Ought claim

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The moral-philosophical expression " ought" characterizes that property of moral norms which distinguishes them from descriptions and constitutes their moral obligation, an ought, to one or every person concerned. Almost always with the expression “ought to claim” in the sense of Kant was connected with the thesis that this had to be understood as categorical, unconditional, non-derivable and universal. The term was used more frequently, especially in the wake of Kant and in deontologically oriented theological ethics from the 1970s.

The factual questions associated with the term “ought” concern on the one hand the formal property of moral norms in contrast to descriptions, for example, but also norms of etiquette and politeness, on the other hand also the problem of where a moral claim comes from or where the moral ought is based.

Moral norms as categorical imperatives

Moral norms can be understood as being relative to certain purposes, desires, interests, preferences or the like. One then usually analyzes moral norms as hypothetical imperatives: if someone wants x, then he should do y. Whoever does not want x is therefore not subject to any moral ought regarding y. In most cases, representatives of such analyzes did not claim that there were also universal values, goals, preferences or the like, which anyone who only wants something can act in a rationally considered manner or "use their reason", and already wants as such. It is different with Kant and many deontological ethicists.

Kant rejected an analysis of moral norms as hypothetical imperatives. According to Kant, moral demands apply independently of every subjectively chosen goal of a person. Moral norms thus have the status of binding universally and independently of all specific circumstances. Kant therefore calls them categorical. Moral norms cannot be derived through judgments of the mind.

In the wake of Kant, his ethics have often been characterized as trying to justify an “unconditional ought” claim. Martin Heidegger, for example, in his introduction to metaphysics, also related the expression “ought to claim” to Kant; The title of the sub-section, "Limitation of Being" (with regard to the concepts of becoming, appearing, thinking and even ought) anticipates the thrust: "In the course of the 19th century, beings in the Kantian sense , what can be experienced for the sciences, wins , to which the history and economics are added, the decisive priority. Due to the predominance of beings, the ought is endangered in its standard role. The ought must assert itself in its claim. It has to try to be grounded in itself. What wants to express an ought claim in itself must of itself be entitled to it. Such things as ought can only emanate from something that makes such a claim of itself, that has a value in itself, is itself a value . The values ​​themselves now become the reason for the ought. However, since the values face the being of beings in the sense of the facts, they can not even turn his . One therefore says: they apply. The values ​​are decisive for all areas of being, that is, of what is present. History is nothing other than the realization of values. "

In describing the profile of Kant's ethics, the phrase of an “unconditional ought” has been used since the 1980s and especially among theological ethicists. Even Herbert Schnädelbach formulated in this sense: "Kant asserts that our own reason itself is practical in the sense that they themselves raises us an indisputable, unconditional Sollensanspruch and that this Sollensanspruch" in the form of the categorical imperative Act so that the maxim of your will could at any time also apply as a principle of general legislation! " a “fact of pure practical reason” [...] is “Micha H. Werner, for example, also formulates that Kant's moral principle represents an“ imperative that appears with an unconditional ought ”.

Theological ethics

Franz Böckle , who, like Alfons Auer, established a model of an autonomous moral justification within theological ethics, formulates in his main work: “In the understanding of the belief in creation, the unconditional ought claim is nothing other than the dependence of a personal free self, which is totally free in this freedom it is claimed to be able to dispose of oneself in freedom. ”It can be particularly emphasized that an unconditional ought claim cannot be redeemed for finite subjects, not only with regard to ethics, but also with regard to the realization of human existence, which can be theologically qualified. For example Herbert Vorgrimler : “The infinite horizon of its activity means that spiritual personhood in knowledge and freedom is aimed at perfection (finality), which it can never achieve on its own, because in death this existential u. Must give up form of activity; even in its ethical ought it does not reach the desired completion (happiness), because it never fully lives up to the ought claim. ”Here some theologians have seen parallels to Emmanuel Levinas .

Whether the should-be claim lies in the content of a norm or is added to it as a formal element is seen differently, the former, for example, is represented by Th. Steinbüchel, the latter by A. Stöckl.

In modern moral philosophy, the most varied of models have been proposed in order to justify an ought claim addressed to the respective subject or other subjects, including, for example, by Alan Gewirth , whose argumentation shows some parallels to that of Immanuel Kant , and in moral theology, for example, by Dietmar Mieth and Klaus Steigleder was picked up.

The Tübingen moral theologian Dietmar Mieth, a student of Auer, considers the Kantian unconditionality of concrete ethical norms based on material to be too strong at some points, for example if it violates the principle “ought requires ability”. He also reminds us that categorical norms are often inapplicable to individual cases. Rather, the actual moral questions often represent preferential judgments in the case of a specific conflict of values, where models can help, but no content-related categorical demands. In addition to a so-called “model ethic”, he represents a “narrative ethic” in the wake of u. a. by Paul Ricœur , who emphasizes the difficulty of constituting an identity of the subject in general or of subjecting it to general standards of testing rationality; Against a one-sided view of moral unconditionality, he also emphasizes aspirational ethical dimensions: "The concept of moral identity therefore contains the dialectical interplay between aspirational ethical orientation and moral ought, which is reflected on the level of ethical theory as a dialectic of morality and morality."

See also

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ For example in F. Böckle, K. Steigleder u. a. For example, W. Korff also speaks: responsibility ethics. In: LThK . Volume 3, No. 10, p. 601 abruptly from a “general ought” claim.
  2. ↑ GA . Volume 40, p. 151.
  3. ↑ One example among many: R. Langthaler: On the interpretation and criticism of the Kantian philosophy of religion in Jürgen Habermas. In: R. Langthaler, H. Nagl-Docekal (Ed.): Belief and knowledge. A symposium with Jürgen Habermas. Oldenbourg, Vienna 2007, ISBN 978-3-7029-0549-1 , p. 32.
  4. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Reason. In: Ekkehard Martens, Herbert Schnädelbach (Ed.): Philosophy A basic course. Volume 1, Rowohlt, Hamburg 1985, pp. 77-115, here 98
  5. ^ Deontological theories. In: Paul Van Tongeren , Jean-Pierre Wils (ed.): Lexicon for philosophical and theological ethics.
  6. ↑ Franz Böckle: Fundamental Morality . Kösel, Munich 1977, ISBN 3-466-20124-1 , p. 90.
  7. ↑ man. In: Herbert Vorgrimler: Theological dictionary. Herder, Freiburg 2000, ISBN 3-451-27430-3 , p. 409.
  8. ↑ For example Georg Schwind: The other and the unconditional. Initiatives from Maurice Blondel and Emmanuel Levinas for the current theological discussion. Pustet, Regensburg 2000, ISBN 3-7917-1695-6 , p. 205.
  9. ^ A. Saberschinsky: Norm. In: Philosophical Lexicon of Basic Theological Concepts. P. 298.
  10. ↑ Morality and Experience. Volume 1, p. 163.

literature

Kant
  • JE Atwell: Ends and principles in Kant's Moral Thought. Dordrecht 1986, DNB 1010831879 .
  • J. Ebbinghaus: The formulas of the categorical imperative and the derivation of content-related duties. In: J. Ebbinghaus: Collected essays, lectures and speeches. Darmstadt 1968, DNB 456501908 , pp. 140-160.
  • G. Nakhnikian: Kant's theory of Hypothetical Imperatives. In: Kant studies. Volume 83, 1992.
  • HJ Paton: The Categorical Imperative. A study in Kant's moral philosophy. Philadelphia 1948.
  • G. Patzig : The Categorical Imperative in the Ethics Discussion of the Present. In: Günther Patzig: facts, norms, sentences. Reclam, Stuttgart 1980, ISBN 3-15-009986-2 , pp. 155-177.
  • Dieter Schönecker, Allen W. Wood: Immanuel Kant, "Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals". An introductory comment. 2nd Edition. Schöningh, Paderborn 2004, ISBN 3-8252-2276-4 .
  • H. Stratton-Lake: Formulating Categorical Imperatives. In: Kant studies. Volume 83, 1993, pp. 317-340.
  • H. Wagner: Kant's concept of hypothetical imperatives. In: Kant studies. Volume 85, 1994, pp. 78-84.