Theaetetus

This article deals with Plato's dialogue Theaetetus . For the mathematician of the same name, see Theaetetos (mathematician) .

The beginning of Theaetetus in the oldest surviving medieval manuscript, the Codex Clarkianus written in 895 (Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39)

The Theaetetus ( ancient Greek Θεαίτητος Theaitetos , Latinized Theaetetus , eingedeutscht also Theatetus ) is in dialogue form authored work of the Greek philosopher Plato . A fictional, literary conversation is reproduced verbatim. Plato's teacher Socrates and two mathematicians are involved: the young Theaetetus , after whom the dialogue is named, and his teacher Theodoros of Cyrene .

The topic is made up of key questions in epistemology . It discusses what knowledge is and how to distinguish established knowledge from true but unproven claims. The question arises as to whether such a general distinction is even possible and whether it can be convincingly justified. It should be clarified under which conditions one can claim to know something and to make verifiably true statements about it. What is needed is an incontestable criterion for proven truth .

In the course of the discussion, all attempts to determine the difference between knowledge and right opinion fail. If meaningful statements are possible at all, there must be objective truth, because every discourse presupposes the distinction between “true” and “false”. However, it is not possible to use a generally applicable criterion to distinguish presumably correct from demonstrably correct ideas. Each of the proposed definitions of “knowledge” also applies to a correct but unproven assumption. The use of the term “knowledge” thus proves to be fundamentally problematic. Apparently, while one can make true statements, one cannot really know that they are true. The dialogue ends in perplexity ( aporia ).

In research on the history of philosophy, the epistemological discussions in Theaetetos have led to lively debates that continue. The main question is about Plato's own position. According to one hypothesis, he himself represented the epistemological skepticism that seems to result from the failure of the efforts in the dialogue, at least for a time, after he had run into seemingly insurmountable logical difficulties with his theory of ideas . The contrary opinion is that he did not share the pessimistic assessment of the possibility of knowledge. Rather, he only presented it in the Theaetetus to encourage the reader to grasp and solve the problem.

Place, time and circumstances

The conversational situation is probably made up by Plato. The dialogue plot is also embedded in a fictitious framework plot. Two former students of Socrates, who were executed a long time ago, Eukleides and Terpsion, lead the framework discussion. They meet in their hometown Megara in the far west of the Attica landscape . Eucleides says that he heard a lot from Socrates about his memorable conversations with Theaetetus, who was then still very young. These conversations took place in Athens , the hometown of Socrates and Theaetetus. Eukleides recorded such a discussion from memory in a book, following the account of Socrates. There he continuously reproduces the course of the conversation in direct speech. At Terpsion's request, he now has the book read aloud. Its content constitutes the internal plot of the Theaetetus .

The information in the eucleid is an important point of reference for the time of the framework. He has just met Theaetetos in the port of Megara, who was recently wounded in a battle near Corinth and is now being brought to Athens. Apparently what is meant is a military conflict in the context of the Corinthian War , but not the Battle of Corinth in 392 BC. But possibly a skirmish between Athenian and Spartan troops in the spring of 391 BC. According to this, the death of Socrates, the 399 BC. Was executed eight years ago at the time of the framework story. However, this dating is controversial; According to an alternative hypothesis accepted by many researchers, the participation of Theaetetus in the fighting at Corinth falls in the year 369 BC. At that time, an alliance in which the Athenians were involved was subject to a force of the Theban general Epameinondas .

The Theaetetos is the first part of a trilogy , a group of three dialogues linked in terms of content and scenery that take place within two days. On the first day, the conversation between Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodoros takes place, which forms the plot of Theaetetus . The following day begins with the discussion depicted in Plato's Dialogue Sophistes , in which Socrates is quite reserved. There a new participant appears, the “Stranger from Elea ”, who examines questions of definition with Theaetetus and Theodoros. The problem of truth already dealt with in Theaetetus comes into focus again, this time from a different point of view. The third dialogue follows on the same day, the politicos (“statesman”). There the procedure for defining is tested using the example of the definition of the term “statesman”.

The time of the three discussions is the spring of 399 BC. Chr .; the trial of Socrates, in which he will be sentenced to death, is imminent. The Theaetetus mentions that the charges against him have already been brought. The temporal proximity to the execution of the philosopher, an event familiar to Plato's contemporaries, unspokenly forms the background of the event. It contributes to the effect that Plato wants to achieve on readers. Dealing with this event, which was shocking for the Socratics and Platonists , is an essential aspect of Plato's literary activity.

The scene of the action of Theaetetos is the Palaistra - a practice area intended for wrestling matches - in an Athenian gymnasium . At that time the grammar schools served primarily for physical training; In addition, a Palaistra was also a social meeting place for young people. The descriptions in Plato's dialogues show that Socrates liked to stay in such places. There he had the opportunity for fruitful philosophical discussions with young men and young people. In addition to the three interlocutors Socrates, Theaetetus and Theodoros, two friends of Theaetetus are present, who listen in silence. One of them is Socrates the Younger .

The participants

Bust of Socrates (1st century, Louvre , Paris)

Socrates

As in many other dialogues of Plato, Socrates takes on the role of the conversation leader. In the art of philosophical investigation he is far superior to the two mathematicians. It shows them that their previous ideas do not stand up to scrutiny. The perplexity into which he throws his interlocutors is intended by him; it is a didactic means with which he wants to encourage further efforts. To achieve this effect, he brings to light the inadequacy of others' approaches, carefully avoiding admitting one's own view. The reason for this reluctance, which is a main feature of his usual approach, he goes into more detail in the Theaetetos . He describes himself as an obstetrician who is ignorant himself, but who can help others to “give birth” to their insights.

According to a widespread, previously generally predominant interpretation, Socrates functions here, as in other works by Plato, as the author's “mouthpiece”; that is, it reflects his point of view or at least part of the Platonic concept. However, this equation is rejected by some historians of philosophy or only accepted with considerable reservations. In addition, some of the statements made by Platonic Socrates are not, or only partially, meant seriously. It is unclear and controversial to what extent the positions of Plato's dialogue figure agree with those of historical Socrates. An analogous problem exists with regard to the teaching of the famous sophist Protagoras , which Socrates describes and fights in Theaetetus : The question of how faithfully Plato's presentation reproduces the way of thinking of historical Protagoras is controversial. In any case, Plato's intention to make Protagoras appear in an unfavorable light is clearly recognizable.

Theodoros

The mathematician Theodoros is not an invented figure; there is no doubt about its historical existence and Plato's statements about him are largely credible. He came from Cyrene , a Greek city in what is now Libya . That he belonged to the generation of Socrates is evident not only from Plato's account, but also from the history of the geometry of Eudemos of Rhodes . The information in the sources leads to the dating of his birth around 475/460 BC. Since he survived Socrates, he is no earlier than 399 BC. Died. He was a student and friend of Protagoras, but he turned away from sophistics early on and turned to geometry. According to Plato, which is probably correct, he was not only a mathematician, but was also considered an excellent expert in astronomy and music and gave lessons in these subjects. Perhaps Plato himself was one of his students. However, it is uncertain whether Theodoros was ever in Athens. The historian of philosophy Diogenes Laertios claims that Plato visited him in Cyrene. His stay in Athens, which is reported in the Theaetetus , is possibly an invention of Plato for the literary purpose of allowing him to meet Socrates. The late antique philosopher Iamblichus counted Theodoros among the Pythagoreans , but the credibility of this message is doubted in research.

At the time of the act of Theaetetus , Theodoros, like Socrates, is already an old man. After the presentation in the dialogue, he does not consider himself a philosopher, but consciously restricts himself to his subject, the geometry into which he has "saved" himself according to his words. Thus, in Plato's eyes, he does not belong to the elite of wisdom lovers. He does not want to take part in philosophical investigations because he considers himself incompetent in this area and also believes that he is too old for it. Despite his reluctance, Socrates included him in the common philosophical search for truth.

Theaetetus

Theaetetos is also a historical person. Plato's statements that he was a mathematician and student of Theodorus and that he joined the circle of his interlocutors as a youth shortly before the death of Socrates are probably correct. The presentation in the dialogue, according to which he was wounded near Corinth, was also seriously ill there from an epidemic and was therefore close to death on the journey home, is generally considered to be credible. It is disputed, however, in which combat operations - 391 or 369 BC. BC - this happened. From Plato's account it can be deduced that Theaetetus around 415 BC Was born in BC. If he survived in 391 despite his very poor state of health, or if he only fought at Corinth in 369, then - as some researchers suspect - he may have belonged to the Platonic Academy , which was founded around 387.

Plato apparently held Theaetetus in high esteem. In dialogue he drew an extraordinarily advantageous picture of the intellect and character of the still very young, highly talented mathematician who was open to philosophical questions. As a dialogue figure, Theaitetos is the model of a promising future philosopher who could qualify for a statesmanlike leadership role in an ideal state. Outwardly, however, according to Plato, he was unsightly, which reduced his social rank among the beauty-conscious Athenians. Because of his lack of physical attractiveness, he was not considered for the homoerotic relationships that played an important role in the milieu of the circle around Socrates.

Eucleides and Terpsion

Eukleides of Megara, to whom Plato assigns the role of the reporter in the framework plot, was the founder of a philosophical trend that became known as " Megarists ". In Plato's dialogue Phaedo he is named among the friends of Socrates who were present at the execution of the philosopher. When Plato and some other Socratics left Athens after the death of Socrates, Eukleides took them to Megara.

Terpsion is the only one of the five named speakers of the dialogue whose historical existence is uncertain, because it is only attested in writings that come from Plato or whose authors proceeded from his statements. Like Eucleides, he was among those present according to Plato's report in the Phaedo at the death of Socrates.

content

The framework story

Two citizens, Eukleides and Terpsion, meet in Megara, both of whom were once pupils of the philosopher Socrates, who was executed years ago in Athens. Eucleides comes from the port where he met Theaetetus, an Athenian who also belonged to Socrates earlier. He tells that Theaetetus, who took part in a campaign, was badly wounded near Corinth, is also sick with the dysentery that is rampant in the army and now seems near death. This encounter reminded Eukleides that Socrates held Theaetetus in high esteem and told of the fruitful conversations he had with him. Eukleides made notes of this from memory, which he later put together in book form. In the book he gives a direct dialogue between Socrates and Theaetetus and the mathematician Theodoros of Cyrene. He gladly fulfills Terpsion's wish to inform him of the contents. The two go to the house of Eucleides, who immediately has the book read aloud.

The introductory conversation

Socrates asks Theodoros, who has apparently been in Athens for some time and is giving mathematics lessons, which of the young people he noticed because of their special talent. Theodoros names one, Theaetetus, whom he regards as his most gifted student. Theaetetus not only caught his eye because of his excellent comprehension, but also because of his excellent character, his composure and perseverance. Such a combination of ingenuity and virtue is rare. Physically, Theaetetus is not an attractive figure, rather he looks like Socrates, who is known for his unattractive appearance. At the request of Socrates, Theaetetus is asked to approach.

Theaetetus says that under the guidance of Theodoros he became knowledgeable in mathematics, astronomy and music. By expertise (sophía) he understands, as he explains when asked by Socrates, nothing other than knowledge (epistḗmē) ; these two terms are synonymous. For Socrates, however, this is not a matter of course, but requires justification; it calls for a definition of the term “knowledge”.

The question of knowledge

Theaetetus, who is not familiar with the philosophical search for the universally valid, tries to explain the term by giving examples. He understands knowledge to mean what Theodoros teaches in mathematics and other subjects, as well as the professional knowledge that craftsmen have. Socrates draws his attention to the fact that each of this knowledge relates to a specific subject. The question is not about individual areas of knowledge, but about the knowledge itself. We are looking for a definition that applies to every type of knowledge.

Theaetetos realizes that it is not about an illustration but a general definition. A mathematical example occurs to him for this. In geometry, too, it is important not only to check the correctness of an assertion for individual figures, but to find something that is generally valid. Theodoros was able to prove mathematically or at least graphically demonstrate using a construction that the side length of a square with an area of 3 square feet (the square root of 3) is incommensurable with the unit of length 1 foot and is therefore an irrational number . He also showed this for the square roots of the natural numbers that are not square numbers , from 5 to 17. But then he broke off. On this basis, Theaetetus and Socrates the Younger formulated the general law for the square roots of non-square natural numbers and for the cube roots of non- cubic natural numbers. Socrates praises this discovery and encourages Theaetetus to look for the universally valid with regard to knowledge and not to be discouraged by the difficulty of the task.

The Maeutic approach

Theaetetos confesses that the question of the nature of knowledge has preoccupied him many times and that he still does not let go. However, his attempts to clarify this have led to nothing. Socrates compares this spiritual constellation with a pregnancy: Theaetetus is "pregnant" with a concept, an idea for a solution and now suffers from "birth pains". Socrates is a specialist in such situations. His mother was a midwife and he himself practices the "midwifery art", the maieutics , in the spiritual field .

Midwives are always older women who practice this job when they can no longer have children themselves. They know how to control labor, cope with a difficult birth or even perform an abortion. In addition, thanks to their excellent knowledge of human nature, they would also be the best matchmakers, but they hold back on the marriage foundation in order not to fall into disrepute as matchmakers.

It is analogous in many respects with the maieutics, the midwifery art of Socrates. He does not help women, but men, and his concern is not with physical but spiritual births. He considers himself sterile, that is, unwise. As he claims, he does not have any ideas of his own, but he helps others to bring to light what has matured spiritually in them, to give birth to it, as it were. He is very familiar with mental contractions. He provides obstetrics with targeted questions that he asks the “pregnant women”; in this way he enables them to clarify their immature or wrong ideas and thoughts. Since he restricts himself to offering assistance in this sense, he is not a teacher in the actual sense, because he does not pass on any knowledge. The art of midwifery produces nothing but that which is already present in the “pregnant woman” and which urges to light. Socrates also knows how to advise on the “partner search”: If someone is unsuitable for his type of truth search and therefore would not make any progress under his guidance, then he recommends a teacher who suits him and teaches him in a conventional way.

However, as Socrates explains, there is also an essential difference between philosophical maeutics and the work of midwives: these only deal with real children and real births, while in the case of spiritual pregnancies, phantoms are also born. Therefore, the philosopher's maeutics is more demanding than the midwifery profession: the spiritual obstetrician not only has to provide assistance during labor, but also be able to assess the nature of what is produced. The distinction between useful knowledge and absurd thoughts is the most important part of his work and the greatest challenge. He gets his interlocutors to see through existing erroneous ideas and to give up. In doing so, however, he often encounters a lack of understanding when those he cares for do not realize that it is for their own good. Now Theaetetos is to entrust himself to the guidance of the experienced obstetrician by answering his questions.

The first definition of knowledge

The first attempt by Theaetetus to determine the nature of knowledge starts from perception (aísthēsis) , that is, from the immediacy of evidence . The young mathematician believes that knowledge (epistḗmē) is based on perception. Thus one could equate it with their content, the perceived and therefore obvious; there is no difference between perception and cognition or knowledge. Socrates points out that the famous sophist Protagoras thinks that way too. From Protagoras comes the well-known saying “Man is the measure of all things: that which are, that they are, and those that do not exist that they are not.” Accordingly, things are as they appear to the observer; the perceiver determines that something is as it appears to him, and that is the only access to reality he can have. This theory leads to the consequence that there are no objectively true statements about facts, but only statements about impressions. So you cannot say that something is big or heavy, but only that it appears that way to a certain person at a certain point in time. It may seem small or light to another. What is cold to someone who is cold is not cold to someone who is not cold. According to Socrates' conjecture, this relativism is a secret doctrine of Protagoras, which the sophist only revealed to his (paying) students. In addition, there is another aspect on which almost all thinkers - Socrates emphasizes Heraclitus and Empedocles by name - agree: Since everything is in constant change, there is nothing that “is”, because being would presuppose a constancy that it is not there. Everything changes; it “is” not, but it becomes (“flux theory”). This change alone is productive; Standstill would be annihilation, just as the universe would go down if the sun stood still. Thus there is no objective, absolute truth, but only relative circumstances and correct statements about current conditions. Both the perceptions of different viewers and those of the same viewer at different times are different.

In view of the description of the relativity of all things and relationships, Theaetetus is amazed. Socrates draws his attention to the fact that amazement - the ability not to take facts for granted - is the beginning of philosophy.

Subsequently, Socrates describes in detail the point of view of the thinkers who only accept and classify processes both in the outer world and within the soul. Nowhere in their worldview does a “this” or “that” exist as a real, persistent “thing”. There is only a combination of factors that cause the changing nature of the objects of perception. Theaetetus cannot ignore this train of thought, but does not know what to make of it.

There is also another aspect: perceptions can be unreliable and misleading. Illusions, dreams, feverish fantasies and madness create impressions that have no counterparts in external reality. The dreaming believes to really perceive and experience the dream content. It is impossible to prove that in the present moment one is neither dreaming nor fantasizing, but perceiving something real. This discredits perception as a source of knowledge, because it cannot be relied on.

These considerations have consequences for the question of truth, knowledge and knowledge. In a world in which nothing is permanent, timeless truths and ever-valid judgments are impossible. Thus, the assumption that there is a recognizable objective truth, a fact “in itself”, must be rejected. In place of an objective truth there is a subjective and time-dependent one. What appears real to a person at a certain point in time is for him all reality at that time, and reality can only exist in this form. What shows itself to the perceiver is true, but only related to him and to the respective point in time. Every constellation is unique. So everyone makes himself a judge of his own momentary truth, which then applies in this limited framework. The initial thesis of Theaetetus is thus saved and even substantiated: everything that is perceived is by definition true as it appears. Thanks to the consistent renunciation of any objective claim to truth, the subjective judgment can be raised to an infallible authority. From this perspective, perception and knowledge coincide.

Criticism of the first definition

With the support of the obstetrician Socrates, Theaitetus gave birth to his spiritual child. Now it has to be checked what it is good for. Socrates fundamentally criticizes the concept of Protagoras. At the same time he also takes on the defense of the position he is attacking, because Protagoras, who has already died, cannot “come to the aid” of his teaching. Socrates opened the attack with the argument that there was no reason for Protagoras to make humans and not monkeys or pigs the measure of all things. If all opinions stand side by side on an equal footing as subjective truths, any discourse would be meaningless, because a discussion always has the purpose of comparing statements and evaluating them according to their truthfulness. This presupposes a supra-individual standard. However, as Socrates immediately adds, Protagoras could object that the choice of man as a yardstick is in fact arbitrary and one could also choose an animal. That is only a shocking idea for the conceited crowd. Protagoras could also easily defend himself against the objection that the denial of an objective truth renders a reasonable discourse impossible. He could argue that he has an evaluation criterion on which the discourse can orient itself: It is not a question of whether something is objectively true or false, but only about what is better and what is worse. One can talk about it meaningfully and teach others.

In the role of the critic, however, Socrates shows that equating what is perceived and what is known does not do justice to reality. One can perceive something without understanding it. Knowledge does not result directly from seeing or hearing, but from the ability to process impressions, which enables understanding. For example, in order to receive a message, one must understand the language of the communicator. One needs memory, and this is an active function even without current perceptions. Another criticism by Socrates, who now also includes Theodorus in the investigation, aims at the lack of consistency in Protagoras' position. Here Socrates starts from the following considerations: Protagoras gets into a self-contradiction if he excludes the opposite of his view, because according to his concept this is just as true as his teaching, as long as someone takes it. Even his principle that there is no such thing as truth as such, but only truth “for someone”, is not correct in itself, but only because and as long as someone thinks it is correct. The replacement of “true” and “false” by “better” and “worse” or “more useful” and “more harmful” fails because the relativization of the truth is not convincing, especially when it comes to the question of usefulness. You can see this in medicine or politics. There are advisors in these areas who have to assess what is useful. The consultants, however, have different opinions among themselves; sometimes they and the decision makers they advise are wrong. Thus, an objective criterion for assessing the usefulness of advice would be needed. But that is incompatible with consistent relativism.

Digression about the philosophical way of life

Theodoros thinks it doesn't hurt to move from one study to another, more comprehensive, because there is enough time to discuss. Following on from this, Socrates compares the philosophical discourse with the legal one. As he thereby digresses from the original theme of the dialogue, these explanations are referred to as “digression” or “excursus” in Theaetetos . The term “episode” is also used.

Socrates describes in detail what distinguishes the way of life and the discourse of philosophers from the attitude and behavior of non-philosophers. In the democratic state of Athens, the focus of ordinary citizens' interests is on two areas of public life: the political disputes that take place in popular assemblies and the highly politicized judiciary in Athens. The philosopher keeps away from both. For Socrates the non-philosopher is like a slave because he is subject to constraints from which the philosopher is free.

Anyone who has to appear in court as a party to the process is always under pressure. His speaking time is limited; He is not allowed to choose his subjects freely, but has to limit himself to responding to the arguments of the other side. In terms of content, it is not about factual aspects, but only about asserting personal interests. All that matters is influencing the judges, and that requires cunning, lies, and flattery. The truth doesn't care. Therefore, citizens who have been involved in the judiciary from their youth become emotionally crippled. They have no backbone, but are the servants of those whom they have to serve. The situation is similar in other public life, where it is important to attack an opponent with abuse or to praise someone in power. A central concern is to maintain one's own social rank, which depends on the one hand on wealth and on the other hand on the family background. Particularly important is the ancestry, which can be traced back genealogically over numerous generations to mythical figures like Herakles .

The life of philosophers is very different. Politics and the judiciary are so indifferent to them that they do not even know where the court, town hall or meeting places are. They take no notice of power struggles for office. They are just as uninterested in who is descended from whom as they are in foreign property and the private affairs of their neighbors. They do not know about the legislation and the popular resolutions. Your attention is only directed to exploring the nature of things, especially human nature, and the right way to live. You have any amount of time for these topics. Their guiding principle is the divine; their aim is to become as similar as possible to the deity by cultivating the divine virtues.

This contrast between the philosophers and the mass of the unphilosophical citizens results in a mutual disdain. Either side appears to the other to be ridiculous and unsuitable for important tasks; each considers what is most important from the point of view of the other to be irrelevant. A philosopher is helpless in court because the rules of conduct there are completely alien to him. Socrates illustrates the opposing attitudes with the anecdote of Thales , a pre-Socratic philosopher who fell into a well looking at the heavenly bodies. A Thracian maid who saw this mocked him: he wanted to explore the sky, but did not even know what was at his feet. The philosopher's otherness to the world is assessed positively by Socrates, he sees it as a sign of their inner freedom. He also thinks that any despiser of philosophy can be embarrassed with arguments if he is willing to hold such a dialogue.

The failure of the first definition

After the digression, Socrates returns to refuting the subjectivist counter-view. As he now explains, the replacement of “true” and “false” by subjective value judgments about utility is opposed to the fact that utility considerations are also oriented towards the future. The future will show whether assumptions about the usefulness of something are correct or not, for example in the case of a law that works or does not serve its purpose. Often the purpose is missed. Hence the assertion that man always carries within himself the criterion for what is useful for him cannot be correct. Rather, he has to be taught about it by a future he does not yet know.

The other pillar of subjectivism, the denial of all constancy, does not stand up to scrutiny either. Numerous interpreters of the world claim that there is nothing that exists and that is at rest, only that which is becoming and moving. The processes that, in their opinion, make up the whole of reality, fall into two main types: change of location and change in nature. Accordingly, as Socrates now establishes, they must assume that everything is always subject to both types of change at the same time, otherwise there would be constancy at least in one respect. If this is the case, however, not only being is abolished, but also the basis of a rational discourse. For example, if something white is subject to a change in color at any moment, the term “white” cannot be defined and used independently of time. That means it is unusable. Every utterance with which something is described as “so” fixes an assumed state of affairs and is therefore inappropriate in a world that has nothing constant.

Finally, Socrates returns to examine the initial thesis of Theaetetus, according to which knowledge can be reduced to perception. He explains that one always perceives through the individual sense organs, each of which is assigned to a certain type of perception. The eye can neither replace the ear nor vice versa, because seeing and hearing are two completely separate, different processes. If knowledge of a situation is to be derived from the sensory perceptions, an instance is required which receives, summarizes and evaluates the information from the individual sensory organs. One can call this instance " soul ". The evaluation is done by comparing and inferring, which requires a knowledge of properties such as “same” and “different”, “similar” and “dissimilar”, “beautiful” and “ugly”. Thus knowledge requires the possession of concepts which do not belong to the content of the perceptions. So it is not possible to trace knowledge and knowledge completely back to perception and to define them accordingly.

The second definition and the question of error

After the failure of the first definition, Theaitetos proposes a new one. Since the reduction of knowledge to material processes, the sensory perception, has failed, this time he takes a spiritual process as his starting point: the formation of opinions, the imagination. Ideas can be correct or incorrect. Therefore Theaetetos defines knowledge as correct opinion (alēthḗs dóxa) . But then, as Socrates points out, the questions immediately arise what constitutes the error and how a wrong opinion can come about at all.

The first difficulty is that error seems theoretically impossible. There seems to be no middle between knowing and not knowing; one cannot know and not know something at the same time. If you know something, you cannot form a false idea about it, and if you do not know something, it does not occur to you to form an idea about it. For example, anyone who does not know Socrates and Theaetetus would not think of taking Socrates as Theaetetus.

The second difficulty arises when one defines error as an assumption whose subject does not really exist. Accordingly, an idea is wrong when it relates to something that does not exist. But one can only imagine what is. An idea that relates to something that is not does not relate to something, it does not relate to anything. So it is not something itself, but nothing. But since there are errors, the definition is useless.

One way out could be that one does not define the error as an assumption of non-existent, but as a confusion of beings (technical language "allodoxy"). Two things or properties that are actual givens are mistakenly inverted in thought. But even then it seems inexplicable how an error can come about. The soul knows the opposing qualities that cannot be present in the same object at the same time. It is inconceivable how she should come to think of the beautiful as ugly, the slow as fast, the ox as a horse or two as one.

The memory as a block of wax

Then another possible explanation of the mistake is examined, which involves memory and gives up the strict separation of knowing and ignorance. From a distance, you can confuse Socrates with someone you don't know, that is, you can be ignorant even though you know what Socrates looks like. Judgments are based on the connection of perceptions with memory impressions. Memory is like a waxy block that takes prints. This is different for each person: with some larger, with others smaller, with some of purer wax, with others of dirtier; the hardness and humidity also vary. The quality of the impressions varies greatly, with the particular nature of the wax setting the framework for docility and forgetfulness. Errors occur when existing impressions are incorrectly assigned to later perceptions. If a perception is not clear enough, for example if someone is seen from a distance, the right imprint can be missed. Theaitetus enthusiastically agrees with Socrates' suggestion, but his relief soon evaporates because Socrates immediately refutes it. The explanation is inadequate, because there are also mathematical errors, and these are not based on failed connections of perceptions with thoughts and memories.

The memory as a dovecote

Finally, Socrates proposes an approach that he himself describes as outrageous: an attempt should be made to clarify the nature of knowledge, although it has not yet been possible to delimit the scope of this term. Socrates finds this methodologically questionable, but he now dares to take this step in view of the current dilemma. In doing so, he introduces a distinction between “having” and “possessing” knowledge. Knowledge is only really available when you have it, not when you just have it. Socrates illustrates this by comparing it to a dress that one owns when one has bought it, but only “has” it when one wears it. Personal knowledge can be compared to a dovecote in which someone keeps pigeons or other birds that he has hunted and caught. The birds correspond to the individual knowledge. If the owner now needs a certain bird, he has to hunt it again within the dovecote. Only when he holds it in his hands does he “have” it. If he accidentally reaches for the wrong bird in the mess, he does not have the one he wants, although he already has it. This corresponds to the confusion of stored knowledge, which is the cause of thinking errors such as mathematical errors.

Again Theaetetus agrees and he adds that not all birds have to correspond to knowledge content; some of them can also be misinformation that is also flying around in the soul. Then an error is not due to a mix-up of pieces of knowledge, but to the grasping of a stored misinformation. But even this approach immediately fails Socrates. He draws attention to the fact that here again the difficulty of a paradoxical mixture of knowledge and ignorance arises: the owner of the "dovecote" considers the misinformation he has caught for knowledge. Accordingly, he lacks the ability to distinguish knowledge from ignorance in this regard. But if he cannot distinguish between a piece of knowledge and a piece of non-knowledge, he actually has no knowledge of the piece of knowledge, so it is not such. If he could tell them apart, he would have knowledge of the piece of ignorance; but then this would not be such, but a content of knowledge. So if you want to escape the paradox and explain the possibility of errors, you have to introduce a separate kind of knowledge, knowledge about knowledge and ignorance. This must then be in a separate “dovecote”, whereby the owner in turn owns the “birds” there, but not always “has”. However, this leads to an infinite regress , since the higher-level memory, in which the knowledge and ignorance about knowledge and ignorance are located, in turn requires a further, higher-level memory.

The inadequacy of the second definition

Finally, Socrates returns to the second definition, equating knowledge with a correct opinion, and shows its unsuitability. In court you can convince the judges through skillful behavior that a defendant has committed a crime, even if there are no witnesses. That then leads to condemnation. However, even if the act was actually committed, the judge cannot know, because he was not there and there is no evidence. He then makes a correct judgment based on a correct opinion that he has, although he has no knowledge of the course of events.

The third attempt at determination and its failure

Now Theaitetos presents his critical interlocutor with a supplemented new version of his proposed definition: Knowledge is a correct opinion “connected with an explanation ( lógos ) ”, that is, one whose correctness has been proven by a reasonable argument. Not all correct statements are "explained" and the unexplained is not an object of knowledge. Socrates also puts forward a theory that he calls a "dream". According to the “dream” there are basic components or primordial elements (prṓta stoicheía) of everything that, although perceived and named, cannot be traced back to anything else and are therefore inexplicable. Explainable things only emerge from the connection of these basic elements to structures. Knowledge always relates only to the compositions, not to their basic components. In principle, the basic components cannot be an object of knowledge. With the introduction of primitive elements, the circularity that results from the requirement to define each concept by an explanation can be avoided. This requirement could only be met by resorting to other terms that would have to be assumed to be known. This would create a system whose components would be traced back to one another. Such a system could not be traced back to anything itself, i.e. without justification. The requirement to explain everything is therefore impossible to meet.

Again the theory put forward by Socrates met with the approval of Theaetetus, and once more Socrates refuted his own proposal. If that which is composed of elements is nothing but the sum of its elements, it is inexplicable, since nothing that can be explained can result from the joining together of the inexplicable. But if the composite is something other than the sum of its parts, namely a form with an independent nature, then this form must also be inexplicable, since it cannot be traced back to the elements or to anything else. Thus the assumption of indefinable primordial elements does not form a basis for a theory of knowledge, it even excludes the possibility of knowledge. Knowledge of links presupposes that their elements can be explained.

Here the question arises for Socrates what it actually means to explain something. Explaining can be defined as a complete comprehension and analytical description of all elements of the composition to be explained, or as an indication of the distinctive characteristic of the term to be explained. Both determinations are, however, useless for the solution of the problem of naming the particularity of knowledge. Neither one nor the other enables a clear demarcation of knowledge from what is actually meant. Furthermore, the definition of knowledge as correct opinion with “explanation” contains a logical circle if the “explanation” is based on the fact that the person explaining knows the characteristic feature of the knowledge object. The knowledge of the characteristic is a knowledge, so it already presupposes what is to be defined.

The closing balance

The result is a sobering final balance: what knowledge is remains open. The art of midwifery at Theaitetos was unable to unearth more than erroneous opinions. Theaetetos admits that. Nevertheless, Socrates does not see the dialogue as a failure, but sees progress in the insight he has gained. Since an understanding of the problem has been achieved, a new proposed solution in the future will be better than the previous one, and in any case Theaitetos now knows how things are with his level of knowledge.

Interpretation and philosophical content

The question of Plato's epistemological position

In Theaetetus , as in his other dialogues, Plato does not directly reveal how he himself thinks about the questions raised. Even if one starts from the traditionally prevailing view that Socrates is to be regarded as the “mouthpiece” of the author, some things remain unclear. Plato lets his Socrates fight against a subjectivistic, phenomenalistic and sensualistic epistemology, which he presents as a consequence of the assertions of Heraclitus and Protagoras. But Socrates also puts forward counter-arguments in favor of the position he rejected. It is unclear whether Plato intended to completely refute the criticized theses or whether he only wanted to restrict their scope. The latter interpretation has been called “Reading A” in the research literature since Myles Burnyeat (1990), the other “Reading B”. After “Reading A”, Plato granted the teachings of Heraclitus and Protagoras a truth content limited to the world of changeable things. According to this interpretation, he only rejected a strong, relativistic version of the critically examined theses, which denies the existence of a recognizable timeless being and excludes any knowledge of objective truth. The validity of individual arguments that are put forward in the dialogue is also controversial.

Another interpretation is that the Theaetetos is more of a methodical exercise than a plea for a particular doctrine. The discussion is open-ended and the reader is not expected to accept one of the typical doctrines of Plato from his middle creative period. Another direction of interpretation emphasizes the progress made in knowledge; In the course of the discussion there was a real approximation of the epistemology which Plato held to be correct. Thus the efforts of the interlocutors only seem to have failed. According to a research hypothesis, the reader should be encouraged to find the answer to the question of knowledge himself based on the insights gained in the dialogue. Jörg Hardy thinks that Plato gives clear indications as to how the problems can be solved. Let the dialogue partners make use of the principle of problem solving through error analysis. This can also be used as a hermeneutic principle for understanding the dialogue. Even Dorothea Frede assumes Plato saw a way out. She thinks he hinted where to look for it. Eugenio Benitez and Livia Guimaraes interpret the outcome of the dialogue as an actual failure in answering the initial question about knowledge, but claim that the experience gained in the search for truth has yielded a benefit that outweighs this failure.

There are also different opinions as to whether Plato himself was convinced that he had a valid definition of knowledge, or whether he considered his efforts in this area to have failed and presented the balance of his unsuccessful search for an answer to the initial question in a dialogue .

Interpretation problems arise when clarifying the question of what Plato actually meant by “knowledge”. In modern epistemology, a distinction is made between “propositional” knowledge (“knowing that”) and knowledge with a direct object (“knowing”). In the ancient Greek language there are no terms that express such a differentiation. This results in an ambiguity that hinders the understanding of the epistemological discourse in Theaetetos .

The question of the development of Plato's teaching

The question of whether Plato fundamentally changed his attitude to the main questions of metaphysics and epistemology in the course of a development of his teaching is one of the most controversial topics in Plato research. The view of the “Unitarians”, who believe that he has consistently represented a coherent point of view, runs counter to the “development hypothesis” of the “revisionists”, who assume a serious change of heart. From the revisionist point of view, an important argument in favor of the development hypothesis is the fact that Plato in Theaetetus focuses on the question of scientific knowledge without bringing his theory of ideas into play. He had already conceived the doctrine of ideas by the time he was writing the Theaetetus and presented it in Dialogue Politeia . It says that ideas exist as independent entities ontologically superordinate to the area of ​​sensually perceptible objects . Such “platonic ideas”, for example “the beautiful in itself” or “the circle in itself”, are an objective metaphysical reality according to the theory of ideas. They form the prerequisite for the existence and recognizability of the individual sense objects whose archetypes they are. Thus the doctrine of ideas should play an important role in answering the question of the nature of knowledge discussed in Theaetetus . For the revisionists, the fact that they were not mentioned there is evidence that Plato moved away from his theory of ideas after he encountered seemingly insurmountable obstacles in their elaboration. The opposite view of the Unitarians is that Plato wanted to show in Theaetetus that the attempt to find a valid definition of knowledge without the acceptance of Platonic ideas is doomed to failure. He wanted to lead the reader to the realization that the theory of ideas is indispensable for the development of an epistemology.

A special aspect of the dispute between Unitarists and revisionists is the question of whether Plato in Theaetetus retained his earlier conviction that, with regard to the realm of sense objects, no knowledge is possible, but only an opinion, and only metaphysical entities come into consideration as objects of knowledge. In this model there is an irreversible discontinuity between knowledge and opinion. There is nothing that can be added to a correct opinion so that it becomes knowledge. According to a revisionist interpretation put forward in particular by Myles Burnyeat, Plato rejected this epistemological position in Theaetetos , which he had advocated in the Dialogue Politeia , and now assumed that there can be knowledge about what is perceived by the senses and that knowledge and what is meant can have the same objects. Lloyd P. Gerson defends the contrary Unitarian interpretation, according to which Plato retained the epistemology of Politeia and confirmed it in Theaitetus .

One of the most famous revisionists was Gilbert Ryle . He counted the Theaetetus to a group of late dialogues in which Plato no longer used his theory of ideas for the argument after he had recognized their problematic.

Anne Balansard points out that the division of the historians of philosophy into the two “camps” of the Unitarians and the revisionists is too rough and does not do justice to the diversity of opinion within the two “camps”.

The assessment of logical atomism

The assumption formulated in Socrates' “dream” that there are final units as immediate givens that cannot be traced back to anything is referred to as the “atomistic” concept in modern philosophical discourse. Gilbert Ryle considered the "dream" to be an anticipation of modern logical atomism , which Plato had critically analyzed.

According to the interpretation of Michael Thomas Liske Plato in Theaetetus thought yet atomistic, that is, he has understood the knowledge of facts as familiarity with a single, not aufzuschlüsselnden object than know of an isolated object. But there he already recognized the difficulties of atomism and thus made progress compared to his middle creative period. Only later did he overcome the atomistic position in the dialogue of Sophist .

Ignorance and maeutics

The paradox of Socratic ignorance is often discussed in research : Plato's Socrates emphasizes his own ignorance, he claims to be “sterile” and to bring forward nothing “but what is his”, but at the same time claims to help others effectively in their search for knowledge with masculinity to be able to. When interpreting these statements, it should be noted that the definitions of the term “knowledge” (epistḗmē) vary . When Socrates speaks of his own sterility and ignorance, he has a very narrow definition in mind. He then thinks of an irrefutable knowledge in the sense of a knowledge of truth based on compelling evidence. Only such knowledge, which he says he does not have, could satisfy him. Since he was unable to “give birth”, he considers himself to be spiritually sterile. Nor does he know anyone who owns it. By the births that he helps others to achieve, he only means results which he considers to be well founded and correct, but whose correctness he cannot prove. While these results are valuable, they do not represent knowledge in the strict sense.

The philosophical life

What is striking is the picture drawn in the Digression of an unworldly and radically apolitical philosopher, whom Socrates portrays as exemplary. The attitude of this philosopher contrasts with the impression of Socrates' own way of life that Plato conveys in other works. There Socrates appears - for Plato the ideal of a philosopher - as a critical but loyal citizen. The Platonic Socrates is well informed about developments in public life, knows his way around politics, the judiciary and rhetoric, and has earned services to the common good. Therefore, the description of a helpless, socially clueless theorist, offered in the Digression, needs to be explained. According to one direction of interpretation, this is a caricaturing representation that in no way corresponds to the Platonic ideal of a philosopher who is also capable of governing the state; rather, Plato criticizes this extreme of an impractical lifestyle. Other researchers do not regard the description of philosophical life in the Digression as a caricature, but as a concept that Plato meant seriously.

Often the picture of the philosopher is interpreted in the Digression in the sense of a compelling demand to turn away from the everyday world. Plato was of the opinion that a philosopher should concern himself exclusively with the general; the particular, the particular is not worth paying attention to and is only a disruption. According to another interpretation, which includes other texts by Plato, he evaluated the preoccupation with the particular neutrally: he did not reject it, but meant that it was the philosopher's striving neither encourage nor hinder his goal, provided it does not distract him from it.

The alleged self-refutation of relativism

An often discussed topic of research is the argument put forward by Plato's Socrates against relativism that it is logically self-refuting. This criticism of relativistic epistemology is known in the specialist literature under the English name "exquisite argument"; in addition, the term peritropḗ ("reversal") introduced by Sextus Empiricus is used. The argument has been cited in various modifications since Plato and discussed in discussions about skepticism . In Theaetetus it is directed against a teaching that is traced back to Protagoras. The train of thought is first:

P: Every judgment is true for the judge (assertion of Protagoras).
P ': Many judge that P is wrong.
C: Since P 'is true after P, P is false.

In this form the argument is flawed because the conclusion C is inadmissible. In C there is a statement about the absolute validity of P. However, this is excluded in the relativistic concept: P should only be true for the person making the judgment. Nevertheless, a supra-individual validity of statements is tacitly assumed in the argument and thus an apparent self-contradiction of the opposing position is constructed.

Socrates anticipates this objection to the argument by pointing out that the opponents of relativism, who consider P wrong, consider their own position to be objectively correct. However, your opinion about the correctness of your position is also a judgment to which P is applicable, and therefore, according to P, no less correct than P. The argument is thus:

P: Every judgment is true for the judge.
P '': Many judge that the judgment that P is false is true not only for the person making the judgment, but also in itself.
C: Since the judgment that P's falsehood is inherently true is actually made by someone, it is no less true according to P than P. Accordingly, P is self-refuting.

Here, however, the same error is made as in the simpler version of the argument, because the claim that P is inherently false is only true in a relativistic model for those who make this judgment. Thus, from a purely logical point of view, the Protagoras thesis is not self-contradicting itself. She is immune to refutation. In terms of content, however, Protagoras is incapable of claiming a higher truth content for relativism than that which it also has to grant to non-relativistic positions. The consequences of this fact are so serious that, according to one research opinion, Socrates' argumentation brings the proponents of relativism at least into considerable difficulties.

The mathematical investigation

Root snail

After the presentation in the dialogue, Theodoros showed geometrically that the square roots of the non-square natural numbers from 3 to 17 are irrational, and Theaetetos generalized this discovery. It is not known how Theodoros demonstrated it; Research even doubts that it is actually a mathematical proof . Holger Thesleff , who took up an idea put forward by Jakob Heinrich Anderhub as early as 1941, says that Theodoros did not prove his assumption, but only demonstrated it in a drawing using a construction, and that he had to stop at 17 because the spiral drawing only offers space for 17 triangles . It is the " root snail " used to construct roots , which is called "Theodorus wheel" or "Theodorus spiral".

In the dialogue Theaetetus claims that he and Socrates the Younger succeeded in generalizing the sentence of his teacher Theodoros. A number of researchers believe that this statement is essentially historically credible, even if it was presented by Plato in a form that served his literary purpose. Árpád Szabó is of a different opinion . According to his hypothesis, Theaetetus was not the discoverer of the generalized validity of the theorem, but only naively imagined that he had made an essential contribution to mathematical research. In reality, his teacher taught him something that he - Theodoros - and other mathematicians had long been familiar with. Myles Burnyeat opposes this view. He sticks to the traditional interpretation, according to which it can be inferred from the presentation in the dialogue that Theaetetos accomplished a real research achievement, and this achievement is a historical fact.

Bust of Plato (Roman copy of the Greek Plato portrait of Silanion , Glyptothek Munich )

Emergence

Chronologically, according to stylistic criteria, Theaitetus is still in the middle group of Plato's dialogues, but from a content point of view, it belongs more to the later work. It can therefore be assigned to a transitional phase between these two creative periods of the philosopher, while the other two dialogues of the trilogy, the Sophistes and the Politikos , are classified under the later works. Presumably, the completion of the work on the Theaetetos falls in the early 360s.

Plato may have revised the prologue, which contains the framework story. The reason for this assumption is provided by a remark by an unknown commentator who was probably written in the second half of the 1st century BC. Was active. He reports that another, "rather frosty" version of the prologue was also in circulation at the time. Although the commentator considered the traditional version to be the only authentic one, research has considered the possibility that both prologues come from Plato. Most proponents of this hypothesis consider the traditional version to be the more recent. In any case, according to the current state of research, it offers the definitive text.

A side note on one side of the oldest preserved medieval Theaitetos -Handschrift, the Codex Clarkianus

Text transmission

The ancient text tradition consists of some fragments written on papyrus from the Roman Empire . The oldest is from the 2nd century, the youngest from the 5th or 6th century. Furthermore, the beginning of a commentary on the dialogue, which is preserved in a papyrus manuscript from the 2nd century, offers a number of readings that are relevant for textual criticism.

The oldest preserved medieval Theaitetos -Handschrift was built in 895 in the Byzantine Empire for Aretha of Caesarea made.

reception

Antiquity

Little is known about the aftermath of Theaetetus in antiquity. However, the scarcity of evidence can be attributed to the unfavorable tradition and does not allow the conclusion that the topic met with little interest.

Plato's student Aristotle has the Theaitetos have known how few references can be found in him, but is not known how he understood this.

The founder of the Stoa , Zeno von Kition , seems to have taken up material from Theaetetus when formulating his epistemology , which, however, he used as an opponent of Platonism in a non-Platonic sense.

In the era of the younger (“skeptical”) academy , which existed between 268 and 264 BC. Began and until the early 1st century BC. Lasted, the Theaetetus was apparently particularly valued by the academics, as it could support their epistemological skepticism . But there is a lack of contemporary evidence for such a reception.

In the tetralogical order of the works of Plato, which apparently in the 1st century BC Was introduced, the Theaetetus belongs to the second tetralogy. The history writer of philosophy, Diogenes Laertios , counted it among the “examining” writings and gave it as an alternative title about knowledge . In doing so, he referred to a now-lost work by the scholar Thrasyllos .

A fragment of the Theaetetus commentary in the Egyptian papyrus Berlin, Staatliche Museen , P. 7982 (2nd century)

From the epoch of Middle Platonism (1st century BC to 3rd century AD) there is little evidence of the aftermath of Theaetetus . The early Middle Platonist Eudorus of Alexandria , who lived in the 1st century BC. Lived, dealt in his only fragmentarily preserved work Classification of the teaching of philosophy with the goal of ethical action. In doing so, he took up the thought presented in the Digression of Theaetetos of "alignment with God within the framework of the possible". By far the most extensive testimony to the Middle Platonic Theaetetos reception is a commentary, the beginning of which - the commentary on a little over a fifth of the dialogue text - has been preserved. This script is believed to have been in the second half of the 1st century BC. BC - at least not earlier - and thus represents the oldest of all surviving Plato commentaries. The author is an unknown Middle Platonist. He defends his interpretation of the commented text against other interpretations and, with implicit approval, mentions the arguments of Platonists who oppose stoic criticism of Platonism. He also fought a Theaitetos -Interpretation, which considers that this dialogue is an epistemological skepticism of Plato. None of the proposals to identify the anonymous commentator with Eudorus of Alexandria, Albinos or Alcinous have prevailed in research. Plutarch dealt with maeutics in the first of his ten Platonic Questions . There he asked and answered the question of why the deity instructed Socrates to act as obstetrician for others but denied him fertility of his own. The Middle Platonist Alcinous , who probably lived in the 2nd century, treated in his textbook (didaskalikós) of the principles of Plato the goal of assimilation to the deity. He also went into the considerations of the Platonic Socrates on the relationship between memory and opinion and mentioned the comparison of memory with a block of wax.

The alignment with God as a goal also found acceptance outside of Platonism. The influential Aristotelian Alexander von Aphrodisias responded to this. He found it was the greatest good for man to become like God. This is given to the thinkers through contemplation and the knowledge of truth which comes about through evidence. Such contemplation is rightly called divine when one contemplates what is most venerable.

The Neo-Platonists , a direction that arose in the 3rd century and dominated the philosophical discourse in late antiquity , took up considerations from Theaetetus . They mainly dealt with metaphysics, with the religious dimension of Platonism and with the topic of the philosophical way of life. Therefore the digression in Theaetetus was of particular interest to them. The demand made there by Plato's Socrates that a philosopher should concentrate on the task of becoming as similar to the deity as possible fell on fertile ground. It was already discussed by Plotinus , the founder of Neoplatonism. Iamblichos († around 320/325), who played a pioneering role in the late ancient Neo-Platonism, was in his school of philosophy the Theaetetus as the fifth study of the twelve most important in his view, Plato's dialogues, as the author of the anonymous traditional late antique Prolegomena to philosophy of Plato reported. The famous Neo-Platonist Proclus (412–485), who headed the philosophy school in Athens, commented on Theaetetus , but little is known of his preoccupation with dialogue.

During the Roman Empire, Plato's ideal of assimilation to God was not only represented by pagan Platonists as far as possible, but also found favor with Christian authors. The church father Clemens of Alexandria , who was strongly influenced by Platonism and who was active in the late 2nd and early 3rd centuries, often quoted the relevant Theaetetus passage and saw it as evidence of the proximity of Platonism to Christianity. The motif also found its way into the patristic literature of late antiquity. In the 4th century the church father Ambrose of Milan took up Plato's famous formulation. The Fathers of the Church also noticed the Thales anecdote, which was circulating in different versions.

The beginning of Theaetetus in the first edition, Venice 1513

Middle Ages and Early Modern Times

In the Middle Ages the Theaetetos was accessible to some Byzantine scholars, but it was unknown to Latin-speaking scholars in the West and in Arabic-speaking countries. In the West it was only rediscovered in the age of Renaissance humanism . The humanist Marsilio Ficino created the first Latin translation . He published it in Florence in 1484 in the complete edition of his Plato translations and thus made the dialogue accessible to a wider reading public. The translation was preceded by an introduction (argumentum) from which it emerges that he understood the text throughout as a representation of Plato's own teaching. He emphasized that the body could not make any contribution to knowledge. The “wax block” is in the soul, not in the body; it should not be equated with the brain.

The first edition of the Greek text appeared in Venice in September 1513 by Aldo Manuzio as part of the first complete edition of Plato's works. The editor was Markos Musuros .

In the centuries that followed, philosophers showed relatively little interest in Theaetetus . Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz prepared a Latin summary of the dialogue in 1676. George Berkeley went into his work Siris published in 1744 several times on places in the ancient work. He found in it an anticipation of the principles of his own empirically shaped epistemology.

Modern

Philosophical Aspects

In modern times, the initially relatively low interest in the philosophical content of the work has increased sharply since the early 20th century. In 1933 Paul Shorey expressed the opinion that the Theaetetus could be regarded as the most thoughtful dialogue of Plato. The study by Francis Macdonald Cornford, published in 1935 on the epistemological theory of Plato and the commentary by Myles Burnyeat (1990), are considered milestones in the research of Theaetetos .

The historians of philosophy are mainly interested in the epistemological output of the work. A broader educated public is primarily familiar with the section on midwifery and the digression on the philosophical way of life with the anecdote about Thales. They are among the most famous passages in Plato's oeuvre.

The philosopher Victor Cousin in 1824 published a French Theaitetos Translation. He defended his metaphysical model against empiricist and sensualist criticism, resorting to the arguments of the Platonic Socrates in Theaetetus .

The Neo-Kantian Paul Natorp expressed himself in 1903 in his monograph Plato's theory of ideas . He found that the train of thought in Theaetetus was "compelling and immediately convincing" once one has "mastered the inner plan of Scripture". According to Natorp's understanding, when Plato examined and rejected the definition of knowledge as true opinion with explanation, he used the term dóxa ("opinion") not in the sense of "judgment" but in the sense of "representation". The ancient thinker fought against the dogmatism of the "true idea", according to which all that matters is to correctly relate a given idea to given things so that the "right" or "true" idea becomes knowledge. Natorp said that the dialogue contained a deeply based, "forever fundamental critique of sensuality". Plato had "clearly stated the unit of consciousness as a basic function of knowledge". He recognized that consciousness understood the general determinations such as being and not being, identity and difference with the help of physical organs, but through itself. The knowledge is based on the relational judgments of the consciousness that Plato called “soul”.

Ferdinand CS Schiller published the essay Plato or Protagoras? in which he examined the defense of Protagoras' conception in Theaetetus . He saw in this the authentic position of the ancient sophist, whom he regarded as an early humanist and a forerunner of his own pragmatism . From a modern point of view, the approach of Protagoras has proven to be correct, Plato's criticism of it is wrong.

For Martin Heidegger , the Theaetetos was one of the few dialogues that provided the textual basis for his interpretation of Plato's philosophy. In the winter semester of 1931/1932 he dealt in detail with the work in a Freiburg lecture. In doing so, he did not adopt the attitude of the “mere reader”, but that of a listener who asked questions. Heidegger said that it was a serious misunderstanding to understand the central question “What is knowledge?” As a question about science. Nor is it an epistemological question, it is not limited to knowledge as theoretical knowledge and occupation of scholars. Rather, Plato's theme is "the whole area and the breadth of human behavior, which prevails and maintains and at the same time diverse knowledge". This also includes “knowledge” in the sense of expressions such as “someone knows how to behave” or “he knows how to assert himself”. The question is how "man himself in his basic behavior, his knowledge of things, wants and should take himself (...) if he is supposed to be a knower". In this way, the question was asked about the human being in an original sense, and this question was “a human attack on himself and his temporary insistence on what is initially familiar and his obsession with what is initially sufficient”. It is about knowledge as possession of truth. However, Plato understood truth and untruth as the correctness of the statement and untruth as its incorrectness. With this he blocked the insight "that and how untruth belongs to the essence of truth". Truth is the unconcealment of beings. Falsehood consists in "adjusting the appearance" of beings, whereby beings are not simply hidden, because they show themselves. It is a "hiding in and through showing oneself", and that is the appearance: an unconcealment that is "concealment at the same time in itself, namely in essence".

Ludwig Wittgenstein made reference to the “dream” of the Platonic Socrates in his Philosophical Investigations , which he wrote from 1936 but was only published posthumously in 1953 . He identified the original elements introduced there, the "simple components of which reality is composed", with the "objects" in his own terminology and with the "individuals" in Bertrand Russell . In his examination of the theses of Platonic Socrates, Wittgenstein problematized the term “composed” as the opposite of “simple”, which is defined differently; one must first agree on the definition. The thesis of Socrates that one cannot ascribe neither being nor non-being to the original elements, brought Wittgenstein into connection with the pattern function of elements. A pattern is an instrument of language and as such is not something represented, but a means of representation in a language game. Wittgenstein illustrated this consideration with the example of the length of the original meter . One could neither say about the original meter that it was 1 m long, nor was it not 1 m long. The reason for this is its "peculiar role in the game of measuring with the tape measure". The same applies to the elements of the language game, for example the "R". In his “Blue Book” Wittgenstein criticized the notion of the Platonic Socrates, in order to be clear about the meaning of a general term, one must find the common element in all applications of the term. This idea has an inhibiting effect on philosophical investigations. Then, like Socrates, one ignores concrete cases as irrelevant, although such cases alone could help to understand the use of the general term.

Bertrand Russell treated the relationship between knowledge and perception according to Theaetetus in detail in his Philosophy of the West ( A History of Western Philosophy , 1945). He presented arguments against the separation of perception and knowledge called for by Plato's Socrates. Socrates' argument is only conclusive for formal knowledge in logic and mathematics that are not derived from perception.

Karl Popper , a sharp critic of Plato, described the Theaetetus as a great dialogue. He counted him to a group of dialogues whose ideas belonged more to the historical Socrates than to Plato.

Paul Feyerabend advocated in his book Science in a Free Society to the Theaetetus and fought relativism shown. Feyerabend found that the relativism of Plato's Protagoras was reasonable and wise, since it observed a multitude of traditions and values ​​and did not introduce any objective values. He is also civilized, since Protagoras does not assume "that the tiny village in which one lives is at the center of the world and that his strange customs are standards for all humanity".

Hans-Georg Gadamer called the Theaetetus one of the most difficult and profound dialogues of Plato. It is read like the basic book of ancient epistemology, but the modern concept of epistemology is determined by the primacy of consciousness and self-consciousness and thus points in a completely different direction than the considerations in Theaetetus . Gadamer emphasized the importance of the fact that Socrates discussed in this dialogue with mathematicians. He said that one could better understand Socrates' conversations, the use of “midwifery” and the behavior of Theodoros and Theaitetus if one took into account the mathematical way of thinking as a background.

In 1987 Hans Blumenberg published his study Das Lachen der Thrakerin. A prehistory of theory . In it he took the anecdote of the fall of the valley in the Digression des Theaetetos as his starting point. He addressed the contrast between the theoretician Thales and the Thracian woman with her distrust of the “theoretical machinations” and her laugh at the “setback of the theory on its operator”. This basic relationship will not disappear from the world, "even if one day the theoreticians degenerate into their majority". The modern producers of the product “theory” are much funnier than their ancient ancestor Thales. They too would find their “Thracians” where they weren't expecting them.

The in Theaitetos discussed error issue is for the modern analytical philosophy interesting from the standpoint of logical problems, resulting in mistaken identity assumptions ( "false identity beliefs"). This involves combinations of statements of the type (1) Socrates believes (mistakenly) that the person he sees in the distance is Theaetetus (although in reality it is Theodoros); (2) Socrates believes Theodorus is Theaetetus; (3) Socrates knows both Theodorus and Theaetetus very well; (4) Socrates does not believe that Theodorus is Theaetetus. If the assumption in (1) relates to the persons to whom, in the opinion of Socrates, it is related (the beheld person and Theaetetus), then (2) follows from (1). (1) and (3) can be true at the same time. But if (3) is the case, then (3) implies (4), i.e. the opposite of (2). The cause of the problem seems to lie in the fact that the correctness of the statement (5) “The assumptions of Socrates relate to what he believes they relate to” is assumed. Whether (5) is therefore wrong, as logicians believe in the direction that God praises Frege , is debatable.

Literary aspects

In 1805, the influential Plato translator Friedrich Schleiermacher expressed his appreciation of the literary quality. He found the "uniform design of the whole and the individual parts" was wonderfully artistic.

In 1919 the renowned Graecist and Plato connoisseur Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff criticized the composition of the dialogue, which he considered to be unfinished. Digression is characterized by abundance and brilliance and is nicely framed, part of the dialogue is richly animated and funny, but in the final part long stretches are dry and colorless. There, Socrates lectured despite his claim that he was only a helper in giving birth to strange thoughts. The work makes an unfinished impression.

The more recent judgments about the literary quality are mostly positive. In 1974, Olof Gigon found that the interplay of Socrates, Theodoros and Theaitetos was created with superior art. The two mathematicians are about to become equal partners of Socrates. Even Ernst Heitsch (1988) remarked praise. He said that you only get a glimpse of the artful nature of the dialogue on reading it a second time. However, the conduct of the conversation is extremely complex and difficult to see through at once. Just as a literary composition in need of Theaitetos of explanation. Michael Erler (2007) agreed with Heitsch, he also thought the composition was well thought out.

Editions and translations

Editions (partly with translation)

• Alexander Becker (Ed.): Plato: Theätet . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27009-7 (reprint of the edition by Auguste Diès, Paris 1926, without the critical apparatus, with a version of the translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher revised by Becker and a commentary by Becker)
• Gunther Eigler (Ed.): Plato: Works in eight volumes . Vol. 6, 4th edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2005, ISBN 3-534-19095-5 , pp. 1–217 (reprint of the critical edition by Auguste Diès with the translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher, 2nd edition, Berlin 1818)
• Winifred F. Hicken (Ed.): Theaitetos . In: Elizabeth A. Duke et al. (Ed.): Platonis opera , Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1995, ISBN 0-19-814569-1 , pp. 277-382 (authoritative critical edition)
• Ekkehard Martens (ed.): Plato: Theätet . Revised and supplemented edition, Reclam, Stuttgart 2012, ISBN 978-3-15-006338-5 (uncritical edition with translation)

Translations

• Otto Apelt : Plato: Theätet . In: Otto Apelt (Hrsg.): Platon: Complete Dialogues , Vol. 4, Meiner, Hamburg 2004, ISBN 3-7873-1156-4 (with introduction and explanations; reprint of the 4th edition, Leipzig 1923)
• Rudolf Rufener: Plato: Spätdialoge I (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 5). Artemis, Zurich / Munich 1974, ISBN 3-7608-3640-2 , pp. 3–124 (with introduction by Olof Gigon pp. XI – XXVI)
• Friedrich Schleiermacher: Theaetetos . In: Erich Loewenthal (Ed.): Platon: All works in three volumes , Vol. 2, unchanged reprint of the 8th, revised edition, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2004, ISBN 3-534-17918-8 , pp. 561–661

literature

Overview representations

• Michael Erler : Platon ( Outline of the history of philosophy . The philosophy of antiquity , edited by Hellmut Flashar , Vol. 2/2). Schwabe, Basel 2007, ISBN 978-3-7965-2237-6 , pp. 231-238, 637-641
• Mi-Kyoung Lee: The Theaetetus . In: Gail Fine (Ed.): The Oxford Handbook of Plato . Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008, ISBN 978-0-19-518290-3 , pp. 411-436
• Michel Narcy: Théétète . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, CNRS Éditions, Paris 2012, ISBN 978-2-271-07335-8 , pp. 686-700.

Comments

• Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxographie platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète . Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2012, ISBN 978-3-89665-552-3
• Alexander Becker (Ed.): Plato: Theätet . Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt am Main 2007, ISBN 978-3-518-27009-7 , pp. 225-381
• Seth Benardete : The Being of the Beautiful. Plato's Theaetetus, Sophist, and Statesman. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago / London 1984, ISBN 0-226-67037-6 , SI85-I.191
• Myles Burnyeat: The Theaetetus of Plato . Hackett, Indianapolis / Cambridge 1990, ISBN 0-915144-81-6
• Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus . Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2004, ISBN 3-89665-315-6
• John McDowell : Plato's Theaetetus . Clarendon Press, Oxford 1973, ISBN 0-19-872083-1
• Ronald M. Polansky: Philosophy and Knowledge. A Commentary on Plato's Theaetetus . Bucknell University Press, Lewisburg 1992, ISBN 0-8387-5215-2
• Paul Stern: Knowledge and Politics in Plato's Theaetetus . Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, ISBN 978-0-521-88429-7

Investigations

• Marcel van Ackeren : Knowledge of the good. Significance and continuity of virtuous knowledge in Plato's dialogues . Grüner, Amsterdam 2003, ISBN 90-6032-368-8 , pp. 226-258
• Rosemary Desjardins: The Rational Enterprise. Logos in Plato's Theaetetus. State University of New York Press, Albany 1990, ISBN 0-88706-837-5
• Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” . Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen 2001, ISBN 3-525-25225-0 ( digitized version )
• Ernst Heitsch : Plato's reflections in the theater. Franz Steiner, Stuttgart 1988, ISBN 3-515-05301-8
• David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism. Text and Subtext in Plato's Theaetetus. Clarendon Press, Oxford 2004, ISBN 0-19-926703-0

Collections of articles

• Giovanni Casertano (ed.): Il Teeteto di Platone: struttura e problematiche . Loffredo, Napoli 2002, ISBN 88-8096-884-X
• Dimitri El Murr (Ed.): La mesure du savoir. Études sur le Théétète de Plato . Vrin, Paris 2013, ISBN 978-2-7116-2495-9
• Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense . Oikoumene, Prague 2008, ISBN 978-80-7298-391-9
• Giuseppe Mazzara, Valerio Napoli (ed.): Platone. La teoria del sogno nel Teeteto. Atti del Convegno Internazionale Palermo 2008 . Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin 2010, ISBN 978-3-89665-498-4

Web links

Editions and translations

• Theaetetos , Greek text after the edition by John Burnet , 1900 ( Perseus Project )
• Theaitetos , German translation after Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited (opera-platonis.de)
• Theaitetos , German translation after Friedrich Schleiermacher ( Zeno.org )
• Theaitetos , German translation by Friedrich Schleiermacher ( Project Gutenberg-DE )

literature

• Timothy Chappell: Plato: Theaetetus. Commentary (old version, superseded by the print version published in 2004)
• Timothy Chappell:  Plato on Knowledge in the Theaetetus. In: Edward N. Zalta (Ed.): Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy .
• Zina Giannopoulou:  Entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy .

Remarks

1. ↑ Michel Narcy: Théétète . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 686–700, here: 688 f .; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 232; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 275-277, 320 f .; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, pp. 301-303.
2. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 210d.
3. ↑ Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 320.
4. ^ Plato, Theaetetus 144b – c.
5. ↑ Plato, Theaitetos 147c-d.
6. ^ Gustav Adolf Seeck : Plato's Theaetetus. A critical commentary , Munich 2010, pp. 9 f., 28 f., 81 f .; Thomas Alexander Szlezák : The image of the dialectician in Plato's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 92, 98, 114 f., 126 f .; to the Protagoras picture Joachim Dalfen : The Homo-mensura sentence of Protagoras in its historical context . In: Otto Neumaier (ed.): Is the human being the measure of all things? , Möhnesee 2004, pp. 1–16, here: 1–5, 16; Daniel Babut : Plato et Protagoras: the "Apologie" du sophiste dans le Théétète et son rôle dans le dialogue . In: Revue des études anciennes 84, 1982, pp. 49-86; Edward N. Lee: "Hoist with His Own Petard": Ironic and Comic Elements in Plato's Critique of Protagoras (Tht. 161-171) . In: Edward N. Lee et al. (Eds.): Exegesis and Argument , Assen 1973, pp. 225-261.
7. ↑ Eudemos of Rhodes, fragment DK 43 A 2.
8. ↑ See Kurt von Fritz : Theodoros (31) . In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 5 A / 2, Stuttgart 1934, Col. 1811-1825, here: 1811; Leonid Zhmud : Theodoros from Cyrene . In: Hellmut Flashar et al. (Ed.): Frühgriechische Philosophie , Basel 2013, pp. 420 f., Here: 420; Leonid Zhmud: Pythagoras and the Early Pythagoreans , Oxford 2012, p. 128.
9. ↑ See Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxographie platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète , Sankt Augustin 2012, p. 24 f.
10. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 165a.
11. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 145a, 169a.
12. ^ Plato, Theaetetos 145c – d.
13. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 2,103; 3.6.
14. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3.6.
15. ^ Kurt von Fritz: Theodoros (31) . In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Vol. 5 A / 2, Stuttgart 1934, Col. 1811-1825, here: 1811; Leonid Zhmud: Theodoros from Cyrene . In: Hellmut Flashar et al. (Ed.): Frühgriechische Philosophie , Basel 2013, p. 420 f., Here: 420.
16. ^ Iamblichos, De vita Pythagorica 267.
17. ^ Kurt von Fritz: Theodoros (31) . In: Pauly-Wissowa RE, Bd. 5 A / 2, Stuttgart 1934, Sp. 1811-1825, here: 1811 f .; Bartel Leendert van der Waerden : Awakening Science , 2nd, supplemented edition, Basel 1966, pp. 233–240, here: 233. Leonid Zhmud, however, comes to a different assessment: Theodoros from Kyrene . In: Hellmut Flashar et al. (Ed.): Frühgriechische Philosophie , Basel 2013, pp. 420 f.
18. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 165a.
19. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 146b.
20. ↑ On the dialogue figure Theodoros see Thomas Alexander Szlezák: Das Bild des Dialektikers in Platon's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 98-103; Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxographie platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète , Sankt Augustin 2012, pp. 22–31; Eugenio Benitez, Livia Guimaraes: Philosophy as Performed in Plato's Theaetetus . In: The Review of Metaphysics 47, 1993/1994, pp. 297-328, here: 303-305, 314.
21. ↑ See the historical Theaetetos Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 274–278.
22. ↑ Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 275; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: The image of the dialectician in Plato's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 103-109; Jill Gordon: Plato's Erotic World , Cambridge 2012, pp. 125-130; Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxographie platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète , Sankt Augustin 2012, pp. 32–38; Eugenio Benitez, Livia Guimaraes: Philosophy as Performed in Plato's Theaetetus . In: The Review of Metaphysics 47, 1993/1994, pp. 297-328, here: 301-303.
23. ↑ See on Eukleides Klaus Döring : Sokrates, die Sokratiker and the traditions established by them . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , vol. 2/1, Basel 1998, pp. 139–364, here: 207–212; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, pp. 144 f .; Robert Muller: Euclide de Mégare . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 3, Paris 2000, pp. 272-277.
24. ↑ See on Terpsion Michel Narcy: Théétète . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 686–700, here: 689 f .; Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 274.
25. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 142a – 143c. Cf. Zina Giannopoulou: Plato's Theaetetus as a Second Apology , Oxford 2013, pp. 20-26.
26. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 143c-144d.
27. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 144d-146c.
28. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 146c-147c. See David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 19-27; Zina Giannopoulou: Plato's Theaetetus as a Second Apology , Oxford 2013, pp. 29–33.
29. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 147c-148d. Cf. Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 28–39; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 27 f .; Zina Giannopoulou: Plato's Theaetetus as a Second Apology , Oxford 2013, pp. 33-37; Ivor Bulmer-Thomas : Theodorus of Cyrene . In: Dictionary of Scientific Biography , Vol. 13, New York 1976, pp. 314-319.
30. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 148e-149a.
31. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 149b-150a.
32. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 150a-151b.
33. ↑ Plato, Theaetetos 150a – 151d.
34. ↑ See on this term Michael Hoffmann: The emergence of order , Stuttgart 1996, p. 41 f., 47–55; Hans-Georg Gadamer: Collected Works , Vol. 7, Tübingen 1991, p. 297.
35. ↑ For the history of philosophy, see Uvo Hölscher : The Herakliteer in Plato's Theätet . In: Reiner Wiehl (ed.): The ancient philosophy in its meaning for the present , Heidelberg 1981, pp. 37–53.
36. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 151d-155c. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 53-71; Rosemary Desjardins: The Rational Enterprise , Albany 1990, pp. 16-27; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 51–60; Mi-Kyoung Lee: The Secret Doctrine: Plato's Defense of Protagoras in the Theaetetus . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 19, 2000, pp. 47–86. For the text of 155b1–2, see Denis O'Brien: Platon, Théétète 155 B 1–2: Une correction du texte . In: Revue des Études grecques 124, 2011, pp. 137–151.
37. ↑ Plato, Theaitetos 155c-d.
38. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 156a-157d. See Rosemary Desjardins: The Rational Enterprise , Albany 1990, pp. 34-54.
39. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 157e-158e.
40. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 158e-160e. See Marcel van Ackeren : The knowledge of the good , Amsterdam 2003, p. 234 f.
41. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 160e-171d. See Alex Long: Refutation and Relativism in Theaetetus 161–171 . In: Phronesis 49, 2004, pp. 24-40; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 54-62; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 73–82.
42. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 163a-164d, 169d-172b. See Timothy DJ Chappell: Reading the περιτροπή: Theaetetus 170c – 171c . In: Phronesis 51, 2006, pp. 109-137; Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 94-102, 108-120; Gail Fine: Plato on Knowledge and Forms , Oxford 2003, pp. 184-212; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 83–96.
43. ^ Plato, Theaetetus 172b – c.
44. ↑ See Zina Giannopoulou: The Digression in Plato's Theaetetus: Observations on its Thematic Structure and Philosophical Significance . In: Elenchos 23, 2002, pp. 75-88.
45. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 172c-175b.
46. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 172d-177a. Cf. on “Adjustment to God” Dietrich Roloff: God-similarity, deification and exaltation to blessed life , Berlin 1970, pp. 198–206; Florian Finck: Plato's justification of the soul in absolute thinking , Berlin 2007, pp. 243–247, 262–264; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 74-81; Zina Giannopoulou: Socrates and Godlikeness in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Journal of Philosophical Research 36, 2011, pp. 135-148.
47. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 173c-177b.
48. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 177c-179b. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 129-132; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 86-88; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 104–116.
49. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 179c-183c. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 133-140; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 89-99; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 117–124.
50. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 183c-186e. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 141–149; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 125–158.
51. ^ Plato, Theaetetos 187a – d. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 150–157.
52. ↑ Plato, Theaitetos 187e – 188c. See Timothy Chappell: The puzzle about the puzzle of false belief: Theaetetus 188a – c . In: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 45, 2001, pp. 97–111; Timothy Chappell: 188a – c: The Key to the Theaetetus . In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 203-216; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 120-125; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 162–171.
53. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 188c-189b. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 163-165; László Bene: False Judgment and the Puzzles about Not-Being: Theaetetus 188c – 189b . In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 217-249; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 125-127; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, p. 172 f.
54. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 189b-190e. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 166-171; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 127-134; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 173–175; Jan Szaif: Plato's Concept of Truth , Freiburg 1996, pp. 363–374.
55. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 190e-196d. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 172–183; Paolo Crivelli: Plato's waxing box . In: Wolfgang Detel et al. (Ed.): Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato , Stuttgart 2003, pp. 175-200; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 134-140; Ernst Heitsch: Plato's reflections in the Theaetet , Stuttgart 1988, pp. 114–122; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 176–189.
56. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 196d-199c. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 184–191; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 140-145; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 190–197.
57. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 199c-200d. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 184, 191 f .; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 145-149; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 199–205.
58. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 200d-201c. Cf. Franco Trabattoni: Theaetetus, 200d – 201c: Truth without Certainty . In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 250-273; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 149-151; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 206–215.
59. ^ Plato, Theaetetos 201c – d. See Ernst Heitsch: Theaetet 203c4–205e8 . In: Hermes 119, 1991, pp. 74-83, here: 76-78.
60. ↑ See on this designation Myles F. Burnyeat: The Material and Sources of Plato's Dream . In: Phronesis 15, 1970, pp. 101-122, here: 103-106. Cf. also on the motif of the dream and its meaning Piotr Pasterczyk: The Socratic Dream and the Problem of Dialectics in Theaetetos , Freiburg 2007, pp. 15–30.
61. ↑ For an understanding of the term “perceiving” in this context, see Gerold Prauss : Platon und der logische Eleatismus , Berlin 1966, pp. 171–173.
62. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 201c-202c. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 202-212; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 153-163; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 217-237.
63. ↑ Plato, Theaetetos 202c-206b. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 213-222; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 163-168.
64. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 206c-210a. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 223-235; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 168-178; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 267–288, 290 f.
65. ^ Plato, Theaetetus 210a – d.
66. ^ Myles Burnyeat: The Theaetetus of Plato , Indianapolis 1990, p. 8 f.
67. ↑ Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 48–52; Robin AH Waterfield (translator): Plato: Theaetetus , 2nd, supplemented edition, London 2004, pp. 159–163, 181–183; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 235; Ernst Heitsch: Plato's reflections in the Theaetet , Stuttgart 1988, pp. 44–47; Marcel van Ackeren: The knowledge of the good , Amsterdam 2003, p. 233, note 109; Jane M. Day: The Theory of Perception in Plato's Theaetetus 152-183 . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 15, 1997, pp. 51–80; Denis O'Brien: How Tall is Socrates? In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 55-119, here: 68-119.
68. ^ David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, p. 4 f .; Rosemary Desjardins: The Rational Enterprise , Albany 1990, p. 7 f .; Mary Louise Gill: Why Does Theaetetus' Final Definition of Knowledge Fail? In: Wolfgang Detel et al. (Ed.): Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato , Stuttgart 2003, pp. 159–173.
69. ↑ Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, p. 15.
70. ^ Dorothea Frede: The soul's silent dialogue. A non-aporetic reading of the Theaetetus . In: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philological Society New Series 35, 1989, pp. 20-49.
71. ^ Eugenio Benitez, Livia Guimaraes: Philosophy as Performed in Plato's Theaetetus . In: The Review of Metaphysics 47, 1993/1994, pp. 297-328, here: 299, 327 f.
72. ↑ See the research overview in Rosemary Desjardins: The Rational Enterprise , Albany 1990, pp. 8–13. See Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, p. 22 f .; David Bostock: Plato's Theaetetus , Oxford 1988, pp. 273 f .; Franco Trabattoni: Fondazionalismo o coerentismo? In margine alla terza definizione di ἐπιστήμη del Teeteto . In: Giuseppe Mazzara, Valerio Napoli (ed.): Platone. La teoria del sogno nel Teeteto , Sankt Augustin 2010, pp. 295-317.
73. ↑ See Ernst Heitsch: Considerations of Platons im Theaetet , Stuttgart 1988, pp. 9–17, 47–51; Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, p. 31 f .; Catherine Osborne: Knowledge is Perception. A Defense of Theaetetus . In: Wolfgang Detel et al. (Ed.): Ideal and Culture of Knowledge in Plato , Stuttgart 2003, pp. 133–158, here: 141–150; Robin AH Waterfield (translator): Plato: Theaetetus , 2nd, supplemented edition, London 2004, pp. 211–215, 235–237; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 233 f.
74. ↑ Overviews of the research debates are provided by Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 16–21 and Wolfgang Detel: Platon's Description of the Wrong Sentence in Theätet and Sophistes , Göttingen 1972, pp. 11–29. See also Denis O'Brien: How Tall is Socrates? In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 55–119, here: 70–78, 102 f., 118 f .; Franco Ferrari: Predicates or Ideas: The ontological status of the koina in Theaetetos . In: Aleš Havlíček, Filip Karfík (ed.): Plato's Theaetetus. Proceedings of the Sixth Symposium Platonicum Pragense , Prague 2008, pp. 160-179; Gokhan Adalier: The Case of Theaetetus . In: Phronesis 46, 2001, pp. 1-37; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, pp. 234–236; Dennys Garcia Xavier: Con Socrate oltre Socrate. Il Teeteto come esempio di teatro filosofico , Casoria 2011, pp. 55–66, 136–150 (representation from a Unitarian perspective); Henry Teloh: The Development of Plato's Metaphysics , University Park 1981, pp. 204-209 (presentation from a revisionist perspective); Allan Silverman: Flux and Language in the Theaetetus . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 18, 2000, pp. 109–152; Robin AH Waterfield (translator): Plato: Theaetetus , 2nd, supplemented edition, London 2004, pp. 239–246; Samuel C. Wheeler III: The Conclusion of the Theaetetus . In: History of Philosophy Quarterly 1, 1984, pp. 355-365.
75. ↑ See on this research debate Lloyd P. Gerson: Knowing Persons , Oxford 2003, pp. 194–238.
76. ^ Gilbert Ryle: Plato's Progress , Cambridge 1966, pp. 14-17.
77. ↑ Anne Balansard: Enquête sur la doxography platonicienne dans la première partie du Théétète , Sankt Augustin 2012, pp 9-15 (research summary).
78. ^ Gilbert Ryle: Logical Atomism in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Phronesis 35, 1990, pp. 21-46.
79. ↑ Michael-Thomas Liske: The veritative 'is' and the logical atomism in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Archive for the history of philosophy 70, 1988, pp. 147–166, here: 162–166.
80. ↑ See on this distinction Klaus Döring: Socrates, the Socratics and the traditions established by them . In: Hellmut Flashar (ed.): Sophistik, Sokrates, Sokratik, Mathematik, Medizin ( Outline of the history of philosophy. The philosophy of antiquity , Vol. 2/1), Basel 1998, pp. 139–364, here: 159f. , 164. See David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 30-35; Zina Giannopoulou: Plato's Theaetetus as a Second Apology , Oxford 2013, pp. 40–47.
81. ↑ Marcel van Ackeren : The knowledge of the good , Amsterdam 2003, pp. 243-253; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 100-103; Rachel Rue: The Philosopher in Flight: The Digression (172 C - 177 C) in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 11, 1993, pp. 71-100.
82. ^ Zina Giannopoulou: Socrates and Godlikeness in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Journal of Philosophical Research 36, 2011, pp. 135–148, here: 136 f .; Thomas Alexander Szlezák: The image of the dialectician in Plato's late dialogues , Berlin 2004, pp. 121–124. Cf. Maria Schwartz: Der philosophische bios in Platon , Freiburg 2013, pp. 245–248.
83. ↑ Anna Lännström: Socrates, the philosopher in the Theaetetus digression (172c-177c), and the ideal of homoiosis theoi . In: Apeiron 44, 2011, pp. 111-130.
84. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 171a – b.
85. ↑ Plato, Theaetetus 171b.
86. ↑ Alexander Becker (Ed.): Platon: Theätet , Frankfurt am Main 2007, pp. 293–295; Luca Castagnoli: Protagoras Refuted . In: Topoi 23, 2004, pp. 3-32; Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, pp. 111-117; Richard Bemelmans: Why Does Protagoras Rush Off? Self-Refutation and Haste in Plato, Theaetetus 169a – 171d . In: Ancient Philosophy 22, 2002, pp. 75–86; Margarita Kranz: Das Wissen des Philosophen , Tübingen 1986, pp. 22-25; Jörg Hardy: Plato's theory of knowledge in the “Theaitet” , Göttingen 2001, pp. 83–96; Marcel van Ackeren: The knowledge of the good , Amsterdam 2003, p. 239 f .; Zina Giannopoulou: Objectivizing Protagorean Relativism: The Socratic Underpinnings of Protagoras' Apology in Plato's Theaetetus . In: Ancient Philosophy 29, 2009, pp. 67-88; Gail Fine: Relativism and Self-Refutation . In: Jyl Gentzler (Ed.): Method in Ancient Philosophy , Oxford 1998, pp. 137–163.
87. ↑ For a discussion of this question, see Debra Nails: The People of Plato , Indianapolis 2002, p. 282; Ludger Hellweg: Mathematical irrationality in Theodoros and Theaetetos. An attempt to regain their theories , Frankfurt am Main 1994, pp. 5-87; Bartel Leendert van der Waerden: Awakening Science , 2nd, supplemented edition, Basel 1966, pp. 233–240; Walter Burkert : Wisdom and Science , Nuremberg 1962, p. 439, note 105.
88. ↑ Holger Thesleff: Theaitetos and Theodoros . In: Arctos 24, 1990, pp. 147-159, here: 151-153.
89. ↑ Árpád Szabó: Beginnings of Greek Mathematics , Munich / Vienna 1969, pp. 69–111.
90. ^ Myles F. Burnyeat: The Philosophical Sense of Theaetetus' Mathematics . In: Isis 69, 1978, pp. 489-513 (on the history of research, pp. 490 f.). See Holger Thesleff: Theaitetos and Theodoros . In: Arctos 24, 1990, pp. 147-159, here: 154.
91. ↑ Michel Narcy: Théétète . In: Richard Goulet (ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 686–700, here: 687; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, pp. 1-3.
92. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 232; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 300.
93. ↑ Michel Narcy: Théétète . In: Richard Goulet (Ed.): Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques , Vol. 5, Part 1, Paris 2012, pp. 686–700, here: 687 f .; Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 232; Antonio Carlini: Il commento anonimo al 'Teeteto' e il testo di Platone . In: Storia, poesia e pensiero nel mondo antico , Napoli 1994, pp. 83-91, here: 83-87; William KC Guthrie : A History of Greek Philosophy , Vol. 5, Cambridge 1978, p. 62; Holger Thesleff: Platonic Patterns , Las Vegas 2009, p. 328 f.
94. ^ Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 1, Vol. 1 ***, Firenze 1999, pp. 466-474.
95. ^ Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 1, Vol. 1 ***, Firenze 1999, pp. 521-523 and Part 3, Firenze 1995, pp. 244-246.
96. ↑ Oxford, Bodleian Library , Clarke 39 (= "Codex B" of the Plato textual tradition).
97. ↑ Alexander Becker (Ed.): Platon: Theätet , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 382.
98. ^ Anthony A. Long: Zeno's epistemology and Plato's Theaetetus . In: Theodore Scaltsas, Andrew S. Mason (eds.): The Philosophy of Zeno , Larnaca 2002, pp. 115-131.
99. ↑ Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, p. 22; Alexander Becker (Ed.): Platon: Theätet , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 382 f .; Heinrich Dörrie , Matthias Baltes : Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 200.
100. ↑ Diogenes Laertios 3: 56–58.
101. ^ František Novotný: The Posthumous Life of Plato , Den Haag 1977, p. 98 f.
102. ↑ See also Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini (CPF) , Part 3, Firenze 1995, pp. 227-562 (with a critical edition, investigation and an extensive bibliography by Guido Bastianini and David N. Sedley).
103. ↑ Plutarch, Platonicae quaestiones 1. For Plutarch's Theaetetos reception, see Harold Tarrant: Plato's First Interpreters , Ithaca 2000, pp. 173–175.
104. ↑ Alkinous, Didaskalikos 2,2; 4.5; 28.
105. ^ Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann : Philosophy lessons and hermeneutics in Neoplatonism . In: Ada Neschke-Hentschke (Ed.): Argumenta in dialogos Platonis , Part 1, Basel 2010, pp. 119–148, here: 123–125.
106. ↑ Alexander Becker (Ed.): Platon: Theätet , Frankfurt am Main 2007, p. 386; David Sedley: The Midwife of Platonism , Oxford 2004, p. 62 f. and note 11.
107. ↑ Hubert Merki: Ὁμοίωσις θεῷ. From the Platonic assimilation to God to God-likeness in Gregor von Nyssa , Freiburg (Switzerland) 1952, pp. 18-25. On Plotin's relationship to Theaetetus, see Sara Magrin: Plotin et la “doctrine secrète” . In: Dimitri El Murr (ed.): La mesure du savoir , Paris 2013, pp. 335–378, here: 335–373.
108. ↑ Prolegomena to the Philosophy of Plato 26, ed. von Leendert G. Westerink : Prolégomènes à la philosophie de Platon , Paris 1990, p. 40.
109. ↑ Heinrich Dörrie, Matthias Baltes: Platonism in antiquity , Vol. 3, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt 1993, p. 201.
110. ^ František Novotný: The Posthumous Life of Plato , Den Haag 1977, p. 137.
111. ^ František Novotný: The Posthumous Life of Plato , Den Haag 1977, p. 196 f.
112. ^ See on the reception of the anecdote in the Christian milieu, Hans Blumenberg: Das Lachen der Thrakerin , Frankfurt am Main 1987, pp. 42–56.
113. ↑ The introduction is edited by Burkhard Mojsisch : Marsilius Ficinus: In Theaetetum Platonis vel De scientia ad Petrum Medicem, patriae patrem, Epitome . In: Bochumer Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 1, 1996, pp. 179–194 (subsequently pp. 195–215 translation).
114. ^ Benson Mates : Leibniz and the Phaedo . In: Files of the II. International Leibniz Congress Hanover, 17. – 22. July 1972 , Wiesbaden 1973, pp. 135–148, here: 144.
115. ↑ George Berkeley: Siris 253, 304 f., 311, 348, 367.
116. ^ Paul Shorey: What Plato said , Chicago 1933, p. 269.
117. ^ Francis M. Cornford: Plato's Theory of Knowledge , London 1935.
118. ^ Myles Burnyeat: The Theaetetus of Plato , Indianapolis / Cambridge 1990.
119. ↑ Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Spätdialoge I (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 5), Zurich 1974, pp. V – LI, here: XI, XIX.
120. ↑ Michel Narcy: Plato, Victor Cousin et la philosophie française . In: Michael Erler, Ada Neschke-Hentschke (Ed.): Argumenta in dialogos Platonis , Part 2, Basel 2012, pp. 103–126, here: 111–114, 118.
121. ^ Paul Natorp: Plato's theory of ideas , 3rd edition, Darmstadt 1961 (first published in 1903), pp. 97, 101, 111-113, 115 f. See to Natorp. Theaitetos -Interpretation Alan Kim: Plato in Germany , Sankt Augustin 2010, pp 104-114.
122. ^ Ferdinand CS Schiller: Plato or Protagoras? , Oxford / London 1908.
123. ↑ Martin Heidegger: On the essence of truth. On Plato's allegory of the cave and Theätet (= Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe , Vol. 34), Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 149–158.
124. ↑ Martin Heidegger: On the essence of truth. On Plato's allegory of the cave and Theätet (= Martin Heidegger: Gesamtausgabe , Vol. 34), Frankfurt am Main 1988, pp. 318–322.
125. ↑ Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations 46 f. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Blue Book. A Philosophical Contemplation (Das Braune Buch) , Frankfurt am Main 1984, p. 121; Timothy Chappell: Reading Plato's Theaetetus , Sankt Augustin 2004, p. 35 f.
126. ↑ Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Investigations 47-50.
127. ↑ Ludwig Wittgenstein: The Blue Book. A Philosophical Contemplation (The Brown Book) , Frankfurt am Main 1984, p. 40 f.
128. ↑ Bertrand Russell: A History of Western Philosophy , New York 1945, pp. 149–159.
129. ^ Karl Popper: The open society and their enemies , vol. 1, 7th edition, Tübingen 1992, pp. 417-419; see. P. 357.
130. ^ Paul Feyerabend: Knowledge for free people , changed edition, Frankfurt 1981, p. 69.
131. ^ Hans-Georg Gadamer: Mathematics and Dialectics in Plato (1982) . In: Hans-Georg Gadamer: Gesammelte Werke , Vol. 7, Tübingen 1991, pp. 290-312.
132. ↑ Hans Blumenberg: The Laughter of the Thracian Woman. A prehistory of theory , Frankfurt am Main 1987, p. 1.
133. ^ Terry Penner: The Wax Tablet, logic and Protagoreanism . In: George Boys-Stones u. a. (Ed.): The Platonic Art of Philosophy , Cambridge 2013, pp. 186–220.
134. ^ Friedrich Schleiermacher: Theaetetos. Introduction . In: Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher: About the philosophy of Plato , ed. by Peter M. Steiner, Hamburg 1996, pp. 194–206, here: 199.
135. ^ Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff: Platon. His life and his works , 5th edition, Berlin 1959 (1st edition Berlin 1919), pp. 405 f., 414 and Plato. Supplements and text criticism , 4th edition, Dublin / Zurich 1969 (1st edition Berlin 1919), pp. 230–232, 235–237.
136. ↑ Olof Gigon: Introduction . In: Plato: Spätdialoge I (= anniversary edition of all works , vol. 5), Zurich 1974, pp. V – LI, here: X.
137. ↑ Ernst Heitsch: Plato's reflections in the Theaetet , Stuttgart 1988, pp. 19, 30.
138. ↑ Michael Erler: Platon , Basel 2007, p. 233.

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