

• Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg . Meiner, Hamburg 1984, ISBN 3-7873-0600-5 (contains a compilation of biographical sources and a complete description of the manuscript)

literature

Overview representations

• Loris Sturlese: Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Author's Lexicon , 2nd, completely revised edition, Volume 2, Berlin 1980, ISBN 3-11-007699-3 , Sp. 127-137
• Loris Sturlese: Dietrich von Freiberg. In: Alexander Brungs et al. (Ed.): Ground plan of the history of philosophy . The Philosophy of the Middle Ages , Volume 4/2: 13th century. Schwabe, Basel 2017, ISBN 978-3-7965-2626-8 , pp. 895–911

Overall representations

• Kurt Flasch : Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophy, theology, natural research around 1300. Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-465-03301-1
• Karl-Hermann Kandler : Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosopher - theologian - naturalist. TU Bergakademie, Freiberg 2009, ISBN 978-3-86012-372-0

Collections of articles

• Joël Biard, Dragos Calma, Ruedi Imbach (eds.): Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg. Brepols, Turnhout 2009, ISBN 978-2-503-52882-3
• Karl-Hermann Kandler, Burkhard Mojsisch, Franz-Bernhard Stammkötter (eds.): Dietrich von Freiberg. New perspectives on his philosophy, theology and science . Grüner, Amsterdam 1999, ISBN 90-6032-355-6
• Karl-Hermann Kandler, Burkhard Mojsisch, Norman Pohl (eds.): The world of thoughts of Dietrich von Freiberg in the context of his contemporaries. TU Bergakademie, Freiberg 2013, ISBN 978-3-86012-445-1

Investigations on individual subject areas

• Dragos Calma: Le poids de la citation. Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l'œuvre de Dietrich de Freiberg . Academic Press, Friborg 2010, ISBN 978-2-8271-1061-2
• Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of the intellect with Dietrich von Freiberg . Meiner, Hamburg 1977, ISBN 3-7873-0373-1

Bibliography (also for the individual works)

• Rolf Schönberger et al. (Ed.): Repertory of edited texts from the Middle Ages from the field of philosophy and related areas . 2nd, completely revised and expanded edition, Vol. 3, Akademie Verlag, Berlin 2011, ISBN 978-3-05-003342-6 , pp. 3649–3655
• Olga Weijers, Monica B. Calma: Le travail intellectuel à la Faculté des arts de Paris: textes et maîtres (ca. 1200-1500) , fascicles 9: Répertoire des noms commençant par S-Z . Brepols, Turnhout 2012, ISBN 978-2-503-54475-5 , pp. 122-136

Web links

Commons : Dietrich von Freiberg  - Collection of images, videos and audio files

• Literature by and about Dietrich von Freiberg in the catalog of the German National Library

Text output

• Selected works in the Bibliotheca Augustana

literature

• Markus Führer:  Entry in Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Daniel Cohnitz: Ray of Light? Dietrich von Freiberg and the story of medieval science , 2003
• Willehad Paul Eckert :  Dietrich von Freiberg. In: New German Biography (NDB). Volume 3, Duncker & Humblot, Berlin 1957, ISBN 3-428-00184-2 , p. 690 ( digitized version ).

Remarks

1. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 19-27; Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984, p. 3.
2. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 22–30; Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984, p. 3.
3. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984, pp. 4-56.
4. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984, pp. 56–63. Dating of death: "approx. 1318 “(Loris Sturlese: Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca. Antichi testi su Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Medioevo 3, 1977, pp. 21-87, here: 41-43); "Against 1318/1320" (Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 31).
5. ↑ The first volume of Dietrich's Opera omnia , Hamburg 1977, pp. XXVII – XXXVIII offers a list of publications .
6. ↑ For the absolute and relative chronology of the works, see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 32–38. See William A. Wallace: The scientific methodology of Theodoric of Freiberg , Friborg 1959, pp. 16-18, 299 f. and Burkhard Mojsisch (ed.): Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , vol. 1, Hamburg 1977, pp. XXXVIII – XXXIX.
7. ↑ For the analogous translation of the title, see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 109 f.
8. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 33 f.
9. ↑ For the chronological classification see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 526 f.
10. ^ See on the dating of Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 34; Alessandra Beccarisi: Johannes Picardi von Lichtenberg, Dietrich von Freiberg and Meister Eckhart: A debate in Germany around 1308 . In: Andreas Speer , David Wirmer (eds.): 1308. A topography of historical simultaneity , Berlin 2010, pp. 516–537, here: 522–524.
11. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 34 f. On Dietrich's antithomism see Anne-Sophie Robin: L'antithomisme de Dietrich de Freiberg dans le De visione beatifica . In: Joël Biard et al. (Ed.): Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg , Turnhout 2009, pp. 165–191; Ruedi Imbach: Gravis iactura verae doctrinae . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 26, 1979, pp. 369–425, here: 386–388; Ruedi Imbach: L'antithomisme de Thierry de Freiberg . In: Revue Thomiste 97, 1997, pp. 245-258; Catherine König-Pralong: Dietrich de Freiberg: métaphysicien allemand antithomiste . In: Revue thomiste 108, 2008, pp. 57–79, here: 62–73.
12. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 35 f .; chronological classification p. 301 f.
13. ↑ For the chronological classification see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 468–470.
14. ↑ See for the chronological classification Rudolf Rehn (ed.): Tractatus de mensuris. Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 3, Hamburg 1983, pp. 205-211, here: 209 f .; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 473.
15. ^ Edited by Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984, pp. 40–48.
16. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 36, 625.
17. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Il "De animatione caeli" di Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Raymond Creytens, Pius Künzle (ed.): Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli OP , Vol. 1, Rome 1978, pp. 175–247, here: 201–205; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 191–193, 693 f.
18. ↑ On Dietrich's "provocative word sequence" see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 44 f.
19. ^ Dietrich von Freiberg: Tractatus de accidentibus , preface 2 ( Opera omnia , vol. 3, Hamburg 1983, p. 55).
20. ↑ For details, see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 92–95, 99 f.
21. ↑ For the history of the administrative enforcement of Thomism in the Dominican order see Kurt Flasch: Meister Eckhart , Munich 2006, pp. 38–42; Ruedi Imbach: Gravis iactura verae doctrinae . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 26, 1979, pp. 369-425, here: 389 f.
22. ^ Dietrich von Freiberg: Tractatus de tribus difficilibus quaestionibus , Prologus generalis 1 ( Opera omnia , vol. 3, Hamburg 1983, p. 8).
23. ^ Dietrich von Freiberg: Tractatus de substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis , preface 1 ( Opera omnia , vol. 2, Hamburg 1980, p. 299).
24. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 25, 34, 40, 311, 692-694; Burkhard Mojsisch: Averroistic elements in the intellect theory of Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Friedrich Niewöhner , Loris Sturlese (Ed.): Averroism in the Middle Ages and in the Renaissance , Zurich 1994, pp. 180–186.
25. ↑ Aristotle, Categories 2a11-13.
26. ↑ Aristotle, categories 2a34–2b6.
27. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 111–113.
28. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 111–115.
29. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 115–122; Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of consciousness (ens conceptionale) in Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Alessandra Beccarisi et al. (Ed.): Per perscrutationem philosophicam , Hamburg 2008, pp. 142–155, here: 148–151; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 155–168.
30. ↑ Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of consciousness (ens conceptionale) in Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Alessandra Beccarisi et al. (Ed.): Per perscrutationem philosophicam , Hamburg 2008, pp. 142–155, here: 149–151; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 122 f.
31. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 123 f .; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 159–165.
32. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 124–126, 238–246; Burkhard Mojsisch: L'essere come essere-cosciente. Il significato dell'ens conceptionale in Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 10, 2005, 211–221, here: 213 f. See Pasquale Porro: Déduction catégoriale et prédicaments relatifs à la fin du XIII ^e siècle . In: Quaestio 13, 2013, pp. 197–220, here: 217–219.
33. ↑ Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of the intellect in Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1977, pp. 51–54; Saskia Wendel : Affective and incarnated , Regensburg 2002, pp. 168–172; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 149–152; Tengiz Iremadze: Conceptions of Thought in Neoplatonism , Amsterdam 2004, pp. 97-100.
34. ↑ On this question see Maarten JFM Hoenen: Dietrichs von Freiberg De ente et essentia from a doxographic perspective . In: Christophe Erismann, Alexandrine Schniewind (eds.): Compléments de substance , Paris 2008, pp. 397–422, here: 399–412; Ruedi Imbach: Gravis iactura verae doctrinae . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 26, 1979, pp. 369–425, here: 374–376, 391–396, 398–408, 419–424.
35. ^ Dietrich von Freiberg, De accidentibus 19-23. For the teaching of the Eucharist see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 253–259, 267–276; Ruedi Imbach, Catherine König-Pralong: Aristote au Latran . In: Revue thomiste 112, 2012, pp. 9–30, here: 18–26.
36. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 254–263; Ruedi Imbach: Metaphysics, Theology and Politics . In: Theologie und Philosophie 61, 1986, pp. 359–395, here: 383 f.
37. ↑ Augustine, De trinitate 14.7.
38. ↑ Andreas Speer: mentis Abditum . In: Alessandra Beccarisi et al. (Ed.): Per perscrutationem philosophicam , Hamburg 2008, pp. 447–474, here: 455–460.
39. ↑ See on this concept François-Xavier Putallaz: La connaissance de soi au XIII ^e siècle , Paris 1991, pp. 349–351, 367, 372; Burkhard Mojsisch: Dietrich von Freiberg - An original recipient of Augustine's mens and cogitatio theory . In: Johannes Brachtendorf (ed.): God and his image - Augustin's De Trinitate in the mirror of contemporary research , Paderborn 2000, pp. 241–248; Andrea Colli: Intellectus agens as abditum mentis . In: Theologie und Philosophie 86, 2011, pp. 360–371, here: 367–370.
40. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 214-216, 227-230, 237, 312-314; Tiziana Suarez-Nani: Remarques sur l'identité de l'intellect et l'altérité de l'individu chez Thierry de Freiberg . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 45, 1998, pp. 96–115, here: 105–109; Norbert Winkler (Ed.): Of the effective and possible reason. Philosophy in the vernacular sermon according to Meister Eckhart , Berlin 2013, pp. 268–275.
41. ↑ 1 Cor 13.12  EU ; 1 Joh 3,2  EU ; Joh 17.3  EU .
42. ^ Hervé Pasqua: La vision béatifique selon saint Thomas d'Aquin et Dietrich de Freiberg . In: Revue thomiste 112, 2012, pp. 513-527; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 217–221.
43. ↑ On these aspects of Dietrich's intellectual doctrine, see Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 42–45, 214–233, 320–337; François-Xavier Putallaz: La connaissance de soi au XIII ^e siècle , Paris 1991, p. 358 f .; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 152–155; Tengiz Iremadze: Conceptions of Thought in Neoplatonism , Amsterdam 2004, pp. 85–89.
44. ↑ Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of the intellect in Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1977, p. 46 f .; Theodor W. Köhler: Foundations of the philosophical-anthropological discourse in the thirteenth century , Leiden 2000, pp. 575-579; François-Xavier Putallaz: La connaissance de soi au XIII ^e siècle , Paris 1991, pp. 362-366.
45. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 332–335; François-Xavier Putallaz: La connaissance de soi au XIII ^e siècle , Paris 1991, pp. 313-316, 321-323; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 146–148.
46. ↑ Burkhard Mojsisch: "Dynamic of the sense" with Dietrich von Freiberg and Meister Eckhart . In: Kurt Ruh (Hrsg.): Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter , Stuttgart 1986, pp. 135–144, here: 138 f.
47. ^ Niklaus Largier: Zeit, Zeitlichkeit, Ewigkeit , Bern 1989, pp. 4–10.
48. ↑ Niklaus Largier: Time, Zeitlichkeit, Ewigkeit , Bern 1989, pp. 12–15.
49. ↑ Udo Reinhold Jeck: The problem of the continuity of time with Aristotle, Averroes, Albert the Great, Ulrich von Straßburg and Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Rainer E. Zimmermann (Ed.): Naturphilosophie im Mittelalter , Cuxhaven 1998, pp. 81–97, here: 91–96; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 471–497; Niklaus Largier: Time, Temporality, Eternity , Bern 1989, pp. 15–21.
50. ^ Rudolf Rehn: Quomodo tempus sit? On the question of the being of time in Aristotle and Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Kurt Flasch (Ed.): From Meister Dietrich to Meister Eckhart , Hamburg 1984, pp. 1–11, here: 8–10.
51. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Il "De animatione caeli" di Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Raymond Creytens, Pius Künzle (ed.): Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli OP , Vol. 1, Rome 1978, pp. 175–247, here: 217–223; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 311, 546 f .; Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, p. 150 f.
52. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Il "De animatione caeli" di Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Raymond Creytens, Pius Künzle (ed.): Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli OP , Vol. 1, Rome 1978, pp. 175–247, here: 189–197; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 186–188, 196–200; Tiziana Suarez-Nani: Substances séparées, intelligences et ans chez Thierry de Freiberg . In: Karl-Hermann Kandler et al. (Ed.): Dietrich von Freiberg. New perspectives in his philosophy, theology and natural science , Amsterdam 1999, pp. 49–67.
53. ↑ See Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 188, 191–193, 201, 204; see. 275 f.
54. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 192–194, 205, 316.
55. ^ Loris Sturlese: Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Author's Lexicon , 2nd edition, Volume 2, Berlin 1980, Sp. 127-137, here: 133 f .; Hartmut Steffan: Dietrich von Freiberg's treatise De cognitione entium separatorum , Bochum 1977, p. 53 f.
56. ↑ Markus Führer, Stephen Gersh: Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg . In: Stephen Gersh (Ed.): Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance , Cambridge 2014, pp. 299–317, here: 299–302.
57. ^ Kurt Flasch: Converti ut imago - return as an image . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 45, 1998, pp. 130–150, here: 133–141, 149.
58. ↑ See on the different concepts of Magister Theodor W. Köhler: Basics of the philosophical-anthropological discourse in the thirteenth century , Leiden 2000, pp. 475-483 as well as the detailed study by Richard C. Dales: The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century , Leiden 1995.
59. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 311–314.
60. ↑ A general introduction to the problem of individuation is given by Jorge JE Gracia: Introduction: The Problem of Individuation . In: Jorge JE Gracia (Ed.): Individuation in Scholasticism , Albany 1994, pp. 1-20. Cf. Jan A. Aertsen : The theses on individuation in the condemnation of 1277, Heinrich von Gent and Thomas von Aquin . In: Jan A. Aertsen, Andreas Speer (ed.): Individual and Individuality in the Middle Ages , Berlin 1996, pp. 249–265.
61. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 315 f.
62. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 314-316, 320. Cf. Burkhard Mojsisch: Die Theorie des Intellekts in Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1977, pp. 54-56; Tengiz Iremadze: Conceptions of Thought in Neo-Platonism , Amsterdam 2004, pp. 100–107.
63. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 318 f.
64. ^ Tiziana Suarez-Nani: Remarques sur l'identité de l'intellect et l'altérité de l'individu chez Thierry de Freiberg . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 45, 1998, pp. 96–115, here: 97–101, 109–115; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 316 f.
65. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 622 f.
66. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 619, 623-625.
67. ↑ Gotthard Strohmaier : Avicenna , Munich 1999, p. 148.
68. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1985, pp. XXX-XXXII, XXXV; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 633 f., 637, 640. Cf. Daniel Cohnitz: Ray of Light? Dietrich von Freiberg and the history of medieval science . In: Studia Humaniora Tartuensia 4, 2003, p. 21 f. ( online ).
69. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 674 f .; Alistair C. Crombie: Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science , Oxford 1953, p. 236 f.
70. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1985, pp. XIX f .; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 637.
71. ↑ Gundolf Keil : "blutken - bloedekijn". Notes on the etiology of the hyposphagma genesis in the 'Pommersfeld Silesian Eye Booklet' (1st third of the 15th century). With an overview of the ophthalmological texts of the German Middle Ages. In: Specialized prose research - Crossing borders. Volume 8/9, 2012/2013, pp. 7–175, here: 8 f.
72. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1985, pp. XXI-XXVII; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 637–639.
73. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 590–593.
74. ↑ Anneliese Maier: At the border of scholasticism and natural science , 2nd, revised edition, Rome 1952, p. 61; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 594 f.
75. ↑ Anneliese Maier: At the border of scholasticism and natural science , 2nd, revised edition, Rome 1952, pp. 65–67; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 591 f., 597 f., 601–607.
76. ↑ Anneliese Maier: At the border of scholasticism and natural science , 2nd, revised edition, Rome 1952, pp. 61–65; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 595–597.
77. ↑ On reception at Tauler see Loris Sturlese: Tauler in context. In: Contributions to the history of German language and literature 109, 1987, pp. 390–426, here: 404 f., 416, 422–424.
78. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Tauler in context. In: Contributions to the history of German language and literature 109, 1987, pp. 390–426, here: 398, 416.
79. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Did Master Eckhart Dietrich von Freiberg read? In: Joël Biard et al. (Ed.): Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg , Turnhout 2009, pp. 193-219.
80. ↑ See Udo Reinhold Jeck: Scientia Multum Rara . In: Karl-Hermann Kandler et al. (Ed.): The world of thoughts of Dietrich von Freiberg in the context of his contemporaries , Freiberg 2013, pp. 143-159, here: 143 f.
81. ↑ Niklaus Largier: The 'German Dominican School'. On the problem of a historiographical concept . In: Jan A. Aertsen, Andreas Speer: Spiritual life in the 13th century , Berlin 2000, pp. 202–213. See Andrés Quero Sánchez: San Alberto Magno y el Idealismo Alemán de la Edad Media tardía (Maestro Eckhart y Teodorico de Freiberg) . In: Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 18, 2011, pp. 95-122.
82. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 407.
83. ↑ Alessandra Beccarisi: Dietrich in the Netherlands. A new document in the Lower Rhine dialect . In: Alessandra Beccarisi et al. (Ed.): Per perscrutationem philosophicam , Hamburg 2008, pp. 292–314; Loris Sturlese: Alle origini della mistica speculativa tedesca. Antichi testi su Teodorico di Freiberg . In: Medioevo 3, 1977, pp. 21-87, here: 48-87. The doctrine of bliss is published critically by Norbert Winkler: Of effective and possible reason. Philosophy in the vernacular sermon according to Meister Eckhart , Berlin 2013.
84. ↑ See on these poems Kurt Ruh: History of occidental mysticism , Vol. 3, Munich 1996, pp. 195–198.
85. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Homo divinus , Stuttgart 2007, p. 111 f.
86. ↑ See Loris Sturlese on the medieval reception of Dietrich's teachings: Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Author's Lexicon , 2nd edition, Volume 2, Berlin 1980, Sp. 127-137, here: 134-136; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 47.
87. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1985, p. XLV; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 677. Cf. Alistair C. Crombie: Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science , Oxford 1953, pp. 260-273.
88. ↑ Giovanni Battista (Giambatista) Venturi: Commentarj sopra la storia e le teorie dell'ottica , Vol. 1, Bologna 1814, pp. 149–166.
89. ↑ In this sense, for example, Alistair C. Crombie expressed himself: Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science , Oxford 1953, pp. 233, 260.
90. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Introduction . In: Dietrich von Freiberg: Opera omnia , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1985, pp. XIII – XLV, here: XIII – XV; Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt 2007, pp. 49, 656, 663 f.
91. ↑ Engelbert Krebs: Master Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). His life, his works, his science , Münster 1906.
92. ↑ Engelbert Krebs: Master Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). His life, his works, his science , Münster 1906, pp. 153–155.
93. ↑ Anneliese Maier: At the border of scholasticism and natural science , 2nd, revised edition, Rome 1952, p. 58.
94. ^ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt 2007, p. 9; Theodor W. Köhler: Foundations of the philosophical-anthropological discourse in the thirteenth century , Leiden 2000, pp. 1–13; François-Xavier Putallaz: La connaissance de soi au XIII ^e siècle , Paris 1991, p. 377 f.
95. ↑ Loris Sturlese: Documents and research on the life and work of Dietrich von Freiberg , Hamburg 1984. Cf. Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt 2007, p. 10 f.
96. ↑ Ruedi Imbach: Gravis iactura verae doctrinae . In: Freiburg Journal for Philosophy and Theology 26, 1979, pp. 369–425, here: 370; see. P. 372 note 20.
97. ↑ Theo Kobusch: The modes of being according to Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Kurt Flasch (Ed.): From Meister Dietrich to Meister Eckhart , Hamburg 1984, pp. 46–67, here: 46.
98. ↑ Jens Halfwassen: Is there a philosophy of subjectivity in the Middle Ages? In: Theologie und Philosophie 72, 1997, pp. 337–359, here: 341, 352–354, 359.
99. ^ Theodor W. Köhler: Foundations of the philosophical-anthropological discourse in the thirteenth century , Leiden 2000, p. 575.
100. ↑ Dominik Perler: Theories of Intentionality in the Middle Ages , 2nd, reviewed edition, Frankfurt am Main 2004, pp. 165–177.
101. ↑ Kurt Flasch: Dietrich von Freiberg , Frankfurt 2007, p. 9 f.
102. ↑ Burkhard Mojsisch: The theory of consciousness (ens conceptionale) in Dietrich von Freiberg . In: Alessandra Beccarisi et al. (Ed.): Per perscrutationem philosophicam , Hamburg 2008, pp. 142–155, here: 153–155.

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