Herbert Schnädelbach

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Herbert Schnädelbach, 2007
Panel discussion in Berlin, 2013

Herbert Schnädelbach (born August 6, 1936 in Altenburg , Thuringia ) is a German philosopher . He was Professor of Philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin and President of the General Society for Philosophy . His “methodical-rational philosophy of conversation” includes contributions to the development of discourse and social philosophy , to the construction of philosophical theories of rationality , to the differentiation of historicism and to the establishment of a language-pragmatic epistemology . He participates in social debates on atheism , free will, values ​​and the communicative concept of action .

Life

Herbert Schnädelbach moved to Breslau with the von Altenburg family at the age of two . He spent his school days in Breslau, Leipzig, Bad Bergzabern and Landau in the Palatinate. There he passed his Abitur in 1955.

Schnädelbach studied philosophy, sociology, German, history and musicology at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main . He worked as a research assistant at the Philosophical Seminar from 1962 to 1966. In 1965 he received his doctorate with a dissertation on Hegel's theory of subjective freedom in philosophy. Schnädelbach received a grant from the German Research Foundation. In 1970 he completed his habilitation with the writing Experience, Justification and Reflection. Try on Positivism . The work has been reviewed by Theodor W. Adorno . After his death, Jürgen Habermas supervised the habilitation process.

Herbert Schnädelbach taught as a professor of philosophy from 1971 to 1978 in Frankfurt am Main with a focus on the philosophy of history , philosophy of science and discourse analysis . At times he was also dean. He then moved to the University of Hamburg , where he took on a professorship with a focus on social philosophy .

Between 1988 and 1990 Schnädelbach was President of the General Society for Philosophy in Germany . In 1990 he organized their XV. Congress “Philosophy of the Present - Present of Philosophy”. In 1993 he was appointed to the Humboldt University in Berlin . There he took over the chair for theoretical philosophy . Schnädelbach played a key role in rebuilding the Institute for Philosophy. He dealt with analytical language philosophy , discourse and rationality theories and dealt with Hegel. Of his sixtieth birthday, the commemorative appeared yourself in thinking oriented . In 2000 he published his three-volume work Hegel's Philosophy. Comments on the major works . Schnädelbach's students include Micha Brumlik , Simone Dietz , Kathrin Glüer , Heiner Hastedt , Geert Keil , Christian Thies , Udo Tietz, Anke Thyen and Mark Young. In 2002 he retired.

Schnädelbach describes himself as an atheist. His newspaper article The Curse of Christianity. The seven birth defects of a world religion that has grown old in the weekly newspaper Die Zeit triggered a national controversy in 2000. Through lectures, newspaper articles, interviews and numerous publications, Schnädelbach has become known to a wider public beyond the professional world. In 2012 he received the Tractatus Prize .

He is married and lives in Hamburg .

philosophy

Trained mainly in critical theory , Schnädelbach does not belong to any particular school. He published numerous papers on GWF Hegel and developed a "distinction theory of discourse confusion" ( Reflexion und Diskurs , 1977): By analytically differentiating between intertwined discourse moments, validity claims can be examined critically.

Understanding of philosophy

Schnädelbach emphasizes the plurality of philosophy as her strength and understands it as an ongoing critical conversation in the field of tension between enlightenment and science . He advocates a strong claim to truth in philosophy, differentiates between philosophy and pseudo-philosophy and seeks confrontation with colleagues who, in his opinion, leave the framework of plurality and ruin philosophy without a sense of responsibility.

“Philosophy is a plural; their inner plurality is their strength. One reason for this lies in the dual character with which it emerged in the West - as science and enlightenment. Knowledge of the world and self-interpretation, objective theorizing and subjective orientation - the legacy of Aristotle and Socrates - have repeatedly entered into new constellations in our tradition. This is one of the reasons why today we always have to refer the need for clarification to the sciences at the same time - here m. E. Decided on the difference between philosophy and pseudophilosophy - as, conversely, in the sciences we have to warn and encourage processes of enlightenment. But philosophy is also plural in substance, if we understand it as the epitome of attempts at thought orientation in the area of ​​the principles of our thinking, knowing and acting. [...] Here we will make use of the most diverse aids - not just what historical- hermeneutical science gives us ; Monopolies are counterproductive in philosophy too. As diverse and varied as the expectations that are brought to us, we have to be as imaginative and flexible when it comes to whether we are responsible for fulfilling them or disappointing them. "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

Children also philosophize, but in the institution of science philosophers have the task of developing the subject of philosophy "responsibly" and not "ruining" it. If the experts' “supposed philosophizing” does not stand up to his demands for enlightenment and science and consequently reaches or exceeds the boundaries of the plural defined by him, then Schnädelbach provokes conflicts and carries them out. In the context of his farewell lecture in 2002 Schnädelbach called those who belong to the conversation of philosophy, but who stand on the fringes “disappoint”, as “the monologues”, phenomenologists and crypto-theologians ”of (pseudo-) philosophy. With this he does not turn against all phenomenologists and theologians, but wants to use these characterizations to show the limits of philosophizing. The accusation of “pseudophilosophy” in this connection goes back to Schnädelbach's assessment that there is a tendency towards increasing “spiritual science” in professional philosophy (which is also lamented in other subjects). Therefore, with the “dual character” of philosophy, he emphasizes what, in his opinion, is rather neglected Enlightenment . "The appropriate relationship between science and enlightenment is perhaps what we are looking for under the word wisdom ."

Although Schnädelbach's philosophy has no original subject area, it follows the Aristotelian triad in terms of its specific relation to the world , which changed with Kant and Wittgenstein (physics> knowledge, ethics / actions, logic> communication). In his remarks “On the philosophical determination of place” he criticizes the disparate parts of what develops under the concept of philosophy in relation to the respective orientation principles in the Orient and Occident as “a culture of thoughtfulness”. Through the philosophical enlightenment, the meaning of philosophy is fulfilled (benefits, results, etc.), while the connection of the enlightenment to science ensures the validity of its statements. He understands “pseudophilosophy” not only in terms of world views, esotericism , “basic ignorance” (it-is-as-as-it is) / - essentialism or “truisms”. In view of the many “philosophies” he vehemently advocates a normative concept of philosophy by calling for “clarifying issues” and “intersubjective validity claims”. Under the latter he sums up an intersubjective connectivity in science, which he denies to all theses of “declamatory and philosophical geniuses”, which he sees embodied by Heidegger , Adorno or Sloterdijk . The institution of philosophy often fails to derive its ( exegetical ) work topics from a primary reference to current practice with the help of explanatory factual questions.

method

Schnädelbach advocates a methodical-rational discussion philosophy that is theoretically based on analysis of reflection, discourse and rationality. He formulates the central thesis that “the” philosophy is a conversation , it analyzes discourses (or conversations) according to typological differences, (reflection) methods, in relation to factual problems and with a formal (not just hermeneutical or linguistic) distinction discursive-normative validity claims. As a result, it is identified as “a” philosophy, namely as one that deals with “the” conversation with its respective factual references “with” validity and rationality claims. His philosophy is both metaphilosophy ('Philosophy of Philosophy', the question of the foundations of reason and the 'Philosophy-as-Conversation' thesis) and a reflection of individual philosophies. Schnädelbach nevertheless believes that philosophy as a whole does not have an original topic of discussion (which is why for a while he opposed the award of philosophical chairs). He does not want to commit himself in his topics of conversation, does not specialize and opposes non-self-determined specialization repercussions on the philosophizing person. Nevertheless, his philosophy with regard to its procedures and orientations, its results and effects can be typologically grasped in the following.

According to Schnädelbach, “the” philosophy is a conversation because those involved in the philosophical conversation are “in” the chaos of the conversation, cannot end it and are conducted freely through “the” conversation in “its” direction, even against one planned direction. This direction only arises “as a result of our doing and not doing”. His conversation philosophy should clarify why "the" philosophy cannot necessarily have an original subject area, as Minerva's owl is referred to the gray on gray of retrospective reflections and can guess at the next result of her investigations, but cannot definitely predict it. Schnädelbach expands the conversation as a “field of tension between the first and second person” (I / you, we / her and vice versa ) to include a “third dimension”, the supposed “thing” (the subject of conversation) and explains the concept of conversation in isolation to dialogue and discourse . His argument is based on his classification of philosophy under a systematic validity claim. He therefore considers the Socratic - Platonic dialogue (Socratic, Maieutic, etc.) to be one-sidedly propaedeutic , without (empirical-Aristotelian) science it is limited to the explication of concepts. The Foucault discourse also lacks the more general validity claim because of its subjectless forms of discourse, which are reminiscent of a Wittgensteinian language game.

Schnädelbach strives for a renewed form of traditional philosophy ( dialogue , rationalism, etc.), which proceeds systematically by means of the orientational achievements of reason, whereby in his early work he refers more to 'discourse' and later to 'conversation' (or uses the terms synonymously). The course of discourse or conversation in philosophy in the second half of the 20th century - in North America (linguistic /) pragmatic and in Europe (linguistic) hermeneutic - is the context of his philosophy. He wants to point out the inadequacies of this process - like Noam Chomsky and later Niklas Luhmann and Jürgen Habermas . Like these, he directs the attention to the linguistic turn and the “communication paradigm” in philosophy and participates in further developing the semantics of their terms. In Schnädelbach's work, these are mainly complex summations and typological theories on knowledge, normativity and cultural history - the latter with several essays in particular on religion and belief - of (post) modernism .

Methodical-rational foundation

Reason reflection and the theory of rationality

Schnädelbach, freely based on Hegel and Goethe, predicted a contribution to Paul Feyerabend's philosophy published in 1980 :

"Despise only reason or science or both, man's highest gifts - so you have surrendered to the devil and must perish."

- Herbert Schnädelbach

He places himself in the tradition of man as animal rational , endowed with his logos , which has existed since antiquity and which was further developed in particular in rationalism , idealism and following the linguistic turn . In Immanuel Kant Schnädelbach sees the true philosopher of modernity, whose critical philosophy takes into account the finitude of human reason. When examining what is reasonable (rational), he refers to Kant's critique of reason in and by means of reason. In doing so, he comes to a revision of Hegel's criticism of Kant, while at the same time preserving his approach that we are always in reflection.

Schnädelbach's concern is the "rehabilitation" of the animal rationale , which he not only pursues in his 1992 essay and essay volume of the same name. His work on the philosophy of conversation contains numerous other essays on rationality theory. It stands in the context of other theories of rationality which - partly based on discourse theoretical and economic theories - were presented in the 1980s in particular ( Karl-Otto Apel , Jürgen Habermas , Wolfgang Kuhlmann ). This is also seen as a reaction to postmodern approaches, where the reference to reason was often discredited by numerous philosophers with a poststructuralist appeal to Nietzsche . Schnädelbach, on the other hand, was appointed to a “rationality project” in Berlin, where, as defender of the animal rationale in 1998, he presented the positive “outline” of a contemporary theory of rationality.

Schnädelbach's controversial essay Rationality Types appeared in 1998. Schnädelbach differentiates between three essential types of rationality, namely the object-language rationality ( justification ), the discursive rationality ( argumentation ) and the rule rationality ( rule sequences ). Justification and reasoning presuppose the rational ability to follow rules. Rationality is the elementary type of rationality. The ability to distinguish cases from right from cases from wrong belongs to rule-following . The consequence of rules is the ability to produce candidates for validity. It is about propositional content such as meaningful utterances, judgments and intentional actions. According to Schnädelbach, the sequence of rules is a condition for the comprehensibility of behavior. In terms of justifications, he classifies cognitive, normative, epistemic and intentional justification types.

Discourse plurality and confusion of discourse

According to Schnädelbach, philosophical riddles often arise from the amalgamation of different types of discourse. He differentiates between descriptive, normative and explicative discourse. In his studies on reflection , which make up a good third of his main work, Reflection and Discourse , published in 1977, Schnädelbach, like the proponents of the linguistic turn (and partly their late medieval forerunners), opposes the view that sentences before or after thinking stand. Like the supporters of the pragmatic turn of the philosophy of language, he comes to the conclusion that reference points do not have “a” imagined meaning, but only that of “normal” sentences. He rejects Descartes ' mirror metaphors as well as Husserl's corresponding views. Schnädelbach arranges the reflection phenomena typologically, as in his philosophy of rationality: with "Kant I" empirically, logically and transcendentally ("transcendental" as "semiotic" as in Apels' transcendental pragmatics) and with "Kant II" phenomenologically, theoretically and in terms of meaning . With his discourse theory, he strives for the development of 'reflection' as a “methodological pattern” of philosophy in general. He does not start with the discourses of society, but with those of philosophy.

“Regardless of the status of a discourse theory as a philosophical theory - whether defined with Habermas by the universal or with Apel by the transcendental character of language pragmatics to which that discourse theory belongs: the pragmatic introductory context makes this theory attractive as a basis for reformulating the mentalistic reflection concepts. When they spoke of 'consciousness' in the sense of a domain category, this expression always includes subject, activity and object of consciousness at the same time . These three aspects of a comprehensive respect [...] remain unabridged in linguistic pragmatics: as speaker, speaking process and what is spoken . Consciousness and acts of consciousness find their analogy in the competence and the performance of the speaker. "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

According to Schnädelbach's diagnosis, the “previous” theory of discourse was partly irreflexive and not completely suitable for a reconstruction of traditional reflection concepts, because it did not contain its own metalanguage and instead, in contrast to Niklas Luhmann, specialized in validity-theoretical contexts and neglected questions of logic.

According to Schnädelbach, philosophical reflection, which helps to create forms capable of reaching a consensus, is based on an intersubjectively reconstructable rationalism, which is to be distinguished from different positions of intuitionism and which methodically reconstructs its thematic subject on the level of pragmatic meaning explications in the form of sentence-like facts. In his view, philosophy in a “radicalized” modernity, which he describes as the semantic tense of an irreversible permanent crisis, can only develop in the pluralities of discourse if it includes questions of validity from the outset.

His systematic design of a plurality of discourses should not be confused with unrestricted pluralism , rather he differentiates between an unproblematic “discourse link” and the problematic “discourse confusion”. Following the remarks on the naturalistic fallacy of George Edward Moore and the concept of category error of Gilbert Ryle describes Schnädelbach the (pragmatic) logics of explications , descriptions and normativities in philosophical discourses which are different from them apart as in everyday communication. According to his thesis, only their different distinction enables figures of thought in which unproblematic discourse links simultaneously confirm the unity of philosophy procedurally. These legitimate links are not only contrasted with descriptive, normative and explicative confusions (ambiguities) from the normative point of view of the ability to consensus. He understands these confusions as the effects of confusion or confusion, which are often the basis of controversial debates (in philosophy as well as in politics, for example) that end in dissent.

Mixing of discourse is widespread: The phenomenological program , which claims to describe the phenomena as an explication, is a systematic misunderstanding. The identification of factual and normative in the form of a transformation of actual sentences into target sentences in many ethics and moral drafts is another. Such a confusion could arise not only in the methodical implementation of a philosophical problem, but also in the thematization of discourse subjects. Schnädelbach describes various forms of confusion of discourse, also in important philosophical traditions, and by determining the systematic location of discursive philosophy wants to provide an internal criterion that enables understandable distinctions.

Normativity and Orientation

Critique of Critical Theory and Habermas

At first Schnädelbach moved in the area of critical social theory (by Max Horkheimer , Theodor W. Adorno and others) with its demarcation from positivism . In his 1971 work Experience, Justification and Reflection. Essay on positivism but he lifted next to the criticism of its normative deficits his strong points and joined Habermas ' critique of Critical Theory at. Schnädelbach also moved away from the claim of critical theory to make a scientific social criticism. He was referring to Max Weber . With his accusation of confusing discourse, he goes beyond Habermas, who pursues a further development or transformation, in his demarcation from critical theory. However, he always remained in their context by examining the theoretical references of their representatives and contemporaries in terms of moral theory (by Adorno, Horkheimer, Sartre and others) and making normative-ethical twists and turns. In 1989 he postulated that the dialectic of the Enlightenment was current only as a negative one, but otherwise the history of philosophy, which had its renaissance as a life-philosophical cultural criticism , not least because of poststructuralism .

Schnädelbach published a review on Habermas' theory of communicative action in 1982. He grants the communicative type of rationality a primacy with regard to the level of justification, which Habermas developed with regard to empirical connectivity. According to Schnädelbach, it is the prejudice of those who describe and evaluate the reasons that prevented an internally deducible connection between this description and evaluation. As a result, the burden of justifying a normative social theory shifts to Habermas' theory of the relationship between communicative action and the lifeworld, especially since the latter is, according to Habermas, the common background knowledge (and the connection point of the theory of action). But according to Schnädelbach, there is also a connection to the first person in the research community (or that of the descriptive and assessing researcher) with his or her previous convictions and thus a “never quite objectifiable a priori”. However, the two-tier social concept of Haberma's main work (that theory of communicative action ) can be justified with the type difference between purposeful and communicative action.

In his essay “Rationality and Normativity” Schnädelbach first clarifies ambiguities of “rational” in order to prove its normative indifference (without excluding the possibility that “the cognitivism of the theory of rationality can perhaps be corrected by integrating emotive and voluntative elements”); so that one is then ultimately thrown back to preferences and decisions of a certain way of life. In dealing with the questions of what should I do in a systematic and understandable way, our respective self-evident principles and orientations must always be questioned.

Values ​​and valuations

Against this background it becomes clear that a methodical-rational Enlightenment, as Schnädelbach understands it, not only critically (with the modern, especially the Kantian Enlightenment tradition) and grammatically (with the language-analytical, especially the language-pragmatic communication tradition), but also normatively is (by means of his own distinction theory following all of the above, but also ethical traditions, especially the socio-philosophical environment in Frankfurt); whereby the normative enlightenment, if it is scientifically supported, results in Schnädelbach's practical understanding of contemporary ethics. All three moments of clarification can be seen in his contributions regarding our values .

“Suddenly, the standards and criteria according to which we find things good, value them and prefer them to others, appear as metaphysical large objects that supposedly exist or apply independently of us and that make us responsible; no wonder that ideologues try to get hold of them and speak on their behalf. Behind this facade disappears the fact that the values ​​in truth represent our own preferences and decisions, for which we are not only responsible for ourselves, but also have to critically review in changed situations; there is no instance that can exonerate us. "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

In the "Practical Philosophy" there is a critical examination of decisions and of preferences that work in the background in ethics , political philosophy, legal and social philosophy, to name just the most popular headings. Schnädelbach's claim to scientific quality is also fulfilled in the neutrality of not committing to the result of an examination in advance, as well as in the evidence procedure for general validity or objectivity.

In his contribution “Values ​​and Values” (2001) Schnädelbach aims at the objectivity of values, which are often discussed in different situations. For this purpose, the practical philosopher needs a set of grammatical concepts that Schnädelbach expands in this essay, for example purpose / value; Values ​​/ valuations; Ratings / ratings; Assessments / judgments; general / necessary; descriptive / normative / evaluative; objective / subjective; intersubjective / private; Term / rule; Sense of communication / sense of action as well as ideology-critical / ontological / grammatical arguments (only the latter are explained with subject-specific philosophical requirements). In addition to these distinctions, he summarizes essential currents of practical philosophy according to Nietzsche (e.g. Neo-Kantians, value phenomenologists and critical theory) without being in need of (moral or ethical) partisanship, and he places them in the context of today's value-language use .

Here Schnädelbach proves that values ​​are not objects (just as the term 'human' is not human and being red is not red, so 'justice' is not itself fair), but only rules of evaluative language use. “By“ objectivity ”of values ​​we can only understand the intersubjective validity of these rules and the preferences that encompass them,” such as the (non-judgmental) decision of the constitutional body regarding the position of human dignity and rights (ordered according to preferences). The corresponding expression in the Basic Law creates a “bridge between the evaluative and the normative”. With regard to the normative area of ​​the private with its everyday quarrels, Schnädelbach only adds the statement that no (legal) regulation or standardization is necessary here. He justifies this by pointing out that only the respective "consensus on the rules of consensus building" is sufficient and indispensable.

He also describes the connection to an intersubjective (not just conventional) validity of language rules as cultural validity. It can not be traced back to the factual or “natural” or mixed up with it (for example with regard to the role of the sexes) because there is no natural validity, nature is mute.

History, culture, language and knowledge

Back and forth in the new holism

History and interpretation

Philosophy of history, criticism of historicism and history of philosophy

Like the philosopher David Hume , Schnädelbach is an anti-traditionalist with tradition - in the sense of an active preservation of history, but actually only with reference to its present value. Despite or because of this paradoxical relationship to history, Schnädelbach is the author of two books that became reference works at home and abroad for the historical period 1831–1933: one on the philosophy of history and another on the history of German philosophy.

Schnädelbach first published in 1974 with the philosophy of history based on Hegel. The problems of historicism a rehabilitation and simultaneous criticism of historicism , which is mostly perceived as reactionary, but after Hegel initially had an enlightening effect (as an enlightenment of the Enlightenment and also against Hegel's system of world history, which was tied to his concept of freedom) . Historicism is defined by him as an attitude of mind which understands all cultural phenomena as historical and thematizes from the point of view of understanding. Historicism is still problematic because of its "secret positivism" with its belief in the laws of history and its restriction to narration with a paradox of theoretical hostility to theory. The book describes an abundance of historical-philosophical aporias , most of which can be traced back to the limitations of historical-philosophical concepts. The thought figure “Every epoch is directly to God” does not even allow the kind of political positivism that historicism asserts politically. According to this approach, normative claims of criticism would only be given in an ideological sense. From this it becomes clear that on this basis any legal system would not really be justified, but only set (a relapse on pre-modern models of authority). How is history still possible then? Since Hegel's path failed, the only way left open was to tread empirical-narrative concepts and open them to comparative theories.

According to Schnädelbach, the teaching of the history of philosophy becomes tangible and useful for the present based on a thematic orientation. Consequently, he organized the book Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933, which was published in 1983, also translated several times and provided with an epoch sketch, according to the following topics: history, science, understanding, values, being and people.

Hermeneutics and Hermeneuticus disease

Schnädelbach ties in with Hans-Georg Gadamer and the hermeneutic tradition several times . So he argues for a hermeneutical and critical theory of rationality without fundamentalism . Nevertheless, philosophy should not be limited to the competent interpretation of classical philosophical texts. In his pamphlet “Morbus Hermeneuticus. Theses about a hermeneutic illness ” (1981) he tries to relativize the universal claims of hermeneutics. “The hermeneutic disease consists in the philologization of philosophy, and after a short analytical pause it spreads again”, whereby one of its symptoms is the conviction “that philosophizing consists in reading the works of philosophers”, which then “independently philosophical [e] “replace thinking. According to Schnädelbach, this disease, which could infect any philosopher, has its focus in hermeneutic ontology. This consists in the view that philosophizing consists in the way of our “being to text” ( Odo Marquard ) and that this “text” is already completely delimited by the great philosophy. The reduction of hermeneutics to a philologization of philosophizing turns "the means into ends and the medium into the content of philosophizing".

Culture

"Culture and Culture Criticism" (1992)

Schnädelbach's explicit plea also includes a critical philosophy of culture. Just as the analytical philosophy passed into a new holism with Quine, the concept of culture is not only general and formalized, but also neutralized to such an extent that it is unable to establish a connection between culture and criticism. So instead of going from culture to criticism of reason (e.g. Adorno ), the path must be taken in the opposite direction.

“Even premodern cultures know cultural criticism - think of the Old Testament prophets, Lao Tzu or Buddha ; therefore the fact of reflexivity does not constitute the modernity of cultures. Cultures are only modern when the cultural criticism in them is no longer based on mythical, religious or transcendent authorities, but has gained the awareness that the criteria and standards it follows must be justified in the culture-critical discourse itself [...] . "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

The question that follows is: Which standards are justified? Schnädelbach discusses their contradictions based on modern cultural criticism. Nature is not a suitable yardstick, since one could use it to argue for the rights of the stronger, against the severely disabled and for the equality of women. Jean-Jacques Rousseau makes a (paradox-solving) counter-calculation with the alienation model, but only Kant would recognize that “the appeal to natural facts in man is incompatible with the thesis of free will”. Schnädelbach points to the aporias of culture-internal concepts ( civilization , civilization , two cultures, modernization , lifeworld ) and totalitarian concepts ( life , superstructure, the cultural whole, society ). Nevertheless, it remains mission critical cultural philosophy, the natural dogmatism off and the relativistic skepticism a zugrenzen, because with the latter - ethically turned - one could torture or child labor in a not criticize world culture. Schnädelbach's remaining, formal and at the same time technical and democratic standard is again the reference to reason and the theory of rationality, since no essentialist, substantial or objectivist standard would be justified. With another reference - but again turned ethically - Schnädelbach pointedly emphasizes the task of the philosophy of history.

"History as Cultural Evolution" (2002/2004)
Herbert Schnädelbach 2007.

In “History as Cultural Evolution” Schnädelbach takes up a discussion between Luhmann and Habermas on the relationship between evolution and history, whereby the term cultural now bears the theoretical construction that characterizes the peculiarity of the historical: history as cultural evolution. First he argues with Kant against the interpretation of history as a “natural process” “according to an agreed plan, as a whole” (Schnädelbach: “be it of God, of foresight, of fate or of humanity”); Instead, there is “purely“ cultural ”that can only be represented in an evolutionary manner: for example the“ development ”of steam locomotives and their“ extinction ””.

Evolution, with the elements of tradition , variation and selection, is a neutral "name for a model of the systematization of information about the past that was developed only historically by chance in biology - by Darwin ." According to Schnädelbach, cultural evolution is a second level of reflexivity, in which man can relate to his nature and tradition. With Schopenhauer , Marx and Nietzsche , their influence on the 20th century and their experiences, one has to admit that intent and success seldom coincide, but the reason for this is “not the irrationality of action itself, but the fact that we there are many and that is why there are many who try to act rationally. ”But if stories are not what you do but what happens to you, then the historical cannot be explained or interpreted according to the scheme of individual rationality of action become. What remains is a narrative, analytical historicism in which the natural can be historical and the historical natural, because evolution "is not a mere fact of nature, but [...] can be applied equally to the natural as to the" cultural "".

From Schnädelbach's perspective, no making or production of future history is possible, but a connection between the sense of action and communication of the historical as an opportunity and burden of a principally intentional controllability of cultural evolution. Schnädelbach draws a sharp distinction between the objective-narrative constitution of the past, which - as the historian's task - is measured by "the resistance of historical material to any classification and assignment" (here lies the historian's task), and historical responsibility, which - related to the production of the future - must be oriented completely differently (namely primarily on "moral and political convictions").

(Post-) analytical philosophy as a philosophy of language

language

"Analytical and Post-Analytical Philosophy" (2004)

Schnädelbach divides the analytical philosophy into three elements. The time of logical atomism followed by logical empiricism. Both have exhausted themselves in their differentiation and are therefore no longer accessible as a program today.

Schnädelbach's thesis is that the third element of analytic philosophy, the analytic philosophy of language, represents the only viable path in this tradition, because the critique of meaning (via the meaningfulness of our terms) takes precedence over the critique of knowledge. Already in 1977, in reflection and discourse - in the distinctive distinction of descriptive, explicative and normative discourses and his theory of discourse mixing - Schnädelbach showed this, with which the rationality debates of the 1980s their understanding of philosophy as discourse (instead of a philosophy of different styles and philosophers) has been anticipated. If one joins the mentalistic paradigm (of Descartes and also Kant) with the language-analytical one (which was initiated above all by Russell and Moore and of Wittgenstein's pragmatic turn, Quine's Two Dogmas , Davidson's On the very Idea of ​​a Conceptual Scheme and many others was developed), then follows after Schnädelbach "the maxim to pick up in the context of critical philosophizing all philosophical questions of substance, first of its grammatical broadly aspect forth to be sure that we are not dealing with linguistic license, ie by linguistic Selbstmißverständnisse generated pseudo problems, have to do [...] ”.

"Phenomenology and Language Analysis" (2000)

In addition to the analytical philosophy of language, phenomenology is another main direction of 20th century philosophy: “Husserl's program of a philosophy as a“ strict science ”including its history of impact on Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty , Emmanuel Levinas , Hans Lipps and many others [.. .] ”, Whereby these directions would combine complementarily in the 21st century - according to Schnädelbach's thesis . While Edmund Husserl wanted to go back to the "things themselves" "in the gown of purely descriptive» essence research «" beyond a mere symbolic understanding of the word, Ludwig Wittgenstein insists that "we can only mean something with something in one language", so that the " Essence ”lies in the grammatical rules of language use. Phenomenology, however, is hermeneutically turned in Husserl's approach and then by Martin Heidegger's being and time , so that it does not stand for a doubling of the world, but rather changes into an interpretation of the phenomena, thus becoming attractive for language analysis (in Jaakko Hintikka , Dagfinn Føllesdal et al. and to a certain extent undermine Schnädelbach's own accusation of confusing discourse (descriptives become explicative). The transcendental (Kant) or meaning-constituting (Husserl) or “black box” subjectivity can be found again today in debates such as “intentionality vs. Conventionality of speech acts ”. Schnädelbach explains that phenomena certainly describe intentions, but here, too, there are again moments of confusion of discourse. Schnädelbach conveys figures of thought through which the phenomenal, nonpropositional (or prepositional) consciousness as a complement to our linguistic competence makes us aware of the limits of this competence, whereby meaning-critical forms always remain linguistic.

Knowledge, will and nature

Knowledge and subject of knowledge

In his epistemology as what the ancients called »physics« - the knowledge of the world of recognizable things and events ", Schnädelbach advocates a grammatical approach according to which epistemology is to be understood as a theory of the forms of knowledge (perceptions, Ideas, memories, etc., which would be revealed through our use of language). His theory is thus based on the use of the language of epistemic expressions and it also gives priority to the explicative discourse in questions of knowledge.

But where do questions of validity come from in the area of ​​knowledge? Without skepticism questions of validity would obviously not be important; like Hegel, to take him seriously, convert the discourse into questions of validity. Accordingly, knowledge requires the discursive satisfaction of a skeptical subject and his skeptical intervention in the context of a discourse. The actual subject of knowledge is here not the one who justifies, but the one who accepts the justification. The explicative moment is given emphasis because it is then not about mere descriptions (how, for example, windows and doors are differentiated) or commands (normative, what should be done with them), but about explanations; So about theoretical understanding about what is no longer in doubt, but what becomes clear to the questioner when spoken with Descartes.

Schnädelbach advocates the propositionality thesis (all epistemic expressions basically require a supplement introduced by "that ...") and that it is no longer about the correspondence of intellectus and res, and certainly not about the identity of subject and object. Schnädelbach exposes the element critical of meaning and methodically distinguishes it (he asks whether sentences are usable, i.e. whether they are perhaps nonsensical and non-communicative, what pragmatic function they have, etc.), whereby the term transcendental is a moment of discussion against metadiscourses. Epistemology is, on the one hand, a philosophical business that, on the other hand, is also empirically researched through numerous disciplines ( cognitive science , evolutionary epistemology , sociology of knowledge ), both complement each other, but the former (a) does not presuppose the possibility of knowledge like the latter, (b) therefore separate it Also know of "opinion and mental confusion" and (c) keep the first person singular and plural perspective. With this perspective Schnädelbach rehabilitates the cognitive subject, however, strictly speaking, it does not refer to cognitive subjects as such, but to their subjectivity, that is, to the structure of conditions that Kant already understood as that which the cognitive subjects themselves always bring into play (and that in the The third person's observation perspective would remain unconsidered), while the objectivity of knowledge denotes the “claim of our knowledge” to “represent something as it actually is - regardless of our preconceptions and prejudices”.

Schnädelbach's epistemology, which is a fallibilistic one, shows central elements of the “postmodern”, namely procedural cognitive processes, an open future of what cannot be definitively determined and a truth that is not at the mercy of finality. The civilizing element of his epistemology and discourse theory is postmodern in this sense, as it still turns out to be future after the questions of validity have been fully satisfied: Truth is discursive and always only provisionally closed (it remains fallible like knowledge).

Free will and criticism of naturalism

In the long-standing contemporary debates on naturalism and free will , Schnädelbach is not an authoritative representative of one direction. With the modest-sounding essay “Assumptions about freedom of will”, he published a contribution in 1980 that increased the complexity of a debate that has since gone through further stages of development. He argues for an entanglement of spirit and nature by means of a causal effectiveness of rationality and he sees himself confirmed in this by Daniel C. Dennett's Elbow Room , chap. 11, and Ernst Tugendhat's “The Concept of Free Will” (1987). Rationality appears as a faculty between determination and action, which does not make us responsible for responsibility, but after the acquisition of rationality competence - ethically applied - it does make us responsible for our actions and our character.

It becomes complex here, among other things, because Schnädelbach introduces the reflexive split that George Herbert Mead creates with “I am me” (I act and know that I act) as a genre competence in the free will debate, as an empirically independent one Relationship to ourselves (we can also be in chains) and thus as a condition of possibility - not just transcendentally or empirically, but precisely performative-pragmatic (a transcendental theoretical transfer of the Kantian ego, which must be able to accompany us , into a pragmatics of interaction or decision-making).

In the naturalism debate and also in the philosophy of mind Schnädelbach develops the position that normative terms cannot be translated empirically (and vice versa ). Schnädelbach describes the various forms of naturalism in the essay “Naturalism” together with Geert Keil , with whom he generally advocates “that a lot of what is called naturalism does not deserve this name, while that which deserves it does not deserve to be represented . ”Because naturalism thrives on keeping nature and forms of the mind as two distinct moments. But apparently it is always the same thing on a vertical level, because we would not perceive natural phenomena without spiritual constructions of meaning.

Criticism of religion

Schnädelbach with Franz-Josef Overbeck 2008

"The Curse of Christianity"

Schnädelbach sparked a debate about Christianity with an article in the newspaper Die Zeit in 2000 . Schnädelbach names seven birth defects of Christianity: original sin , justification as a bloody legal trade, missionary orders , Christian anti-Judaism , Christian eschatology , the import of Platonism and dealing with historical truth. Once Christianity has left its seven birth defects behind, there will be almost nothing left of it; above all, it would then hardly be possible to distinguish it from enlightened Judaism . Anything that is good in Christianity is Jewish anyway.

According to Schnädelbach, an atheist cannot actually be against God because he would have to assume God to do so. There are denominational atheists who believe something about God (namely, “ I believe that God does not exist”) and those who are merely indifferent (“ I do not believe that God exists”). The latter are either " pious atheists" because they express regret (because without religion they would miss an order or perhaps a childlike need for security) or they have no interest in the subject. In the context of location discussions, Schnädelbach acknowledges a philosophically reflected indifference. He identifies himself with what he calls pious atheism , albeit less because of regret, but rather because religious or transcendent questions are posed to him, which, however, are neither answered for him nor generally with God .

Religion as an educational stock

Schnädelbach contradicts the view that religions as the basis of values ​​and morality should have priority.

“Anyone who claims that if people do not believe in God, then morality is bottomless, is historically and philosophically illiterate. We have known since Aristotle that practical philosophy, which is concerned with questions of justice and a good, successful life, stands on its own two feet. "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

Religion, however, is an “educational stock”. One often has to know the Bible in order to understand our world of literature and images. Christianity contributed to modern development, the theology of Christianity helped to advance the Enlightenment . With regard to the spiritual values ​​of Western civilization, however, not only the Christian religion, but also, for example, the Jewish tradition and the development of philosophy in Europe that has been taking place since antiquity were constitutive. When deciding on moral questions, one can trust with Kant that reason justifies itself, and renouncing God could, to speak with Horkheimer , trigger solidarity among people. This trust is his own in a very broad sense of the term religion (which as a rule should be defined more narrowly).

Why Hegel?

Schnädelbach considers Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's “speculative basic figure” of a unity of unity and multiplicity or of the whole and its parts to be ultimately incomprehensible. According to Hegel, the true is the whole, which can only be thought of as a unity of itself with its opposite.

“This speaks of dialectics, because the true one as the unity of itself and the different, as identity and non-identity - that boils down to the antinomy of a union of true and false in the place of truth, which Kant as the index of false , But Hegel saw it as the speculative noon of life . "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

For Schnädelbach, a standpoint of absolute knowledge is a relapse behind the Kantian insights of a critical philosophy of finite reason. In his inaugural address “Hegel's Doctrine of Truth” at Humboldt University, Schnädelbach explained in 1993 that Hegel's “The true is the whole” for this one singular, the absolute, the truth, a concrete object, the unity of itself with its opposite and also represent God - that is, truth does not denote a mere respective validity claim. However, Schnädelbach argues, the latter should be represented on the basis of the finiteness of reason, not as pluralism, but as "that which makes plurality possible: the communicative unity of reason". At the end of his speech Schnädelbach turned this again ethically (along with an acknowledgment of the interpretation of Christianity, which understands peace as a human matter): “Thus the unity of reason itself refers to the idea of ​​peace and thus an ethic of solidarity among finite, at the same time natural and historical, otherwise reasonable living beings. This would not be enough for Hegel, but it should be enough for us. "

With “Why Hegel?” In 1998 Schnädelbach sparked a debate that was initially conducted at the Humboldt University (with Gerd Irrlitz, Volker Gerhardt and others) and which then spread. In his reply, Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer formulated the question in a negative way in order to "Forget Hegel!" Schnädelbach turned against university employment with Hegel, as long as they only served the "ancestral care" and not the present. Only the critical handling of Hegel (as one should not do it) is justifiable and instructive: “If only the whole is true, then it cannot have the wrong outside of it; so we have to think of truth as a true unity of truth and falsehood - but can we understand such a thing at all? "

Schnädelbach later published a three-volume Hegel commentary, his authorship there and an introduction to Hegel on this topic again. He emphasizes the extraordinary importance of Hegel, who presented the most ambitious, most complex and perhaps also the most instructive of all (rational) philosophies. His aim is to consistently develop Hegel's basic speculative figure, the identity of identity and non-identity, and in this way to open up the entire Hegelian system in a logically comprehensible manner. Without speculation, there is no way into Hegel's system structure. In addition to this philosophical approach, Schnädelbach also offers a shortened, overview-oriented approach (from the perspective of idealism ):

" Hegel's philosophy differs from Fichte and Schelling only in that he does not stop at the punctual evocation of absolute consciousness, but takes the trouble to gradually demonstrate the presence of the absolute in the forms of finite consciousness itself, which can only succeed, however, if you already assume that the absolute is always present in consciousness - even in sensual certainty. "

- Herbert Schnädelbach

The attached point of the premise is Schnädelbach's core argument against Hegel. Instead of starting with finite consciousness like Kant (more inductively), with Hegel (more deductively) everything must already be in “holistic consciousness”, which thus resembles Leibniz's monad - namely “without doors and windows”. In the second volume of commentaries on Hegel's practical philosophy (2000), Schnädelbach attributes several ethical phrases to this. The Hegelian philosophy had reached its “final form” in the basic lines of the Philosophy of Law (1821) with its central (istic) orientation towards the 'moral world'; for Hegel the philosophy of history was ultimately a practical philosophy and the “last comprehensive one “ Philosophia practica universalis .

Fonts

  • 1966 Hegel's theory of subjective freedom. Dissertation, Frankfurt a. M.
  • 1968 "What is ideology? An attempt to clarify the concept." In: The evangelical educator. 20th
  • 1971 "On the problem of decidability in the Kantian ethics." In: N. Niebel, D. Leisgang (Ed.): Philosophy as relational science . Frankfurt a. M.
  • 1971 experience, reasoning and reflection. Try on Positivism. Habilitation thesis, Frankfurt a. M.
  • 1974 philosophy of history according to Hegel. The problems of historicism. Freiburg u. Munich.
  • 1977 reflection and discourse. Questions of a logic of philosophy. Frankfurt a. M.
  • 1980 "Is Technology Ethically Neutral?" In: Melvin Kranzberg (Ed.): Ethics in an Age of Pervasive Technology. Boulder.
  • 1982 "Transformation of critical theory. On Jürgen Haberma's theory of communicative action." In: Philosophical Review. 1982 (reprinted inter alia in: Vernunft und Geschichte. 1987, and as The Transformation of Critical Theory: Jürgen Habermas' The Theory of Communicative Action '. In: A. Honneth, H. Joas: Communicative Action: Essays on Jürgen Habermas' `` The Theory of Communicative Action ', Cambridge MA 1991).
  • 1983 Philosophy in Germany 1831-1933. Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3518280010 .
  • 1984 rationality. Philosophical contributions. (Ed.), Frankfurt a. M.
  • 1985 philosophy. A basic course (edited with Ekkehard Martens ) since 1991 in two volumes, 2003: 7th revised edition, Hamburg.
  • 1986 What is Neo-Aristotelianism? In: W. Kuhlmann (Ed.): Morality and Morality. Hegel's Problem and Discourse Ethics. Frankfurt a. M. (reprinted, inter alia, in the second volume of essays, ibid. 1992, inter alia as: What is Neo-Aristotelianism? In: PRAXIS International. 7, no. 3 + 4, 1987).
  • 1987 Reason and History. Lectures and papers (1), Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3518282830 .
  • 1992 For the rehabilitation of the "animal rationale". Lectures and papers 2, Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3518286432 .
  • 1998 "Rationality Types" and "Replik" In: Ethics and Social Sciences. 9 (the article is reprinted in Philosophy in Modern Culture. 2000).
  • 1999 "Critical Theory? Tasks of Critical Philosophy Today." In: Hans Albert , Roland Simon-Schäfer , Herbert Schnädelbach: Renaissance of social criticism. Bamberg.
  • 1999 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel for an introduction. Hamburg. ISBN 978-3-88506-352-0 .
  • 2000 Hegel's Philosophy - Comments on the Major Works. (Ed.) 3 volumes, 1339 pages, Frankfurt a. M.
  • 2000 Hegel's practical philosophy. A commentary on the texts in the order in which they were created (Volume 2 of the Commentaries on the Major Works ), Frankfurt a. M.
  • 2000 naturalism. Philosophical contributions. (Ed. With Geert Keil ), Frankfurt a. M.
  • 2000 Philosophy in Modern Culture. Lectures and papers 3, Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3518290651 . ( Review ).
  • 2000 Descartes in the Discourse of Modern Times. (Ed. With Wilhelm Friedrich Niebel and Angelica Horn), Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3-518-29036-1 .
  • 2000 in the features section: “The curse of Christianity. The seven birth defects of an old world religion. A cultural balance sheet after two thousand years ”and“ Poor Christianity! Preliminary closing words to a heated debate ”(see below).
  • 2002 introduction to epistemology. Hamburg. ISBN 978-3-88506-368-1 .
  • 2004 Analytical and Post-Analytical Philosophy. Lectures and papers 4, Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3518292907 . ( Review ).
  • 2005 Kant. Leipzig.
  • 2006 "Enlightenment and Criticism of Religion." In: German magazine for philosophy. 54.
  • 2007 common sense. Leipzig. ISBN 978-3150203170 .
  • 2008 "Explaining and Understanding - Two Worlds of Science?" In: Gottfried Magerl, Heinrich Schmidinger (Hrsg.): Unity and freedom of science. Idea and reality. Vienna / Cologne / Weimar.
  • 2009 What can we know, what should we do ?: Twelve philosophical answers. (Ed. With Heiner Hastedt and Geert Keil), Hamburg. ISBN 978-3499557040 .
  • 2009 Religion in the Modern World. Lectures, papers, pamphlets. Frankfurt a. M. ISBN 978-3-596-18360-9 . ( Review ).
  • 2012 What philosophers know and what can be learned from them . Munich. ISBN 978-3-406-63360-7 .

"Writings by Herbert Schnädelbach. 1966-1995." In: S. Dietz et al. (Ed.): Orientate oneself in thinking - For Herbert Schnädelbach. (Frankfurt am Main, 1996. ISBN 978-3-518-28853-5 ) Festschrift from 1996 (bibliography not completely complete, but with 94 sorted and listed publications the most extensive compilation to date).

Texts and interviews on the web and in other media

So what do the philosophers even know?

  • The philosophical radio. Moderation: Jürgen Wiebicke, WDR 5, October 26, 2012, 20.05 - 21.00.

Discourse, conversation and Hegel

Religion / criticism and modern culture

Devout atheism

  • Broadcast “Das Philosophische Radio” The philosophical radio with Herbert Schnädelbach about atheism , by Jürgen Wiebicke, WDR August 29, 2008.
  • “Aesthetic quality of experience” , Interview by P. Riesbeck, In: Berliner Zeitung. March 20, 2008.

"The Curse of Christianity" (2000)

Web links

Individual evidence

  1. ↑ Scobel at 3sat, broadcast on November 26, 2009
  2. ↑ See Herbert Schnädelbach, G. Keil (Ed.), Philosophy of the Present. Presence of philosophy . Junius, Hamburg 1993, foreword
  3. ↑ Simone Dietz , Heiner Hastedt, Geert Keil and Anke Thyen, Orientate oneself in thinking . Festschrift for Herbert Schnädelbach. Suhrkamp, ​​Frankfurt a. M. 1996, ISBN 3-518-28853-9 .
  4. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Der Fluch des Christianentums" , in: Die Zeit from May 11, 2000
  5. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Geert Keil (ed.), Philosophy of the Present. Presence of Philosophy , 1993, p. 19
  6. ↑ A. Brauer, Is God manifest - and why not? . Interview with Herbert Schnädelbach, in: Tagesspiegel from December 16, 2007
  7. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach: Philosophy of the present - the present of philosophy. 1993, p. 18f.
  8. ↑ See below “Phenomenology and Language Analysis” as a “viable philosophical (escape) path for phenomenologists of the 21st century.” Source: Herbert Schnädelbach, “The conversation of philosophy. Berlin Farewell Lecture ” [1] (PDF; 164 kB), in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004. See also Berliner Zeitung of July 18, 2002: "Don't avoid confrontations: Herbert Schnädelbach."
  9. ↑ For example from Friedrich von Graf, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung of February 21, 2008: “ Theologies suffer from a grotesque preponderance of exegetical disciplines, which, in view of the scarce stocks of holy texts, have become absurd for outsiders in philological specialization. "
  10. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, On the rehabilitation of the animal rationale . Lectures and Treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 386
  11. ↑ See Herbert Schnädelbach, Analytical and Post-Analytical Philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, p. 350. If we answer the Kantian questions about what can we understand? add, so "[...] next to the theoretical and practical we move the third world reference into the field of attention: that of communication". Herbert Schnädelbach assigns this third world reference to the theory of meaning (semantics) and logic (the latter now as a formal sub-area). See Herbert Schnädelbach, “The Conversation of Philosophy. Berlin Farewell Lecture ” [2] (PDF; 164 kB), in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004. See also Berliner Zeitung of July 18, 2002: "Don't avoid confrontations: Herbert Schnädelbach."
  12. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach: For the rehabilitation of the animal rationale. Lectures and treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, pp. 183ff.
  13. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "The Conversation of Philosophy [...]" [3] (PDF; 164 kB). Based on the Hegelian “milk bowl” and a comparison with “Hannah Arendt” s distinction between acting and making.
  14. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "The Conversation of Philosophy [...]" [4] (PDF; 164 kB), with brief reviews of Plato , Foucault and Lyotard as well as a demarcation from Luhmann's "autopoietic system" .
  15. ↑ Cf. Herbert Schnädelbach, "The conversation of philosophy [...]" [5] (PDF; 164 kB), with brief reviews of Plato and Herbert Schnädelbach, "The face in the sand. Foucault and the anthropological slumber ”in: Axel Honneth u. a. (Ed.), Interim considerations: In the Enlightenment Process , Festschrift for Jürgen Habermas, Frankfurt a. M. 1989, reprinted in Herbert Schnädelbach, second volume of articles (1992) a. in: A. Honneth et al. Philosophical Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightment , Cambridge 1992.
  16. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Reason and History. Lectures and Papers , 1987, p. 263
  17. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, On the rehabilitation of the animal rationale, 1992.
  18. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach's first two volumes of essays already contain his following essays, which he summarizes almost all of them under Sections I. Reason and History and I. Philosophy as Theory of Rationality : About the Reasonability of History (1987), About Historical Enlightenment (1979 ), On the Dialectic of Historical Reason (1981), On Irrationality and Irrationalism (1981), “Remarks on Rationality and Language” (1982), “Conjectures on Free Will” (1980/87), “Understanding something means understanding how it is meant "- Variations on a hermeneutic maxim (1987), Dialectic and Discourse (1987), Dialectic as Critique of Reason (1983), Philosophy as Theory of Rationality (1991), On Rationality and Justification (1987), Rationality and Normativity (1990) , Theses on Validity and Truth (1988), Philosophy and the Science of Man (1989), Metaphysics and Religion Today (1992), Culture and Cultural Criticism (1992). Of the contributions in the third and fourth volume of essays, which could also be assigned to the theory of rationality, only types of rationality (1998) and the limits of reason? Mentioned about a topos of philosophy (2004).
  19. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Rationality Types", main article in: Ethics and Social Sciences. Dispute forum for culture of consideration , Volume 9, Issue 1, 1998, with numerous reactions and a replica by Herbert Schnädelbach and also then in a revised form in Herbert Schnädelbach, Philosophy in modern culture . Lectures and Papers 3, 2000.
  20. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, Reflection and Discourse , Frankfurt a. M. 1977.
  21. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs , 1977, p. 137
  22. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, Reflection and Discourse , Frankfurt a. M .: Suhrkamp 1977, p. 139.
  23. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Philosophieren nach Heidegger and Adorno", in: To the rehabilitation of the animal rationale . Lectures and treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, pp. 307 ff; "Sartre and the Frankfurt School", ibid, p. 251 ff .; Herbert Schnädelbach, "Max Horkheimer and the moral philosophy of German idealism", in: Reason and History . Lectures and treatises, 1987, pp. 207 ff .; Herbert Schnädelbach, "Adorno and the story", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, p. 150 ff. The normative and normative-ethical expressions are gradually named in the following.
  24. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, The topicality of the "Dialectic of Enlightenment". In: To the rehabilitation of the animal rationale . Lectures and treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 231 ff.
  25. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Transformation of Critical Theory. On Jürgen Haberma's theory of communicative action. In: Philosophische Rundschau 1982 (reprinted in: Reason and History )
  26. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Transformation of Critical Theory. On Jürgen Haberma's theory of communicative action. In: Philosophische Rundschau 1982 (reprinted in: Reason and History )
  27. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Transformation of Critical Theory. On Jürgen Haberma's theory of communicative action. In: Philosophische Rundschau 1982 (reprinted in: Vernunft und Geschichte ). For another influential criticism of Habermas' work, see Hans Albert, “Transzendentale Träumereien. Karl-Otto Apels Sprachspiele und seine Hermeneutischer Gott ”, 1975, and also the collection of essays Critical Reason and Human Practice , 1977 (Schnädelbach joins the criticism in: Albert / Schnädelbach / Simon-Schäfer (authors and ed.), Renaissance of Social Criticism ? Return of social theory , Bamberg 1999) or essays from the Erlangen school (as a mediating position at the same time).
  28. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Transformation of Critical Theory. On Jürgen Haberma's theory of communicative action. In: Philosophische Rundschau 1982 (reprinted in: Reason and History )
  29. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Rationality and Normativity", in: To the rehabilitation of the animal rationale . Lectures and Treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, pp. 79 ff
  30. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "The Language of Values".
  31. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, Values ​​and Evaluations. In: Logos 7 (2001), 149 ff. (Reprinted in ders., Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, p. 242 ff.)
  32. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, Values ​​and Evaluations. In: Logos 7 (2001), 149 ff. (Reprinted in: Analytical and post-analytic philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, p. 242 ff.)
  33. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Values ​​and Values", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, p. 242 ff. Herbert Schnädelbach assumes that beyond legal regulations, the tolerance of privacy must begin. But with the indispensable note, the guiding principles of Luhmann's formula “legitimation through procedures” and that of Schnädelbach's demand to take responsibility for preferences and to “also critically examine them in changed situations” are repeated in them (whereby Herbert Schnädelbach with preferences also here Includes beliefs).
  34. ↑ See above, section “descriptive, normative, explicative”, and ibid., References to Moore et al. Ryle.
  35. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Philosophy as Theory of Rationality", in: To the rehabilitation of the animal rationale . Lectures and treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 41 ff.
  36. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Hermeneuticus disease. Theses on a hermeneutic disease. In: Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Philosophie 3, 1981; reprinted in: Vernunft und Geschichte . Lectures and treatises, 1987, pp. 279 ff.
  37. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, “Hermeneuticus disease. Theses about a hermeneutic disease ”, in: Reason and History . Lectures and Abhandlungen, 1987, p. 181 f .: “In schools and philosophical seminars it is also very convenient to hide behind texts as a philosopher” instead of experiencing them “as an ally in the business of self-thinking”.
  38. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Hermeneuticus disease. Theses on a hermeneutic disease. In: Reason and History . Lectures and Papers, 1987, p. 283
  39. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Culture and Culture Criticism", in: To rehabilitate the animal rationale . Lectures and Abhandlungen 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 158 ff. Revised versions of this article appeared as a "Plea for a Critical Cultural Philosophy" in Information Philosophy 4 1992 and in R. Konersmann (Ed.) Kulturphilosophie , Leipzig: Reclam 1996 ( 3rd edition 2004). These later versions first dispense with a much longer introduction, which connects Adorno's approach to cultural criticism with Marx's thesis of reification, and then in the following a series of cross-references and ideas (e.g. to Sigmund Freud , Odo Marquard , Karl Marx , Jürgen Habermas etc.), so that the earliest version must be considered the most elaborate.
  40. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Culture and Culture Criticism", in: To rehabilitate the animal rationale . Lectures and Papers 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 168
  41. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Culture and Culture Criticism", in: To rehabilitate the animal rationale . Lectures and Treatises 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 170
  42. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Culture and Culture Criticism", in: To rehabilitate the animal rationale . Lectures and Papers 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 172
  43. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Culture and Culture Criticism", in: To rehabilitate the animal rationale . Lectures and Papers 2, Volume 2, 1992, p. 180
  44. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as cultural evolution" in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004. Revised version by Herbert Schnädelbach, “Tell a story or make history? Once again about the meaning of history "first in: Culture • Action • Science, 2002. Herbert Schnädelbach himself sees a continuation, but he does not make any text references to Niklas Luhmann's" Evolution and History "and Jürgen Habermas" Geschichte und Evolution ", in: History and Society, No. 2 1976.
  45. ↑ Immanuel Kant, Idea for a General History with Cosmopolitan Intent , A 387.
  46. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and papers 4, 2004, p. 294 and p. 305, with reference to an example by Hans Poser, Wissenschaftstheorie. A philosophical introduction , Stuttgart 2001, p. 262 ff.
  47. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and papers 4, 2004, p. 295 f. The question here is whether, for Schnädelbach, evolution is “just” a radically constructed “model”.
  48. ↑ Cf. Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as cultural evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and papers 4, 2004, p. 298 f. with references to Martin Stuart Fox, Joseph Fracchia, Richard C. Lewontin and Friedrich Kambartel .
  49. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and treatises 4, 2004, pp. 286 f., With reference to Hannah Arendt's "principle of plurality".
  50. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and Papers 4, 2004, p. 300
  51. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and Papers 4, 2004, pp. 300–307
  52. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "History as Cultural Evolution", in: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and Papers 4, 2004
  53. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and Papers 4, 2004, p. 44.
  54. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, "Phenomenology and Language Analysis", in: Philosophy in modern culture . Lectures and treatises 3, 2000, p. 230 ff. With various references and a. to Ernst Tugendhat
  55. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Phenomenology and language analysis. In: Philosophy in Modern Culture . Lectures and treatises 3, 2000, p. 239 with reference to Edmund Husserl: Philosophy as strict science. Frankfurt a. M. 1911 (Reprint 1965, pp. 40, 43)
  56. ↑ Wittgenstein quotes ibid with reference to the other, Philosophical Investigations § 38 Erg.
  57. ↑ See Herbert Schnädelbach, Reflexion und Diskurs , 1977
  58. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: The conversation of philosophy [...] In: Analytical and post-analytical philosophy . Lectures and Papers 4, 2004, p. 350.
  59. ↑ See Herbert Schnädelbach: Epistemology for Introduction. Hamburg 2002, p. 33 and the like. Subjectivity epistemologically or: About the subject of knowledge. In: M. Grundmann, R. Beer (Ed.): Subject theories interdisciplinary. Münster 2003, pp. 70, 73f. reprinted in Schnädelbach 2004, p. 212 u. 216f.
  60. ↑ "About the subject of knowledge", in: M. Grundmann, R. Beer (ed.): Subject theories interdisciplinary. Münster 2003, pp. 74f. and p. 217f. In contrast to Kant, the plural is used here, especially since Herbert Schnädelbach also quotes Charles Sanders Peirce in this regard, "that one should not seek the subjectivity of knowledge in the individual, but always in the respective" community of philosophizing ""
  61. ↑ About the subject of knowledge. In: M. Grundmann, R. Beer (Ed.): Subject theories interdisciplinary. Münster 2003, p. 217.
  62. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach, Assumptions about freedom of will , 1980, and epilogue , 1987, in: Vernunft und Geschichte . Lectures and treatises, 1987, especially p. 123 f. The article combines - also with the help of 78 cross-references - virtually all aspects of the debate that has been going on to date. For more information about the next twenty years, see, for example, Peter Bieri, Das Handwerk der Freiheit , 2001; for representatives of determinism, for example, Gerhard Roth, The brain and its reality , 1994; Wolf Singer, interconnections determine us. We should stop talking about freedom , 2004.
  63. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, Assumptions about freedom of will , 1980, and “Afterword” (1987) in: Vernunft und Geschichte . Lectures and treatises, 1987, p. 118. See also Herbert Schnädelbach, “Three brains and freedom of will. Pseudo-Enlightenment in the guise of science: The newly warmed-up, ever-identical story of determinism this time in a neurophilosophical variant ”, in: Frankfurter Rundschau of May 25, 2004.
  64. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach, assumptions about freedom of will , 1980, and epilogue , 1987, In: Vernunft und Geschichte . Lectures and Papers, 1987, p. 110.
  65. ↑ See Schnädelbach / Keil, "Naturalismus" in: dies., Naturalismus, Frankfurt a. M. 2000
  66. ↑ Herbert Schnädelbach: The curse of Christianity. In: The time. May 11, 2000.
  67. ↑ P. Riesbeck: Pious Atheists . Interview with Herbert Schnädelbach, In: Berliner Zeitung. March 20, 2008.
  68. ↑ See also Herbert Schnädelbach: The pious atheist. In: New Rundschau. 118, No. 2 2007, pp. 112-119.
  69. ↑ See Schnädelbach, Hirschler: Hirschler - Schnädelbach: Last Questions. In: Hirschler - Schnädelbach: Last Questions 01/2001 - chrismon 01/2001 ( Memento from June 18, 2010 in the Internet Archive ): “You argue with a need that we undoubtedly have. I've also experienced things in my life where I thought: Now I actually want to thank someone. Even as a child. We survived the heavy air raid on Dresden in 1945, and I have no fear. Conversely, we often have the experience that nobody is actually to blame, but I have to complain to someone or hold someone responsible. But this place is empty. You fill this place with "God" or with "something like God". So you have a cipher or symbol for it. I find it intellectually more honest to leave this place empty. ”Hirschler:“ But you don't leave it empty, you fill it your way! ”Schnädelbach:“ No, I don't. If someone can fill this place with a personal God for himself, then I have nothing against it. But no theologian can give me an answer to the question of the meaning of life. I am convinced that you have to find the answer to this question yourself. I have nothing against religiosity. But I have something against a form of religiosity that is made binding on everyone. If you tell me that I have to fill this vacancy somehow, otherwise I might have a mayfly existence, I cannot accept that. Believe me, I can live quite well with the absent God. "
  70. ↑ A. Brauer, Is God manifest - and why not? . Interview with Herbert Schnädelbach, in: Tagesspiegel from December 16, 2007
  71. ^ P. Riesbeck, Pious Atheists 'Aesthetic Experience Quality' . Interview with Herbert Schnädelbach, in: Berliner Zeitung of March 20, 2008
  72. ^ Enlightenment and criticism of religion. In: German magazine for philosophy. 54 2006; and religion and critical reason. In: Laube, Pfleiderer (ed.): The reason of religion. Protestant Aspects of a Current Controversy. In: Loccumer Protocols. 62/07, Rehburg-Loccum 2008.
  73. ^ The philosophical radio with Herbert Schnädelbach about atheism. WDR, broadcast on August 29, 2008
  74. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Hegel for an introduction. 1999, p. 14ff.
  75. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Philosophy in modern culture. Lectures and papers 3, 2000, p. 69.
  76. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Philosophy in modern culture . Lectures and papers 3, 2000, p. 85.
  77. ↑ See Primin Stekeler-Weithofer, Forget Hegel !. In: Information Philosophy Vol. 5, December 2000, pp. 70–75: “Anyone who rejects their own cultural tradition as a whole as outdated replaces self-consciousness with self-provincialization. Here, too, the responsibility rests with the interpreter himself, namely in our current dispute between attitudes towards tradition and the present. I wholeheartedly agree that we should forget Schnadelbach's Hegel, the contradictory and presumptuous, theological, progressive and democratic criticism. At the same time, however, the thesis that Hegel Schnädelbach or that of any other reader is the true Hegel must be forgotten. "
  78. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Philosophy in modern culture. Lectures and papers 3 , 2000, p. 73
  79. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Hegel for an introduction. , 1999, p. 158 with a cross-reference to Plato's Menon
  80. ^ Herbert Schnädelbach: Again: Hegel for an introduction. In: Hegel for an introduction. 1999, fn. 157.
personal data
SURNAME Schnädelbach, Herbert
BRIEF DESCRIPTION German philosopher
DATE OF BIRTH August 6, 1936
PLACE OF BIRTH Altenburg , Thuringia