Parmenides (Plato)

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The beginning of Parmenides in the oldest surviving medieval manuscript, the Codex Clarkianus written in 895 (Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39)

The Parmenides ( ancient Greek Παρμενίδης Parmenídēs ) is a work of the Greek philosopher Plato about unity and multiplicity, being and not being , written in dialogue form . A fictional conversation between Plato's teacher Socrates and the philosopher Parmenides is reproduced , after whom the dialogue is named, whose pupil Zeno von Elea and a young person named Aristotle , who should not be confused with the famous philosopher of the same name . The elderly Parmenides is staying with Zeno in Socrates' hometown Athens . He appears with authority; Opposite him, Socrates, who is only nineteen here, is in the position of a student.

The whole process is probably fictitious. Parmenides and Zenon lived in the then Greek-settled southern Italy , where Parmenides was the most famous representative of the Eleatic school named after his hometown Elea .

The report on the philosophical discussion, introduced by a framework plot, is divided into two differently designed parts. The first part discusses difficulties that arise from the Platonic doctrine of ideas : The use of basic terms such as “many” and “one” leads to paradoxical conclusions if ideas are understood as independently existing metaphysical entities and as causes of appearances. In addition, there is no explanation for the connection between ideas and appearances, and the ideas seem in principle to be unrecognizable. The problems cannot be solved; the deliberations lead to aporia (perplexity). The second part takes place between Parmenides and Aristotle: Parmenides gives thought exercises that are intended to prepare for finding solutions to the problems of the first part. However, the solutions themselves are not presented.

The Parmenides is considered Plato schwierigster and rätselhaftester dialogue. For decades there has been an intensive, controversial research discussion about the philosophical content, the research literature is extraordinarily extensive. A main problem is that Plato makes the doctrine of ideas, a core part of his philosophy, appear problematic and contradictory. What is disputed is what he was aiming for with the criticism of the doctrine of ideas, whether he took it seriously at all or only viewed it as exercise material, what consequences he possibly drew from it and how the quality of the individual arguments is to be assessed in the dialogue. The spectrum of interpretations ranges from the hypothesis that Plato gave up the theory of ideas in old age, to explanations according to which the exercises in the second part should enable the reader to find the solutions himself. According to a controversial hypothesis, the “ unwritten doctrine ” of the philosopher , which was only transmitted orally, offers the way out of the problems identified in Parmenides .

Framework story, place and time

The actual dialogue is embedded in a nested framework. A man named Kephalos, who comes from Klazomenai in Asia Minor , introduces himself as the narrator . He reports on a visit to Athens that he made with some of his compatriots. The framework action begins in the Agora , the market and meeting place of Athens. There the group from Klazomenai meets two friends from ancient times, Plato's brothers Glaukon and Adeimantos . Together they go to the house of Glaukons and Adeimantos' half-brother Antiphon in the nearby Melite district . There, at the request of his guests, Antiphon tells of a conversation that Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates and Aristotle had a long time ago. His description of the course of the conversation at that time constitutes the actual content of Parmenides .

However, Antiphon himself was not present at the philosophical discussion, which he gives in detail. He was born long after this memorable event. Therefore he only knows it from the depiction of a friend of Zeno's named Pythodoros , in whose house in the Kerameikos district the two philosophers from Italy lived at that time. There Socrates and Aristotle met Parmenides and Zeno. As the host, Pythodoros had listened attentively and remembered everything well. Decades later he often related the details to the then still youthful Antiphon, who memorized Pythodorus' account by listening to it frequently.

A lot of time has passed since then. Antiphon is now a mature man, but his memory of the impressions of his youth does not let him down. He is therefore able to recall the details from memory to his guests from Klazomenai. The plot is thus interlaced several times: the narrator Kephalos only knows the conversation from a third hand, the reader learns it from a fourth hand.

According to the information in the dialogue, Parmenides and Zeno stayed in the homeland of Socrates on the occasion of the "Great Panathenaeans ", the most important festival of the Athenians. Parmenides was about 65 years old, Zeno about forty, and Socrates still very young. The great panathenaies were celebrated every four years. The celebration that took place in the summer of 450 BC best fits the ages of the participating philosophers. Took place. Socrates was nineteen at the time.

Antiphon was probably made after 423 BC. Born in BC. At the time of his alleged relationship with old Pythodorus, he is said to have been a youth (meirákion) , i.e. around 14 to 17 years old. Therefore, the last decade of the 5th century BC comes at the earliest. In consideration. Since Antiphon was dependent on the depiction of Pythodorus, i.e., obviously unable to question Socrates personally, one has to imagine that 399 BC Socrates, who was executed in BC, was no longer alive. Accordingly, the report of Pythodoros in the first years of the 4th century BC should have. To have been passed on to Antiphon. Antiphon's encounter with the visitors from Klazomenai would have been around a quarter of a century later. Accordingly, the fictitious framework plot of Parmenides probably falls in the 370s.

The chronological framework resulting from these considerations is compatible with historical chronology. Theoretically it could have happened like this: the conversation with Parmenides in 450 BC. BC, the report of Pythodoros to Antiphon more than half a century later, the passing on of the story to Antiphons visitors after about two to three further decades. However, Pythodoros would have to have reached an unusually old age. In addition, the fiction is based on the assumption that the course of a long, substantively very demanding philosophical discussion could be faithfully reproduced from memory after about seven to eight decades in which it was only passed down orally. In the case of Pythodorus as well as Antiphon and the narrator Kephalos, this requires an extraordinary conscientiousness and memory. Historically, this would be implausible in this form, but here Plato could make use of his literary creative freedom.

Apart from Plato's information, there is no evidence of Parmenides' stay in Athens and an encounter with Socrates.

The interlocutors

Socrates (Roman bust, 1st century, Louvre , Paris)

The framework story

Kephalos, Adeimantos, Glaukon and Antiphon are involved in the framework story. Also present are companions of the Cephalus who are not named and who do not speak.

Kephalos von Klazomenai, the narrator of the framework story, is possibly a figure invented by Plato. There is no evidence of its existence outside of Parmenides . According to his description in the dialogue, he has known Adeimantos and Glaukon for a long time; whose half-brother Antiphon was still a child when Cephalus came to Athens for the first time. Apparently, at the time of the framework story, Kephalos is already at an advanced age. Like his fellow countrymen who accompany him, he is very interested in philosophy and eager to learn more about the famous discussion with Parmenides.

Glaucon and Adeimantos are also known from other works by their brother Plato. In Parmenides , Adeimantos willingly mediates the gathering of the visitors from Klazomenai with his half-brother Antiphon. Otherwise, the two brothers play no role in this dialogue.

Antiphon is a son of the diplomat Pyrilampes , the second husband of Plato's mother Periktione . He descends from respected citizens of Athens on both his father's and mother's side. The Melite district west of the Acropolis , where he lives, is a posh area. In his youth he was busy with philosophy, but at the time of the framework he lost interest in it; now, like his grandfather of the same name, he mainly devotes himself to horse breeding. Only at the urgent request of the visitor does he agree to spread his memories.

The discussion with Parmenides

At the meeting of the philosophers in 450 BC Parmenides, Zeno, Socrates and Aristotle discuss. Pythodorus and two others present listen in silence and only intervene briefly once to get the hesitant Parmenides to explain.

The only nineteen year old Socrates appears differently in Parmenides than in numerous other dialogues of Plato. While he is usually the dominant figure and confidently steers the course of the conversation, here he is inexperienced and in need of instruction. He represents the Platonic doctrine of ideas, which Plato only developed after the death of the historical Socrates. The views that Plato puts into the mouth of his literary dialogue figure must therefore not be equated with the philosophy of the historical Socrates.

Parmenides was very old for his time in Athens when he visited Athens. He is a famous teacher and teaches young, inquisitive Athenians such as Socrates and Aristotle the methodological tools of philosophical analysis. He leaves it up to them to find the solutions to the problems that he poses for them. The basic convictions of this dialogue figure correspond to those of the historical pre-Socratics Parmenides. However, the literary figure combines these ideas with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, which was unknown to their historical model. Parmenides appears in the dialogue named after him in the role of the superior, highly respected master who benevolently observes the efforts of the young Socrates. Plato depicts him here with great respect.

Parmenides' pupil Zeno of Elea is a historical figure whose life, apart from a legendary tradition, is little known. It is uncertain whether Plato's statements in Parmenides are based on credible biographical information about Zeno. In the dialogue, Zenon appears as a handsome man of about forty. He has caused a sensation with a script in which he defends his teacher's philosophy. In order to show the correctness of the Eleatic doctrine of unified being, he examines the opposite view and tries to prove its consequences as absurd.

The historical politician Aristotle - not to be confused with the famous philosopher of the same name - made a name for himself as a supporter of the oligarchic direction. During the short-lived rule of the oligarchs after the crushing defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War , he was a member of the " Council of Thirty ", a body that consisted of thirty leading representatives of the oligarchic movement and from 404 to 403 BC. Exercised a reign of terror in the city.

In Parmenides , Aristotle is the youngest participant in the discussion. In the second part of the dialogue he answers Parmenides' questions in a dialogue. It turns out to be easy to steer. According to a research hypothesis, with the introduction of this dialogue figure, Plato wanted to allude to his famous student of the same name and put him in an unfavorable light. It is possible, but it is a mere guess that has received little research support.

Pythodoros, on whose report Antiphon refers in the dialogue, really lived. A quarter of a century after the time of the fictitious discussion with Parmenides, he was active as a commander in the Peloponnesian War. According to the possibly inauthentic dialogue Alcibiades I ascribed to Plato , he was a paying student of Zeno. In Parmenides he appears as the house owner and host of Parmenides and Zenon; therefore one has to imagine him as at least thirty years old at this point in time.

content

The introductory talk

As the narrator of the entire dialogue plot, Kephalos reports that he came to Athens from his hometown Klazomenai with some philosophically interested men and met his old friend Adeimantos and his brother Glaukon at the market. Since the visitors from Klazomenai had heard that Adeimantos' half-brother Antiphon knew an oral tradition about the encounter between Parmenides, Zeno and Socrates, they wanted to find out more. Adeimantos was happy to put you in touch. They went to Antiphon's house together and persuaded him to tell what he knew about that conversation between the famous philosophers. Although Antiphon had not dealt with philosophy for a long time, he could still remember exactly everything he had heard in his childhood from the aged Pythodorus, who had been present at the discussion as the host of Parmenides and Zenon.

This is followed by Cephalos' rendering of Antiphon's account. At first, Kephalos tells in indirect form, later he goes on to communicate the course of the conversation in direct speech.

The discussion about problems of the theory of ideas

Clarifying the requirements

Zeno read his treatise, which was previously unknown in Athens, to a crowd of listeners, including Socrates, in Pythodorus' house. This is then discussed. Zeno's writing contains a representation of the Eleatic teaching. Their core idea is a sharp separation between the unified, timeless beings and the variety of emerging and passing, only seemingly real appearances. The history of the drafting of the treatise forms a dispute about the Eleatic philosophy. In a famous didactic poem Parmenides had put forward his view that there is only one being, that all multiplicity is illusion. With this paradoxical doctrine the Eleatic thinker had caused a sensation and offense. Scoffers targeted his claim as a ridiculous absurdity. Thereupon Zeno, who was still young at the time, wrote his treatise in which he polemically defended his teacher's thesis. In the meantime he has become a mature man and distances himself from his former belligerence. In terms of content, however, he sticks to his convictions. In order to prove it to be correct, he chooses the way of refuting the contrary view. He tries to show that the assumption of a really existing multiplicity leads to nonsensical conclusions and must therefore be given up. According to his exposition, beings can in no way be a real multiplicity, because then the many real entities would have to be similar to one another on the one hand, but at the same time dissimilar on the other. But between the similar and the dissimilar there is a contradiction in terms that excludes the possibility that a real entity can be similar and dissimilar to another real entity at the same time. Here Socrates hooks up as a listener after Zeno has finished his lecture and asks for an explanation.

In his opinion on Zeno's argument, Socrates starts from the theory of ideas. For him, similarity and dissimilarity are ideas, that is, real, timeless givens in the sense of Parmenides' requirement that beings must be withdrawn from all change. As ideas, they are superior to variable phenomena; they exist independently of them and give them the properties “similar” and “dissimilar”. In the context of this model, the intertwining of similar and dissimilar in the world of appearances is not a problem for Socrates. He can attribute it to the fact that the things perceptible to the senses are influenced by both ideas, that of the similar and that of the dissimilar, and these influences mix. The ideas, on the other hand, are completely separated in their existence both from the appearances and from one another. Hence there can be pure dissimilarity, that which is absolutely dissimilar, as an idea, and this idea has no resemblance whatsoever. Similarly, there is similarity as an idea in which nothing is dissimilar. Thus ideas of opposites can exist as real multiplicity; the world of beings does not have to be absolutely homogeneous, as the Eleatics believe. Only when the Eleatics could show that the absurd mixture of similarity and dissimilarity they claimed affected the world of ideas would their arguments against the reality of multiplicity gain weight.

Although Socrates contradicts Parmenides and Zeno, they are delighted with his zeal and objection, for they fundamentally share his idea that everything that is changeable and perishable must be reduced to the unchangeable. Parmenides assures himself that Socrates actually understands all general terms as ideas, i.e. not only accepts an idea of ​​similarity and an idea of ​​dissimilarity, but also, for example, regards the just in itself, the beautiful in itself and the good in itself as ideas. However, Socrates shows uncertainty when asked whether there are ideas not only of properties but also of things, such as an idea of ​​fire or an idea of ​​man. The classification of negatively valued concepts in the world of eternal, exemplary ideas seems absurd to him; he refuses to admit that there must be ideas of feces, filth and other despicable and worthless things, although his model seems to require them. Parmenides attributes this inconsistency to Socrates' youth, because in youth one is not yet free from conventional prejudices. For Parmenides it goes without saying that within the framework of the doctrine of ideas not only things that people like must be assigned their own ideas; no appearance can be without a particular idea from which it is evoked.

The relationship between ideas and appearances

Parmenides then points out the fundamental difficulties that arise when one tries to grasp the relationship between ideas and appearances more precisely.

According to the theory of ideas, all objects that can be perceived by the senses are bundles of properties, the different and changing combinations of which make up the special nature of the individual object. The properties arise because the objects absorb the ideas and are thus subject to their creative influence. For example, a big thing is big because it receives something from the idea of ​​size and thus, to a certain extent, participates in this idea. But here the question arises as to how such participation is conceivable. If every idea, as the doctrine of ideas demands, is an immutable unity, it must be indivisible. Thus it cannot be divided among the sensory objects participating in it, but must be absorbed equally by each object as a whole. However, this is countered by the fact that the objects are different and separate from one another. One and the same idea should therefore be present in its entirety at the same time in a multitude of separate objects. Parmenides compares this to a canvas covering several people so that it appears to be spread over them as a whole. In reality, however, each of them only covers a certain part of the cloth. Analogously, one would have to imagine the relationship of the separate individual objects to an idea as participation in a certain part of it. Then the idea would be divisible after all, which would annul its existence as a unified reality.

Also, the notion of divisible ideas is inherently contradictory. For example, if the idea of ​​size is divided up, the parts cannot be more comprehensive than the whole of which they are parts; rather, they are smaller. Then great things would not be great through participation in the idea of ​​greatness, but rather through participation in something that is smaller than the idea of ​​greatness, that is, is relatively small. This is absurd. Besides, the idea of ​​smallness would then be greater than its parts; So there would be parts of smallness that showed more smallness than absolute smallness.

The self-predication

Another serious problem arises from “self-predication”, the association of the idea of ​​a property with the set of objects that have this property. It cannot be that the idea of ​​greatness, while the cause of greatness in all great things, is not great in itself. If it is an independent, real existing entity, it forms a set together with all objects to which it gives size, which is characterized by the fact that all of its elements have the property size. Then the question arises as to which instance gives this set the size property. This authority should be superior to the idea of ​​size as well as to the individual great things. So it would be more comprehensive and therefore larger than the idea of ​​size. In addition, for the same reason, their size would have to be generated by a further, even larger instance. This results in an infinite regress , a progression into the infinite. Then the ideas would not be units, but rather characterized by limitless multiplicity. They would no longer be suitable for reducing the diversity of phenomena to simple, uniform principles. But this tracing back is the starting point of Socrates, his foundation of the doctrine of ideas, which finds such simple principles in ideas. The theory of ideas would lose its basis.

Socrates' objection that the ideas are perhaps thoughts that appear as such in the souls and, viewed in this way, are not subject to recourse, does not help. It is refuted by Parmenides' reply that they are not thoughts of nothing, but of something that is, that is, of objectively existing ideas. If ideas were just people's thoughts, they could not be the patterns and creators of things that are not thoughts but are present in nature. If natural things were products of thoughts, they should themselves consist of thoughts.

Socrates interprets the relationship between ideas and appearances in the sense of the doctrine of ideas as the relationship between archetypes and their images. Parmenides, on the other hand, asserts that this is a relationship of similarity. If, however, there is a similarity between the archetype and the image, both of them would have to participate in a superordinate archetype, which is the cause of this similarity. This in turn leads to an infinite regress.

The question of recognizability

Parmenides sees an even more serious difficulty in the field of epistemology . It occurs when one tries to explain how a person can acquire knowledge of ideas at all. Parmenides shows this by taking on the role of a critic of the theory of ideas. His argumentation, which Parmenides describes as difficult to refute, is: If the world of ideas exists, the barrier between it and the world of phenomena is of a fundamental nature, since these two areas are absolutely different in nature. The assumption of an independent, self-sufficient world of ideas results in their fundamental inaccessibility for humans as residents of the world of appearances. Thus, if the ideas are such as the doctrine of ideas demands, they are necessarily either nonexistent or unknowable. The things of the phenomenal world can only enter into relationships with one another and the ideas can only be related to one another. For example, a slave is always the slave of a particular human master and is never a slave to the idea of ​​mastery, and the idea of ​​mastery can only be related to the idea of ​​slavery and not to individual slaves. Therefore, all human knowledge can only refer to one truth that is “with us” and each concerns a specific object of knowledge. Knowledge par excellence that is not related to a specific object, but to the idea of ​​truth, to truth itself, lies beyond the horizon of people. In order to gain knowledge about individual ideas, one would first have to recognize what is truth with regard to the ideas. That is, one should first grasp the ideas of knowledge and truth. From these considerations it follows not only that the world of ideas is in principle closed to man, but also that a God who has knowledge of ideas cannot have access to the world of man.

Practicing the philosophical method of investigation

Socrates followed Parmenides' explanations, he sees their conclusiveness and does not find any solutions for the time being. It turns out that he prematurely believed that he could grasp the reality of the ideas. He still lacks the training necessary to enable a philosopher to thoroughly examine questions such as those discussed here. Parmenides points out that one cannot make a well-founded decision until one has examined all possibilities regarding the consequences that result from them.

Socrates asked for a demonstration of this investigation technique. Parmenides hesitates at first, but then gives in to the united requests of those present. Since he does not want to monologue, he needs a partner for the performance. He chooses Aristotle. With it he shows in a compact sequence of theses, questions and answers how philosophical analyzes are to be carried out. As the subject of the exemplary investigation, he chooses a core theme of his philosophy: the question of whether the one is or is not. For the purpose of clarification, it is necessary to check for each of the two hypotheses “the one exists” and “the one does not exist” whether it can be part of a consistent system, that is, if it is valid. The consequences of the existence or non-existence of the one as well as those of the existence or non-existence of the other, that is, a plurality of entities, need to be examined.

Scheme of a comprehensive philosophical investigation

The overall examination consists of eight steps or individual examinations, for which the term " hypotheses " has been used since ancient times . This expression, which is also often used in modern research, is misleading here, because it is not about eight different assumptions, but rather eight types of consequences resulting from the two assumptions (hypotheses) “the one is” and “the one is not ”. These eight aspects of the problem, which must be systematically investigated, can be represented schematically as follows:

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The one
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
is not
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences for one thing
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences
for the other
(the multiplicity)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences for one thing
 
 
 
 
 
Consequences
for the other
(the multiplicity)
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
in relation to
yourself
 
in relation
to the other
(the multiplicity)
 
in terms
of the one
 
in relation to
yourself
 
 
 
in relation
to the other
(the multiplicity)
 
in relation to
yourself
 
in terms
of the one
 
in relation to
yourself

First investigation

The first investigation is based on the hypothesis that the One is , that is, that an absolutely simple entity actually exists. Against this, Parmenides argues, among other things:

If the one has parts, it is a multiplicity and therefore not a unity, therefore not one. If it has no parts, it is a whole. But wholeness is given when nothing is missing. This assumes the existence of parts that could be missing. Both possibilities thus lead to the result that the one, the partial unity, is not.

A partial one cannot have a beginning, an end or a middle; it must be without extension, limit and form. It cannot be in anything else, because otherwise it would be affected by what is around it, which would presuppose parts of the One. Hence it cannot have a place; it is nowhere. In addition, it cannot be at rest or in motion. Movement is ruled out because it cannot rotate around its center due to a lack of expansion and a change in position would require an environment in which the one thing would be, which has already been ruled out because of the partiality. A state of rest would also require an environment to which the entity would be at rest. Thus the One can neither be in motion nor at rest.

Further arguments of this kind lead to the result that the one cannot have any of the properties “identical” and “different”, “similar” and “dissimilar”, “equal in size” and “unequal in size” and that it does not exist in time can and can have nothing to do with time. If it has no relation to time, statements such as “the one was”, “the one has become” and “the one will be” may not apply. So the statement relating to the present “the one is” cannot be correct either. Accordingly, the one is not and cannot be grasped.

Second investigation

With the second investigation Parmenides returns to the starting point and re-examines the question of the existence of the One.

If that is one, there must necessarily be a being. But the being of the One is different from the One as such. If it were identical with him, one would not speak of the being of the one, but only of the one. So the one has two properties: to be one and to be one. So it is not absolutely uniform, but has two aspects, and that means: two parts. Each of these in turn has two parts, a unity aspect and an aspect of being, since it is both something - an entity and as such a unity - as well as something being. So there are four parts on this subdivision level, each of which in turn is divided into two parts, and so on. Thus, paradoxically, the One is a multiplicity, an infinite amount of entities.

Furthermore, if the one has a unity aspect and an aspect of being and these are not identical, then they are different from each other. The difference results neither from oneness nor from being, but is a third given. In addition to being and oneness, the one also includes a third element. This means that the numbers one, two and three are also assumed. From this in turn follows the existence of “even” and “odd” and the infinite amount of the remaining numbers, all of which participate in being. The being turns out to be limitless diversity, and each of the innumerable entities has the properties “one” and “being”. Again it turns out that the one is paradoxically unity and multiplicity at the same time. This applies to both the unity aspect and the being aspect.

Further paradoxical conclusions are: The one is limited and unlimited, shaped and shapeless, in itself and in another. It is at the same time identical with itself and different from itself and identical with everything else and different from everything else. It has to touch the other and itself and at the same time not touch and be quantitatively equal and at the same time unequal to the other and itself. Furthermore, its being requires that time be given to it. It then enters the realm of becoming and passing away, which leads to further absurd consequences. There must then be a transition between states such as “moving” and “resting”, which the one accomplishes. This has to happen suddenly, because nothing can be moving and stationary at the same time. The moment of transition can therefore not be part of the time continuum, since it would otherwise be assigned to either the previous or the subsequent state. So it is outside of time, and the one that makes the transition is neither moved nor immobile at that moment. One is performing an act of becoming without being in time.

Third investigation

The third investigation again starts from the hypothesis that the one is and tests it from the point of view of the relationship between the one and the other. There are contradictions here as well.

The other - the totality of that which is not the one - cannot be the one, but has to represent its opposite, because it is constituted by its opposition to the one. It is a multiplicity that consists of parts which together form a whole. But every whole is as such an entity and thus a unity. As a unit it participates in the One. So the other is at the same time involved in the one and the absolute opposite of the one. The same applies to the individual parts of the other.

The further conclusions correspond to those that have already arisen for the one. It can also be shown for the other that it has to be limited and unlimited, similar and dissimilar, moving and resting at the same time.

Fourth investigation

The next question examined is what consequences the separation of one from the other has for the other, assuming that the one is. The other includes all entities that are not one. Accordingly, there cannot be anything third outside the duality of one and the other. The one and the other must be completely separate from each other, and there cannot be a superordinate unit that encompasses both the one and the other. But if there is only one and the other and the other has nothing of the one in it, there can be no duality or trinity in the other, since numbers presuppose the presence of the number one. This means that the other cannot contain opposites. So it cannot be what it should be by definition, but just like the one it must be free from determinations such as “identical”, “different”, “similar”, “dissimilar”, “moving” and “resting”.

The balance of the considerations so far is that the one, if it is, is on the one hand everything, but on the other hand not even one, both in relation to itself and in relation to the other.

Fifth investigation

The four subsequent investigations deal with the consequences of assuming that the one is not. The hypothesis that the one is not is the starting point for statements about the nonexistent one. The statement “The one is not” only makes sense if it has a definable object. The one must therefore be something definable, even when it is not, that is, something that can be separated from everything else. The determination is that it is different from the other. In addition, there must be a knowledge about it, because the statement that it is not only makes sense if one understands what is meant by it, and that requires mental comprehension. If it is knowable with regard to its possible non-being, it belongs to that extent to the realm of the knowable. Since it differs from the other even as the non-being, it must have the properties of diversity and dissimilarity. Since it is only dissimilar to the other and not to itself, it also has the property “similar”. Furthermore, Parmenides shows that the non-existing One must also have in itself at the same time equality and inequality, being and non-being, immutability and change.

Sixth investigation

The sixth investigation is a counter-observation that assumes an absolute understanding of the statement "The one is not". If the one is absolutely not, it cannot become and perish (i.e. gain and forfeit being), it cannot change and it cannot have any properties. It cannot be related to time, cannot be recognized and cannot be the subject of meaningful statements. The result is the opposite of that of the fifth investigation.

Seventh investigation

The seventh investigation examines how the hypothetical absolute non-existence of one affects the other. If one is not, the other cannot be determined by demarcation from the one. But the other as such must also include the element of difference. The difference must therefore lie within the area of ​​the other and relate to its content. But if the one does not exist, these cannot be units. So it can only be about undifferentiated masses. Such masses, in the absence of a factor that could make them into units, cannot really be large or small, limited or unlimited, similar or dissimilar, etc., but only appear so.

Eighth examination and overall result

The eighth investigation shows the absurdity of a world that exists without one but with the other. Such an other can neither be a unity nor a multiplicity and cannot even appear as a unity or multiplicity, for a multiplicity would be a set of units. So this other is nothing. If one is absolutely not, the other is absolutely not either. Then there is no semblance of anything, but absolutely nothing.

In conclusion, Parmenides sums up the paradoxical results of the investigations: Whatever the assumptions, the result is always that the one and the other, both in relation to one another and considered individually, are at the same time everything and are not, everything seem to be and not seem to be. With this statement, which Aristotle agrees, the dialogue ends.

Philosophical content

In the intensive research discussion on the philosophical content of Parmenides , the focus is on the question of how Plato evaluates the in-depth criticism of his theory of ideas, which he has presented there, and what conclusions he drew from it. The spectrum of interpretations ranges from the hypothesis that he gave up the doctrine of ideas in his last creative phase to the assumption that he had completely solved the problems raised in the dialogue and the doctrine of ideas remained intact. According to the latter interpretation, he wrote Parmenides as an exercise text for his students, as he expected that, due to their philosophical training, they would be able to find the solutions through their own thought. According to a middle line of interpretation, Plato considered the doctrine of ideas in the form in which it was formulated in the writings of his middle creative period to be in need of correction and in Parmenides indicated the need to rethink the concept; the result was a new version of the doctrine which he applied in later works. Some researchers believe that if you understand the theory of ideas correctly, it shows that it is not affected by the criticism at all. This is only directed against false interpretations of the doctrine of ideas that Plato rejected. Indications of his Parmenides, who asserted in the dialogue that a talented, sufficiently trained philosopher can master the difficulties, speak for an optimistic attitude of Plato, which however is not easy. In addition, Plato Parmenides makes it clear that if one does not assume ideas, a philosophical investigation is not possible at all. Accordingly, philosophy stands and falls with the assumption that ideas are real, because only under this condition does the philosophical use of terms and classification of objects make sense.

The validity of individual arguments of Plato's Parmenides is disputed. The question here is whether there are false conclusions or logically inadmissible assumptions. Opinions differ widely: some researchers consider the deduction of the individual conclusions to be logically flawed, others to be conclusive; for some, the initial theses “one thing is” and “one thing is not” are meaningful statements, for others it is a violation of the logical syntax. It is often pointed out that the difficulties of the doctrine of ideas discussed in Parmenides are partly due to a "reification" of ideas. This is a mistake in the argumentation, which consists in starting from an analogy between ideas and things without paying sufficient attention to their differences. An example of this is the comparison made in dialogue with a canvas. Presumably Plato wanted to turn against a "material" understanding of the doctrine of ideas by showing the reader its fatal logical consequences. Another important aspect is the ambiguity of terms such as “the one” and “to be”. The question of whether Plato's Parmenides uses the terms consistently in the same sense is controversial.

One direction of interpretation emphasizes the contrast between Platonic and Eleatic philosophy. According to her, Plato wanted to show that the Eleatic way of thinking inevitably leads to a dead end. He had to deal with the teaching of Parmenides, as it is incompatible with the core ideas of his doctrine of ideas, methexis (participation) and mimesis (imitation). With the idea that the sensory objects participate as images in the ideas as their archetypes or imitate them, the theory of ideas tries to make the connection between the changeable individual things and the unchangeable ideas understandable. The influence of the ideas should explain the existence and nature of the phenomena. The Eleatic ontology , however, radically separates the unchangeable being from the non-existing, illusory world of sense objects. In this way it excludes participation or imitation in principle; within its framework there can be no relation whatsoever between what is and what is not. In addition, Samuel Scolnicov emphasizes a methodological contrast between Plato and Parmenides: the historical Parmenides was "the first Cartesian ". Like René Descartes , he started from the idea that a methodically correct approach must lead to absolutely reliable results if one chooses an evident fact as a starting point and deduces everything from it. Opposing assumptions could be proven wrong by showing their self-contradiction. This was the standard practice of Parmenides and Zeno. Plato rejected this approach of the Eleates, especially the idea of ​​an evidently true statement as a starting point, and criticized it in Parmenides .

The relationship between Parmenides and the highly controversial “ unwritten doctrine ” or Plato's doctrine of principles is much discussed . A number of researchers believe that Plato, with Parmenides, opposed the conviction of the Eleatics that unchangeable being is the highest principle. He wants to prepare the reader for the realization that a way out of the difficulties shown in the dialogue can only be found if a meta-level is set above the level of ideas, on which the "overflowing" one is located. Only the doctrine of the one overseeing enables the resolution of the contradictions that one gets into when one regards the one as being or as nonexistent. This is what Plato's doctrine of principles is about, which he only presented orally in the academy, but the main features of which can be reconstructed from the sources. With this understanding, some modern researchers (including Jens Halfwassen , Christoph Horn and Ingeborg Schudoma) take up an interpretation approach that the ancient Neo-Platonists started from. In the Neoplatonic tradition, the one overriding plays a central role as the highest principle and origin of everything. Other historians of philosophy (Giovanni Reale, Maurizio Migliori) also interpret Parmenides in terms of principles and find indications of an overarching level in it, but represent a somewhat different model. They reject the strictly monistic aspect of the Neoplatonic interpretation tradition and claim that Plato attributed a bipolar structure to the whole of reality. He did not allow the “indefinite duality” - the “other” of Parmenides - to emerge from the one, but rather regarded it as an independent original principle and, like the one, located it outside of being. Still others consider the principled interpretation to be totally wrong.

The two arguments of Parmenides, which show an infinite regress, gave rise to very lively discussions that lasted for decades. This topic is discussed in the research in connection with a criticism of Aristotle of the doctrine of ideas, which is known under the designation "argument of the third man" ("Third Man Argument", TMA). The third person's argument corresponds to the first regressive argument in Parmenides . With the "third person" is meant the superordinate third instance above the idea of ​​the person and the person as an individual, which is required according to the recourse argument if one assumes that the idea forms a class with the individual beings. Modern debates revolve around the questions of whether the regress arguments are a valid objection to the doctrine of ideas and how Plato assessed this. The answer depends philologically on the understanding of the text and philosophically on whether the assumptions that lead to the infinite regress are necessary for the doctrine of ideas and whether Plato considered them necessary.

Franz von Kutschera thinks that the most important key to understanding Parmenides lies in the mereological logic that Plato used in the dialogue. He had a mereology - a doctrine of the relationship of a whole to its parts - which he presupposes, but does not justify.

The view has been expressed on various occasions that individual statements in Parmenides are reactions of Plato to the understanding of ideas of Eudoxus of Knidos . Eudoxos understood the participation of the individual things in the ideas as a mixture; He believed that the ideas were mixed with the perceptible objects, that is, they were locally present in them. The explanations about numbers in the second part of the dialogue are influenced by the Pythagorean theory of numbers.

Another interpretation is that Parmenides' argument in dialogue should show the limits of logic and point to facts that are absurd and yet real. Parmenides instructed Socrates that the current approach, which from the outset gives conceptual thinking priority over being, leads to hopelessness and is therefore a mistake. This is particularly evident from the paradox of time. This results in the insight that being is more fundamental than the logos and dialectics , the philosophical method of gaining knowledge. The incompleteness of the dialectical discourse is revealed.

Emergence

Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

The authenticity of Parmenides was contested by some researchers in the 19th century, for which the silence of Aristotle, who nowhere explicitly mentions dialogue, gave rise to. Even in recent times skepticism has been expressed, but today an overwhelming majority of researchers consider the dialogue to be an authentic work of Plato.

There is agreement that Parmenides is one of the later dialogues. It is attributed to the late work or to a transition period between the middle and late creative period. Together with the Theaetetus and the Sophistes , he belongs to a group of "critical" dialogues in which the philosopher subjects thoughts that he had put forward in earlier works to a critical examination. Stylistically, Parmenides seems to belong to the group of the middle dialogues, the content suggests a relatively late development.

The different shape of the two parts of the dialogue has given rise to the assumption that the parts were originally separate. This hypothesis put forward by Gilbert Ryle was particularly well received in the English-speaking world, but has also met with opposition. Possibly the first part was originally intended for a wider audience, the second - the study conducted with Aristotle - and the combination of the two for the philosophers in Plato's Academy . However, recent research emphasizes that in the present version of the dialogue the two parts are merged into a coherent whole.

Most of the dates in the composition place them in the period between 375 and 360.

reception

Antiquity

Even during Plato's lifetime, a broader public apparently took note of Parmenides' ideas, at least superficially. This can be seen from the fact that the paradoxical aspect of the work was taken up in contemporary comedy and made a target of ridicule. In the age of Hellenism and the early Roman Empire, however, Parmenides apparently received relatively little attention. Interest in him only increased from the second half of the third century.

The fact that Plato's pupil Aristotle, who dealt in detail with the theory of ideas, nowhere mentions Parmenides by name is interpreted differently , although his argument against the separate existence of ideas partly agrees with the one put forward there. In his text Metaphysics a number of content parallels to Parmenides can be found. This suggests that he knew the dialogue. The assumption that Aristotle first formulated the criticism when he was still a member of Plato's academy and that Parmenides is Plato's reaction to this criticism has found less approval .

In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, the Parmenides belongs to the third tetralogy. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios counted them among the “logical” writings and gave “About the Ideas” as an alternative title. In doing so, he referred to a now-lost work by the scholar Thrasyllos .

The New Pythagorean Moderatos von Gades , who lived in the 1st century, designed an ontological model with which he took up, among other things, the Parmenides . He was of the opinion that the dialogue should be interpreted in the light of Pythagorean teaching.

The scholar Athenaios , who used to criticize Plato vehemently, claimed that the account of a philosophical discussion in which Socrates and Parmenides took part was chronologically inconsistent.

In the period of Middle Platonism (1st century BC to 3rd century) Parmenides does not seem to have played a prominent role for the Platonists. It was only with the emergence of Neoplatonism in the 3rd century that the work gained increasing importance for the metaphysical speculation of thinkers who invoked the Platonic tradition. In late antiquity it was one of the writings that had the greatest influence on Neoplatonism - the then dominant philosophical trend.

Plotinus († 270), the founder of Neoplatonism, rarely mentioned dialogue, but used it intensively for his metaphysics. He praised Plato's approach, which was more differentiated than the Eleatic, emphasized the absolute transcendence of the One and appealed to Parmenides for his doctrine of the threefold hierarchical order of the intelligible cosmos, the spiritual world . With this a new appreciation of this work became apparent, because the hierarchical structure of the spiritual world with the "overseeing" one at the top was a central component of the Neoplatonic philosophy.

Plotin's pupil Porphyrios († 301/305) seems to have dealt extensively with Parmenides . He is credited with a fragmentary and anonymously transmitted commentary on the dialogue, but the hypothesis of his authorship is controversial.

In the period that followed, the Neoplatonic reception of dialogue intensified, which was eagerly studied by philosophers who were mainly interested in metaphysical and theological questions. Since the Neoplatonists traced everything back to the “overriding” one as the supreme principle, the argumentation of Plato's Parmenides, which was directed against both an existing and a non-existent one, was very welcome. It served them as a foundation for their doctrine of the absolute transcendence of the One, which should be understood neither as being nor as nonexistent. According to their interpretation, the dialogue is not to be understood as aporetic, but the second part provides the solution to the problems raised in the first.

Porphyrios' pupil Iamblichus , who founded a very influential Neoplatonic school, wrote a commentary on Parmenides . He considered this dialogue to be the crowning glory of theology and the Timaeus to be the most important work on natural science. The later Neo-Platonists also saw Parmenides and Timaeus as the two fundamental writings of classical philosophy. In the course of the Late Antique Neo-Platonists, the study of these two dialogues was the culmination of the philosophical training. Hence, late antiquity was the heyday of the Parmenides commentary. In addition to Iamblichus, the late antique commentators on the dialogue included some leading representatives of the Neoplatonic school of Athens: Plutarch of Athens , Syrianos , Proklos , Marinos of Neapolis and Damascius . Most of this literature is lost; only the commentaries of Proclus and Damascius have survived. Damascius 'commentary is incomplete and the end of Proclus' work is only in a Latin translation. The extensive commentary by Proclus is of great importance in the history of philosophy, also because it provides information about the older commentaries that have been lost today. But Proclus did not deal with the whole dialogue. He was selective; from the second part of Parmenides he only commented on the first investigation, the evidence of which he needed for his negative theology . In his Platonic Theology he emphatically rejected the view that the second part was only about logical exercises. He said that the aporias in the first part were each caused by a thinking horizon that was not appropriate to the question. They are only apparently insurmountable; the solution results when the level of knowledge is raised to a higher rank. The didactics of Parmenides could help. The knowledge needed to discover the truth can be obtained from the dialogue itself.

The direct ancient text transmission is limited to a few late ancient fragments of parchment manuscripts.

middle Ages

The oldest surviving medieval Parmenides manuscript was made in 895 in the Byzantine Empire for Arethas of Caesarea . The late medieval Byzantine scholar Georgios Pachymeres wrote a sequel to the commentary of Proclus. But he commented from a purely logical point of view, thus neglecting the theological aspect that was central to Proclus.

In the Arabic-speaking world, Parmenides was known from the Arabic translation of Galen's summary of the dialogue, which Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq , a scholar of the 9th century, had made. The philosopher al-Kindī , a contemporary of Ḥunain, seems to have had a certain knowledge of the content of Plato's work, which he possibly owed only to Neoplatonic literature.

The text of the dialogue was unknown to the Latin-speaking scholars of the West in the early and high Middle Ages . But it was known of its existence because it was mentioned in the works of ancient Roman authors ( Gellius and Calcidius ). It was not until the late Middle Ages that part of Parmenides became accessible to some western scholastics , as Wilhelm von Moerbeke translated Proklos' commentary into Latin between 1280 and 1286. Thanks to the quotations from Proclus, the scholastics gained knowledge of part of the dialogue text. The late medieval Parmenides reception was shaped from the beginning by the Neoplatonic perspective. However, the circulation of Moerbeke's translation among medieval scholars seems to have been limited; Interest only increased in the Renaissance.

Early modern age

In the West, the Parmenides was rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The Byzantine scholar Georgios Trapezuntios made the first Latin translation in 1459 in Rome. Trapezuntios, who detested Plato, did not translate the dialogue of his own accord, but at the request of Cardinal Nikolaus von Kues . Nikolaus, who was an important metaphysician, was very interested in the Neoplatonic interpretation of Parmenides . Cardinal Bessarion sharply criticized the translation. In his combat pamphlet In calumniatorem Platonis (“Against the slanderer of Plato”), published in 1469, he found that Trapezuntios did not reproduce the Greek text, but ruined it. Nikolaus von Cues and Bessarion noticed the correspondence between Parmenides, interpreted as Neoplatonic, and the famous writings of the ancient Christian theologian Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita , who was strongly influenced by Neoplatonism.

The humanist Marsilio Ficino made a new Latin translation of the dialogue, the first to be printed. He published it in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Plato translations. As a Neoplatonist, he was convinced that Parmenides contained Plato's theology, which is here unfolded in its entirety. Giovanni Pico della Mirandola turned against this interpretation in his treatise De ente et uno ("On beings and the one"). In the second part of the dialogue, Pico saw only a logical practice piece. Ficino reacted to this with his very detailed Parmenides commentary, completed in 1494 and printed in 1496 , in which he presented his point of view and tried to refute Pico.

Ficino's Neoplatonic, theological interpretation had a lasting influence on the understanding of Parmenides in the period that followed. Among the scholars who followed this view were Aegidius de Viterbo and Francesco Patrizi da Cherso .

The first edition of the Greek text appeared in Venice in September 1513 by Aldo Manuzio as part of the first complete edition of Plato's works. The editor was Markos Musuros .

Leibniz took the Parmenides into neuplatonischem sense as a theological work, which does not reveal the profundity of Plato's philosophy. However, he did not take over the Neoplatonic concept of the overriding one, but equated the one with the being and with God. He recommended reading Plato's text if one wanted to understand his philosophy and not sticking to the old commentaries.

In 1793 Thomas Taylor published the first English translation of Parmenides . It was entirely shaped by the Neoplatonic view and made an important contribution to its dissemination to the educated public.

Modern

Philosophical Aspects

The modern reception is characterized by an intensive examination of the philosophical output of the work, which has led to a great variety of partly contradicting interpretations. Parmenides is often referred to in the research literature as the most difficult and puzzling dialogue of Plato. The interpretive approaches for the particularly controversial second part of the dialogue can be divided into two main groups: some historians of philosophy regard the text as a mere logical exercise without positive metaphysical meaning, others believe that one can infer a metaphysical teaching of Plato from it.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 1831

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel expressed great appreciation for Parmenides , but also criticized him. He called it "probably the greatest work of art of the old dialectic" and the "most famous masterpiece of the Platonic dialectic" and found it to be a "perfect document and system of genuine skepticism". The Parmenides embrace and destroy the whole field of knowledge through concepts of the understanding. It is not a question of a doubt about the truths of the understanding, which recognizes arising and passing away, diversity and composite nature and makes objective assertions from them, but the truth of such a knowledge is completely negated. For Hegel this “skepticism” is “the negative side of the knowledge of the absolute, and immediately presupposes reason as the positive side”. In the fact that the thoughts "make themselves to be the other of themselves", Hegel saw "the solid, the truthful": the unity of thoughts. As an example he cited becoming as the truth of being and non-being, their inseparable unity. However, Plato's dialectic is not completed in Parmenides because it did not go beyond negation . The next step, the negation of negation as affirmation , was not said by Plato. Rather, the dialectic in Parmenides is partly limited to refutation, partly it has “nothing at all for the result”.

The Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp viewed the dialogue as a program of exercises, as an "academic seminar hour". The “thread of the labyrinth” is the “methodological meaning of pure concepts”. The purpose of Parmenides is an indication of "the most powerful of the philosophical tasks, that of the system of pure concepts". The "greatness of the litter that Parmenides means" should not continue to be misunderstood.

The Neo-Kantian Nicolai Hartmann believed that Parmenides showed how all the value of the concepts arises from their community. Plato makes the inner connection of the basic concepts "tangible as something necessary, inescapable". In the second part of the dialogue, he used the eight investigations to demonstrate that the terms form a system from which no component can be torn apart without tearing up the whole and thus abandoning all thinking.

Bertrand Russell considered the Parmenides "perhaps the best collection of antinomies that has ever been created". He saw it as a document of Plato's self-criticism.

The study Plato and Parmenides published by Francis Macdonald Cornford in 1939 was groundbreaking for later research . Cornford found the second part of the dialogue to be a very subtle and masterful analysis of logical problems. He examined the philosophical-historical position of the work, in particular its relationship to the theory of ideas of Plato's middle creative period as well as to the doctrine of the historical Parmenides and the Pythagorean tradition. According to Cornford's interpretation, the dialogue has a positive metaphysical content, which, however, is not to be interpreted theologically in the sense of the Neoplatonic tradition.

Alfred Edward Taylor believed that Parmenides was just an ingenious game that served to ridicule Eleatic monism.

Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker dealt with Parmenides in his book The Unity of Nature . He said that one could not understand Plato's philosophy as long as one could not understand this dialogue. Therefore this has to be tried, although one can "only despair" given the differences of opinion in the secondary literature. The doctrine of principles is to be used. Weizsäcker examined the applicability of the argument in the second part of the dialogue to questions of modern philosophy of physics .

Franz von Kutschera sees a special achievement of Plato in Parmenides in the development of a mereology that is not only elementary; it is "a far stronger logic than all systems that have been developed up to Leibniz".

Literary aspects

From a literary point of view, Parmenides is usually little appreciated. Even the influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher found in the introduction to his translation of the dialogue, published in 1805, that the "conversation that was a deterrent for many (...) from many sides" was difficult reading; the language shows itself "as an artificial language still in the state of the first childhood". From a philological point of view, the renowned Graecist Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff judged that it was a "bone-thin dialogue (...) if you can still use the word" and "as unplatonic as possible"; Obviously Plato imitated Zeno's style in an exaggerated manner. "Anyone who dares to venture into this logical undergrowth and hopes for edible fruit will be seriously disappointed." More recent research also suggests that the second part of the work, which is stylistically very different from the other dialogues of Plato, is Eleatic literature - probably a text by Zeno - replicated. Helmut Mai contradicts the traditional view that the second part should not be viewed as a real dialogue because of the modest role played by Aristotle. He emphasizes that the second part also has a dialogical structure that is relevant to the philosophical content.

Franz von Kutschera came to a favorable assessment of the literary quality, praising the complexity of the work and the successful characterization of people and atmosphere in the first part.

Editions and translations

Editions (with translation)

  • Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Plato: Works in eight volumes. Volume 5, 4th edition. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 (reprint of the critical edition by Auguste Diès; next to it the German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2nd, improved edition, Berlin 1818)
  • Ekkehart Martens (Ed.): Plato: Parmenides . Reclam, Stuttgart 2001, ISBN 978-3-15-008386-4 (uncritical edition with translation)
  • Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Plato: Parmenides . Meiner, Hamburg 1972, ISBN 3-7873-0280-8 (critical edition with translation)

Translations

  • Otto Apelt : Plato's Dialogue Parmenides . In: Otto Apelt (Ed.): Plato: All dialogues . Vol. 4, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (with introduction and explanations; reprint of the 2nd, revised edition, Leipzig 1922)
  • Rudolf Rufener: Plato: Spätdialoge II (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 6). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 105–189 (with introduction by Olof Gigon pp. XXVI – XXXII)
  • Franz Susemihl : Parmenides . In: Erich Loewenthal (ed.): Plato: Complete works in three volumes . Vol. 2, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 483-560

literature

Overview representations

Comments

  • Reginald E. Allen: Plato's Parmenides . 2nd revised edition, Yale University Press, New Haven 1997, ISBN 0-300-06616-3 (English translation with detailed commentary)
  • Franz von Kutschera: Plato's "Parmenides" . De Gruyter, Berlin 1995, ISBN 3-11-014557-X (Commentary; Review by Andreas Graeser: Plato's 'Parmenides' in a new light . In: Göttingische Gelehre Werbung, Vol. 249, 1997, pp. 12-29)
  • Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità. Commentario filosofico al “Parmenide” di Platone . Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1990, ISBN 88-343-0289-3
  • Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson. Translation and Explication of Plato's Parmenides . University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 1996, ISBN 0-268-03817-1
  • Ingeborg Schudoma: Plato's Parmenides. Commentary and Interpretation. Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg 2001, ISBN 3-8260-1978-4
  • Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides . University of California Press, Berkeley et al. 2003, ISBN 0-520-22403-5 (introduction, English translation and commentary)
  • Robert G. Turnbull: The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy. Translation of and Commentary on the Parmenides with Interpretative Chapters on the Timaeus, the Theaetetus, the Sophist, and the Philebus . University of Toronto Press, Toronto et al. 1998, ISBN 0-8020-4236-8

Investigations

  • Andreas Graeser : The Fog Dispelled. Two Studies in Plato's Later Thought. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 2010, ISBN 978-3-515-09646-1 , pp. 13-78
  • Rudolf-Peter Hägler: Plato's 'Parmenides'. Problems of interpretation . De Gruyter, Berlin 1983, ISBN 3-11-009599-8
  • Constance C. Meinwald: Plato's Parmenides . Oxford University Press, New York / Oxford 1991, ISBN 0-19-506445-3
  • Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides. The Conversion of the Soul . Princeton University Press, Princeton 1986, ISBN 0-691-07303-1
  • Hans Rochol: The general term in Plato's dialogue Parmenides . Hain, Meisenheim am Glan 1975, ISBN 3-445-01271-7
  • Hans Günter Zekl : The Parmenides. Investigations into the inner unity, goal setting and conceptual process of a platonic dialogue . Elwert, Marburg 1971, ISBN 3-7708-0441-4

reception

  • Maria Barbanti, Francesco Romano (ed.): Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione. Atti del III Colloquio Internazionale del Centro di Ricerca sul Neoplatonismo . CUECM, Catania 2002, ISBN 88-86673-11-6 (essays on reception from antiquity to the 20th century)
  • John D. Turner, Kevin Corrigan (Eds.): Plato's Parmenides and Its Heritage . 2 volumes, Society of Biblical Literature, Atlanta 2010, ISBN 978-1-58983-449-1 and ISBN 978-1-58983-450-7 (essays on reception up to the end of late antiquity)

Web links

Text editions and translations

literature

Remarks

  1. Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 308 f .; Franz Dieter Ferfers: The first part of Plato's 'Parmenides' , Bonn 1978, p. 15.
  2. ^ Plato, Parmenides 126c.
  3. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 224.
  4. Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Spätdialoge II , Zurich 1974, pp. V – LI, here: XXVII f.
  5. See on Kephalos Richard Goulet: Céphalos de Clazomènes . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 2, Paris 1994, p. 262 f.
  6. See on Adeimantos Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 2 f.
  7. See Antiphon Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 31.
  8. There were seven people in total, Parmenides 129c – d.
  9. On the relationship between Plato's dialogue figure and historical Parmenides, see John A. Palmer: Plato's Reception of Parmenides , Oxford 1999, pp. 150–158, 221–254.
  10. Thomas Alexander Szlezák : Plato and the writing of philosophy , part 2: The image of the dialectician in Plato's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 80–88; Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann : Alternatives to “cold reason”. Studies on the dialogicity of the Platonic Parmenides . In: Klaus W. Hempfer, Anita Traninger (ed.): The dialogue in the discourse field of its time , Stuttgart 2010, pp. 27–45, here: 37 f. Andreas Graeser: Prolegomena for an interpretation of the second part of the Platonic Parmenides , Bern 1999, p. 10 f.
  11. Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 304 f. Gregory Vlastos examines the relationship between Plato's dialogue figure and historical Zeno : Plato's testimony concerning Zeno of Elea . In: The Journal of Hellenic Studies 95, 1975, pp. 136-162, here: 136-149 and John A. Palmer: Plato's Reception of Parmenides , Oxford 1999, pp. 95-105.
  12. See on Aristotle Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 57 f.
  13. See also William KC Guthrie : A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, p. 36. The hypothesis is endorsed by Holger Thesleff : Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 306.
  14. Alkibiades I 119a.
  15. See on Pythodoros Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 259 f.
  16. ^ Plato, Parmenides 126a-127a. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 43 f.
  17. ^ See on Zeno's treatise Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. 62–64.
  18. ^ Plato, Parmenides 127a-128e. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 45-48.
  19. Plato, Parmenides 128e – 130a. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 48-52.
  20. Plato, Parmenides 130a – e. See William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, pp. 39 f .; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 44-47; Christoph Ziermann: Plato's negative dialectic , Würzburg 2004, p. 41 f.
  21. Margarete Lünstroth examines the concept of participation in Parmenides : "Teilhaben" and "Erleiden" in Platons Parmenides , Göttingen 2008.
  22. Plato, Parmenides 130e-131c. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, pp. 170–173.
  23. Plato, Parmenides 131c-e. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 59-61.
  24. Plato, Parmenides 131e-132b. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platon's Philosophy , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, pp. 174–176; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, pp. 42-44.
  25. Plato, Parmenides 132b-c. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 176 f .; Reginald E. Allen: Ideas as Thoughts: Parmenides 132b-c . In: Ancient Philosophy Vol. 1 No. 1, 1980, pp. 29-38; Beatriz Bossi: Is Socrates Really Defending Conceptualism in Parmenides, 132b3 – d4? In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Parmenides. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2005, pp. 58-74.
  26. Plato, Parmenides 132c-133a. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 177 f .; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, pp. 46-49.
  27. ^ Plato, Parmenides 133a-135c. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, pp. 178–181; William KC Guthrie: A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, pp. 49 f .; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 59-65.
  28. Plato, Parmenides 135c-136c. See Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. 98-114.
  29. ^ Plato, Parmenides 136c – 137c. See Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. 114-116.
  30. Plato, Parmenides 137c-166c.
  31. In older research, nine “hypotheses” were mistakenly assumed at times; For the number of hypotheses, see Luc Brisson : La question du statut de Parm., 155 e 4 - 157 b 5 dans la seconde partie du Parménide de Platon examinée à l'aide de l'informatique et de la statistique lexicale . In: Recherches sur la tradition platonicienne (Plato, Aristote, Proclus, Damascius) , Paris 1977, pp. 9-29.
  32. Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 3 note 14.
  33. Simplified after Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 28.
  34. A principled interpretation of the first study is offered by Jens Halfwassen: The Rise to One , 2nd Edition, Munich 2006, pp. 298–405.
  35. ^ Plato, Parmenides 137c – d. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 80 f.
  36. Plato, Parmenides 137d-139b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 81-85.
  37. ^ Plato, Parmenides 139b-142a. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 85-94; Malcolm Schofield: Plato on Unity and Sameness . In: The Classical Quarterly 24, 1974, pp. 33-45; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 100-102.
  38. Plato, Parmenides 142b – 143a. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 94-101.
  39. ^ Plato, Parmenides 143a – 144e. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 101-108.
  40. Plato, Parmenides 144e – 157b. Cf. Franz von Kutschera: Platons Philosophie , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 202 f .; Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 109-139; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 102-121; Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. 175-253. Werner Beierwaltes examines the relationship between the one and time : Ἐξαíφνης or: The Paradox of the Moment . In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 74, 1966/1967, pp. 271–283, here: 272–275. See also Luc Brisson: L'instant, le temps, et l'éternité dans le Parménide (155 e - 157 b) de Plato . In: Dialogue Vol. 9 No. 3, 1970, pp. 389-396.
  41. ^ For the third study, see Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 126-137.
  42. Plato, Parmenides 157b – 158b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 139–142.
  43. Plato, Parmenides 158b-159b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 142-144.
  44. Plato, Parmenides 159b – 160b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 144–147.
  45. Plato, Parmenides 160b.
  46. Plato, Parmenides 160b-163b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 147–157; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 141-155.
  47. Plato, Parmenides 163b-164b. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 157–159.
  48. See on this contrast Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 155–159.
  49. ^ Plato, Parmenides 164b-165e. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 159-163; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 162-165.
  50. Plato, Parmenides 165e-166c. See Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 163-166; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, pp. 165-167.
  51. Plato, Parmenides 166c. See Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. 303-305.
  52. A renunciation of Plato's doctrine of ideas or at least an admission that it is afflicted with considerable, for the time being unsolved difficulties, assume among others Gregory Vlastos: The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides . In: The Philosophical Review 63, 1954, pp. 319-349, here: 347-349; Friedrich Wilhelm Niewöhner: Dialogue and Dialectics in Plato's “Parmenides” , Meisenheim 1971, pp. 1–5, 92–96; Henry Teloh: The Development of Plato's Metaphysics , University Park 1981, pp. 147-170, 218; Reginald E. Allen: The Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides: Zeno's Paradox and the Theory of Forms . In: Journal of the History of Philosophy 2, 1964, pp. 143-155; Béatrice Lienemann: The Arguments of the Third Man in Plato's Dialogue “Parmenides” , Göttingen 2010, p. 387.
  53. The assumption that Plato believed that he had completely solved the problems or was at least convinced of their solvability is represented by Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 226 f .; Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Spätdialoge II , Zurich 1974, pp. V – LI, here: XXVIII, XXX; Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità , Milano 1990, pp. 490-494; Margarete Lünstroth: Partaking ” and “Suffering” in Plato's Parmenides , Göttingen 2008, pp. 13–20; Hans Rochol: The general term in Plato's dialogue Parmenides , Meisenheim am Glan 1975, pp. 219–221, 283.
  54. Samuel C. Rickless: Plato's Forms in Transition. A Reading of the Parmenides , Cambridge 2007, pp. 5 f., 240-250; Robert G. Turnbull: The Parmenides and Plato's Late Philosophy , Toronto et al. 1998, p. 140; Kenneth M. Sayre: Plato's Late Ontology. A Riddle Resolved , 2nd Edition, Las Vegas 2005, pp. 18-74; Julius Moravcsik: Plato and Platonism , Cambridge (Massachusetts) 1992, pp. 129-161, 168-170; Sarah Waterlow : The Third Man's Contribution to Plato's Paradigmatism . In: Mind 91, 1982, pp. 339–357; Kenneth Dorter: Form and Good in Plato's Eleatic Dialogues , Berkeley 1994, pp. 19-21, 228; Charles H. Kahn: Plato and the Post-Socratic Dialogue , Cambridge 2013, pp. 2 f.
  55. David Apolloni: The Self-Predication Assumption in Plato , Lanham 2011, pp. 130, 193-195; Florian Finck: Plato's justification of the soul in absolute thinking , Berlin 2007, pp. 99–122; Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Plato: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, p. XXX; Robert S. Brumbaugh: The Purpose of Plato's Parmenides . In: Ancient Philosophy Vol. 1 No. 1, 1980, pp. 39-47; Andreas Graeser: The Fog Dispelled , Stuttgart 2010, pp. 15, 73; Franz Dieter Ferfers: The first part of Plato's 'Parmenides' , Bonn 1978, pp. 149–151.
  56. Plato, Parmenides 133b – c, 135a – b; see. 135c-d.
  57. Plato, Parmenides 135b – c.
  58. Peter Staudacher offers an overview of the research opinions : ΤΑΥΤΟΝ and ΕΤΕΡΟΝ in Plato's Dialog Parmenides , Tübingen 1976, pp. 80–98 and Sung-Jin Kim: Der contradiction and judgment in Plato's Parmenides , Frankfurt am Main 1989, pp. 8–10.
  59. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 227 f .; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, p. 169 f .; Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 187 f .; Florian Finck: Plato's foundation of the soul in absolute thinking , Berlin 2007, p. 107 f .; Hans Günter Zekl (Ed.): Plato: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, p. XXI f.
  60. Georgios Koumakis: Platons Parmenides , Bonn 1971, pp. 26 f., 31, 36-38; Franz von Kutschera: Plato's "Parmenides" , Berlin 1995, p. 10 f.
  61. Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 2 f. Cf. Martin Suhr: Platon's criticism of the Eleaten , Hamburg 1969, pp. 111–113, p. 119, note 1; Robert G. Roecklein: Plato versus Parmenides , Lanham 2011, pp. 121-158.
  62. ^ Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, pp. 3-16.
  63. See Giovanni Reale: To a new interpretation of Plato , 2nd, extended edition, Paderborn 2000, pp. 61, 205–209, 293–313; Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità , Milano 1990, pp. 359, 368 f., 463-466, 508 f .; Jens Halfwassen: The rise to one , 2nd edition, Munich 2006, pp. 187–197, 265–404; Christoph Horn: The Platonic Parmenides and the possibility of his principle-theoretical interpretation . In: Antike und Abendland 41, 1995, pp. 95–114; Ingeborg Schudoma: Platons Parmenides , Würzburg 2001, pp. 9, 14, 105; Mitchell Miller: "Unwritten Teachings" in the Parmenides . In: The Review of Metaphysics 48, 1995, pp. 591-633; Martin Suhr: Platon's criticism of the Eleaten , Hamburg 1969, p. 2, 113. Cf. Egil A. Wyller : Platons Parmenides in its connection with Symposion and Politeia , Oslo 1960, p. 13, 55–189.
  64. For example Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Platon: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, pp. XVII – XIX.
  65. Béatrice Lienemann offers a bibliography of relevant works: The arguments of the third person in Plato's dialogue “Parmenides” , Göttingen 2010, pp. 397-403. See David P. Hunt: How (not) to exempt Platonic Forms from Parmenides' Third Man . In: Phronesis 42, 1997, pp. 1-20; Constance Meinwald: Good-bye to the Third Man . In: Richard Kraut (ed.): The Cambridge Companion to Plato , Cambridge 1992, pp. 365-396.
  66. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Platon's Philosophy , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, pp. 185–194.
  67. Malcolm Schofield: Eudoxus in the 'Parmenides' . In: Museum Helveticum 30, 1973, pp. 1-19; Hans Günter Zekl (Ed.): Plato: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, pp. XXI f .; Franz von Kutschera: Plato's “Parmenides” , Berlin 1995, pp. 25–28.
  68. Kenneth M. Sayre: Parmenides' Lesson , Notre Dame 1996, pp. XIX, 123 f., 130-132, 140, 162 f., 177 f., 216, 239, 268 f., 276 f., 279.
  69. Kelsey Wood: Troubling Play. Meaning and Entity in Plato's Parmenides , Albany 2005, pp. 1-10, 16-18, 31-36.
  70. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 223; Hans Günter Zekl: Der Parmenides , Marburg 1971, p. 2 and p. 195 f. Note 5; Friedrich Wilhelm Niewöhner: Dialogue and dialectics in Plato's "Parmenides" , Meisenheim 1971, p. 79 f.
  71. See for classification Gerard R. Ledger: Re-counting Plato , Oxford 1989, pp. 212–215; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, pp. 304-308.
  72. ^ Gilbert Ryle: Plato's Parmenides . In: Reginald E. Allen (ed.): Studies in Plato's Metaphysics , London 1965, pp. 97–147, here: 145 f.
  73. ^ Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 2 and note 6; Friedrich Wilhelm Niewöhner: Dialogue and dialectics in Plato's "Parmenides" , Meisenheim 1971, pp. 78–80.
  74. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 223; Gilbert Ryle: Plato's Progress , Cambridge 1966, pp. 286-295; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 305.
  75. ^ Samuel Scolnicov: Plato's Parmenides , Berkeley 2003, p. 3; Edward Halper: A Note on the Unity of the 'Parmenides' . In: Hermes 118, 1990, pp. 31-42; Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità , Milano 1990, pp. 413-417.
  76. Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 224; Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Plato: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, p. XV, note 4; Ingeborg Schudoma: Platons Parmenides , Würzburg 2001, p. 16 and note 12.
  77. Lucien Jerphagnon: Quelques échos du Parménide de Plato dans la littérature ancienne non-philosophique . In: Energeia. Études aristotéliciennes offertes à Mgr. Antonio Jannone , Paris 1986, pp. 271–277, here: 272–274.
  78. Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità , Milano 1990, p. 45 and note 8.
  79. Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Plato: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, pp. XV – XVII; Maurizio Migliori: Dialettica e Verità , Milano 1990, pp. 143-145; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 224; Gail Fine: On Ideas , Oxford 1993, p. 39 f .; Friedrich Wilhelm Niewöhner: Dialogue and dialectics in Plato's "Parmenides" , Meisenheim 1971, p. 101 f. Note 180 (research overview).
  80. Diogenes Laertios 3.57 f.
  81. See also John M. Rist: The Neoplatonic One and Plato's Parmenides . In: Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 93, 1962, pp. 389-401, here: 390. See, however, the skeptical position of Carlos Steel: Une histoire de l'interprétation du Parménide dans l'antiquité . In: Maria Barbanti, Francesco Romano (ed.): Il Parmenide di Platone e la sua tradizione , Catania 2002, pp. 11–40, here: 17–20.
  82. Athenaios 11,505f.
  83. Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : The Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 196.
  84. Jens Halfwassen: The Rise to One , 2nd, extended edition, Munich 2006, p. 265.
  85. See on Plotin's Understanding of Parmenides Jens Halfwassen: The Rise to One , 2nd, extended edition, Munich 2006, pp. 185–192; Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 15–20.
  86. The hypothesis comes from Pierre-Henri Hadot: Fragments d'un commentaire de Porphyre sur le Parménide . In: Revue des Études grecques 74, 1961, pp. 410-438. Jens Halfwassen: Plotin and the Neo-Platonism , Munich 2004, pp. 144–146 and Giovanni Reale: Presentazione expressed their approval . In: Pierre Hadot (ed.): Porfirio: Commentario al “Parmenide” di Platone , Milano 1993, pp. 9–15; rejecting u. a. Gerald Bechtle: The Anonymous Commentary on Plato's “Parmenides” , Bern 1999 (edition, translation and detailed examination of the fragments). Bechtle suspects that it originated in Middle Platonic circles. Cf. Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, p. 21 f. and note 39 (and on the content of the comment on pp. 22–35). Michael Chase provides a detailed research overview: Porphyre de Tyr. Commentaires à Plato et à Aristote . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Volume 5, Part 2 (= V b), Paris 2012, pp. 1349–1376, here: 1358–1371.
  87. See generally on the Neoplatonic understanding of Parmenides Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 9–15, 285–313; Hans Günter Zekl (translator): Proklos Diadochos: Commentary on the Platonic Parmenides , Würzburg 2010, pp. 58–63; Gyburg Radke: The smile of Parmenides , Berlin 2006, pp. 145–168; Werner Beierwaltes: Thinking of One , Frankfurt am Main 1985, pp. 193–211.
  88. The fragments are critically edited, translated into English and commented on by John M. Dillon : Iamblichi Chalcidensis in Platonis dialogos commentariorum fragmenta , Leiden 1973, pp. 206-225, 386-403.
  89. Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Plato 26, ed. von Leendert G. Westerink : Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon , Paris 1990, pp. 39 f., 75; see. Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 2, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1990, pp. 106-109, 367.
  90. The fragments of Syrianos' commentary are edited and translated by Sarah Klitenic Wear: The Teachings of Syrianus on Plato's Timaeus and Parmenides , Leiden 2011, pp. 214–331.
  91. ^ Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: The Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 197; Henri Dominique Saffrey, Leendert G. Westerink (eds.): Proclus: Théologie platonicienne , Vol. 1, Paris 1968, pp. LXXXII-LXXXIX.
  92. ^ Proclus, Platonic Theology 1.9. Cf. Horst Seidl: On the metaphysical point of view in the 2nd part of Plato's Parmenides . In: Journal for philosophical research 27, 1973, pp. 24–37, here: 25–27.
  93. Michael Erler: Plato's criticism of the scriptures and the meaning of the aporias in Parmenides after Plato and Proclus . In: Jean Pépin , Henri Dominique Saffrey (eds.): Proclus lecteur et interprète des anciens , Paris 1987, pp. 153–163. Dirk Cürsgen: Henologie und Ontologie , Würzburg 2007, pp. 87–284, provides a detailed examination of Proklos' commentary .
  94. Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 1, Vol. 1 ***, Firenze 1999, pp. 146-154.
  95. Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39 (= "Codex B" of the Plato textual tradition).
  96. ^ Concetta Luna , Alain-Philippe Segonds (ed.): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon , Vol. 1, Part 1, Paris 2007, pp. CXVI, CLX – CLXIV. Pachymeres' commentary has been critically edited and translated into English by Thomas A. Gadra and others: George Pachymeres: Commentary on Plato's Parmenides , Athens / Paris 1989.
  97. Dimitri Gutas : Plato. Tradition arabe . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5/1, Paris 2012, pp. 845–863, here: 851, 854.
  98. ^ Raymond Klibansky : Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance . In: Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1941–1943, pp. 281–335, here: 281–289, partially corrected by Carlos Steel (ed.): Proclus: Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon. Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke , Vol. 1, Leuven 1982, pp. 34 * -42 *.
  99. See on Trapezuntios' translation and the criticism of it James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 180-192, 431-435; critical edition: Ilario Ruocco (Ed.): Il Platone latino. Il Parmenide: Giorgio di Trebisonda e il cardinale Cusano , Firenze 2003.
  100. ^ Raymond Klibansky: Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance . In: Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1941–1943, pp. 281–335, here: 304–312 (outdated with regard to the dating of the translation).
  101. James Hankins: Plato in the Italian Renaissance , 3rd edition, Leiden 1994, pp. 346, 476-478, 485; Maude Vanhaelen: The Pico-Ficino Controversy: New Evidence in Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Parmenides . In: Rinascimento 49, 2009, pp. 301-339. In general on Ficino's understanding of Parmenides, see Arne Malmsheimer: Plato's 'Parmenides' and Marsilio Ficino's 'Parmenides' commentary. A critical comparison , Amsterdam 2001 and the introduction to the Italian translation of the Parmenides commentary by Francesca Lazzarin: Marsilio Ficino: Commento al “Parmenide” di Platone , Firenze 2012, pp. XXIII – CLXIX.
  102. Maude Vanhaelen (Ed.): Marsilio Ficino: Commentaries on Plato , Vol. 2: Parmenides , Part 1, Cambridge (Massachusetts) 2012, p. XVI.
  103. ^ Leibniz: Notes on the writing of Marius Nizolius . In: Carl Immanuel Gerhardt (Ed.): Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz , Vol. 4, Hildesheim 1965 (reprint of the Berlin 1880 edition), pp. 174–176, here: 176. See Raymond Klibansky: Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance . In: Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1941–1943, pp. 281–335, here: 329 f.
  104. See Raymond Klibansky: Plato's Parmenides in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance . In: Mediaeval and Renaissance Studies 1, 1941–1943, pp. 281–335, here: 328.
  105. Friedrich Wilhelm Niewöhner: Dialog and Dialektik in Plato's “Parmenides” , Meisenheim 1971, pp. 71–77 and Georgios Koumakis: Platons Parmenides , Bonn 1971, pp. 17–19, 24–32, offer compilations of very different statements .
  106. For example from Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Spätdialoge II (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 6), Zurich / Munich 1974, pp. V – LI, here: XXVI; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 226 f .; Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 163; Mitchell H. Miller: Plato's Parmenides , Princeton 1986, p. 3.
  107. See the overview in Jens Halfwassen: The rise to one , 2nd edition, Munich 2006, pp. 267–272.
  108. Hegel: Phenomenology of Spirit , preface. In: Hegel: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 9, Hamburg 1980, p. 48.
  109. Pierre Garniron, Walter Jaeschke (ed.): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy , Part 3, Hamburg 1996, p. 33.
  110. ^ Hegel: Critical Journal of Philosophy . First volume, second piece . In: Hegel: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 4, Hamburg 1968, p. 207.
  111. Pierre Garniron, Walter Jaeschke (Ed.): Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy , Part 3, Hamburg 1996, pp. 34–36.
  112. Hegel: Science of Logic , Vol. 1, Introduction. In: Hegel: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 11, Hamburg 1978, p. 26. On Hegel's Parmenides Reception, Rudie Trienes: The Problem of Dialectics in Plato's Parmenides, taking into account Hegel's interpretation , Frankfurt am Main 1989, p. 129– 190; Klaus Düsing: Hegel and the history of philosophy , Darmstadt 1983, pp. 55–96; Wolfgang Künne : Hegel as a reader of Plato . In: Hegel Studies 14, 1979, pp. 109-146.
  113. ^ Paul Natorp: Plato's theory of ideas , 2nd edition, Hamburg 1994 (first published in 1903), pp. 224, 229, 244. For a criticism of Natorp's Parmenides interpretation, see Hans Günter Zekl (ed.): Platon: Parmenides , Hamburg 1972, p XXVII f .; Hans Rochol: The general term in Plato's Dialog Parmenides , Meisenheim am Glan 1975, pp. 32–38, 44 f., 239–247.
  114. ^ Nicolai Hartmann: Plato's Logic of Being , 2nd edition, Berlin 1965 (first published in 1909), p. 330.
  115. ^ Bertrand Russell: The Principles of Mathematics , London 1997 (first published in 1903), p. 355.
  116. ^ Bertrand Russell: History of Western Philosophy , 2nd edition, London 1979 (first published 1945), p. 142.
  117. ^ Francis M. Cornford: Plato and Parmenides , London 1939, p. IX.
  118. ^ Alfred Edward Taylor: Plato. The man and his work , 5th edition, London 1948, p. 351.
  119. Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker: Die Einheit der Natur , 2nd edition, Munich 1971, pp. 471–491.
  120. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Plato's Philosophy , Vol. 2, Paderborn 2002, p. 193; see. Pp. 199-201.
  121. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Parmenides. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp. 128–146, here: 128 f., 146.
  122. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 402 and Plato. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), p. 222 f.
  123. Gerard R. Ledger: Recounting Plato , Oxford 1989, pp. 164-167, 212 f.
  124. Helmut Mai: On the dialogicity of the 2nd part of Plato's Parmenides . In: Philosophisches Jahrbuch 117, 2010, pp. 20–40.
  125. ^ Franz von Kutschera: Plato's "Parmenides" , Berlin 1995, p. 144.
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