Negative theology

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The negative theology (Greek Teología apophatikḗ , latin theologia negativa ) is a from the Platonic derived procedure statements about God or via the A first principle of the metaphysical . Thinking and talking about God is limited in that all positive statements are consistently criticized as inappropriate and rejected. Only negative statements can be considered true.

The terms “positive” and “negative” are not meant in a judgmental sense. All statements with which the nature of God is to be determined by establishing what he is are considered “positive”. This is done by ascribing certain qualities to him, such as goodness or wisdom, or by being identified with these qualities (e.g. God is good or God is good ). Here ideas that come from the realm of human experience are transferred to God. Negative theology rejects such an approach and justifies this with the claim that it is in principle impossible to adequately take into account God's absolute transcendence in positive statements . The inappropriateness of human ideas and the falsehood of the statements about God based on them are the only things that can be determined as correct about God. Thus only negative statements, i.e. negations of positive statements, are legitimate. The systematic elimination of erroneous positive ideas is an indispensable prerequisite for a realistic relationship between man and God.

The negation of positive determinations is not to be understood as an affirmation of opposing determinations. To say that God cannot be called good does not mean that He is called bad. Rather, negative theology teaches that terms such as “good” and “bad” are not applicable to God.

Antiquity

Plato

The starting point for negative theology is made by Plato's remarks about the unspeakable nature of the highest. In Dialog Politeia he assigns the highest priority to the idea of ​​the good , because the good supersedes being and all other determinations such as knowledge and truth. He thinks that the good as an idea is the cause of the knowable truth in the knowable things and is therefore ontologically superior to truth, knowledge and all other ideas. As the cause of the being of things, good itself is not being, but surpassing being in dignity and strength. In the dialogue Timaeus Plato writes that it is difficult to find the originator and father of the universe, and that it is impossible to announce him to everyone once he has been found. In the dialogue with Kratylos , Plato made Socrates state that “we know nothing about the gods, neither about them nor about their names, as they call one another”. In the Seventh Letter he criticizes the written dissemination of teachings about the “first and highest in nature” and states that those who have really understood something about it are reluctant to put it down in writing; such knowledge cannot be put into words in any way like other knowledge.

Fundamental to the discussion of the ancient Platonists with the problem of the absolute transcendence of the first principle, the primordial ground of all things, are considerations that Plato makes in the dialogue Parmenides . The argumentation in Parmenides becomes the starting point for the formation of a Platonic metaphysics of the "supernatural" (ontologically above all beings) one that unfolds into the world of things that are. Plato's pupil Speusippus already took up the principle of the conceptual negativity of the one who overshoots.

Middle Platonists

The Jewish philosopher Philo of Alexandria (1st century), who combines Platonic philosophy with Jewish theology, emphasizes the incomprehensibility of God. He states that if one wants to find God one is looking for something difficult to reach, "which always retreats and remains in the distance and rushes ahead of the persecutors with an infinite distance in between". Therefore, the human spirit must “lag behind the grasp of the primordial reason at immeasurable intervals”. However, in contrast to Plato, Philo assumes that the first principle, which he equates with the God of the Jewish religion, can be expressed as being; God revealed himself in the Tanakh as the being. Philo thinks that ascribing certain properties to God is inadmissible; one cannot say what it is, but only that it exists and that its existence is free of all properties. God could not be named, linguistically incomprehensible.

In Middle Platonism , Plato's references to the transcendence of the first principle are taken up. The philosopher Alkinous writes in his textbook Didaskalikos that God is ineffable ( árrhētos ). Alcinous explains by way of explanation that nothing belongs to God, neither bad nor good. If he were good, he would have a share in the good, then the good would be an overriding principle. Neither a quality belongs to it (otherwise it would have been bestowed on it from its source) nor non-quality (otherwise it would have a lack of quality and would need to be perfected). It is neither a part of something nor like a whole that has parts; neither move nor be he moved. The Middle Platonist Numenios also takes the path of negation. He paraphrases the first principle, which, like Plato, he calls “the good”, in negative terms. He is convinced that it can be found where there is an inexpressible and indescribable loneliness. With reference to Plato's Timaeus, the Middle Platonist Kelsos describes the first as unnameable. In spite of this limitation of linguistic possibilities, Kelsos is of the opinion that God does not withdraw completely from the human understanding. There are three ways to get a certain idea of ​​what would otherwise remain unspeakable: “by combining them with other things or by distinguishing them or by comparing them with them”. With the second path, he means negative theology. Kelsos' Christian critic Origen accuses him of having only spoken about the highest “in empty negations”.

Neoplatonist

In the 3rd century Plotinus , the founder of Neo-Platonism , called the ontologically highest, which Plato called the good, “ the one ” (Greek to hen ). In doing so, he expresses that it is absolutely simple. As the extreme opposite to the differentiated and manifold, the one contains no distinction, neither a duality nor any other plurality. Like Plato's good, it is the origin and basis of existence of all things and as such the highest that can be.

Thus, in a religious context, one would equate Plotinus with God or, in a polytheistic religion, with the supreme deity. However, such a determination is problematic from the Neoplatonic point of view, as it can have the consequence that characteristics are ascribed to the Supreme that are considered divine, for example by being designated as “good” or identified with the good. In this way a difference and thus a non-unity would be carried into the absolutely undifferentiated one, so that it would no longer be the one. Hence, for Plotinus, even Plato's equation of the good with the highest (the first principle) is not appropriate. Only from the human perspective does the one appear as something higher, something worth striving for and therefore good, but for itself it is not good. In Neoplatonic philosophy, the one is neither good nor bad and, as in Plato, is neither being nor non-being, but rather beyond both. It actually "is" not, because being as the opposite of non-being or perfect being in contrast to a diminished being already presupposes a distinction and thus something that is subordinate to the one. Strictly speaking, the definition of the one as "one", as simple or uniform in the sense of an opposition to plurality, is a misunderstanding of its true, non-opposed nature, about which, paradoxically, no accurate statement is possible. One is “unspeakable” ( árrhēton ). Although Plotinus does make statements about the one thing, he tends to provide such statements with restrictions such as “as it were”, “to a certain extent” ( hoíon ). He makes it clear that the terms used here are not meant in their usual meaning, but are only intended to indicate something that cannot actually be expressed verbally. One thing remains in principle withdrawn from an intellectual, discursive understanding.

The late antique Neo-Platonist Proklos is the first author to combine the terms “negation” ( apóphasis ) and “theology”. He uses the expression trópos tēs aphairéseōs ("procedure of removal"); the provisions must be removed on the way to one. In his commentary on Plato's Parmenides , he recommends sticking to the negations, following Plato's example, and using them to show the sublime excess of the One. Through the negations a theological hymn to the One can be sent up. The function of all positive expressions is that they are intended to indicate, as "additions", the characteristics of something formed. Hence, when applied to the formless first and one, they reach nowhere. Since the One is withdrawn from any contradiction, it is also not to be understood as a collapse of the opposites. Proclus presents a negative dialectic , which he presents and practices in particular on the basis of the Parmenides interpretation as a method of metaphysical philosophizing. It became groundbreaking for medieval negative theology. Proclus applies the approach of negative theology not only to the one as the first principle, but also to the second principle, the nous , which, as a purely spiritual sphere, forms the uppermost area of ​​the intelligible world and of existing things. He denies that discursive thinking with its positive statements can adequately grasp and describe the nous. Hence, for Proclus, silent contemplation is the superior approach not only with regard to the one but also with regard to the nous. Nevertheless, one speaks of the one; Proclus sees the reason for this in the natural striving of the soul towards the One.

Church fathers

According to the understanding of the ancient church fathers , who were strongly influenced by Platonism, the god of Christian theology includes both the absolutely transcendent one of the Neoplatonists and the nous or demiurge (world creator), to whom the world owes its existence to the senses. The Platonic skepticism regarding the justification of positive statements about the deity thus also affected Christian ideas about God. The Church Fathers also found starting points for such skepticism and for the idea of ​​the “unspeakable” God in individual biblical statements. Relevant passages include those that emphasize the uniqueness of God and sharply demarcate him from everything extra-divine (Exodus 20: 3–5; Deuteronomy 5: 7–9), as well as the “speech on the Areopagus” of the Apostle Paul , where the "Unknown God" is proclaimed as the true Creator, who is fundamentally different from the apparently known gods of the Greeks and not as they should be worshiped. New Testament statements such as “No one has ever seen God” (John 1:18) and “who lives in the inaccessible light that no human has seen nor can see” (1 Timothy 6:16) emphasize the transcendence of God.

Early church fathers

The negative theology approach was well received by theologians of the early Patristic era. They used it in particular when dealing with anthropomorphic (humanizing the divine) ideas of their pagan environment. As early as the 2nd century, Justin the Martyr was of the opinion that God was "ineffable"; its existence is recognizable, but not its essence. Designations such as “Father”, “Creator” and “Lord” and even the word “God” are not really appropriate, they only make sense from a limited human perspective and cannot say anything valid about the limitless God per se. Nor should one assign a name to God, since a namesake must be there before the named person and because names serve to differentiate, but God is unique and therefore does not have any distinguishing feature. With these considerations, Justin follows Platonic lines of thought.

In the period that followed, Clement of Alexandria and Origen gave decisive impulses to the development of negative theology, drawing on Philon's doctrine of the unknowability of God. Like Justin the Martyr, Clemens said that although God's existence can be inferred by the human understanding through conclusions from the perceptible creation, his essence cannot be grasped in thought and therefore cannot be expressed in words. He is inaccessible and ineffable, shapeless and nameless. Terms such as “the good” or “being” are also only helpful to a limited extent and cannot be used in the actual sense. The provisions which are ascribed to God are only justified in the sense of analogies to what is known; they could not convey real knowledge. True insight arises for those who know what God is not. Nevertheless, Clemens does not completely reject positive statements, but grants them a certain value within the framework of the restrictions to which human endeavors are subject. He also believes that Christ is not as unknowable as God the Father but can be known in certain aspects. This limits Clemens' negative theology.

For Origen the incomprehensibility of God results from his incorporeality. God's nature is inaccessible to the human mind, which proceeds from its sensory experience. Only through his works can God be known with regard to certain aspects of his existence. Names cannot express the very essence of God. But they are legitimate to a limited extent insofar as they only suggest. Bible passages where God is described as fire or light are to be interpreted as metaphors . However, Origen does not consider human ignorance of the divine mysteries to be absolute. He thinks it will be eliminated in the course of salvation history.

Late antique church fathers

In late antiquity , too , ecclesiastical authors emphasized the unknowability of God's essence. In the 4th century it was particularly about the defense of a teaching of the Arian theologian Eunomius , who assumed that God could be unrestrictedly known by the human spirit. Like his opponents, Eunomius thought in Neoplatonic terms; at the same time he used the means of Aristotelian logic. He taught that God had a specific name, though only containing a negative definition, by means of which his essence could be fully expressed and grasped, namely agénnētos ("ungenerated", without origin). The main opponents of his theology were the Cappadocian church fathers, Basil the Great , Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzen . Basil made a distinction between God's recognizable modes of action (energies) and his fundamentally unknowable nature. Gregory of Nyssa agreed with him and developed a theory of human language to make it clear that God cannot be grasped by linguistic means, but is inexpressible. Gregory of Nazianz pointed out the inadequacy of the human understanding, referring to Plato regarding the problem of knowledge of God and of speaking about God.

Other church fathers, among them John Chrysostom and in the Latin- speaking West Augustine , grappled with the question of the possibilities and limits of the knowledge of God and taught that God is inexpressible, that his essence (Greek ousía , Latin substantia or essentia ) cannot be expressed in words.

Pseudo-Dionysius

The patristic concept of negative theology that has been elaborated most extensively and has the most lasting effect is that of an unknown late antique author who called himself Dionysius and was identified in the Middle Ages with Dionysius Areopagita , a disciple of the Apostle Paul mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles . Today he is referred to as pseudo-Dionysius . Pseudo-Dionysius, who wrote his works in Greek, took over some concepts and thoughts from the Neo-Platonist Proclus. In place of the Neoplatonic model of emanation , the gradual emergence of the world from the first cause, he is replaced by a Christian model of creation, in which there is also a hierarchical order of levels, but the totality of what is created goes back directly to the unfathomable Creator.

Pseudo-Dionysius discusses the differences between positive ("cataphatic") and negative ("apophatic") theology. He starts from an investigation of the individual names and attributes of God, which are known from Revelation and the positive theology based on it. On the path of causality ( via causalitatis ), positive theology concludes from positive properties of created things such as goodness or wisdom that there is something corresponding in the cause of the created thing. Since the Creator gave these properties to the created, he must possess them himself, for he cannot be less than what he has caused. On the path of negation (Latin via negationis ), however, Pseudo-Dionysius arrives at the result that these names and designations cannot really belong to God, since they do not do justice to his transcendence. Since they are not valid statements about his being, they must be negated. In this sense, Pseudo-Dionysius describes negations as true and affirmations as inappropriate. But the negations also turn out to be not really accurate; since they are also inadequate, they too must be negated. However, this does not mean a return to positive statements, but a turn to “over-statements” with the prefix over- (Greek hyper- , Latin super- ), for example “over-looking” or “over good”. Ultimately, however, the over-statements are only aids and not factual assertions about the nature of God. Only through the last negation, with which one transcends any kind of determinations, is the decisive step taken in approaching divine reality: namelessness is identified with the “ineffable name”, which is the basis of all names and designations and as such all names united. Thus, the completion of emptying leads to completed fullness, absolute emptiness and absolute fullness turn out to be identical.

The positive statements of the Revelation remain recognized as true by Pseudo-Dionysius, but they do not refer to God's nature, but only to his effect. In addition, they are the necessary initial component of a cognitive process, which in its later course is a path from the effect to the cause, from multiplicity to the one. Positive theology is a path of descent from what is most like God (terms such as “the high”, “the first”, “the outstanding”) down to what is most alien to God and yet unites Forms part of his creation (inanimate and vice). Negative theology begins with the bottom and bottom (inanimate matter and the lower emotions) by negating it with regard to God, and then moves up by using all words and names up to the highest-ranking concepts such as life and goodness as statements about God rejects. Through this step-by-step execution of the negations, the soul accomplishes an ascent that takes it away from the familiar world of thought and thus leads it to God. The one striving for knowledge comes to an insight into his own ignorance and ignorance; negative theology leads him to wordlessness and thus to silence. His efforts to reach the goal by means of the ideas based on sensory perception and the discursive thought processes based thereon have failed. Such failure proves to be a prerequisite for achieving an authentic relationship with God.

The last phase of the ascent, in which the consistently advancing negative theology cancels and thereby surpasses its own negative statements, is later referred to in Latin theological terminology as the way of ascent ( via eminentiae ).

middle Ages

In the Middle Ages, the concept of negative theology presented by Pseudo-Dionysius was received by both Western, Latin-speaking and Eastern, Greek-speaking theologians. In the west, as in the east, it was established as an integral part of church teaching. In 1215 the Fourth Lateran Council ruled that no similarity could be established between Creator and creature without specifying an even greater dissimilarity between them.

Eriugena

In the 9th century a manuscript of the "Corpus Dionysiacum" (collected works of Pseudo-Dionysius) came to the Franconian Empire . Irish scholar Johannes Scottus Eriugena translated the corpus into Latin and wrote a commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius' work On the Heavenly Hierarchy . He also made Latin translations of the main works of Maximus the Confessor . In his own main work, the text Periphyseon ("About Natures"), he dealt with the problems of positive and negative theology. He made a significant contribution to the spread of negative theology in the Middle Ages. The Latin term theologia negativa and the relevant Latin terminology go back to Eriugena .

Eriugena emphasizes that positive and negative theology are only seemingly opposed to one another. Rather, in his view, they agree in everything. Positive theology “dresses” the “naked” divine being (essentia) with statements such as “God is the truth”, which are to be understood metaphorically . Negative theology takes this dress off the deity in a logical process. In doing so, however, it does not contradict positive theology, because it takes into account its metaphorical manner of speaking. Positive theology does not claim “This is God”, but only “This is how God can be called”. The undressing that negative theology performs leads to the insight that God is not a "something"; therefore, from this point of view, it can be called a “nothing”. Since it is not “something”, there is no positive answer to the question of what it is (quid est) . Thus God himself does not know what he is either; not even he himself "understands" his being in the sense of grasping something specific. His divine ignorance ( ignorantia ) is the highest wisdom.

In the context of this theological concept, Eriugena interprets the Christian doctrine of the creation of the world “out of nothing” ( creatio ex nihilo ) . For him, this statement about creation cannot be understood in terms of time in the sense that before creation there was the Creator and a nothing and this nothing then became the world at a certain time. Nor can it be meant spatially or materially in the sense that outside of the Creator there was already a space and a nothing to be understood as a substrate , and creation was then an impact on this space and this substrate. Such ideas presuppose that God wants to create at a point in time after which He did not previously want to. That would mean that something accidental happened to God and brought about a change in him, which Eriugena found absurd. That is why the Irish thinker - like Gregory of Nyssa - identifies the nothing out of which God creates the world beyond time with the nothing that is God himself. Eriugena rejects a temporal priority of the Creator over creation.

Master Eckhart

Meister Eckhart presents his negative theology in particular in his commentary on the biblical book Exodus . There he wants to show how reason progresses on the path of negation and how it comes to the insight into God's unity. He ties in with the leader of the undecided by the philosopher Maimonides (12th century). In the sense of traditional negative theology, Eckhart explains that all affirmations or positive attributes in no way belong to God. They are inaccurate and void, even if they are perfections from a human point of view (e.g. power, wisdom or life). Negative statements, on the other hand, are appropriate insofar as they lead to a purification of thinking directed towards God. In contrast to positive statements, they do not demand more than they actually do. The statement that God is one is permissible insofar as it is only a negation of heterogeneity or divisibility. A positive statement can be a definition or concern an accident or a relation or refer to effects; Eckhart explains why none of these types of statements can be considered with regard to the nature of God.

However, Eckhart does not stop at the establishment of the superiority of the path of negation, but subjects it to criticism as well. Positive statements must be excluded from the point of view of puritas , since they relate God to something created and thus create a concept of God that is contaminated from the start; negative statements are incorrect from the point of view of abundance ( plenitudo ) insofar as they exclude something, although the divine does not negate or exclude anything. Thus, for Eckhart, both the positive and the negative path prove to be inadequate; both introduce limitations that are incompatible with the all-encompassing and undifferentiated character of the deity. Neither positively nor negatively anything definite can be said about the deity, since it is beyond any differentiation. It is “ignorant” (without properties by which it could be defined), is a “groundless ground” and a “silent desert”, a “simple silence”. Since God has no limits, there is nothing he is not; thus it is "a denial of denial".

Nikolaus von Kues

In the 15th century, Nikolaus von Kues took up negative theology. He applies it to the infinite “maximum” (God), which has no opposites and, according to the doctrine of the coincidence of opposites, coincides with the very smallest, the “minimum”. In doing so, he is looking for a way out of the dilemma that arises from the fact that negative theology, on the one hand, shows the questionability of the positive, but on the other hand, by consistently eliminating all positive determinations, leads to the radically indeterminate.

Negative theology shows that the essence of the maximum must remain inaccessible. Only the necessity of its existence can be proven. Perfect truth is already unattainable in the realm of sense objects, because knowledge is based on comparisons, but the constant change in things that can be perceived by the senses excludes an exact comparison between them. The infinite maximum cannot be compared with any of the finite things. Therefore it remains withdrawn from human knowledge. Whoever sees this, recognizes his ignorance and thereby comes closer to the truth. Although he cannot reach her, he can "touch" it. The role that negative theology has to play in this is different for Nikolaus than for the older tradition based on the teaching of Pseudo-Dionysius. He does not give negative theology any priority over the positive and does not regard the positive as a mere propaedeutic of the negative. Rather, he sees these two approaches as a pair of equally important opposing poles. If these two opposing poles not only coexist, but understand their coincidence into a unity and thus overcome the contradiction, the unspeakable can be touched.

Orthodox theology

In the Eastern Roman and Byzantine Empire , the concept of negative theology found a stronger response than in the West. The theologian Maximus Confessor took up the doctrine of Pseudo-Dionysius in the 7th century. The conviction that God's essence is in principle unknowable became a core component of orthodox theology.

The orthodox conception received its definitive form in Palamism, the doctrine formulated in the 14th century by the theologian Gregorios Palamas , which is the official position of the Greek Orthodox Church to this day. Palamism differentiates between God's being inaccessible to creatures (Greek οὐσία ousía ) and his active forces (Greek ἐνέργειαι enérgeiai ) with which he reveals himself. According to his essence, even when he willingly turns to the non-divine, God always remains separate and unknowable from his own turn. However, one can recognize him in his active powers, and in the uncreated Tabor light , which belongs to the active powers, an experience of God can be experienced. The difference between essence and active forces is real, i.e. not a mere conceptual construct of people, but for Palamas the active forces are not an ontologically independent reality that exists alongside the essence, which would be incompatible with the unity and indivisibility of God, but the active forces are just as God as the being is God. Since they are God, they are uncreated. God is completely present in every one of his working forces. Thus, the active forces are God under the aspect of his knowledge and self-revelation, the being is God under the aspect of his fundamental unknowability. The negative theology is on the one hand affirmed, on the other hand it is canceled.

The main theological opponent of Palamism, Barlaam of Calabria , a contemporary of Gregorios Palamas, was also a staunch advocate of negative theology, which he interpreted quite differently than his Palamitic opponents. He made a sharp distinction between the realm of the uncreated (God), which in its entirety is in principle closed to human thought and all human experience in every respect, and the realm of created things. Because of God's inaccessibility, the theological statements about him are little more than mental games.

Early modern age

During the Renaissance , large Catholic circles, including humanists such as Marsilio Ficino and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola , unconditionally adhered to the authenticity of the writings of Pseudo-Dionysius, although Lorenzo Valla expressed doubts about the authenticity and justified in which Erasmus followed him. The negative theology of Pseudo-Dionysius continued to shape the thinking of Catholic theologians. Pico della Mirandola, however, relativized the claim to validity of radical negative theology; He did not accept the Neoplatonic primacy of the one over being, but ascribed the same scope to both concepts and related both equally to God. Charles de Bouelles (Carolus Bovillus) resolutely advocated the primacy of negative theology over positive in his De nihilo ("About Nothing") published in 1510 . With him the non-determination is more original than the determination. God creates nothing in himself; being emerges from the negation of nothingness. Martin Luther initially valued conventional negative theology, later he emphatically rejected the ideas of Pseudo-Dionysius and described them as dangerous.

In the second half of the 16th century, John of the Cross emphasized the otherness and the distance between creator and creature, the incomprehensibility and inaccessibility of God.

In the Age of Enlightenment , negative theology comes into focus as a fundamental criticism of the positive, whereby its approach is instrumentalized for the purposes of criticizing religion. David Hume asks how a " mystic " (follower of negative theology) who starts from the absolute incomprehensibility of God differs from a skeptic ( agnostic ) or atheist who considers the first cause unknown and incomprehensible .

In his criticism of religion, Kant does not entirely reject the ideas and images of God. But he says that they were only created to "give effect" to the necessary moral laws. If, on the other hand, the conceptions or ideas of a supreme being are understood as “direct knowledge of new objects” or as real being, from which, conversely, the moral laws are first derived, then according to Kant this is “enthusiastic or even outrageous” and must “the pervert and thwart the ultimate ends of reason ”. For Kant, the absolute cannot be determined, although he presupposes it behind the phenomena of the world.

Modern

theology

In modern times, the concept of a negative theology is rejected by strongly Bible-oriented theologians. Magnus Striet gave particular reasons for this criticism. The critics refer to the large number of positive statements about God and his characteristics in the Bible and argue that these statements are connected with a claim to truth, which cannot be denied or restricted within the framework of biblically founded Christianity. In addition, in negative theology, the importance of faith, grace and salvation history is not adequately emphasized. Furthermore, Striet thinks that negative theology amounts to a negation of religion and thus to atheism . He refers to Ludwig Feuerbach , who in his book Das Wesen des Christianentums , published for the first time in 1841 , had asserted: The allegedly religious reluctance to end God through certain predicates is only the irreligious wish not to want to know anything more about God, God chooses to beat the senses ; this is nothing more than a subtle, devious atheism .

philosophy

Karl Jaspers believes that in negative theology “a metaphysical worldview is dispensed with in favor of creative vitality, the mystical depth of experience, the movement towards ideas”. It says only negations and paradoxes about the whole, but cannot permanently overcome the “need of human nature”, “to have the whole as a world view, as the outermost horizons of our being, also in front of us, to think it and also to look at it ".

Jacques Derrida undertakes an actualization of the approach of negative theology, which he breaks away from the usual attachment to a traditional religious context by generalizing it, while at the same time partially distancing himself from it. He is concerned with criticism of all approaches that link the other with provisions from the realm of the non-other, thereby damaging the radicality of otherness. From his point of view, the singularity of the (completely) other (of which God is only an example) falls by the wayside. Here Derrida sees a similarity between negative theology and deconstruction : Both approaches criticize the exclusion of parts or aspects of a given fact through the use of language and oppose a categorization and classification that restricts the handling of objects of thought from the outset and therefore does not do them justice can be. However, Derrida also believes that there is an important difference between negative theology and deconstruction: He accuses negative theology of introducing an affirmative element again with the “super-statements” such as “overseeing” and, like positive theology, a “metaphysics of Presence ”, which he rejects from a deconstructivist point of view. His concept of différance is based not only on indeterminability, but also on non-presence; Presence is to be deconstructed. Jean-Luc Marion contradicts Derrida's criticism of negative theology. He believes that the pseudo-Dionysian way of “supra-statements” is not a return to a metaphysics of God's presence, not a veiled positivity, but radical negation and a theology of absence.

Daoism

Because of the rejection of all God-related provisions, there is an analogy between the God of negative theology and the Dao principle in Daoism , which is also denied all imaginable properties.

literature

General

  • William Franke (Ed.): On What Cannot Be Said: Apophatic Discourses in Philosophy, Religion, Literature, and the Arts. 2 volumes. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2007, ISBN 978-0-268-02882-4 (Volume 1) and ISBN 978-0-268-02885-5 (Volume 2)
  • William Franke: A Philosophy of the Unsayable. University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame 2014, ISBN 978-0-268-02894-7
  • Maria-Judith Krahe: On the nature of negative theology. A contribution to the elucidation of its structure. Munich 1976 (dissertation)
  • Mariele Nientied: Talking without knowing. Apophatics in Dionysius Areopagita, Moses Maimonides and Emmanuel Levinas. Pustet, Regensburg 2010, ISBN 978-3-7917-2263-4
  • Marco M. Olivetti (Ed.): Théologie négative. CEDAM, Padova 2002, ISBN 88-13-24436-3 (numerous articles)
  • Thomas Rentsch : Theology, negative. In: Historical Dictionary of Philosophy . Volume 10, Schwabe, Basel 1998, Sp. 1102-1105
  • Michael A. Sells: Mystical Languages ​​of Unsaying. University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1994, ISBN 0-226-74786-7
  • Ralf Stolina: Nobody has ever seen God. Treatise on Negative Theology. De Gruyter, Berlin / New York 2000, ISBN 3-11-016853-7
  • Hella Theill miracle: The archaic concealment. The philosophical roots of negative theology. Fink, Munich 1970
  • Marco S. Torini: Apophatic Theology and Divine Nothing. About traditions of negative terminology in occidental and Buddhist mysticism. In: Christoph Elsas (Ed.): Tradition and Translation. On the problem of the intercultural translatability of religious phenomena. De Gruyter, Berlin a. a. 1994, ISBN 3-11-013930-8 , pp. 493-520
  • Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa. Language and method of negative theology. Fink, Munich 2006, ISBN 978-3-7705-4151-5

Antiquity

  • Marios P. Begzos: Apophaticism in the Theology of the Eastern Church. The Modern Critical Function of a Traditional Theory. In: Greek Orthodox Theological Review 41, 1996, pp. 327-357
  • Jens Halfwassen : The ascent on the one hand. Investigations on Plato and Plotinus. Teubner, Stuttgart 1992, ISBN 3-519-07458-3 , pp. 265-405
  • Jens Halfwassen: Plotinus and Neoplatonism. Beck, Munich 2004, ISBN 3-406-51117-1 , pp. 43-49
  • Darryl W. Palmer: Atheism, Apologetic, and Negative Theology in the Greek Apologists of the Second Century. In: Vigiliae Christianae 37, 1983, pp. 234-259

middle Ages

  • Kurt Flasch : The Metaphysics of One in Nikolaus von Kues. Problem-historical position and systematic importance. Brill, Leiden 1973, ISBN 90-04-03721-7 , especially pp. 318-329
  • Wouter Goris: Unity as a principle and goal. Attempt on the unified metaphysics of the opus tripartitum Meister Eckhart. Brill, Leiden 1997, ISBN 90-04-10905-6 , pp. 156-206
  • Vladimir Lossky : Theology négative et connaissance de Dieu chez Maître Eckhart. Vrin, Paris 1960
  • Christian Ströbele: Performance and Discourse: Religious Language and Negative Theology in Cusanus (= texts and studies on European intellectual history. Series B, Volume 12). Aschendorff, Münster 2015, ISBN 978-3-402-15998-9

Modern times

Web links

Remarks

  1. ↑ Plato, Politeia 508a-509b.
  2. ↑ Plato, Timaeus 28c.
  3. ↑ Plato, Cratylus 400d.
  4. ^ Plato, Seventh Letter 341b – e, 344d – 345b.
  5. ↑ Jens Halfwassen: The rise to one , Stuttgart 1992, pp. 264–297.
  6. ↑ Philon of Alexandria, Quod deus sit immutabilis 62, ed. André Mosès, Paris 1963, p. 94 f .; for other relevant passages at Philon see Josef Hochstaffl: Negative Theologie , Munich 1976, pp. 33–35.
  7. ↑ Philon of Alexandria, De posteritate Caini 18-19, ed. Roger Arnaldez, Paris 1972, pp. 54-57.
  8. ↑ Alkinous, Didaskalikos 10, ed. John Whittaker and Pierre Louis: Alcinoos: Enseignement des doctrines de Platon , Paris 2002, p. 23 f.
  9. ↑ See Josef Hochstaffl: Negative Theologie , Munich 1976, p. 72 f.
  10. ↑ Kelsos, Alethes logos 7:42. See also Horacio E. Lona: Die 'Wahreehre' des Kelsos , Freiburg 2005, pp. 410-412.
  11. ↑ See Heinrich Dörrie : Die Platonische Theologie des Kelsos in their examination of Christian theology , Göttingen 1967, pp. 28–30, 36–38.
  12. ↑ Plotinus enneads V, f 3,13,1.
  13. ^ Proklos, In Platonis Parmenidem 1128. Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, p. 21.
  14. ^ Proklos, In Platonis Parmenidem 1108 and 1191.
  15. ↑ Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, p. 17 f.
  16. ↑ See Werner Beierwaltes : Proklos. Basic features of his metaphysics , 2nd edition, Frankfurt am Main 1979, pp. 339–366.
  17. ^ Arthur H. Armstrong: The Negative Theology of Nous in Later Neoplatonism . In: Horst-Dieter Blume , Friedhelm Mann (ed.): Platonism and Christianity , Münster 1983, pp. 31–37.
  18. ^ Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem 1191.
  19. ↑ Acts 17.22 to 31  ELB .
  20. ↑ The evidence is compiled by Maria-Judith Krahe: On the nature of negative theology. A contribution to the elucidation of its structure , Munich 1976, p. 117 f.
  21. ↑ Maria-Judith Krahe: On the nature of negative theology. A contribution to the elucidation of its structure , Munich 1976, pp. 119–121; Henny Fiskå Hägg: Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism , Oxford 2006, pp. 260-268.
  22. ^ Henny Fiskå Hägg: Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Apophaticism , Oxford 2006, pp. 254–260.
  23. ↑ See on this conflict Maria-Judith Krahe: On the nature of negative theology. A contribution to the elucidation of its structure , Munich 1976, pp. 126-137.
  24. ↑ Ralf Stolina: Nobody has ever seen God , Berlin 2000, p. 13.
  25. ↑ Hella Theill-Wunder: Die archaische Verborgenheit , Munich 1970, pp. 160–165.
  26. ↑ Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa. Language and method of negative theology , Munich 2006, pp. 23–36.
  27. ^ Heinrich Denzinger: Compendium of Confessions of Faith and Church Doctrinal Decisions , 43rd Edition, Freiburg 2010, p. 337, No. 806.
  28. ↑ See Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, p. 53 f.
  29. ↑ Maria-Judith Krahe: On the nature of negative theology. A contribution to the elucidation of their structure , Munich 1976, pp. 190–212.
  30. ↑ Michael A. Sells: Mystical Languages ​​of Unsaying , Chicago 1994, pp. 34-62.
  31. ↑ Meister Eckhart, Sermon 48, The German Works , Vol. 2, pp. 420 f. = Meister Eckhart: Works , ed. Niklaus Largier, Volume 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, p. 508 f .; Sermon 2, The German Works , Vol. 1, pp. 43 f. = Meister Eckhart: Works , ed. Niklaus Largier, Volume 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, pp. 34-37; Sermon 42, The German Works , Vol. 2, p. 309 = Meister Eckhart: Works , ed. Niklaus Largier, Volume 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, p. 456 f.
  32. ↑ Meister Eckhart, Sermon 21, The German Works , vol. 1, p. 361 line 10 - p. 363 line 2 = Meister Eckhart: works , ed. Niklaus Largier, Volume 1, Frankfurt a. M. 1993, p. 248 f. See Mauritius Wilde: The New Image of God. Image and theology in Meister Eckhart , Freiburg (Switzerland) 2000, pp. 224–226.
  33. ↑ See also Kurt Flasch: Nikolaus von Kues. History of a development , Frankfurt 1998, pp. 56 f., 107–118, 403–410, 440–443, 528–534, 562–564; Kurt Flasch: The Metaphysics of One in Nikolaus von Kues , Leiden 1973, pp. 197–202, 318–329.
  34. ↑ A summary of the Palamitic position is provided by Michael Kunzler: Gnadenquellen. Symeon of Thessaloniki († 1429) as an example of the influence of palamism on orthodox sacramental theology and liturgy , Trier 1989, pp. 7-19.
  35. ↑ Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, pp. 161–165.
  36. ↑ Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, pp. 165–167.
  37. ↑ David Hume: Dialogues concerning natural religion , ed. Richard H. Popkin, 8th Edition, Indianapolis 1996, p. 28 (first published in 1779).
  38. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason , B 846.
  39. ↑ Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason , B 847.
  40. ↑ Magnus Striet: Obvious Secret. On the Critique of Negative Theology , Regensburg 2003. In 2008 a collection of relevant essays was published, which among other things contains various statements on Striet's position: Alois Halbmayr, Gregor Maria Hoff (eds.): Negative Theologie heute? On the current status of a controversial tradition , Freiburg 2008.
  41. ↑ Ludwig Feuerbach: Das Wesen des Christianentums , Stuttgart 1969 (text of the 3rd edition, Leipzig 1849), p. 56.
  42. ↑ Karl Jaspers: Psychologie der Weltanschauungen , 6th edition, Berlin 1971 (first published in 1919), p. 200 f.
  43. ↑ See Mariele Nientied: Reden ohne Wissen , Regensburg 2010, pp. 29–32, 88–90; Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, pp. 200–209.
  44. ↑ Dirk Westerkamp: Via negativa , Munich 2006, pp. 209–215; Mariele Nientied: Reden ohne Wissen , Regensburg 2010, pp. 88–91.